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ART. I.—CATHOLICISM AND MR. W. H. MALLOCK.

1. *The Nineteenth Century*. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co.
2. *The Contemporary Review*. London: Strahan and Co., Limited.

MANY readers, both Catholic and non-Catholic, have been considerably struck by a series of papers on matters connected with the groundwork of religion and morality, which have appeared during the last two years in the *Contemporary Review* and in the *Nineteenth Century*. The style of these essays is easy, lucid, varied and attractive. Their subjects are the existence of God, the possibility of morality, the responsibility of man, and the proof of a supernatural order. The writer, Mr. W. H. Mallock, has published at least one other work besides the papers in question, and that work has not failed to attract attention. The fact that he has been able to arouse the interest of the reading public, not to say the thinking public, in the abstruse discussions which he has taken up, is a proof that he has no common power of thought and of exposition.

But the circumstance which has most decisively differentiated Mr. Mallock's lucubrations from those of other contemporary "apologists" is, that he has not hesitated to point to Catholicism as not only the sole form of religious opinion which is worth discussing, but as offering a reasonable and a highly consistent solution of all the chief problems of religion and morality. His advocacy of Catholicism is marked by great ability, and not unfrequently gives occasion for passages of great beauty and feeling, and, what is more strange, it is characterised by a singularly intimate and appreciative knowledge of Catholic teaching. It is no wonder if his opponents have set him down as a Catholic himself. To set down Mr. Mallock as a Catholic was equivalent to closing the discussion. On the other hand, Mr. Mallock has

lately declared, most unmistakeably, that he is not a Catholic, but a sceptical looker-on. And Catholics, who do not believe in any infallibility save that of Church and Pontiff, are wary and cautious in accepting the services of a champion whose principles do not hinder him from turning round upon them at any moment. A sceptic, even when he argues for the truth, is a man to be feared. Yet his arguments may be very good, for all that. And it may be here at once admitted that many of the pages in which this writer explains and vindicates the doctrines and practices of the Catholic faith, are not only admirably adapted to open the eyes of the general non-Catholic reader, but may with profit and advantage be studied as models of exposition by Catholics themselves.

To draw attention to Mr. Mallock's now completed series of papers will at once help us to understand better one or two of these most pressing and important matters on which he argues, and enable us to see how far he can be accepted by Catholics as an auxiliary in the never-ceasing battle of the kingdom of truth against the power of this world.

It will not be needful to take Mr. Mallock's papers one after another in chronological order. It will be better to follow him in his different subjects, than to give an exact account of their sequence in his writings. It may be mentioned, however, that the essays, on which the remarks which are to follow will be grounded, are seven in number, and that the first, entitled "Modern Atheism: its Attitude towards Morality," appeared in the *Contemporary Review* for January, 1877, whilst the latest, called the "Logic of Toleration," was printed in the *Nineteenth Century* for January of the present year.\*

The discussion, or exposition, which is conducted in the papers here indicated, is marked by a great unity of thought. It is true that the writer addresses at one time mere Atheists, at another professional Agnostics, and at another those who believe in the existence of God and the responsibility of man. But his argument is one organic whole. It has root and trunk and branches; but it is one tree. It may be stated under three heads; and if we are a little formal and professorial in stating Mr. Mallock's theses, it is because we are more anxious, just now, to do justice

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\* It may be useful to give a complete list of the articles of the series we are to consider, with the dates of their appearance: 1. "Modern Atheism: its Attitude towards Morality" (*Contemporary Review*, January, 1877). 2. "Is Life worth Living?" (I.) (*Nineteenth Century*, September, 1877). 3. "Is Life worth Living?" (II.) (*Nineteenth Century*, January, 1878). 4. "The Future of Faith" (*Contemporary Review*, March, 1878). 5. "Faith and Verification" (*Nineteenth Century*, October, 1878). 6. "Dogma, Reason, and Morality" (*Nineteenth Century*, December, 1878). 7. "The Logic of Toleration" (*Nineteenth Century*, January, 1879).



to his own thoughts that to comment upon them. We take it, then, that he tries to show: 1. That Agnosticism means the disappearance of morality; or, that morality implies God. 2. That the "proof" of a God is utterly unaffected by science. 3. That Catholicism, the great and only considerable visible embodiment of consistent Theism, is completely untouched by any objections brought against her by science or by common sense.

1. *Agnosticism means the disappearance of morality. Morality implies God.*

If any inquirer ask what is the difference between Agnosticism and Atheism, the answer must be that there is very little. Atheism means the assertion that there is no God; Agnosticism means the assertion that you do not know, and no one else knows, whether there be a God or not. But it seems to be the wish of the prominent non-theistic writers of our own day to be called Agnostics, and not Atheists. One reason for this is, no doubt, that the word Atheism has certain unsavoury associations which are not such as to prepossess men in favour of those who adopt it. The common feeling of ordinary people, when they hear of an Atheist, is that he is not only an unbeliever, but an evil-doer; a man who, perhaps, rather scoffs than misbelieves, and only pretends to doubt that he may the more freely follow his lower appetites.

The "Atheism" of the present hour is respectable, and even solemn. It is distinguished by a painful sensitiveness to any disrespect for facts, and by an exalted and sometimes even tearful appreciation of the "holiness" and "beauty" of things in general. How much these invocations of the spirit of morality are worth will be presently seen. Meanwhile, in a late paper by Professor Tyndall,\* we have the portrait of an Agnostic drawn by his own hand. He says he is not an Atheist, and he is not a Materialist. His position is that he does not know. He does not reject God, or the soul, or the view that consciousness implies something above and beyond matter. But he wants some one to prove these things for him. Meanwhile, he rests, and awaits light. Having exhausted physics and "reached its very rim," a mighty mystery, he confesses, still looms beyond him. No step has been made towards its solution. Professor Tyndall began his life as a "believer;" that is, he was brought up in certain Christian traditions still lingering in Scotland, and he accepted them, not because any authoritative teacher enjoined him to accept them, but simply because certain of his neighbours or friends received them and held them. Accepting Christian teaching on such a basis as this, it was very

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\* *Nineteenth Century* for November, 1878.

natural that he should begin to doubt and to inquire almost as soon as he could think. At first he was content with attacking Catholicism, but he very soon went beyond the confines of the orthodox Protestantism in vogue where he was born. He went to Germany, incited, as it appears, by the writings of Mr. Carlyle. He wanted to inquire from German speculators what they could tell him about the aspirations and ideals of his own mind. Science, however, came in his way, and to her he devoted himself—not without hopes of learning some “ultimate” facts even from her. But, although he has had some success in science, he has never passed a step beyond science. The burden of his writings, as he says, has been “as much a recognition of the weakness of science as an assertion of its strength.” He has compared the mind of man to a musical instrument with a certain range of notes, beyond which in both directions exists “infinite silence.” Behind, above, and around us, “the real mystery of the universe lies unsolved, and, as far as we are concerned, is incapable of solution.”

The Agnostic, however, whilst he passively doubts whether there be a God, or a future, or human free-will, does not use his position as a warrant for license and evil-living. On the contrary, morality is his strong point. He is able to show the world a way to a higher morality than any “religious” system has ever reached. Religion has taught mankind to order their life with reference to a state of future reward and future punishment. This is selfishness. Agnosticism preaches benevolence, not as the Christian practices benevolence, in order to save his own soul, but simply and purely for the benefit of the human race at large. It preaches self-sacrifice and suffering; not that the heart may thereby be drawn nearer to God, but in order that there may be in the universe more order, beauty, sweetness, and purity; and the only eternal life which it admits, is the life of absorption into that universe out of which all life emerges, and the life of immortal hope, encouragement, and teaching, which a virtuous career will leave behind it for the generations which are to follow.\*

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\* The Positive or Agnostic “End of Man” is expressed by George Eliot in lines (quoted by Mr. Mallock), whose power and splendour might easily be converted to Christianity:

Oh, may I join the choir invisible  
Of those immortal dead, who live again  
In minds made better by their presence . . . .  
So to live is heaven . . . .  
To make undying music in the world,  
Breathing us beauteous order that controls  
With growing sway the growing life of man. . .  
So we inherit that sweet purity  
For which we struggled, groaned, and agonized  
With widening retrospect that bred despair. . . .

It is evident, even on a cursory glance, not only that the "ends" or motives of human actions, as here laid down, are inadequate, but that they are no "ends" at all, in the absolute sense of the word, and, therefore, that they are either erroneously stated, or else that they depend on something ulterior. Motive is very various. There is motive which is automatic, as when a sudden impending danger causes nervous and muscular contraction, resulting in the uplifting of the arm to protect the body, or the shock or shrinking of the frame. There is motive which is simply appetite, as when one is moved by hunger or by rage. Thirdly, there is motive which is rational, or (by excellence) human; when the reason apprehends what is right, good, and useful. Neglecting the first two classes of motive, we have to observe that rational motive—without the presence of which there is no such thing as morality or immorality—is either mediate or final. When I leave my house for the purpose of visiting a poor sick man, whether I *like* it or not, I do not go for the sake of that visit, or of that act of self-denial, or of that pleasant duty; but I have an ulterior motive, such as goodwill towards the sick man, ostentation or interior satisfaction. These motives, in their turn, perhaps, depend on others. If I wish well to the sick man, it may be because God wills it; if I am urged by the desire to stand well in the sight of another, it may be because I look to him for help or recompense. And it is possible that I may place my whole, complete, and final motive in any one of these things—making ostentation, selfish pleasure, or the love of God, respectively, my last end and sovereign motive. It is not to our purpose here to observe that all but one of these motives would, if made final, be a grievous breach of the moral order, or, in other words, a mortal sin. What we have to notice is, that the "motives" of the Agnostic moralist are neither mediate nor final, and are, therefore, only called motives at all by a confusion of terms. They are not

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That better self shall live till human time  
 Shall fold its eyelids, and the human sky  
 Be gathered like a scroll within the tomb,  
 Unread for ever. This is life to come,  
 Which martyred men have made more glorious  
 For us who strive to follow. May I reach  
 That purest heaven, and be to other souls  
 That cup of strength in some great agony,  
 Enkindle generous ardour, feed pure love,  
 Beget the smiles that have no cruelty,  
 Be the sweet presence of a good diffused,  
 And in diffusion ever more intense;  
 So shall I join that choir invisible,  
 Whose music is the gladness of the world.

mediate, because those who describe them do not want to find middle motives, but final motives. The whole question is about final motives, or, in other words, on the basis of morality. The inquiry is, Why is a thing, finally and adequately, right or good? But neither are they final motives. Benevolence to others cannot be a final motive, because benevolence either means vague well-wishing, or it means wishing and *procuring* good to another; in the former sense, it is not properly a motive at all, but only a sentiment which might co-exist with any kind of practical life, good or bad; in the latter, it is clear that before it exist at all, you must know what you mean by "good;" for no one can practically wish "good" to another, or procure another's good, unless he first has settled what "good" consists in. Self-sacrifice cannot be an end; what is one to sacrifice one's self for? Suffering cannot be an end; why must one suffer? Order, sweetness, beauty, and purity, are not ends at all. They only express certain ways in which *things* are arranged, or modes in which they affect our perceptions. It is not enough to say order; you must have a definite thing to arrange, and a definite arrangement. It is not enough to say sweetness. That metaphor only means the pleasure your perception receives from things; and it either denotes something absolute, outside of yourself, and therefore more "final" than itself, or else it is only a name for your own complacent selfishness. So with beauty and purity. Mr. Mallock puts this very well:—

We have here a lot of fine phrases. But what do these fine phrases mean? They may mean anything, or they may mean nothing. They name a *something*, it is true; but in the act of naming it, they shroud it in a vapour of praise. We want this vapour cleared away. We wish to see the praised *something* plainly. We want to know in detail what the phrases mean. We want them translated into terms of life and action. For it is according to the value of the exact meaning of them that the system they belong to stands or falls. We know what self-sacrifice and unselfishness mean well enough. In the world's "better self," we find no meaning but what we bring. "Beauteous order" is of course "beauteous." But we do not want it to be thus named by others; we want to be shown it, so that we may be forced so to name it ourselves. Whilst as to "undying music," we want to hear it first before we know whether its continuance would be a blessing or a torture. . . . It is the ultimate end of action we want to know about, which is quite distinct from our painful efforts to secure it. What is this precious *something*, this peculiar kind of happiness, that we ought to live for? What is that we gain by virtue and seriousness, and lose by vice and frivolity? It must be something, and it must be something definite. Else why is the moralist pleased with the serious; and why is he angry with the frivolous? He can only tell us why, by presenting to us this end of action; and by presenting it to us in such a way that we

see it to be its own justification, that we realise it to be attainable, and that we feel it to be attractive. ("Is Life worth Living?" No. I., p. 267.)

This extract shows how Mr. Mallock deals with the "phrases" of the Agnostic school. The whole of the paper from which it is taken is a most able development, illustrated by citations from eminent Agnostic writers, of the complete hollowness of such talk as we find in Professor Huxley, about "high peaks," "bright ideals," and the "good of mankind." But in the second paper, with the same title, he endeavours to pin his antagonists to a definite statement of what they really do aim at. He demonstrates with much force that their aim and object comes, in the end, to this, that the thing which makes life worth living is "the highest kind of *personal* happiness that life can be made to yield to us." And it is out of this answer, which looks at first sight very like the completest heathenism, that Mr. Mallock draws the absolute necessity of the belief in God and in religion as a condition of all morality. The way in which he does this is a good sample of the whole spirit of these interesting papers.

He notices, first of all, that there are two schools of those who hold this comprehensive moral rule; the one, in which our great physicist lay-preachers are conspicuous, solemnly affirm their personal happiness to lie in truth, purity, kindness, avoidance of sin, and those other matters which Christian preachers have treated in all Christian ages; whilst the other, somewhat more logically it would seem, frankly protest that their personal happiness is, simply, that which makes them happy, and *that* may be either the matters just mentioned, or their exact opposites. To both these schools—for on this point he classes them together—Mr. Mallock says, "Whatever you think, or assert, your personal happiness in life to be situated in, I can prove to you, as a matter of fact, that *God and Religion are in that thing.*" Let it be observed that he does not undertake to prove that a man *ought* to be a believer and a religious man in order to be happy. What he affirms is that "a certain supernatural moral judgment" has become our primary faculty; nothing is esteemed or enjoyed unless approved by such a judgment; "it mixes its voice spontaneously with every estimate we form of the world around us." In other words, what men choose and what they enjoy, Atheists or Agnostics be they ever so deeply dyed, they choose and enjoy on religious grounds. This startling thesis he proceeds to prove.

The "proof" is a series of illustrations, showing how the "supernatural sense" is always with us, and that to it is due every keener pleasure and every deeper interest that we at present find in life. The first illustration is taken from Art, which is the quintessence of all life, deriving all its meaning from life; and the special walk of Art selected is Drama.

Let us turn to Sophocles, to Shakspeare, and to Goethe, and consider some of their greatest plays, and how they present life to us. If we do this, it will need but little thought to show us that all these are addressed primarily to the supernatural moral judgment; that this judgment is perpetually being expressed explicitly in the plays themselves; and still more, that it is always presupposed in us. . . . In *Macbeth*, for instance . . . in what does the real tragedy lie? Not in the fact that Duncan is murdered, but that Macbeth is the murderer. What appals us, what purges our passions with pity and with terror as we contemplate it, is not the external, the social effect of it. . . . We see in *Hamlet* precisely the same thing. The action that our interest centres in is the hero's struggle to conform to an internal personal standard of right, utterly irrespective of use to others and of natural happiness to himself. . . . We should have been indignant with him if . . . instead of sacrificing social happiness for the sake of personal right, he had abandoned personal right for the sake of social happiness. In *Antigone*, again, we have an explicit statement of the supernatural moral axiom in which that whole marvellous tragedy rests—that the one rule we are to live by, and not to live by only, but to die for, is no human rule, no standard of our own, nor can it be altered by what will make either ourselves or others happy. . . . Would we see the matter pushed to a yet narrower issue, let us turn to *Measure for Measure* and to *Faust*. In both these plays we can see at once that one moral judgment, not to name others, is presupposed before all things. This is a hard and fixed judgment with regard to female chastity and the supernatural value of it. . . . It will thus be seen that the supernatural moral judgment is, the first faculty in us that art appeals to. . . . Nor is this true of sublime and serious art only. It is true of cynical and profligate as well. It is true of Congreve as it is true of Sophocles. The supernatural moral judgment is essential to the character of the libertine as it is to the character of the saint. . . . For profligacy is not merely the gratification of the appetites, but the gratification of these at the expense of something else. ("Is Life worth Living?" No. II., pp. 176-9.)

A second proof of illustration Mr. Mallock finds in the well-known axiom of the Agnostic philosophers that Truth is holy, and must be loved and pursued for its own sake. "Truth" means the apprehension of the facts, the sequences, of the natural order, as observation and experiment reveal them to us. It means the knowledge of Nature. But no one can "love" Nature. Nature kills, robs, cheats, pitilessly and unceasingly. At least, if there is no other purpose in Nature than Nature herself, this is so. The Theist affirms that there is. And in reality, our author says, so does the Atheist. No reasonable being could worship, revere, or love Truth for its own sake—that is, *things*, just as they present themselves—unless he believed that Truth was, somehow or other, the instrument of an Intelligence which orders the universe to a justice and goodness beyond itself. The Agnostic may think he does; but let him analyse his thought and he will find he cannot. So that the sentiment, or rational prompting, of the line of Truth for its own sake means



the love of Truth for the sake of its connexion with some supernatural element not given in experience.

If, however, Agnosticism goes logically on, Mr. Mallock foresees calamity and disaster. If the sole test of virtue comes to be—as, with Agnostics, it ought to be—merely personal pleasure, and the whole test of right to be nothing but the things which positively exist, then Mr. Mallock foretells, not so much the reign of immorality (which the Agnostics of the coming century will not mind), but a reign of—dullness.

Vice and virtue will deaden to one neutral tint; every deeper feeling, either of joy or sorrow, will lose its vigour, and will cease any more to be resonant. There will be no contrast; there will be no variety; there will be no solemnity of thought for the Tyndalls; there will be no levity of thought for the Voltaires. (*Ibid.*, p. 164.)

Thus, before the Agnostic hypothesis, morality will disappear. Right and wrong will be the same. Virtue and vice will be words without a meaning. Human action will have no motive but personal enjoyment; and enjoyment itself, of whatever kind, will lose its keenest relish.

We cannot pretend to have here done complete justice to the keen and brilliantly-written pages of the two essays, entitled, "Is Life worth Living?"; and our remarks on them must be very brief. Happily there is no necessity that they should be long.

We need not stop to remark that it is incorrect to call the moral judgment a *supernatural* judgment. Mr. Mallock evidently means—(indeed he explains himself to mean)—that the judgment by which a man pronounces a thing right or wrong, good or bad, is not derived from his senses or his experiments, but comes in some way from the mind itself; in fact, that it is, in language which need not yet be considered out of date, not *à posteriori* but *à priori*. The word "supernatural" should be reserved for what is not merely supra-sensual, but beyond the natural power of the very mind itself. Neither is "Faith," as used by Mr. Mallock, Faith in its proper sense of belief in authority as distinct from knowledge at first hand; but with him it is simply a conviction, or a knowledge, over and beyond what he sees, feels, and hears.

Looking to the writer's thesis, it seems clear that his keen analysis will affect the Agnostics very little indeed, though it may affect the ordinary run of readers a great deal. He certainly crumbles to pieces most completely and satisfactorily the feet of clay on which the Agnostic idols have stood up to impose upon the world. If any one wants to be thoroughly disenchanted with the "phrasing" of Professors Tyndall and Huxley, of Mr. Frederic Harrison and of George Eliot, he cannot do better than read these two papers, "Is Life worth Living?" To be a follower of Professor Tyndall you must give up the distinction



between right and wrong. This is a somewhat alarming proclamation: but it is true. And it is useful that those who admire Professor Tyndall should see this clearly. In this country, at least, morality has still a strong hold. Those who profess to recognise her are not always very clear why they do so. But the reign of morality, though there are many breaks in her kingdom and many mistakes about her law, is intimately bound up with that knowledge of God and of the supernatural which, although so much distorted, is much better than nothing at all. With Englishmen, if you touch morality you outrage God. There is no space here to discuss how far this persuasion is technically true. But one effect of it is that morality is strong; and, therefore, any attack on morality is resented. In this country, if you prove a theory to be incompatible with morality, the first impulse of most men is to look for a flaw in the theory, and not to conclude that all is over with morality. And since there are questions where success in seeing truth depends a very great deal on hearty goodwill, energy, self-discipline, and on many more things than cold and calculating discussion, such a disposition is a valuable safeguard. Mr. Mallock's dissection of Agnostic "phantoms" will, therefore, help a great many readers to a clearness which they will welcome. They will be like men whom a friendly hand leads out of a troublesome fog and helps up to a wide and pleasant view, of which they knew well enough beforehand, and which they had valiantly set out to find, but which was harder to reach than they had expected.

But how far it will convert the Agnostic himself to find out that his views must result in the evaporation of morality is another question. There is actually among us at this moment a school which loudly professes that to be good merely means to be happy — by any means which makes you happy. The able men and brilliant writers who still talk of bright ideals and holy aspirations, will, and do, resent the being told that these phrases, and similar ones, are phrases and nothing more. But even if Mr. Mallock could persuade them that they are wasting their breath, and that their first principles must land them on the same shores as their shallower but more reckless brethren have already run aground on, they are not the men to be turned back from a philosophic theory because, if acted upon, it will make life in another generation not worth living. Mr. Mallock turns their attention to the "supernatural" element, which insists upon intruding into every moral judgment or pleasure. Here, he says, is a scent, or a seasoning, which is of entirely foreign production. Your principles did not put it there. And you cannot get rid of it. Thus challenged, it is very possible that the philosophers will answer, Let us try. They will, perhaps, look more closely at their ideals.

They will pull to pieces consecrated phrases with greater ruthlessness than ever. They will edit revised manuals of ethics, politics, and literature from which worship, purity, and holiness are more and more completely excluded. And it may not be long when the illustrations which are afforded by the remorse of Macbeth, the guilt of Margaret, and the purity of Isabella, will fall pointless and ineffective.

It will be seen, then, that Mr. Mallock has at least shown that the present generation of Agnostic writers have not yet got rid of old-world morality. They have put out the old fires, and boast that they are warm without them. The truth is, the fires are not all extinguished, and there is warmth still in the air; when you have made them diligently stamp out every smouldering spark, and when the temperature has had time to fall, you prophesy that they will shiver. The question is whether they will mind it.

2. *The proof of a God is utterly unaffected by Science.*

Our author's purpose in the second class of papers, of which "Faith and Verification" (*Nineteenth Century*, October, 1878) may be taken as a sample, is to show the falsehood of a certain axiom of modern science. We are told, for the purpose of showing the unreasonableness of believing in a personal God, that "nothing is surely true except what cannot rationally be doubted." Mr. Mallock undertakes to show that this axiom is an utterly false one; that so far from being true it is in utter opposition to truth; and that, if we will only test by reason our own beliefs, each of us who can, in any sense, be said to be moral, or to be acting upon any fixed principles whatever, will find that so far from proof being the test of all that we hold true, it is only the meanest, the most subordinate truths that are capable of being proved at all. He proceeds to show this somewhat in the way in which he proved the thesis we have just been considering, by illustration. He defies Mr. Huxley to think of any possible manner or mode of "proof" of the existence of God. He then points out that the admission (by the Agnostics) of the fact of consciousness lands them at once in the region of "faith," as distinct from science. Science gives nothing but molecules, and groups of molecules; but every one "believes" there is more than molecules and their groupings. This is illustrated by the history of a battle between Mr. Huxley and the late Professor Clifford. Mr. Huxley (so far refusing to submit to Mr. Mallock's generalisation) thinks we can get on without "faith;" morality, like emotion, is only a secretion. Professor Clifford is horrified at this, and denounces it as false, futile, and degrading. Physics is one thing, morality another. See, says Mr. Mallock, how he is forced—Positivist as he is, and more—to admit an element which none of his instruments can verify. If there is anything more in our

mental acts than molecular movement, we must admit *will*, or choice. If we judge (as we do judge) that such and such a choice is the *right* one, that is a further plunge into the "supernatural." And finally, if we ask *why* it is right, and answer (as we do finally answer), because it leads to God, because it leads to the heart's desire, we have advanced to the knowledge or "belief" (though not to the proof) that God exists, and that there is such a thing as religion. In other words, morality is logically inseparable from Theism; Theism is the one form to which reason must ultimately reduce the "ideal element," the "lifting power" of which, according to Professor Tyndall, is so essential to us.

It thus appears that Mr. Mallock's point here, is, on the one side, that no proper "proof" of God's existence, or of any moral ideal, or of free will itself, either does or can exist; on the other, that our conscious mental life involves these three truths.

It is not necessary here to say, once more, that the word "supernatural" as used by Mr. Mallock is not the same as the "supernatural" of Catholic theology. It means, with him, above or beyond matter or sense.

Neither is it necessary to repeat that "faith" with him merely means *à priori* acceptance. As to the word "proof" he seems to us to use it even more arbitrarily than his other terms. Why should "proof" be confined to the physical world? Let it be observed that proof does not regard facts, but laws or principles. We *observe* facts, but we prove laws. What the senses offer us, we accept as existent; what our senses affirm constantly under uniform circumstances we hold to be proved as a general induction. Thus, in one sense, a law, even a physical law, can never be proved. To arrive at a law the mind takes a leap; not from one fact to many, but from a limited number of facts to universality. It is this use of the "imagination" in scientific discovery which our foremost philosophers make so much of. It is the power to see further than eyes can see and to hear where there are no sounds. But if proof in physical matters be a leap of the imagination, why should not the leap which the mind makes from its own mental "facts" to mental laws be not also called a "proof?" If we are permitted to infer, from observed facts, the law of gravitation, why may we not infer, also from facts, the law of an objective moral principle? With all except the purest phenomenists the assertion of the law of gravitation means the assertion of true forces or things, systematised and widely spread, apart from thought, and distinct from the things from which we infer their existence. If we find, in mental matters, evidences of objective reality, we have a right to call this a proof. A constant presence of external motive—a persistent attraction and repulsion—a light which never

altogether leaves us and which sometimes burns with a dazzling radiance—if in our mental phenomena we discover the uniform existence of elements like these, we cannot surely be wrong in taking the leap and inferring the existence of objective right and wrong, and of a Being whom further analysis will prove to be what Christians mean by God.

But without insisting on mere terminology, let us notice that Mr. Mallock has here hit upon what Catholic philosophy calls the ontological proof of the existence of God. We cannot, he says, prove God, but we accept Him; we see Him; the very conceptions of our Agnostic thinkers contain God within them. Catholic philosophers call this a proof. And, perhaps, Mr. Mallock should not have insisted so strongly that there is no possible "proof" of the existence of Will, Right, or God. He repeats this over and over again. His argument is, "I assume morality; and I assume it partly because you, the Agnostics, cannot rid your thoughts and phrases of its presence; and I say that if you once talk about morality, you say Will, you say choice, you say right and wrong, you say religion and God." The obvious weak place of such an edifice is its foundation. Suppose the Agnostic gives up the idea of morality, as we have seen some already do, and as others would find little difficulty in doing—what, then, becomes of the argument? It crumbles to pieces. The true force of the proof Mr. Mallock here stumbles upon—he would deny he was positively proving anything, but he really is—consists in this, that all human thought, even rude and elementary thought, is illuminated by the ideal. It is this fact which makes it so utterly impossible for the Agnostics to think or talk without thinking or talking morality. The argument is not a poor *ad hominem* thrust against men whose theories will have disappeared to-morrow; it is one that rests on the very foundation of all conscious life. The reason why the present generation of Agnostics habitually use language which involves morality, choice, and God, is because such conceptions are, in a sense, innate in the human mind. By "innate" is here meant, not that they exist in the mind as ready formed notions, prior to all perception. The mental firmament has no such sun or stars as these to rule its day and night. But they are innate in the sense that by a very few and easy steps of reasoning—in many cases, without conscious "discourse"—the mind disengages these conceptions from contingent and material phenomena. God does not shine in my intellect like a sun, awakening my hitherto sleeping perceptiveness; such a vision is reserved for other states of existence; but the notion of Him, true but inadequate, can be swiftly gathered by comparison, affirmation, negation, and analogy, from the waters where He

rests, the clouds where He walks, the earth which is His footstool; that is, from the very first mental occupation which is supplied to the mind in its earliest collision with things outside itself.

### 3. *The Reasonableness of Catholicism.*

Mr. Mallock, in his paper on "Dogma, Reason, and Morality" (*Nineteenth Century* for December, 1878), proceeds a step further in his "apology" for Theism. He rightly admits that to believe in Will and in God is not to answer all the difficulties these stupendous terms involve. He finds men and women who are determined to retain their spiritual world, but who find it "a world of bewilderment;" they are baffled perpetually in trying to reduce it to order. Even natural religion, in its most vague form, has a wilderness of unanswerable difficulties; but "orthodoxy" and all forms of revealed religion have deserts far more vast.

Taking these difficulties in order, he first treats the two primary or fundamental difficulties which any system of belief in God must, almost on the threshold, present to the anxious thinker. These are, first, the existence of evil in the face of God's power, and, secondly, the freedom of man's will in the face of God's will. We cannot say he *treats* these two formidable texts. But he devotes a page of acute reflections to their elucidation. The sum of his reply comes to this; on any system, theistic or atheistic, moral evil exists; if you deny it, you of course deny morality and reduce good and bad to secretions and disease (we have seen that some Agnostics would not shrink from this); but if moral evil, or "the bad," exists, you have this contradiction, that the necessary blind evolution of the universe results sometimes in "good," but frequently in wrong, sin, badness; it could not be otherwise, and yet you have moral wrong. No contradiction could be greater. Therefore the difficulty must be met by Agnostics as well as Theists. Here, again, we see that Mr. Mallock's reasoning rests on the presumption that the Agnostic clings to morality.

But the interest of the paper on "Dogma, Reason, and Morality," and of another which is in many ways its supplement, "The Logic of Toleration" (*Nineteenth Century* for January, 1879), lies in what Mr. Mallock says of the position held in respect to theistic difficulties by the Catholic Church. He complains, with much justice, that whenever English Rationalists criticise Christianity they criticise Protestantism. To them, all theological authority is represented by the bishops, the dignitaries, the incumbents, or the curates, of the Anglican establishment. They forget that

They have still the Church of Rome to deal with, which is Christianity in its oldest, its most legitimate, and its most coherent form. They

surely cannot forget her existence or her magnitude. To suppose this would be to attribute to them too insular, or rather too provincial, an ignorance. The cause, however, certainly is ignorance, and an ignorance which, though less surprising, is far deeper. In this country the popular conception of Rome has been so distorted by our familiarity with Protestantism, that the true conception of her is something quite strange to us. Our divines have exhibited her to us as though she were a lapsed Protestant sect, and they have attacked her for being false to doctrines that were never really hers. They have failed to see that the first and essential difference which separates her from them lies not primarily in any special dogma, but in the authority on which all her dogmas rest. Protestants, basing their religion on the Bible solely, have conceived that Catholics of course profess to do so likewise; they have covered them with invective for being traitors to their supposed profession, and have triumphantly convicted them of contradicting principles that they always repudiated. The Church's primary doctrine is her own perpetual infallibility. She is inspired by the same spirit that inspired the Bible, and her voice is, equally with the Bible, the voice of God. This, however, which is really her primary doctrine, popular Protestantism either ignores altogether, or treats it as if it were a modern superstition, which, so far from being essential to the whole Church's system, is, on the contrary, inconsistent with it. Looked at in this way, Rome to the Protestant's mind has seemed naturally to be a mass of superstitions and dishonesties; and it is this view of her that, strangely enough, our modern advanced thinkers have accepted without question. Though they have trusted the Protestants in nothing else, they have trusted them here. They have taken the Protestant's word for it that Protestantism is more reasonable than Romanism; and they think, therefore, that if they have destroyed the former, *à fortiori* have they destroyed the latter.\*

Having said this much—and it is well and opportunely said—Mr. Mallock admits that there are numerous difficulties, both intellectual and moral, which meet the inquirer who may look wistfully to the Catholic Church for a solution to his doubts. His primary reply to those who urge these difficulties is this: whatever is hard to understand, or hard to accept in the claims of the Catholic Church, is a mere repetition of that which was hard to accept in *accepting morality or religion at all*. If it be true, as it is objected, that the church only takes in a comparatively small portion of the human race, the difficulty, or the mystery, has already turned up in a simpler form, in the form of the presence of evil and the partial and capricious prevalence of good; and Theists have accepted it with open eyes. If it be true that she preaches "supernatural" doctrines, incapable of verification by physical methods, the Theist has already committed

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\* *Nineteenth Century*, December, 1878, p. 1040.



himself to this very process by avowing himself a Theist. If an individual man may painfully work out from consciousness the conception of religion and of God, why should not a body of thinkers and teachers, with a far-reaching tradition and an unbroken continuity, successfully formulate the motives, the aspirations, the beliefs of humanity? And then it is to be observed that the theory of the Catholic Church is that she is protected and assisted in her work by that same Holy Spirit who first revealed to her what she teaches. Once admit God, and this ever-living, ever-loving will, and revelation becomes a probability, and perpetual assistance a consistent and a looked-for gift.

To sum up, then, if we would obtain a true view of Catholicism, we must begin by making a clean sweep of all the views that, as outsiders, we have been taught to entertain about her. We must, in the first place, learn to conceive of her as a living, spiritual body, as infallible and as authoritative now as she ever was, with her eyes undimmed and her strength not abated; continuing to grow still as she has continued to grow hitherto; and the growth of the new dogmas that she may from time to time enunciate, we must learn to see are, from her standpoint, signs of corruption. And further, when we come to look into her more closely, we must separate carefully the diverse elements we find in her—her discipline, her pious opinions, her theology, and her religion.

Let her be fairly looked at in this way—looked at not with any prepossession in her favour, but only without prejudice—and thus much, at least, I am fully convinced of. I am convinced that, if it be once admitted that we belong to a spiritual world, and in that world are free and responsible agents, there will be no new difficulty encountered, either by the reason or the moral sense, in admitting to the full the supernatural claims of Catholicism. . . . Difficulties, as I have said, we do meet doubtless, but we have passed them long ago, as we crossed the threshold of the spiritual world. We have neither denied them nor forgotten them. We have done all that was possible—we have accepted them. (*Ibid.*, p. 1034.)

Mr. Mallock's advocacy of the Catholic Church has called forth some surprise and a few public comments; and it becomes interesting to examine, first, how it is that he has been led to make an "apology" for Catholicism; then, whether Catholics can accept his services; and lastly, his final avowal that he is, at the very end of his toilsome struggle with Atheists and Agnostics, still a "complete outsider," "a literal sceptic."

The fundamental view of the writer of these papers, it will be remembered, is that there is in human consciousness a moral, ideal, "supernatural" element, and that human language does, and must, recognise and express it. Holding this, and studiously realising all the difficulties such a view presents, he looks round



on the world, and wonders whether faith—which is his generic name for the higher elements here alluded to—is destined to revive again, or to die. Faith, to hold mankind in any considerable numbers, must be embodied in some external organisation. A few severe thinkers might keep their faith, and never commune with their fellows. But the masses, whose intellectual life is sluggish, often interrupted, and often hardly conscious, require a *Church*; and a Church means a more or less elaborate analysis of "Faith," held and enforced by a few upon many. Now the Catholic Church is not merely pre-eminent by her past history and her present extent and influence. She is, in truth, the only organisation which either is at this moment a real Church, or may be expected to last in the world without transformation into a new substance. She is seen to be the only body which claims to have a *living* voice—that is, which professes to be able to say decisively, yes or no, in the perpetually fresh aspects of human thought, which, because man's intellect is always dividing and adding, necessarily arise in every generation. And because she can speak, she can *develop* herself, and grow. Development means the analysis of dogma "once delivered."

Catholicism is the only (creed) that has recognised what dogmatism really implies, and what necessarily will be in the long run demanded of it, and has provided herself with the full appliances for meeting these demands. She alone has seen that if there is to be any infallible voice in the world at all, this voice must be an ever-living one, as capable of speaking now as it ever was in the past; and that, as the world's capacities for knowledge grow, the teacher shall be always able to unfold it to a fuller teaching. The Catholic Church is the only historical religion that can conceivably adapt itself to the wants of the present day, without virtually ceasing to be itself. It is the only religion that can keep its identity without losing its life, and keep its life without losing its identity; that can enlarge its teachings without changing them; that can be always the same, and yet be always developing. (*Ibid.*, p. 1031.)

All this has been said with more or less emphasis by Catholic theologians. Given the spiritual judgments and ideal aspirations of the human heart, on the one hand, and the existence of an Infinite Being on the other, revelation may be expected, though it cannot be claimed as a right. And a revelation, to be worth anything to the world at large, and to each several age as it comes up, must be protected by an infallible interpreter. And it is true also, as against the extreme physicists and positivists, that the "proofs" for this hyper-physical universe are as valid as the proofs for the first elements of morality—even if we admit that their validity is no greater. As we have said, there seems to be little likelihood that such arguments will have much effect upon

the Agnostics themselves. They either have already sacrificed morality, or their children will do so. Or else they will practice, and even profess, the conventional morality of their age, in order not to offend against what J. S. Mill calls our "present wretched social arrangements," but in their books and articles they will elaborate views in which anti-moral premisses will be clearly drawn out, and the conclusions, for the moment, left unexpressed. But it must not be forgotten that there is a wide world of readers, and even of thinkers, who dwell, not on the "rim" of physics, but in the plains, the mountain-ranges, or even the jungles, of the interior. They believe in Huxley, in Darwin, in Häckel; but they also believe far more warmly in Shakspeare, Sophocles, Wordsworth, Tennyson, or, perhaps, in the Sermon on the Mount. They believe in modern science, in progress, in freedom of thought; but they cling to more or less definite ideas of goodness, honesty, purity, and the life to come. For this large class, it is useful to let in the light on fundamental thought. It is useful to show them that if they sneer at revelation, at eternal punishment, at miracles, at infallibility, they have stultified themselves. Accepting what they do—Will, Morality, God—they have placed themselves in the hyper-physical world for good or for evil, and if they reject any portion of it—the Catholic position amongst the rest—it must be for better reasons than because it offers them no physical proof.

Catholics may confidently, and even gladly, accept such a view of their Church. While men keep calling on us for "proof" of this and of that, no enterprise can be better or more legitimate than to show what kind of proof is possible and sufficient. This is chiefly what Mr. Mallock has tried to do. He has done more, however. He has clearly brought out the "supernatural" side of human nature. He has skilfully seized the idea of the Catholic Church, and shown how she responds to that which humanity requires. But these two latter aspects of his argument are not so fundamental as the analysis of the question of "proof." His results are not quite our own; or rather his terminology is not what we should have used. He maintains that nothing can be proved but matters physical and sensible. To us it seems that "proof" is of more than one kind. We can prove Will from mental phenomena as truly as we can prove gravitation from physical.

It may appear to some of our readers that a view which seems to rest the proof of religious matters on the ideas and aspirations of the human mind is dangerously idealistic. What becomes, it will be asked, of the proof of God's existence drawn from the visible universe, or the demonstration of the Church from history and fact? We answer that such demonstrations are perfectly

untouched by the arguments we have been considering. The author here reviewed has answered men according to their asking. There are things antecedent to arguments from fact or from history. It is not worth while proving God from Nature, if the process is denounced beforehand as invalid. It is bootless to appeal to the life and miracles of our Lord for a demonstration of His mission and of His Church, when a miracle is declared to be a contradiction in terms, and when men see nothing in Jesus but physical phenomena. Nothing can be proved till you know what you mean by proof. When that is settled, and, indeed, in the very settling of it, many luminous considerations will be revealed. The mere analysis of the mind and its intuitions will be seen, like the flights of birds high up in the autumnal skies, to show the existence of the warmer regions out of sight. And when the mind's *à priori* concepts have been fairly mapped out for use, then, and only then, will Nature speak with a voice of power and the invisible things of God be declared by that which we see; then, and not before, will the historical proofs of our Lord's miracles be found to yield demonstration, and the records of evangelist and of apostle be lighted up with the demonstration of the Church of Christ.

Whilst trying to place before the reader, in summary, the results of Mr. Mallock's argument, we have, as it may be surmised, left large portions of his papers unconsidered. But it would be unjust not to say that, beyond his main discussion, he has treated many questions of detail in a very acceptable manner. For instance, he gives an admirable explanation of the doctrine of the Church on exclusive salvation,\* a subject so often declaimed upon by ignorant controversialists. He shows with much clearness how a complex or elaborate creed can be compatible with simple and personal religion; and why and in what sense such a creed is necessary or useful.† He meets the objection that Catholicism has many rival religions‡—and that in all ages and all lands (as recent comparative mythology is showing) there have been religious earnestness and religious aspiration.§ He finds occasion to speak of the invocation of Saints, of purgatory, and of rationalistic Biblical criticism, and on each point he clears up a misunderstanding or explains the position of the Church. And we may truly say that, with the exception of a phrase here and there, we find nothing in these explanations which might not have been written by a Catholic.

With all this Mr. Mallock is no Catholic. He is a sceptic; ||

\* *Nineteenth Century*, December, 1878, p. 1028.

† *Ibid.*, p. 1030-1.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 1031.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 1030.

|| *Ibid.*, January, 1879, p. 88.

that is, he does not believe in anything. This confession is the only irrational utterance in these able Essays. It would be interesting to know the details of this scepticism; to know where it begins, and what are its boundaries. Meanwhile there is this consideration. The exposition of views, the details of argument, rarely convert a man—never convert a man by themselves. And one reason is that conversion is one vital act, and the momentum which effects it must touch the mind all at once. But an argument is a long affair. What we hear we half forget before we are at the end of it; what we remember is half blotted out, its connexion is marred, and its outline is indefinite and vague. It is the same with a man's own views. He writes a book in many chapters; and as the chapters did not exist in his thought when he began it, so they have partially disappeared when he ends it. What has remained? A definite, practical conviction? There is no deep conviction of life but is connected with a hundred roots of discussion; and we can only handle one or two of these roots at once. For a life-conviction one must be smitten as by a hammer or pierced as by a spear; but a train of literary argument passes across the surface of the mind as the bow over the violin; at any moment the tune is partly over and done with and partly in the future; what is past is already fading from the sense; what is to come has not affected it; and when the last note has sounded there is a lingering thrill of the sensibility, but not the tune itself. No one was ever converted by an elaborate argument. Argument may remove difficulties; brief and telling points may show light where there was darkness before. But that conviction which is called *conversion* must be wrought by the force which alone can beat down the intellect and flood the will with fervour—by the "right hand" of God. But argument may disturb fancied security, give a sense of danger, and make the heart look inward and upward. To look inward means to think on one's destiny; to look upward means to pray. And a man who has seen so many glimpses of august and awful things as Mr. Mallock has seen must feel his heart urged to pray. If he prays he will surely see the light.

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## ART. II.—FREE WILL.

IN the DUBLIN REVIEW of July, 1871, I began a series of philosophical articles, the purpose of which was to start from the very logical commencement; and, by a gradual process, to establish securely on argumentative grounds, with special reference to the sophisms of modern unbelief, the existence of that Infinitely Perfect Being Whom Christians call God. The purpose was a bold one; and it is probable that few others feel more clearly than I do the many imperfections which have accompanied at every step my attempt to fulfil it. But then the task itself has seemed to me, for very many years, the one philosophical necessity of our time. And since no one undertook it, I have indulged the hope that I may at least do substantial service by marking out a track which, on the whole, shall be found the correct one, and which others shall hereafter more satisfactorily tread.

Man proposes; God disposes. I continued my series with a certain regularity down to our Number for July, 1874; but from that time it was entirely suspended for two years. In July, 1876, on resuming it, I expressed a hope that I should now "be able to continue the course much less intermittently than has hitherto been the case." In fact, however, not one word more have I written of it from that day to this. Taught by experience, I make no further promises; and I have likewise reached an age when health and intellectual vigour (not to say life itself) may fail me at any moment. Still, I have now a better chance than I have had for several years back; nay, I may say, better than I have yet had at all, being free from the unrelenting labour and anxiety of editorship. In fact, the first thing which suggested to me a thought of resigning that post, was my increasing recognition of the circumstance that, as years grow on me, I find it more and more impossible to unite the two occupations of editorship and philosophical speculation. It is now my firm intention to make the prosecution of this series the one intellectual labour of my life, until either I shall be incapacitated for pursuing it, or shall have brought it to an end. I need hardly add that no other channel of communication with the public can be nearly so acceptable to me as my old home—the DUBLIN REVIEW: and that I am very grateful to the Editor for giving me the use of his pages. At last, the delay may, in some respects, be of advantage. One benefit at all events, which I accidentally thence derive, has been that I

shall be able to avail myself of the light thrown on various parts of the subject by recent Catholic writers of great ability and thoughtfulness. I refer, of course, prominently to Dr. Mivart's admirable "Lessons from Nature;" not to mention his very valuable paper on "Emotion" in the *Catholic American Quarterly* of last April. But I also refer to various writers—FF. Sutton and Gavin; Messrs. Rickaby and H. W. Lucas—who have contributed to the *Month* papers of signal interest and power.

Here I may desist from egotism; I may shroud myself under the less obtrusive "we," to which I have been accustomed for so many years, and which is in many respects more convenient for philosophical discussion.

#### REPLY TO A REPLY OF DR. BAIN'S.

The plan according to which we have hitherto laid out our articles, and which we hope to continue, was set forth, we trust, with sufficient clearness in July, 1876, pp. 57-64. Our argument led us in due course (April and July, 1874) to the very fundamental and critical question of Free Will. Our reasoning on that subject, we consider, was such as will hold its own against all gainsayers; but the two opponents whom we encountered as specially representing the hostile camp, were Mr. Stuart Mill and Dr. Bain. Mr. Mill's death had at that time already occurred; but Dr. Bain, in the third edition of his great work on "The Emotions and Will," referred to our article of April (pp. 498-500), and professed to refute it. His remarks, however,—expressed, we are bound to say, with most abundant courtesy,—seem to us so very insufficiently considered that, had they come from an ordinary writer, we should not have thought it worth while to notice them. But Dr. Bain is justly recognised as one of the two living thinkers (Mr. Herbert Spencer being the other) who stand at the head of the English psychological (as distinct from physiological) movement towards antitheism. Then his volume itself (on the "Emotions and the Will") is one, we think, of very conspicuous ability; one which shows in various places great power of psychological analysis; and one which throws much light on some hitherto obscure corners of the human mind. Moreover, he was the one living person with whom we were in direct and immediate conflict. We have really therefore a right to deal with him as with a representative man, and to take credit on our own side for whatever weakness may be found in his reasoning. At last he has, of course, full liberty to "amend his plea;" and if he is disposed hereafter to make a greater approach towards putting forth his full strength on the point at issue, we promise him we shall

encounter him with greater readiness and gratification than we do at present.

If the reader wishes thoroughly to apprehend the reasoning we put forth in April and July, 1874, we fear we cannot dispense him from the necessity of reading our two articles. Even supposing him, however, to have done so, a brief summary of our essential and fundamental argument will fix its salient points more definitely in his mind. Such a summary also may be useful, as exhibiting the general lie of the controversy even to those who may not care to go thoroughly into the matter. But, most of all, such a summary is indispensable, if Dr. Bain's various replies are to be placed in a clear light.

We did not profess to treat the *whole* doctrine of Free Will. We considered it exclusively on its psychological side, reserving all metaphysical questions for later consideration. Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain maintain, "as a truth of *experience*," "that volitions follow determinate moral antecedents with the same uniformity and the same certainty as physical effects follow their physical causes." This, in fact, is the doctrine called by its upholders the "Deterministic." We joined issue on their own ground of experience, and alleged that experience testifies the precise contradictory of their thesis. As Dr. Bain calls his doctrine "Determinism," we called our contradictory one by the name of "Indeterminism." The full doctrine of Free Will includes, indeed, the doctrine of Indeterminism; but it includes also a certain doctrine on the causation of human acts. This latter is a metaphysical question, and must be argued (as indeed, we argue it in the second part of our present article) on metaphysical grounds. Here we have no concern with it, except to mention that it is external to our controversy of 1874.

We began by drawing out with much care (pp. 327—333) a full statement of Dr. Bain's theory, as we apprehend it. Dr. Bain implies that he is satisfied with the accuracy of our analysis; for he says (p. 498) that "the arguments for and against Free Will are clearly summarised" in our article. We further pointed out, that there are two different cases which need to be separately considered. There are (1) cases in which for a while the will's spontaneous impulse exhibits much vacillation and (as one may say) vibration. But we added (p. 328) that "in the enormous majority of instances there is no vacillation or vibration at all in this spontaneous impulse; that on the contrary (in these instances) there is one definite and decisive resultant" of the various attractions which at any given moment act on the mind. We think that our own doctrine of Indeterminism is established by experience with no less conclusiveness in the former than in the latter class of cases. Still it is the



latter class of cases which place those mental facts on which we rely in more intense and irresistible light ; and to this class of cases therefore we mainly appealed.

In the great majority of those moments therefore, which together make up my waking life,—my will is so promptly determined by the combined effect of the various attractions which solicit it, that its preponderating spontaneous impulse is definite and decisive. So far Dr. Bain and ourselves are in entire mutual agreement. Supposing, then, Dr. Bain could show that men never *resist* this preponderating spontaneous impulse, we should not have a word further to say in our defence. Our contention against him turns precisely, critically, vitally, on one all-important and most definite kind of phenomena. "What we allege to be a fact of indubitable experience"—these were our words (p. 331)—"is this. At some given moment my will's *gravitation*, as it may be called, or preponderating spontaneous impulse, is in some given direction ; inasmuch that if I held myself *passively*, if I let my will alone, my will would with absolute certainty move accordingly : but *in fact* I exert myself, with more or less vigour, to *resist* such impulse ; and then the action of my will is in a different, often an entirely opposite, direction. In other words, we would draw our reader's attention to the frequently occurring simultaneous existence of two very distinct phenomena. On the one hand, (1) my will's *gravitation* or preponderating spontaneous impulse is strongly in one direction ; while, on the other hand, at the same moment its actual *movement* is quite divergent from this. Now that which *motives*"—to use Dr. Bain's terminology\*—"affect, is most evidently the will's spontaneous inclination, impulse, gravitation. The Determinist then by saying that the will's movement is infallibly determined by 'motives,' is obliged to say that the will never moves in opposition to its preponderating spontaneous impulse. And, in fact, he does say this. All Determinists assume, as a matter of course, that the will never puts forth effort for the purpose of resisting its preponderating spontaneous impulse. We, on the contrary, allege, that there is no mental fact more undeniable than the

\* We used the word "motive" in a different sense from Dr. Bain (see pp. 335, 6 ; also p. 346). What Dr. Bain calls a "motive," we called an "attraction." According to our use of terms, to ask what is my "motive" for some action, is to ask what is that end which I have resolved to pursue, and for the sake of which I resolve on the performance of that action. But if a *Determinist* asks me what is my "motive" for some action, he means to ask me what is the attraction which allures (and infallibly determines) me to do what I do. By "motive" he means an "attraction ;" but by "motive" we mean—not a certain attraction, or a certain solicitation—but a certain governing resolve.

frequent putting forth of such effort." "And on this critical point," we added, "issue is now to be joined."\*

We proceeded (pp. 337—339) to give instances in which, we think, no fair inquirer can doubt that men do put forth that anti-impulsive effort, as we called it, on which we lay so much stress; and (be it observed) if so much as any of these instances be admitted as genuine, the controversy is conclusively decided in our favour. It is quite clear to our mind, we say, that no intelligent person, who really gives his attention to the matter, can fairly examine these instances without admitting their conclusiveness. It is not all intelligent persons, however, of the phenomenistic school who will really give their attention to what their opponents say. And a most kind criticism of our article, which appeared in the *Spectator* impressed us with the opinion that we had failed in conveying to adverse readers, with due detail and illustration, the fundamental distinction on which our whole argument turned; the distinction between "anti-impulsive effort" on one side, and the will's "preponderating spontaneous impulse" on the other. To the supplying of this defect therefore, we devoted a supplementary article in our following Number. If our readers wish thoroughly to apprehend the strength of our case, we must beg them to peruse that article; and we may add, for their encouragement, that it is very far from hard reading. Here we can but exhibit a few specimens of the instances which we suggested. And we should premise that, in order to obtain greater freedom of expression, in this second article we somewhat enlarged our terminology. In what here follows—for the sake of still further, we hope, elucidating our argument—we have, in some unimportant respects, somewhat modified the said terminology; but no one can even cursorily peruse our July article, without understanding us to mean exactly what we shall now proceed to express. The chief term which we first introduced in July, 1874, was the term "desire." If my will's preponderating spontaneous impulse be directed to the attainment of some given result, I may be said to have a "preponderating desire," or simply "the desire," of that result. Or, again, the said preponderating spontaneous impulse may be called my "strongest" present impulse, or my "strongest" present desire. Very frequently, of course, there exists what may be called a "desire," but one which is not the "strongest," the "preponderating," present desire. For example. A is called very early on the 1st of September, and feels a real "desire" to sleep off again; nevertheless, his wish

\* In quoting our former articles, we occasionally make some entirely unimportant change of expression, in order to obtain (we hope) somewhat greater clearness.

to be early among the partridges is a stronger, more influential, more keenly-felt, more stimulating desire. His "strongest present desire" therefore, his "strongest present impulse," his "preponderating spontaneous impulse," is to get up at once; which he accordingly does, as a matter of course. His *weaker* desire is to stay in bed, his *strongest* present desire to get up.

This terminology being understood, our illustrations were directed to show, that over and over again *men resist their strongest present desire*. Let us revert to a preceding illustration. When A is called early on the 1st of September, his strongest present desire is to get up, and he gets up as a matter of course. But B, who is no sportsman, has also ordered himself to be called early the same morning, for a very different reason. He will be busy in the middle of the day, and he has resolved to rise betimes, that he may visit a sick dependent. When he is called, by far his strongest present desire is to sleep off again: but he exerts himself; he puts forth manly self-restraint, and forces himself to rise, though it be but laboriously and against the grain. A starts from bed by a spontaneous and indeliberate impulse; but B resolves weakly and fails, resolves more strongly and fails again, until he at last succeeds by a still stronger and crowning resolve in launching himself on the sea of active life (pp. 166, 7). "Surely," we added, "no mental states are more unmistakably contrasted than" the mental states of A and B respectively; though both are called early and both get up. A *obeys* his strongest present desire, while B *resists* it.\*

Parallel instances—we just now pointed out—are extremely frequent; and to this point we shall presently return. At the same time, we said in April (p. 341), "very far the most signal," the most impressive, the most arresting "instances of the doctrine we are defending, will be found in the devout Theist's resistance to temptation." We gave an illustration in July (p. 165). "A military officer—possessing real piety and steadfastly purposing to grow therein—receives at the hand of a

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\* We do not forget that a third hypothesis is possible. In another man, C, there may be that "vacillation" and "vibration" of the will's preponderating spontaneous impulse, which we have already mentioned. He is, we may suppose, a much less keen sportsman than A. His desire of lying in bed is at one moment slightly the stronger, and his desire of getting up is slightly the stronger next moment. Such vacillation, indeed, may continue for no very inconsiderable time. But what we ascribe to B is, that when he is called, his indefinitely strongest present desire is his desire of sleeping off again; and that he combats that desire, from a motive of benevolence, by vigorous anti-impulsive effort. No one surely will doubt that such a case is frequent enough.

brother officer some stinging and, as the world would say, 'intolerable' insult. His nature flames forth; his preponderating spontaneous impulse—his strongest present desire—is to inflict some retaliation, which at least shall deliver him from the 'reproach' of cowardice. Nevertheless it is his firm resolve, by God's grace, to comport himself Christianly. His *resolve* contends vigorously against his strongest present *desire*, until the latter is brought into harmony with his principles." What a sustained series of intense anti-impulsive effort is here exhibited! What could be wilder than to say that, during this protracted period, he is acting in accordance with his strongest present desire, and with his will's preponderating spontaneous impulse?

Let it be distinctly observed that we rest our case, not on the mere fact of an agent putting forth *effort* of the will, however intense; but *anti-impulsive* effort. Here, again, we drew our illustration from some gallant soldier. Such a man "will very often put forth intense effort; brave appalling perils; confront the risk of an agonising death. But to what end is this effort directed? He puts it forth, in order that he may act in full accordance with his preponderating spontaneous impulse; in order that he may achieve what is his strongest present desire; in order that he may defend his country, overcome his country's foe, obtain fame and distinction, gratify his military ardour, &c." Such efforts as these—efforts directed to the gratification of a man's strongest present desire—we called "congenial" efforts; and undoubtedly the fact of such efforts being frequently put forth affords no argument whatever against Determinism. These efforts may be not less intense—they may (if you will) be indefinitely more intense—than those which we commemorated in the preceding case. The two classes of effort mutually differ, not in degree but in kind. As regards our present argument, their difference is fundamental: that difference being, that "congenial" efforts are in *accordance* with the agent's strongest present desire, whereas "anti-impulsive" efforts are in *opposition* to it. And we may be permitted perhaps to point the contrast more emphatically, by introducing what may in some sense be called a theological consideration; though in truth the fact to which we refer is an observed fact of experience, like any other. What soldier then could be found who would bear insult, contumely, and contempt with perfect patience, unless he were supported by earnest and unflinching *prayer*? But certainly with a very large number there is no need of earnest and unflinching prayer, in order to heroic action in the field. There have been not so very few warriors of truly amazing intrepidity, who have not exactly been men of

prayer. So essentially different in kind are the two classes of effort.

There is a very familiar use of language, which will throw still further light on the point before us. What we have called "anti-impulsive effort," is continually spoken of in unscientific language as "self control" or "self-restraint." Take the pious soldier who receives a stinging insult and bears it patiently: what is most remarkable in his conduct is his "self-restraint." But no one would commemorate the "self-restraint" of one who should be so carried away (breathlessly as it were) by military ardour, by desire of victory, by zeal for his country's cause, by a certain savage aggressiveness, which is partly natural and partly due to past habit—who should be so carried away (we repeat) by these and similar impulses, that (under their influence) he faces appalling danger without so much as a moment's deliberation or reflection.

In July, 1874, we thus summed up our argument. "The whole Deterministic controversy," we said (p. 169), "turns on this one question: Do I, or do I not, at various times exercise self-restraint? Do I, or do I not, at various times act in resistance to my strongest present desire?" For consider. "What can 'motives,' in Dr. Bain's sense of that term, 'or 'circumstances,' or 'temperament,' or 'habit,' or 'custom,' imaginably do for me at this moment, except to effect that my *desire* shall be this rather than that? How can they imaginably influence my action in those cases, where my action is *contrary* to my strongest present desire? If then there are such cases—if it be true that I often, or indeed ever, act in *opposition* to what at this moment is my strongest desire—then it demonstratively follows that my will at such times acts for itself; independently of 'pleasure,' or 'pain,' or 'circumstances,' or 'motives,' or 'habits,' or anything else."

The question is simply and precisely this: "Do men ever resist their strongest present desire? Is there such a thing among men as 'self-restraint'?" "Let any one rightly understand," we concluded (p. 172), "what it is which Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain affirm; and let him then proceed to look at the most obvious and every-day facts of life;—he will be able to discern with the clearest insight that their pretentious theory is a mere sham and delusion." Never was a more egregious imposture palmed on the world under the name of science and philosophy.

There is another matter, subordinate of course in importance, to the vital issue we have been considering, but yet in its consequences of very considerable moment. We have said incidentally that the cases are very frequent, even with the most

ordinary men, in which they put forth (however languidly and feebly) some little amount of self-restraint and self-control. There is honour among thieves. Even a member of the criminal classes brings himself again and again to resist his strongest present desire, in order to a deliberate provision for his own safety. So much is surely plain on the surface of facts. And the very same circumstance—the great frequency of anti-impulsive effort—is moreover made most manifest, by that conviction of their own moral liberty, which so intimately possesses the minds of all men in the whole world, except only that infinitesimal portion of mankind, the Deterministic philosophers. We appealed to this in April, 1874 (p. 340). “Considering,” we said, “how very few can look upon their habitual conduct with satisfaction if they choose to measure it even by their own standard of right,—emphatic stress may justly be laid on the universal conviction, that there *is* such a thing as sin and guilt. There could be no sin or guilt, if every one’s conduct were inevitably determined by circumstances; and what a balm therefore to wounded consciences is offered by the Deterministic theory! Yet so strong and ineradicable in the mass of men is their conviction of possessing a real power against temptation, that they never attempt to purchase peace of mind by *disclaiming* that power.” But how could it possibly happen that this conviction is so profoundly rooted in their mind—that it bears so strong a *prima facie* appearance of being an innate and indestructible instinct—were there not in each man’s life a very frequent experience, on which that conviction is based? We pursued a similar argument in pp. 35–12.

The remainder of our April article was mainly occupied in considering the various objections to our thesis which Determinists have adduced. There will, of course, be no reason for here reconsidering those objections, except so far as Dr. Bain has reproduced them. Without further preamble, therefore, we proceed to his reply.

The absolutely bewildering circumstance in that reply is, that Dr. Bain does not once throughout refer to that one central and fundamental argument, on which we avowedly based our whole case. No doubt he is unaware of our July article; but what can have been more express and emphatic than our statement of April? As soon as ever we had concluded our exposition of the Deterministic reasoning, we added (p. 334), that “the whole argument (in our view) should be made to turn on one most simple and intelligible issue.” And we then proceeded to set forth that issue in the plainest possible terms. Dr. Bain complains (p. 498) that “we throw on him the burden of” disproving Indeterminism; whereas we assumed the whole burden



of proof ourselves, assailing Determinism unequivocally and emphatically. Dr. Bain has resolutely ignored our argument, and then complains of our not having *adduced* one. We cannot at all conjecture the cause of this singular omission.

Dr. Bain begins what he does say by a courteous remark, that in our article "some new aspects" of the Free Will question "have been opened up." We cannot, however, accept this compliment in anything like its full extent; because so much of our argument was built on Mr. Lloyd's pamphlet, which Dr. Bain has evidently never seen.\*

Dr. Bain's first adverse criticism is this:—

The writer too much identifies Determinism with the utilitarian theory of morals, or, indeed, with pure selfishness; for he regards Free Will as the only known counterpoise to selfish actions. Now it is true that, in illustrating the operation of motives, the opponents of Free Will describe these usually as "pleasures" or "pains;" being a convenient summary and representation of all possible motives. But they do not therefore maintain that all conduct is necessarily self-seeking. Many anti-libertarians assert in the strongest manner the existence of purely disinterested impulses. But the quoting of these disinterested motives—for example, pity and heroic self-devotion—would not alter one whit the state of the argument. As motives, these have a power to urge the will, and, when present alone, they determine it; in the case of a conflict, one side will succeed, which is thereby shown to be the stronger, and will prove so again should the situation be repeated (p. 498).

We reply, in the first place, that had we said what Dr. Bain supposes, we should have been entirely justified, by his and Mr. Mill's language, in ascribing to *them* the doctrine which he here disavows. All Determinists, we need not say, hold as their first principle that the will is infallibly determined by what they call the "strongest motive;" and it will be seen in the above paragraph how simply Dr. Bain takes this proposition for granted. Now, let the two following statements be observed, which we extracted from Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain respectively in April, 1874 (p. 329, note). Mr. Mill says (*the italics are ours*):—

Those who say that the will follows the strongest motive, do not

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\* "The Freedom of the Will stated afresh." By E. M. Lloyd. Longmans, 1868. Our own relation to that pamphlet is somewhat singular. Mr. Lloyd sent it to us for notice; and in January, 1869 (pp. 218—220), we commended it in terms, on the whole, of warm eulogy. For several years we thought no more about it, and we did not even look at it when we wrote our articles of 1874. We were reminded of it, however, by the references to it contained in Mr. Lucas's very thoughtful papers on "Free Will" in the "*Month*." And on perusing it again, we find that its influence on our own course of thought must have been much greater than we were at all aware of.



mean the motive which is strongest in relation to the will, or, in other words, that the will follows what it does follow. They mean the motive which is strongest *in relation to pain and pleasure*: since a motive, being a desire or aversion, is *proportional to the pleasantness* as conceived by us of the thing desired, or the *painfulness* of the thing shunned.

Still more pointedly Dr. Bain:—

It is only an identical proposition to affirm that the greatest of two pleasures, or what appears such, sways the resulting action: for it is the resulting action alone that determines which is the greater.

We quoted, of course, from Dr. Bain's second edition, which was then the most recent. Mr. H. W. Lucas mentions in one of his papers—we have not cared to verify the statement—that in Dr. Bain's third edition this sentence is not to be found. It is curious, that in this third edition he should complain of us for misunderstanding him; while at the same time, without making any avowal of the fact, he withdraws the very sentence which we had quoted as authenticating our view of his doctrine.

We should add that we were as far as possible from ascribing to Dr. Bain the doctrine we have just named, in the cruder and more obvious sense which many of his expressions would bear. On the contrary, every one who reads our April article, from p. 327 to p. 332, will see what very great pains we took to interweave his various dicta—which are not very easily susceptible of mutual reconciliation—into one consistent theory.

But now we reply, secondly, that no words could possibly be more express than those we used in *disclaiming* by anticipation the precise view which Dr. Bain ascribes to us. He thinks we hold Determinists, as such, responsible for the thesis, that the will is never influenced by “disinterested motives;” or, in other words, that the mind is never attracted towards action, except by the thought of personal enjoyment, positive or negative, in one or other shape. Now, no doubt, we held *Dr. Bain himself* responsible for this thesis, for the simple reason that, as has been seen, he distinctly expressed it. But we went out of our way to explain with most unmistakable clearness, that our argument against Determinism was not in the slightest degree affected by the cross controversy which Dr. Bain now raises. As the matter is of much importance, we will inflict on our readers a repetition of our whole passage.

As it is very important to avoid all possibility of cavil, it will be perhaps better to add one further explanation of the exact point at issue. Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain hold, that in each case the spontaneous impulse or inclination of the will is determined by *the balance of imme-*

diate pleasure; and (taking into account the various explanations they give of their statement) we are so far entirely in accord with them. But our own essential argument would not be affected in the slightest degree, if this theory of theirs were disproved. And it is worth while, at the risk of being thought tedious, to make this clear.

The essence of Determinism is the doctrine that, at any given moment, the will's movement is infallibly and inevitably determined by circumstances (1) internal, and (2) external: *i.e.*, (1) by the intrinsic constitution and disposition of the will, and (2) by the external influences which act on it. Now, no one doubts that in every man, during far the larger portion of his waking life, there exists what we have called a definite and decisive spontaneous impulse of his will. And Determinists allege that circumstances, internal and external, determine the will's actual movement, *precisely by determining its spontaneous impulse*. It is the very essence of Determinism therefore to allege that the will's actual movement is never divergent from its spontaneous impulse.

But it is a different question altogether, and one entirely irrelevant to the Deterministic controversy, to inquire *what* is exactly the fixed relation which exists between circumstances on the one hand, and the will's spontaneous impulse on the other. Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain adopt on this question the balance-of-pleasure theory; and here we agree with them. But quite imaginably philosophers might arise (though we think this very improbable) who should adduce strong arguments for some *different* theory on the subject. Now this, as our readers will see, is a cross controversy altogether, and in no way affects the issue between Determinism and its assailants. We have ourselves assumed, throughout our article, the balance-of-pleasure theory as confessedly and indisputably true; because (1) we account it the true one, and because (2) it is held by all the Determinists we ever heard of: but nothing would be easier than to mould our argument according to any different theory which might be established. The question between Determinists and ourselves is not at all how the will's spontaneous impulse is *formed*, but exclusively whether it is ever *resisted*. Determinists as such say that it is never resisted, and Indeterminists as such maintain the contrary (p. 335, note).

Dr. Bain's second adverse criticism is the following:—

Remarking upon the assertion of the Determinists that the number and complexity of the motive forces are the only obstacles to our foreseeing the course of any one's voluntary decisions—the writer throws upon us the burden of showing that any uncertainty or precariousness of prediction is due to this, and not to the Freedom of men's Will. We reply that this burden, on every principle of evidence, lies upon him. The rule of Nature is uniformity; this is to be accepted in all doubtful cases, until an exception is made good (p. 498).

Here is the paragraph to which we have already referred, as containing Dr. Bain's complaint, that we have thrown on Determinists the burden of proof. But if our readers will refer

to that passage of ours (pp. 354-5) on which Dr. Bain comments, they will see that the said passage is no part whatever of our *direct argument*; they will see that it occurs among our *answers to objections*. We had already given grounds—such as we have exhibited in the earlier part of our present article—for holding that the contradictory of Determinism is among the most certain, nay, the most obvious, of psychological facts. In our appeal to these facts we threw no burden of proof whatever on Dr. Bain or any other Determinist. Nothing could be more aggressive than our whole line of argument; nor, we may add, did we rest any part of that argument on the experienced impossibility of predicting human acts. Having established, as we consider, our doctrine, we proceeded to encounter the various objections against it which Determinists have alleged. Among these objections is one founded on “the number and complexity” of those attractions which at any given moment solicit the will. Dr. Bain entirely admits that there is great “uncertainty and precariousness” in any attempt to predict future human actions. We ascribe this fact in a considerable degree to Free Will; *he* ascribes it exclusively to that “number and complexity” of attractions which we just now mentioned. On this allegation of his we commented as follows: “Nowhere,” we said, “has any Determinist whatever attempted to show that this uncertainty and precariousness of prediction is due exclusively to the number and complexity of attractions; that it is not largely due to the Freedom of men’s Will. Yet, until they have shown this, they have shown nothing worth so much as a pin’s head towards the establishment of their theory” (p. 355). Our own argument, as we just now mentioned, was entirely independent of this particular question. Still, if (*per impossibile*) Determinists had been able to show that human conduct is capable of being predicted with certainty in the abstract,\*—they would have adduced an argument as irrefragable on their side as ours is on our side; and the net result would have been a contradiction in terms. We pointed out, therefore, that not only Determinists have not shown this, but that they have not even *attempted* to show it. These thinkers,—so intolerant of *à priori* theories, so earnest in upholding an exclusive appeal to experience,—in this particular allegation of theirs have not so much as *attempted* any appeal to experience. They base their conclusions entirely on *à priori*

\* By the phrase “capable of being predicted in the abstract,” we mean (as we explained in April, 1874, p. 355, note) “capable in itself of being predicted: capable of being predicted therefore by a person of superhuman and adequate intelligence, who should thoroughly penetrate the antecedent facts.”

theories; nay, on *a priori* theories of what we must really call the very flimsiest character.

This most strange circumstance, we say, is exhibited on the very surface, by that paragraph of Dr. Bain's which we have last quoted. He does not *profess* to prove the uniform sequence of human voluntary acts by any *observation* of such acts. His belief in the uniform sequence of those acts is based on considerations which he cannot himself pretend to be anything stronger than conjectures, more or less probable, derived from analogy. Even had these conjectures possessed indefinitely greater force in the way of probability than we can for a moment admit,—what nevertheless could possibly be their value? What could possibly be the value of mere conjecture—*probable* conjecture if you will—when opposed to certain and constant experience? What can possibly be the value of mere probability on one side, when weighed against absolute certainty on the other? But, in real truth, Dr. Bain's conjectural inferences do not carry with them so much as the slightest appearance of probability, unless he begin by *assuming* on his own side what is the one vital and fundamental point of difference between him and his opponents. A very few words will make this clear.

No doubt it is admitted by every one that all physical, and a large number of psychical, phenomena proceed ordinarily\* in the way of constant and uniform sequence. Therefore, argues Dr. Bain, it may be taken for granted as a matter of course, unless the contradictory be proved, that those psychical phenomena, which are called acts of will, *also* proceed in the way of constant and uniform sequence. Certainly we consider that we *have* proved most conclusively the contradictory of this. But what we are now urging is, that,—apart altogether from proof on our side,—Dr. Bain's inference is utterly fallacious on *his*, unless he *assume* what is the one vital and fundamental point at issue between him and the opposite school. The general uniformity of Nature, we say, does not afford the very slightest presumption that all acts of the *human will* are included in this uniformity—unless it be *assumed* that there is no such thing in *rerum naturâ* as morality in the Christian sense, nor any Moral Governor of the world. If there is a God Who rewards and punishes human acts, it is involved in the very notion of such a doctrine that human acts are free. The presumption, therefore, on which Dr. Bain relies, is on the surface palpably irrelevant, except as addressed to those who have already denied that there is a Moral Governor of the world. That an Atheist, in whatever way he

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\* "Ordinarily;" for we need not here discuss the question of *miracles*, on which we speak in the later portion of our Article.

veils his Atheism, will certainly repudiate Free Will—this is the very last thing we care to dispute. In our view, he has already given up all which to a reasonable man makes life worth the living; and Free Will to him would be the most inexplicable of portents.

Dr. Bain thus proceeds:—

The [DUBLIN] writer is surprised that no one has remarked what he admits to be a difficulty in Free Will, namely, that the power of resisting vicious impulses is so rarely exercised. The truth is, in the eyes of the scientific psychologists, Free Will, maintained purely as an aid to virtue, is an anomalous position, and not capable of being argued on the ordinary grounds of mental doctrines. If our consciousness seems to show something distinct from the uniform sequence of motive and act, it shows that equally for all sorts of conduct; the restriction to virtuous conduct is purely arbitrary, and, as already said, is not a psychological but a theological assumption (pp. 498-9).

There is one clause in this paragraph which we desire to note, as the only one which indicates any perception whatever on Dr. Bain's part, of what our line of argument had been. In this clause, and in this alone, he exhibits some vague kind of surmise, that we had appealed to "consciousness" as "showing in human action something distinct from the uniform sequence of motive and act." Why did he not extend his investigation further, and at least learn what were those particular *facts* of consciousness on which we relied?

Otherwise there is a certain difficulty in dealing with the paragraph before us, because it appears to confuse two totally distinct passages of ours. However, our obvious course will be to cite and defend the two in succession. In p. 337, then, of our April Article, we thus wrote:—

We need hardly say that, in our view, devout Theists are immeasurably the most virtuous class of human beings. Consequently, in our view, devout Theists will, with absolute certainty, immeasurably exceed other men in their anti-impulsive efforts; for the simple reason that they immeasurably exceed other men in the vigilant care with which they adjust their volitions with a standard which they consider supremely authoritative.

And in p. 341 we thus supplemented the above:—

Nor has the Determinist any right to ignore such facts, because he himself may believe that no God is cognisable, and that devout Theism is a superstition. If it be unmistakably proved that those who hold and act on a certain belief (however *untrue* he may consider that belief) do put forth great, or indeed any, anti-impulsive effort, he is bound in reason to abandon his theory.

If Dr. Bain is referring to these passages, he entirely misunderstands us when he says that we "maintain Free Will

purely as an aid to virtue." We hold most strongly that those who follow without resistance their will's spontaneous impulse are no whit less *free* in their act than those who resist it.\* We did not say that devout Theists "immeasurably exceed other men" in the number of their *free acts*, but in the frequency, or at least in the intensity, of "their *anti-impulsive efforts*." We were occupied in showing how undeniable a mental phenomenon it is, that men do from time to time resist their preponderating spontaneous impulse. "Even the mass of men who live mainly" or entirely "for this world, by no means" rarely, nay with considerable frequency, "do oppose themselves to the spontaneous impulse of their will" (p. 340). But devout Theists put forth immeasurably stronger and more sustained anti-impulsive effort than any other class; and it is by studying, therefore, the phenomena of *their* interior lives, that by far the most striking and emphatic proof of our thesis will be obtained.

If Dr. Bain asks *why* it is that Theists so very much exceed other men in the intensity and persistency of anti-impulsive effort, we gave a most intelligible reason. It is because "they immeasurably exceed other men in the vigilant care with which they adjust their volitions by a standard which they regard as supremely authoritative." Mr. H. W. Lucas, in the course of three very able Articles on Free Will contributed to the *Month* (February, April, June, 1878)—Articles in which he frequently refers to our own with much kindness of expression—thus develops our statement:—

Christian asceticism teaches a man to value the inward intention rather than the external deed. It teaches him to "watch his heart," to observe his thoughts, and to direct them as often as possible by positive acts to God, the end of his whole being. It brings prominently before his mind the practice of self-control as a most important exercise of the interior life. In short, it is hardly necessary to insist that the habit of "recollection" necessarily tends to multiply the daily number of . . . choiceful acts. Take, on the other hand, the case of a man who has no belief in the supernatural. He, too, often resists the greatest present impulse, either for the sake of others, or with a view to his own greater advantage in the future. But he does not value the practice of self-control as a constant means of meriting in the sight of an All-seeing Dispenser of reward and retribution. The self-control which he does exercise tends to become habitual—in other words, tends to embody itself in a new set of impulses; and his wish must be so to establish

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\* We said in April, 1874 (p. 347), that it will "in various ways be more convenient," when engaged in answering mere objections, to consider those objections as brought, not merely against Indeterminism, but against the full doctrine of Free Will. "Nor," we added, "is such a procedure in any way unfair to our opponents, but the very contrary; for it does but offer them a larger target to shoot at."



prudential and benevolent impulses in the mind, that foresight and benevolence may be frictionless: and there is no tendency to any higher kind of effort. Whereas, for the Christian ascetic, there are simply no limits to the process of self-perfection. He, too, endeavours to establish and cultivate virtuous impulses; but each set of such impulses once established becomes for him a platform from which to mount upwards to higher exercises of self-control.

According to our own humble view, then, all men—good, middling, and bad alike—are equally free. But good men exercise their Freedom very largely in *resisting* their preponderating spontaneous impulse; whereas it is characteristic of bad men, as such, that they so largely exercise their liberty in *abstaining* from that resistance to spontaneous impulse, which nevertheless is fully in their power.

But we are disposed to think that there is another psychological doctrine altogether entirely distinct from Indeterminism, which Dr. Bain has greatly in his mind, when he makes the comment we have just quoted. It is a fundamental principle of Catholic theology and philosophy that no one acts wickedly for wickedness' sake (*propter malitiam*). Thus, it happens that the philosophy of good and of evil acts proceeds respectively on a mutually different basis. He who is to act virtuously must in some sense pursue virtue.\* But the converse by no means holds, that he who acts wickedly is in any sense pursuing wickedness; for his wickedness precisely consists in his inordinate and (so to speak) unprincipled pursuit of *pleasure*. In a later part of our series we hope to set forth this great verity, with its psychological proof, as clearly and as fully as we can. Here we are only concerned with it incidentally, as throwing possible light upon the origin of Dr. Bain's mistake. Libertarians speak of Free Will as exercised in the direction of pursuing virtue, and again as exercised in the direction of pursuing pleasure, but never as exercised in the direction of pursuing wickedness. Moreover, they hold that *self-restraining* exercise of Free Will, or what we have called anti-impulsive effort, is with quite immeasurably greater frequency put forth in the direction of virtue, than of pleasure; because pleasure, of course, has only too great attractiveness of its own. Dr. Bain may have observed these statements; and inferred from them, that Libertarians "maintain Free Will purely as an aid to virtue." But such a statement, as we have

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\* So Dr. Mivart: "For an act to be good, it must be really directed by the doer to a good end, either actually or virtually. The idea of good, which he has in the past apprehended, must be influencing the man at the time, whether he adverts to it or not; otherwise the action is not moral."—"Lessons from Nature" (p. 118).

pointed out, implies a complete misapprehension of the doctrine we advocate.

Lastly, we must entirely deny Dr. Bain's allegation, that what we affirm is in any kind of way a "theological assumption." Doubtless, in arguing on philosophical ground against philosophers, we should be guilty of an intolerable sophism if we based our argument in any degree upon any *theological* doctrine—*i.e.*, on any doctrine which we do not claim to know otherwise than through Revelation. But not only we made no appeal to any such doctrine, we made no appeal even to Theism: which it would of course, indeed, have been grossly paralogistic to do, since we are maintaining Free Will as a premiss towards the *establishment* of Theism. We thought we had made all this quite clear in a passage which we just now quoted. The Determinist's theory is, that no man resists his strongest present impulse; and his theory therefore is conclusively and finally refuted if it be shown that any one man—and much more if it be shown that a large class of men—do often resist their strongest present impulse. The refutation of Determinism would be none the less irrefragable, though these resisters of their strongest present impulse were the most ignorant, the most superstitious, the most degraded of mankind. The appeal is made, not to any religious doctrine whatever, but to an observed psychical fact.

So much on the particular passage above quoted from our Article of April, 1874. But there is another entirely distinct passage, in quite a different part of that Article, to which, we fancy, Dr. Bain may partially refer. Here it is:—

One objection remains of a far more serious character, though it has not been adduced either by Mr. Mill, Dr. Bain, or, so far as we know, by any other writer of their school. "If all men," it may be asked, "possess so real a power of resisting their will's spontaneous impulse, how does it happen that this power is by comparison so inconsiderably exercised?" Against Catholics in particular as *ad homines* the same difficulty may be still more urgently pressed, "You hold that Catholics at least have full moral power, not only to avoid mortal sin, but to make the pleasing God the one predominant end of their life. Yet how few and far between are those of whom you will even allege that they do this—how amazingly few on the supposition that all have the needful power!" The difficulty here sketched demands the most earnest attention; but its treatment would carry us into a line of thought entirely different in kind from what has occupied us in our present Article. We will therefore defer its discussion to a future opportunity, content with having shown, by our mention of it, how very far we are from ignoring it or wishing to pass it over (pp. 360-361).

The reason for our having introduced, in some sense prema-

turely, these considerations, may be briefly stated. The ultimate purpose of our series, as we have so often explained, is to use these preliminary doctrines—Free Will, the reasonable basis of Morality, the principle of Causation, &c.—as so many steps towards the argumentative establishment of Theism. Now, the main consideration on which modern antitheists predominantly dwell—that which is both in itself immeasurably their most powerful stronghold, and is felt by them to be so—is the existence upon earth of *evil*, in that degree and kind which experience testifies. In our view, we frankly avow, all other religious difficulties put together do not even approach in gravity to this difficulty, though it stood alone. The contemplation of the world's existent state is, as F. Newman says, “a vision to dizzy and appal; and inflicts upon the mind the sense of a profound mystery, which is absolutely beyond human solution.” If, then, in our treatment of Theism we did not place practically and emphatically before our readers the full character and dimensions of this difficulty, it would be better not to write on our theme at all. Surely to say this is no exaggeration, but the simplest common sense. For what kind of persuasiveness could the advocate of Theism hope to exercise, who should be felt by his opponents—or again (which is even more important) by seriously perplexed inquirers—not really to *apprehend* that antitheistic argument which weighs with them more than do all the rest put together? We thought it therefore of great importance to show from the earliest moment how fully our mind is occupied, how deeply penetrated, by the truly tremendous fact on which antitheists lay such prominent stress. Now that portion of our series in which we catch, as it were, the first glimpse of this bewildering enigma is the discussion of Free Will; and we would not therefore allow that discussion to pass without showing that we carefully bore the difficulty in mind with a view to its future examination. It is not, of course, until we shall have set forth the absolutely impregnable basis on which Theism reposes that the opportune moment will have arrived for directly and, we hope, unflinchingly confronting the whole difficulty. At the same time, we may refer to an Article of October, 1874 (pp. 447-460), as precluding the full line of thought which we hope in due course to pursue.

For the moment, however, we have nothing to do with this difficulty, except so far as it may be accounted a refutation of the Free Will doctrine; and, considered in this narrow point of view, it is most easily disposed of. We claim to have established Indeterminism on absolutely irrefragable psychological grounds; and we further allege, that the arguments to be adduced in the

second part of our present paper develop with certainty the doctrine of Indeterminism into the full doctrine of Free Will. Now, the facts to which we draw attention in the above-quoted paragraph have not even the *primâ facie* appearance of *contradicting* this great doctrine. The thesis which (as we hold) we shall have conclusively established is, that the human will is free to resist its preponderating spontaneous impulse. The fact to which Dr. Bain draws attention is, that this power, if it exist, is at all events exercised in a comparatively inconsiderable degree, at least as regards persistence and intensity. Well, there is not here even the *primâ facie* appearance of *contradiction*. To say that a certain power exists, is not even *primâ facie* incompatible with saying that it is comparatively little exercised. Let us take a somewhat grotesque illustration. Dr. Bain does not doubt that the immense majority of adults possess a permanent power of standing for a short time on one leg: yet out of the million millions who possess this power, how many and how often are they in the habit of exercising it? The utmost which can be said is, that the fact, to which we draw attention, renders the doctrine of Free Will an *improbable* one. Well, let us concede so much, at least for argument's sake. Still, whereas the *objection* to Free Will cannot possibly be alleged as going beyond the sphere of *probability*, the argument in its *favour* is irresistibly *conclusive*. And probability on one side (we need not say) is simply worthless against certainty on the other.

Dr. Bain proceeds :—

Libertarians admit that to strengthen a good motive by good education, inculcation, or other means, and obversely to weaken some vicious motive, would have the very same effect as the supposed outburst of free and uncaused will. Why not, therefore, be content with an assumption that is thoroughly consistent with the whole of Nature's working, rather than admit an exceptional principle that hardly admits of intelligible wording? (p. 499).

We protest at starting against Dr. Bain using the terms "free" and "uncaused" as synonymous; but on this we are to speak in the second part of our Paper.

Secondly, it is strange we should have to impress on Dr. Bain that what he represents all Libertarians as *admitting*, is precisely what we emphatically and energetically *deny*. To "strengthen a motive" (using the word "motive" in Dr. Bain's sense), has an effect fundamentally and most pointedly different from that produced by an "outburst of Free Will." By "strengthening a good motive,"—or (as we should express it) by intensifying the influence of some healthy attraction,—I change for the better my will's preponderating spontaneous impulse; but an "out-

burst" of freedom is characteristically manifested by *resistance* to such impulse.

Thirdly, Dr. Bain asks why we should not be "content" with his "assumption." He speaks as though the controversy between him and us were of no very serious and vital matter; whereas the ultimate question is nothing less than this, whether there be or be not a Moral Governor of the world. We should have thought antitheists were at one with Theists in distinctly recognising that what is at issue between the two parties is about the most momentous and awful alternative which can agitate the human mind.

Dr. Bain continues:—

The writer in the DUBLIN REVIEW allows that "in proportion as men have passed through the earlier part of their probation, and established firm habits of virtue, in that proportion their resistance to predominant temptation (but only within certain limits\*) may be predicted with much confidence." But if good habits and good training do so much, how do we know that they are not the sole and sufficient cause of moral goodness? And how can we find out where their influence ceases, and the influence of an unpredictable volition begins? (p. 499).

Dr. Bain here expresses himself as though we considered all free acts absolutely unpredictable; whereas, in the very paragraph which he quotes from us, we were arguing that free acts are by no means entirely incapable of more or less approximate prediction. Mr. Mill had argued that human action is in greater degree predictable than it would be if man possessed Free Will. We maintained against him (April, 1874, p. 355) "that no power of foreseeing man's conduct can be alleged as known by experience, which presents even the superficial appearance of implying any greater certainty and uniformity of human action, than might have been fully anticipated from our own doctrine." As part of our argument for this thesis, we wrote (p. 356) the passage which Dr. Bain quotes. In many cases (such was our remark), even that standing refutation of Determinism—a man's resistance to predominant temptation†—may be predicted with much confidence. Suppose A have

\* Dr. Bain *italicises* these five words.

† In April, 1874 (p. 344, note), we explained what we meant by the phrase "predominant temptation." "A person," we pointed out, "may be said to be visited by 'temptation,' whenever he is solicited by any attraction to forbidden pleasure; even though that attraction be more than counterbalanced by other divergent ones. By using the term 'predominant' temptation then, we refer to a case in which the attractions towards forbidden pleasure *predominate* over other co-existing attractions; so that the will's preponderating spontaneous impulse is in a sinful direction."

acquired a strong habit of resistance to evil impulses,—and suppose the predominant temptation which at any given moment assails him be inconsiderable,—the fact that he resists predominant temptation *at all* is a conclusive proof of his freedom ; but, nevertheless, if I know him intimately, I can predict as a matter of extreme probability that he *will* resist. Nevertheless my power of probable prediction does not extend beyond “certain limits.” Let the predominant temptation be, on another occasion, indefinitely *stronger*,—I may be in the greatest doubt and anxiety as to how he will comport himself under his probation. What can be simpler and more intelligible than this?

There is one little matter, however, here which still requires explanation, though Dr. Bain has not referred to it. In our Article of July, 1874, we thus argued ; and we have quoted the passage in a previous page. “What,” we asked, “can ‘motives,’ or ‘circumstances,’ or ‘temperament,’ or ‘habit,’ or ‘custom’ imaginably do for me, except to effect that my *desire* shall be this rather than that? How can they imaginably influence my action in those cases where my action is *contrary* to my strongest present desire?” Yet in the passage cited by Dr. Bain we have averred that habit can be of very important service,—not only as effecting that my present strongest desire shall be this rather than that,—but also, and even more importantly, in facilitating my *resistance* to my strongest present desire. Are not these two statements, it may be asked, mutually contradictory?

The direct answer to this objection is extremely simple. In July, 1874, we placed the words “habit,” “motives,” and the rest within inverted commas, to show that we were using them in the sense given them by Determinists. Now, we explained in April, 1874 (p. 343, note), that Dr. Bain in his whole treatment of moral habits—and we suppose all other Determinists do the same—entirely omits all reference to that most important factor in the formation of a moral habit, the will’s repeated anti-impulsive efforts. This is, so far, to his philosophical credit ; as he shows entire consistency in shutting his eyes to that psychical fact—men’s repeated resistance to their strongest present desire—on which we have throughout laid such prominent stress. And we still entirely hold what we set forth in July, 1874 : we hold that “habit,” as described by Dr. Bain, cannot imaginably “do anything for me, except to effect that my” strongest present “desire shall be this rather than that.”

It will be far more satisfactory, however, if we do not content ourselves with this logically sufficient reply ; if we add a few



words on the relation which exists between moral habit on the one side and anti-impulsive effort on the other. First, however, we would remind our readers that the fact itself of men resisting their strongest present desire is, as we have so often urged, by itself a standing demonstration of Indeterminism. And we would especially insist on the very obvious circumstance, that this demonstration is no whit less irrefragable—if only the *fact* of resistance be admitted—whatever the degree of *facility* with which, in any given case, the resistance may be accomplished. The essential doctrine of Determinism is, that men, by the very constitution of their nature, inevitably obey their strongest present desire. This allegation is conclusively refuted by one single *fact* of resistance; the question of greater or less *facility* being simply irrelevant.

These remarks being premised, we are now to consider the permanent effect produced on a man's mind in the way of habit, by a sufficient series of anti-impulsive efforts. It will be found on consideration, we believe, that this effect consists of two entirely different particulars. We are not, of course, attempting to set forth in detail the full theory of habits, but only saying so much as is required for our immediate purpose. And we will take, by way of illustration, an instance to which we have more than once referred: the instance of some brave soldier receiving a most bitter insult, and taking it patiently. In time past he has received many such insults, greater or less as it may be, and in every instance by a strong anti-impulsive effort (united, doubtless, with earnest prayer—but that is not to our present purpose) has compelled himself to behave Christianly under the temptation. One effect of these repeated acts will have been, importantly to elevate what, on any given occasion, is his will's preponderating spontaneous impulse. There is many a little insult he now receives, which some years ago would have generated a spontaneous predominant desire of retaliation, but which now engenders no such predominant desire whatever: his will's strongest present *desire* is to forgive the offender. Let us suppose, however, that the insult is of a specially stinging character, and that his will's preponderating spontaneous impulse is in the evil direction. Here the *second* good result of his previous anti-impulsive efforts comes into clear view and into practical exercise. He finds it far easier now than he did ten years ago, to "conquer nature" (as ascetical writers say), and to resist his strongest present desire. Here, then, are two quite different results effected in his mind by his past anti-impulsive efforts. Firstly, his will's spontaneous impulse on any given occasion is much more in the direction of virtue than would otherwise have been the case; and, secondly, his

resistance to a preponderating spontaneous evil impulse (should such arise) is much readier and easier than it would otherwise have been. Dr. Bain, in his theory of moral habit, sees clearly enough the first of these two results, but is entirely blind to the second.

He next argues thus:—

The existence of such an uncertain power [as Free Will] is as likely to discourage as to encourage the understood means of virtuous training; unless we suppose that the Free Will impulse is a grant proportioned to the goodness of the previous training (p. 499).

It is a continually increasing surprise how it can be that a thinker of Dr. Bain's great ability and generally keen psychological insight, so persistently fails in catching even a glimpse of what his opponents mean. What Libertarian ever called "the Free Will impulse" a "*grant*?" According to Libertarians, it is precisely and critically the contradictory of a "*grant*;" being the agent's own self-determined choice. God grants to men, no doubt, the *power* of free choice; but it is implied in the very idea of that power that the choice itself is no grant from God at all.

Next comes the argument, which Determinists are very fond of adducing, that belief in Free Will "is as likely to discourage as to encourage the understood means of virtuous training." We replied to this argument in April, 1874. In pp. 342-3 we set forth the immense value of virtuous training and habits; and we dwelt on these as one principal cause of "the indubitable fact that very frequently the spontaneous impulse of a devout Theist's will is one of high virtue." We also drew attention (p. 345) to the "very frequent phenomenon," "that a devout man—even when his will's spontaneous impulse leads to a virtuous act—proceeds nevertheless by an effort to make his act more virtuous (*i.e.*, more efficaciously directed to the virtuous end) than otherwise it would be." The advantage then of virtuous training and habits is not less inestimably great on the Libertarian than on the Deterministic hypothesis. Who, indeed, in the whole world are more urgent than Catholics in upholding the necessity of careful religious education? Yet who are more uncompromising advocates of Free Will?

We have now quoted textually every syllable in which Dr. Bain directly replies to our Article. But a page follows, occupied with miscellaneous denunciations of that doctrine which is so distasteful to him. Free Will, if it existed, would be a "mysterious uncertainty that baffles all prediction" (p. 499); its acts would be a series of "caprices" "that no man could predict, and therefore no man trust to" (p. 500); it would be a power which

may "forsake a man in some critical moment when he most wants it;" "a power that comes from nothing, has no beginning, follows no rule, respects no known time or occasion [!], operates without impartiality" [!!] (*Ibid.*). In one word, this alleged Free Will is "an influence that we can take no account of; that we do not know how to conciliate or to appease; an inscrutable fate, realising all the worst results that have ever been attributed to the sternest deliverances of the necessitarian and the fatalist" (*Ibid.*). It seems almost impossible to grapple with such wild statements as these. According to Dr. Bain, when I say that within a certain sphere I can act as I choose, this is equivalent to saying that, within the said sphere, I am governed by an "inscrutable fate" external to myself. In other words, to say that I have *full* control over my actions, is to say that I have no control over them whatever. The "deliverances of the necessitarian and the fatalist" he admits to be "stern;" but to say that I am neither fated nor necessitated, he accounts still sterner. He has failed to explain, however, what third alternative remains.

Perhaps it will be more satisfactory if we place the issue before our readers in a concrete shape. And we begin with a very obvious remark. The doctrine of Free Will which we are to discuss, must be the doctrine of Free Will, not as travestied by its opponents, but as clothed in that particular shape in which its advocates hold it. Dr. Bain, we say, was bound to contemplate the doctrine, not from his own religious or non-religious stand-point, but from the stand-point of those who are zealous for its maintenance. But who are these? Indubitably they are the thinkers, who consider the one fundamental verity of man's life to be God's moral government of the world; who hold as the one true principle of human action, that good acts meet with divine reward, and evil acts with divine chastisement. Such a man knows, let us say, that in a short time he will be visited by some serious temptation, and is full of anxiety as to the issue. Determinists tell him: "Whether you do or do not resist this temptation, is an alternative no more within your power than is the alternative whether to-morrow will be a fine day or rainy. The result depends exclusively and infallibly on circumstances, external and internal, over which you have no control whatever." He replies at once, that if this were the true law of human action, it would be as unjust in the Creator to punish him for evil actions as for evil dreams. Far different is the language of Libertarians. "The whole issue," they tell him, "rests critically and in the last resort simply with yourself. Begin at once to pray God for strength; impress carefully on

your mind the motives which will avail you in your trial ; work at this day after day ; when the decisive moment comes, place your trust in God, and put forth at the same time your own hearty effort. Do all this, and success is absolutely certain. Such preparatory exercises may be somewhat irksome, and the crowning effort itself will no doubt be in some sense distasteful ; but God has given you the power, as experience will at once show you, to resist your will's preponderating impulse, and to overcome all the difficulties which lie in your path. *Sursum corda.*" Here is an intelligible and consoling doctrine, which every moral agent can take and use to his unspeakable blessedness, and which places God's moral governance before his eyes as a living and satisfying reality. But Determinists, who follow Dr. Bain's lead, tell him that such advice would make him place his trust in "caprices of his will, which no man can predict, and therefore no man can trust to ;" in an agency "which may forsake him in some critical moment when he most wants it ;" in "an influence that he can take no account of, nor know how to conciliate or appease ;" in "an inscrutable fate realising all the worst results that have ever been attributed to the sternest deliverances of the necessitarian or the fatalist." Surely all this is more like the invective of a rhetorician than the utterances of a grave philosopher.

Here, then, having replied in detail to the whole of Dr. Bain's reply, we close the first part of our Paper.

#### CAUSATION AND FREE WILL.

In our reply to Dr. Bain's objections we have made ourselves responsible, as we explained in a note, for the full doctrine of Free Will. But our readers will remember, that in our positive exposition we have not advanced beyond the psychological doctrine of "Indeterminism." Determinists allege, as an observed psychical fact, "that volitions follow determinate moral antecedents with the same uniformity and the same certainty as physical effects follow their physical causes ;" that the will's course of action is infallibly and inevitably determined at every moment by the circumstances (1) internal, (2) external, of that moment. We have entirely denied this alleged psychical fact ; in support of that denial we have appealed to a thousand undeniable mental phenomena ; and by so doing have established (we consider) the doctrine of Indeterminism. This doctrine, however, is purely a negative one ; it is simply the doctrine, that the doctrine of Determinism is false. Our next step must be, by introducing the metaphysical principle of Causation, to develop the negative psychological doctrine of Indeterminism into the positive metaphysical doctrine of Free Will. It will

not be requisite to elaborate our present argument with any extraordinary care, because all the essential part of our controversy with the Determinists has now been brought to an end. There never has been and there never will be a philosopher, who, on the one hand, admits that doctrine of Indeterminism maintained by us in 1874, and also that doctrine of Causation maintained by us in 1876, who, on the other hand, would hesitate for a moment to accept the entire doctrine of Free Will.

It was in July, 1876, that we treated this doctrine of Causation; and we should be glad if, at the present point of our argument, our readers would peruse what we there said, from p. 64 to p. 81. It will be in many ways convenient, however, if we here reproduce that portion of our then remarks, which has a more especial bearing on the Free Will question. And, in particular, we must remind our readers of the fundamentally different sense in which the word "cause" is used by Phenomenists (who are always Determinists) and by Intuitionists respectively.\* This distinction requires especially to be borne in mind, when we are engaged with our present theme. Determinists uniformly allege that the doctrine of Free Will represents certain voluntary actions as being external to the sphere of "causation;" whereas, in the Libertarian's view, it is precisely *free* acts which testify the principle of "causation" more prominently and emphatically than do any other mental phenomena whatever. It is really astounding (this is not too strong a word) to observe, how uniformly Determinists forget (what it is impossible they should not know) that they use the word "causation" in a sense fundamentally different from that given it by the opposite school.

For instance. The Phenomenist and Intuitionist agree in saying, that the sun "causes" light and warmth.† But by so speaking, the Phenomenist only means that that phenomenon which is called the sun's presence is "universally and uncon-

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\* As to the sense in which we use the words "Phenomenists," "Intuitionists," see especially the same Article, p. 58.

† We do not forget the theory of that excellent philosopher, Dr. Martineau—a theory hardly different from what is called "occasionalism"—that no substance can be a true "cause" unless it be intelligent. This theory, however, is comparatively rare among Intuitionists, and it will be more convenient to ignore it in our text. There is no Theistic conclusion, we believe, which we purport to establish by our method, which Dr. Martineau could not equally establish by his. But it would be most inconveniently periphrastical if we laboured so to construct our language throughout as to include his theory. And at last—for reasons given in our Article of July, 1876—we must be permitted (in a spirit removed most widely from any disrespect) to account that theory a mistaken one.

ditionally" (to use Mr. Mill's phrase) followed by those two other groups of phenomena, which are called the presence of light and of warmth. He recognises no kind of "influx" or "agency" in the sun, as regards the production of light and warmth. He recognises no closer nexus between the sun and the sensation of warmth than between the first letter of the alphabet and the second; or between the moment of time which we call "eleven o'clock" and the moment of time which we call "five minutes past eleven." In one word, by "causation" he means no more than "uniform phenomenal sequence." But, according to the Intuitionist's view, as exhibited by us in July, 1876, the case is very different. The idea of "cause" is as entirely distinct from that of "phenomenal sequence," as any one idea in the whole world is distinct from any other. That very notion of "influx" or "agency," which a Phenomenist *excludes* from the idea of "cause"—is the precise notion which an Intuitionist *expresses* by that term. Such was our statement in July, 1876; and we will here quote a portion of what we then set forth:—

"The idea 'cause,'" we said (p. 74), "is a simple idea not composed of any others;\* and, on the other hand, it is a purely intellectual idea, not a copy of any thing experienced by the senses. Now of course," we added, "there is a certain difficulty in explaining an idea of this kind. Were it a copy of some sensation, we could content ourselves with referring to such sensation. Were it a compound of simpler ideas, we could explain it by reciting those simpler ideas. But neither of these methods being (by hypothesis) available, we can only suggest the occasions on which an inquirer may unmistakably recognise what is undoubtedly a very prominent part of his mental furniture. Now, the illustration commonly given by philosophers of a 'cause' seems to us most happily chosen; as the very one in which that idea is exhibited with especial distinctness and prominence. We refer to the influx of a man's volitions into his bodily acts. I am urgently in need of some article contained in a closet of which I cannot find the key; and accordingly I break open the closet with my fist. Certainly my idea of the relation which exists between my volition and my blow, is most absolutely distinct from that of universal and unconditional sequence. If, on the one hand, the idea of 'cause' is incapable of being analysed, on the other hand it is to the full as incapable of being explained away or misapprehended. The idea is as characteristic and as

\* In July, 1876 (p. 69, and note), we explained that by the word "cause" we throughout meant what Catholic philosophers call "the efficient cause." Moreover, we exclude the "moral cause," which they usually include under "the efficient."



clamorously distinguished from every other, as is that of 'sweet,' or 'melodious,' or 'white.' Phenomenists may deny that it corresponds with any objective reality; but they cannot deny that it is in fact conceived by the human mind, without exposing themselves to the intellectual contempt of every one who possesses the most ordinary intelligence and introspective faculty." Then,—so much being understood as to the meaning of this word "cause,"—Intuitionists maintain that this indubitably existing idea does correspond with an objective reality. And when therefore they say that the sun "causes" light and warmth, they mean—not that that phenomenon which is called the sun's presence is uniformly and unconditionally followed by those other groups of phenomena which are called the presence of light and warmth—but that that *substance*, which is called the sun, exercises a *power*, which they call the "causal" power, of *diffusing* light and warmth.

It is implied, we may add, in their whole notion of a "cause," that a cause must be one or other *substance*. When they mention the influx of my volition into some blow which I deal forth, they would thus explain their meaning in detail. The blow is nothing else than a certain movement of my closed hand. The cause of that movement is my soul; which addresses, if we may so speak, to my hand that command, which is called a "volition."

It seems to us accordingly of great importance that, in all philosophical discussion, an Intuitionist shall abstain with great care from using the word "causation" in the sense which Phenomenists give to it. Yet what they call "causation" is so extremely important a fact, and so constantly requires the philosopher's notice, that some expression for it is a kind of necessity. Accordingly we took the liberty of coining a terminology for the purpose (p. 68). Throughout what remains therefore of our series, we shall use the word "prevenant," to express what Phenomenists call a "cause;" "postvenant," to express what they call an "effect;" "prevenance," to express what they call "causation."

It will be understood then at once that what they call "the law of causation," and we call "the law of prevenance," is simply the well-known law of *uniform phenomenal sequence*. It is no difficult matter to understand what is meant by that law; and we have nowhere seen it more clearly set forth, than in some sentences of Mr. Mill's, which we quoted in July, 1876, p. 65. As we pointed out however in the same article (p. 66)—even in regard to the *existence* of this law, there is a very important difference between Phenomenists and Intuitionists. The former consider it absolutely

universal; whereas Intuitionists regard it as *generally* holding indeed, but nevertheless as subject to two important exceptions. "In the first place they hold, that this uniformity of nature is interrupted with indefinite frequency by miracles and other prodigies. And in the second place they maintain," as we have been maintaining in our present paper, "that one most important class of psychical phenomena—viz., human volitions—are largely external to the common law of uniformity."

Having made clear then what we meant by "cause," we proceeded in July, 1876 (pp. 75-7) to take a further step. We proceeded to set forth what appear to us conclusive psychological grounds for holding, as a self-evident truth, as a philosophical axiom, that "whatever has a commencement has a cause." This we called the "doctrine" or "principle" of "causation" or "causality." And when we speak of *psychology* as establishing a *metaphysical* truth, there is of course one fundamental premiss on which we build our argument. This premiss (see July, 1876, p. 61) is the doctrine which we call "the principle of certitude," and which we have maintained to be the first principle of all possible knowledge. It is the doctrine, that whatever a man's existent cognitive faculties, if rightly interrogated and interpreted, avouch as certain, is thereby *known* to him as certain.

It will conduce to a clear apprehension of our future argument if, before proceeding further, we compare in detail those two theories regarding the phenomenal world, which are advocated by the Intuitionist and the Phenomenist respectively. In what immediately follows therefore, we are not professing to adduce any *argument* whatever; we are merely exhibiting the two antagonistic views, for the purpose of more distinct apprehension. And firstly (to repeat a previous remark) in regard to one particular class of mental phenomena—viz., deliberate acts of human will,—the Intuitionist excepts them, whereas the Phenomenist does not except them, from the otherwise prevailing law of uniform sequence. Putting these however on one side, the Intuitionist and Phenomenist alike hold that phenomena, both physical and psychical, ordinarily proceed according to the law of prevenience. The Phenomenist however considers that this is an ultimate fact, proved by experience and in no other way; though we have more than once called on him to adduce, if he can, any even plausible *reason* for his affirmation, that experience, taken by itself, would warrant any such conclusion.\* The Intuitionist takes up entirely different

\* See October, 1871, pp. 311-317; and our reply to Mr. Mill's reply, January, 1874, pp. 32-38.

Our own humble opinion is, that the law of prevenience cannot be

ground. He holds that "prevenience" is the *result* of "causation." According to him, *e.g.*, those groups of phenomena, which are called the presence of light and warmth, follow ordinarily on that phenomenon which is called the sun's presence, simply because that *substance*, which is called the sun, has the causative *power* of *diffusing* light and warmth. And so in every other instance of prevenience. Then this difference of view leads to another, which we should not fail to point out. The Phenomenist and Intuitionist agree, we have said, in holding, that phenomena *ordinarily* proceed according to the law of prevenience. But Intuitionists have no philosophical difficulty whatever in admitting those exceptions to prevenience, which are called *miracles*; whereas the Phenomenist, if he would be consistent, must resolutely deny the fact of their existence.\* Let us assume, *e.g.*, it were alleged on grounds of human testimony, that, on one most solemn occasion, the sun, being present, failed to diffuse light. The historical proof of such a statement (for anything we here say) may or may not be satisfactory. But as a matter of *philosophy*, the Intuitionist sees in it no difficulty whatever. In such a case (he would say) the sun's effect does not come into actual existence, because of a counter-acting effect which is at the same moment produced by the immediate causative act of God. But the Phenomenist is compelled by his philosophical theory (if he be consistent) to be proof against any amount of testimony, which may be adduced for such a miraculous fact. In his view, the one sole foundation of human knowledge is men's undeviating experience of phenomenal uniformity. To admit therefore, that in any one case—still more, that in a series of cases—there has been an experienced *interruption* of that uniformity, would be to overthrow his whole structure of knowledge from its very foundation.

In the view of an Intuitionist then, there are three different classes of phenomena, for which the philosopher is required to assign a proximate cause.† First we will mention those phenomena which he calls free acts of the will; and to what proximate

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established as certain, by appealing exclusively to facts of experience; and that neither can it be established as certain, by appealing exclusively to the principle of causation: but that it can be established with certainty by appealing to *both* these sources of knowledge in mutual combination. This thesis however requires to be worked out with great care, and it is entirely external to the course of our own argument.

\* See July, 1876, pp. 70—72.

† By a "proximate" cause, we need hardly say, we mean "a substance which produces the effect, without intervention of any other substance." If I am stabbed, the proximate cause of my wound is not the aggressor's *hand*, but his *dagger*.

cause he refers *them*, is the very inquiry which we are immediately to institute. Secondly we may name those phenomena which he accounts miraculous; and the proximate cause of these, in his view, is the First Cause, God. Lastly we will consider that enormously large series of phenomena, physical and psychical, which proceed according to the law of prevenience. As to physical phenomena—we are distinguishing these for the moment from psychical—their proximate causes are those innumerable physical substances, which exist in the universe, each possessing its own permanent properties and forces. It is these substances which, in accordance with their action and interaction, causatively produce those physical phenomena, which surround men on all sides, and which proceed according to the law of prevenience. But now as regards those *psychical* phenomena, which proceed in the soul of any given man according to the law of prevenience. Of these there may be in any given man either one proximate cause, or two, but never more. One proximate cause is his soul, possessing its own forces, properties, acquired habits. In many instances however (whether or no in all), another proximate cause co operates—viz., his *body*. For his body, in many instances at least, by its own properties, powerfully conduces to psychical results.

Here then we close our exposition, and resume our thread of *argument*. Let us recount in inverse order the three statements we have just made, and see how far we have hitherto adduced sufficient proof of their truth. Firstly then, as regards those physical and psychical phenomena which proceed according to the law of prevenience,—we consider that the statement which we have just made has been conclusively established in our article of July, 1876. Secondly, as regards those phenomena which the Intuitionist accounts miraculous, we consider that our statement as yet is entirely unproved. At the present stage of our argument, we have no right whatever to assume that God exists, still less that He works miracles. And now thirdly, as regards those phenomena of the human will which we have already shown to be outside the law of prevenience,—we will proceed without further delay to inquire what is *their* proximate cause. We begin with a preliminary remark.

From the doctrine of causation already laid down, a further conclusion at once results. The sun, we have said, is a proximate cause of light and warmth. But the sun itself had a commencement, and therefore must have a cause. The sun is a cause indeed, but a *caused* cause—an “intermediate” cause. Our present purpose however is not to insist at length on this truth; because the more appropriate place for insisting on it will be at that portion of our series, in which we hope here-

after to exhibit the well-known argument for a First Cause. What we here wish to point out, is an extremely important distinction which may imaginably exist, between one and another class of these intermediate causes. In regard to those phenomena which proceed according to the law of prevenience,—it is manifest that their proximate causes are determined, in any given instance, by strictest necessity to one fixed and definite result. Every such proximate cause has its proper effect marked out for it, and must produce that proper effect neither more nor less. The sun, *e.g.*, must cause at any moment that precise amount of light and warmth, neither exceeding nor falling short, which is determined according to the law of prevenience. If two or more proximate causes are at work together, the effect of one will no doubt be often modified by the effect of the other; but this fact is of course in no way inconsistent with what we have just said. Nor would our remark be less indubitable, though at such moment some preternatural intervention were effected with the course of phenomena. Even on such a supposition, the cause itself, as we have already said, would none the less exercise activity towards its proper effect; though that effect might be prevented from coming into actual existence, because of a counteracting effect simultaneously produced by some *preternatural* cause. In all such cases then, we say, the proximate cause has its own proper effect marked out for it by strictest and most absolute necessity. Let us call such causes “blind” causes.\* So the sun, the earth, that stone, this knife, the pen I hold, is a “blind” cause of its appropriate effects.

Turning from physical to psychical phenomena, the same doctrine holds. Let us consider those various psychical phenomena of mine, which proceed according to the law of prevenience. In the case of all these phenomena, it is involved (by hypothesis) in the very constitution of my nature, that, given certain psychical and corporeal antecedents, one definite group of psychical consequents infallibly and inevitably follows. My soul and body then, in jointly producing this phenomenal group, have their proper agency marked out for them by strictest and most absolute necessity: they are causes indeed, but “blind” causes. If it be not too grotesque an illustration, consider what happens when water is boiled in a kettle. The water possesses certain

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\* The distinction in the text is substantially equivalent to the distinction made by Catholic philosophers between a “necessary” and a “free” cause. But it appeared more appropriate not to use the latter phrase, until the doctrine of Freedom should be established.

We shall make no further reference in our text to cases of preternatural intervention. They do not, as has been seen, at all affect our argument; and we have sufficiently shown that we do not forget their possibility.

forces and properties of its own; the fire possesses certain forces and properties of its own; and when the two substances are brought into due proximity, they produce by their joint causative agency that phenomenon of the former, which is called "boiling." Apply the analogy to any one of my psychical phenomena, which proceeds according to the law of prevenience. My soul possesses certain forces and properties; my body possesses certain forces and properties; and on the occurrence of certain given circumstances, on a certain given occasion, the two substances produce, by their joint causative agency, that phenomenon of the former, which is called, *e.g.*, an "emotion."

So much then on "blind causes." But now we can at all events easily *imagine*, that there may be what we will call an "originative" intermediate cause. We can easily imagine, that some substance shall not be determined by its superior cause with strict and inevitable necessity to one fixed effect; but on the contrary, shall be permitted a certain latitude of choice. Nor again have we any difficulty in imagining, that the very same substance may be necessitated to act as a "blind" cause in regard to one class of its effects, while nevertheless it can act as an "originative" cause in regard to another class. It is involved of course in the whole supposition, that the substance, which acts as an originative cause, must be an *intelligent* substance, such as is the human soul. Moreover, whereas we have said that our supposition is an easily *imaginable* one, we are not aware of any philosopher who has attempted to show that it is one intrinsically impossible.

Our readers will, by this time, have anticipated the course which our remarks are to pursue. Let us take the particular case to which we have so often referred. I have just received some stinging insult; and I am at this moment conscious of two entirely different psychical phenomena, which irresistibly force themselves on my attention. One of these is my preponderating spontaneous impulse; which powerfully prompts me to plans of retaliation. The other phenomenon is my firm and unflinching *resistance* to that impulse. The two phenomena continue in mutual company for a considerable period; and we are now to consider the proximate cause of each. Now, as to the former, we are in one most important respect altogether accordant with the Determinists. We hold, as they do, that, by the very constitution of my nature, my preponderating spontaneous impulse follows, by infallible and inevitable consequence, from antecedent phenomena; that it is most strictly determined by the law of prevenience. It results therefore from our principles, that the *proximate causes* of this preponderating spontaneous impulse,—viz., my soul and my body,—are here acting as "blind" causes.



But now as to the *accompanying* phenomenon, my *resistance* to this impulse: what is *its* proximate cause? Its proximate cause is manifestly my soul.\* But in this case does my soul act as a "blind" cause? Most certainly not. A blind cause is necessitated to act according to the law of phenomenal prevenience; whereas we trust we have abundantly shown, both in our articles of 1874 and in the earlier part of our present paper, that the law of prevenience issues in my preponderating spontaneous impulse, and by no means in my active *resistance* to that impulse. My soul then, in producing a psychical phenomenon of this latter kind, acts as an "originative" cause: it acts in virtue of a power (which it is thereby shown, within certain limits to possess) of *choosing an alternative*. As a blind cause, it is co-operating with my body in producing its own preponderating spontaneous impulse; and at the same moment, as an originative cause, it is effecting its own free *resistance* to that impulse.

And here we would earnestly press on our reader's notice a fact of extreme importance which (we are confident) will be admitted as certain by every one who fairly examines what takes place in his own mind. Consider those various periods of time during which I am occupied in vigorously resisting certain solicitations—*e.g.*, to revengefulness—which intensely beset me. It is a matter of direct, unmistakable, clamorous consciousness, that during those periods it is my own soul and no external agency which is putting forth active and sustained anti-impulsive effort. Nor, indeed, is this remark less applicable to *all* cases of anti-impulsive effort; though, of course, where the effort is less vigorous, the consciousness of which we speak is less obtrusive.

But more than this may be said. The experience which I obtain even in one such protracted and vehement struggle is simply sufficient to give me an intimate and infallible knowledge of one all-important fact. We refer to the fact, that at every moment of the struggle it has depended on my own free choice with what degree of efficacy I have contended against the temptation. We shall have to pursue this subject in some detail on a future occasion.†

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\* For we heartily follow Mr. Lucas (the *Month*, February, 1878, p. 244) in holding that "no one in these days need concern himself to maintain, in scholastic language, a real distinction between the soul and its faculties."

† We abstain from saying, with some Libertarians, that the free agent is at every moment directly and immediately *conscious* of his freedom; because it seems to us unintelligible how the direct and immediate consciousness of one given moment can testify an abiding *power*. See our remarks in *April*, 1874, pp. 351-2. Our own way of

In the above view of originative causation we have not spoken of my *body* as co-operating with my soul; because (as we have already pointed out) an originative cause must necessarily be an intelligent substance. Nor have we hesitated at last to use the word "free"—because, as we shall immediately point out, the notion of freedom is included in the notion of an originative cause.

Many Libertarians, when explaining Free Will, are in the habit of introducing reference to the human personality; to the "Ego." We do not find this necessary; and if it be not necessary, we think it very undesirable. Those questions which concern the "Ego" are so intricate, and (we may add) so intimately mixed up with theological dogma, that their treatment requires most anxious care. Nor can we see that the true doctrine of human personality, whatever it may be, has any special relevance to the exposition with which we are here engaged. Without further reference therefore to the "Ego," we now proceed with that exposition.

To sum up matters then as far as we have gone, assuming for a moment the truth of Theism. If we contemplate that vast assemblage of substances and phenomena in the universe, which are known to man by experience and reason,—bound together as they are in a chain of interacting causation—we may observe this circumstance. There are two kinds of substances\*—and neither experience nor reason testifies more than two—which act as originative causes: these two are (1) God, and (2) the souls of men. The First Cause, God, is, we need not say, originative of everything. He created that vast number of physical substances which first existed in the universe, endowing each with its own forces and attributes, and enabling them to coalesce into fresh substances. He conserves the agency of substances, as of so many blind causes; and, *through* that agency, He preserves the enormous multitude of physical phenomena, which succeed each other regularly and harmoniously according to the law of prevenience.† He created the human

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speaking would be that I have an unremitting and most intimate knowledge of my own freedom, founded on my intimate familiarity with my own repeated mental acts. As far as we can see, however, the question between these Libertarians and ourselves is purely a verbal one.

\* We feel the extreme awkwardness of this expression, but cannot think of a better.

† We must not be understood to imply by this phrase that, having created substances each possessing its own forces and attributes, God leaves them to themselves, with only the co-operation of His general concursus, in their generation of corresponding phenomena. In an article of April, 1867, called "Science, Prayer, Free Will, and Miracles," we earnestly denied this; and we based on our denial a defence of the

body, and conserves its agency, with its own appropriate efficacy as a blind cause towards the production, not of physical only, but also of psychical phenomena. He created the human soul; uniting it mysteriously with the human body, endowing it also with diversified efficacy as a blind cause, and conserving it in the exercise of that efficacy. And by these two combined agencies He originated that large number of psychical phenomena which, no less than physical, move forward regularly and harmoniously according to the law of prevenience. But over and above all this, He endowed the human soul with the unspeakably important and characteristic power of origination causation. This power enables me within certain limits, at my own pleasure and choice, to break off from the chain of prevenience; nay, to act, in a certain true sense, independently of God. It is involved, we say, in this doctrine of Free Will which we maintain, that God has to a certain extent abdicated the controlment of my acts, and left them to my own independent choice.\*

Here we give up our momentary assumption of Theism, and proceed at once to the last stage of our argument. At this point we introduce, more prominently and directly than hitherto, the term "Free Will;" and we thus define that term, in connection with our preceding remarks. At whatever moment and within whatever sphere my soul has the proximate power of acting as an origination cause,—whether it *exercise* that power or no,—at that moment and within that sphere my "will" is said to be

Christian's prayer for temporal (not to say spiritual) blessings. Certainly (as we argued at length in that article) there is no vestige of inconsistency in saying that—even while phenomena move strictly and rigorously on the law of prevenience—God nevertheless is actively working at every moment behind the veil, and stimulating their course in this or that direction.

As the article to which we refer has much connexion with our present theme, we may mention that the number which contained it having become quite out of print, we privately reprinted the article two or three years ago. It can be had from Messrs. Burns and Oates by any one who may be interested in the subject.

\* There is a certain Catholic doctrine concerning God's "concursum" with the action of second causes, which may be thought to present difficulty against what is said in the text. Such a question is of course external to our present series of articles. But we may refer our readers to our notice of Dr. Murray's work on "Grace," in January, 1877. The passage of that notice to which we here refer, occurs in p. 229.

We may at this point also assure our theological readers, how very far we are from forgetting the vast and inestimable influence for good exercised by God over man's Free Will. In the notice just mentioned indeed, we ventured to express, as the bias of our own judgment (p. 232), that "those exercises of Free Will on which the salvation of any given person substantially and predominantly depends, are those whereby he prays to God for infallible grace."

"free." And it remains to show, that this definition is precisely equivalent to that which is more commonly given than any other by Catholic philosophers. We do not mean that Catholics are *bound* to this latter definition; for the Church allows considerable latitude of opinion on the matter. At the same time she fully permits her children to hold—what for ourselves we do hold—that no view of Free Will is altogether satisfactory to the intellect, except that taken by the great Jesuit theologians; and we think that their view is becoming every day the more commonly accepted one among Catholics. It is usually expressed thus: "*Potentia libera est ea quæ, positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, potest agere et non agere.*" There is a certain awkwardness indeed in this exact *form* of the definition, because some given "power" may possibly be "free" in some acts, and yet not in all. F. Palmieri accordingly words it somewhat differently: "*Libertas est ea indifferentia activa agentis, quâ, positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, potest agere et non agere:*" and it is in this form that we prefer it. To appreciate its bearing, whether in one form or the other, let us consider any given moment of human action. My soul possesses certain qualities, intrinsic and inherent; certain faculties, tendencies, habits, and the like; and it is solicited by various attractions, having respectively their own special intensity, direction, and adaptation to my temperament. In order that my soul may act, nothing more is necessary than that which now exists: "*Posita sunt omnia requisita ad agendum.*"\* My will cannot be *free*, say these theologians, unless at this very moment my soul has a real power, at least of either doing this given act or *not* doing it. They consider, of course, that in a vast majority of cases it has *more* power than this; it has the power of acting with greater or less efficiency in this or that direction. But unless it have at least *so much* power as above described, my will is not free at all. And we should add two very obvious explanations. Firstly, when the *will* is said to act, this is a mere figure of speech; for it is the *soul* which acts.† Secondly, when the soul is said to "act," the immediate reference is to its own *internal* action; whether or no that internal action be the *resolving* on, nay the immediately *commanding* of, some external act.

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\* The Theist indeed holds that God's concursus is also necessary; but then he further holds that it is always given.

† Unless indeed a real distinction be supposed between the soul and its powers. We have already quoted however with assent Mr. Lucas's repudiation of such a doctrine. It is one for which much might be said if it were permissible, on matters of pure philosophy, to go by *authority*; but for which we have never seen any *argument* that appears to us of weight.

Such then being the more recognised Catholic definition of Free Will,—we are now to show that this definition is precisely equivalent to that which we just now gave in our own language, and in accordance with our earlier remarks. And one or two homely illustrations will make this abundantly clear.

I am walking for health's sake in my grounds on a bitterly cold day. My strongest present desire is to be back comfortably in the warm house: but I persistently refuse to gratify that desire; remembering the great importance of a good walk, not only for my general health, but for my evening's comfort and my night's sleep. Plainly, according to the Jesuit definition, my will acts with perfect freedom. My present action is resistance to my strongest present desire; and I have full proximate power to abstain, if I choose, from the continuance of this action, by resolving to go indoors. But no less plainly this act is free, according to that definition of Free Will which *we ourselves* set forth. My soul and body, co-operating as blind causes, generate my preponderating spontaneous impulse towards going in doors; while my soul, acting as an origivative cause, generates my continued *resistance* to that preponderating spontaneous impulse.

Conversely. I am sitting over the fire, with a novel in my hand; and my strongest present desire is to continue in my present position. I remember indeed, that nothing in a small way can well be worse for me, and that I shall pay dearly for myself-indulgence. "*Video meliora proboque: deteriora sequor,*" and I stay just as I am. Here again, according to the Jesuit definition, I am undeniably free; for I am entirely able, without any further "*requisita ad agendum,*" either to continue my self-indulgent action or to abstain from it. And here again my freedom is equally manifest, according to *our own* definition of freedom. True indeed, my soul is not at this moment acting as an origivative cause; but it has the *proximate power* of so acting if it pleases.\*

At last indeed, the fact before us is perhaps too obvious to need illustration. It is most plain on the very surface, that whenever and within whatever sphere I have the proximate power to do or not to do this action, at that time and within that sphere my soul has the proximate power to act, if it so choose, as an origivative cause. And if this be so, the two definitions of Free Will are of course mutually equivalent. But the sense of the term being thus understood, there is absolutely

\* In this particular case indeed, it may perhaps be said really to *act* as an origivative cause, as originating the act "I don't choose just now to resist my strongest present desire." For reasons however which will appear hereafter, we prefer our definition as it stands.

nothing which we need add to our preceding remarks, in order to show that men do possess that power called Free Will, and by no means unfrequently are able to exercise it. Moreover what we have now said is abundantly sufficient, as will be shown in subsequent articles, for the direct purpose we have in view: it is an exposition of Free Will abundantly sufficient as a premiss for the establishment of Theism. At the same time, we are here brought into the close presence of a question, which in other ways is of the gravest importance, both speculative and practical. During how many moments of the day, in what acts, under what conditions, am I free? Some Libertarians, *e.g.*, have implied, or even expressed, a proposition of this kind: "My will is not at this moment free," they say, or seem to say, "unless I am at this moment placing before myself the alternative, 'shall I now do this act or not do it?' Otherwise," so they proceed, "how can it be true that I have the *proximate power* to abstain from it? How can it be said that I have the proximate power of abstaining from an act, when the very thought of abstaining from it does not occur to me?" This position seems to us, as we have said, so pregnant with momentous results, whether for good or evil, that we think it deserves much more sustained and systematic notice than it has commonly received. We will give two different illustrations of what seems to us undeniably involved in it.

Firstly, take the case of a holy man occupied in meditation and prayer. At first he places before himself the alternative, "Shall I do this or not do it?" But as he proceeds in his holy task, he is too much immersed in the thought of God to think at all about *himself*. He dwells (*e.g.*) on the mysteries of Christ; he makes corresponding acts of faith, hope, and love; he prays for the Church; he prays for his enemies; he prays for the various pious ends which he has at heart; and his thoughts are entirely filled with such holy contemplations. It seems not less than grotesque to suppose that all this time he has been asking himself the question, "Shall I go on with these prayers of mine or shall I leave them off?" And yet, according to what seems the obvious meaning of that position which we criticise, as soon as ever he *ceases* to ask himself this question, his moral freedom comes temporarily to an end. From that moment his prayers are no more free,—and therefore no more formally good, and no more meritorious,—than if he were in bed and asleep.

A picture on the opposite side. In my evening examen I observe clearly that, during a long conversation which I have had with a friend, I have been largely animated by vain-glory; and I ask forgiveness of my sin accordingly. Yet at the time when I was occupied in that conversation, I had no suspicion



whatever of the motive which was in fact at work. It would seem to follow from the doctrine we criticise, that the acts of vain-glory, not having been free, had not been culpable; and that to repent of them was as absurd on my part as it would be to repent of a bad dream. For plainly, since I did not know that these acts of vain-glory *existed*,—still less did I ask myself the question whether I should continue them or no. In fact, as far as we can see, the doctrine before us would deny the possibility of there *being* such offences as *secret* sins at all; for if I do not *know* of the sinful acts, how, on this view, can I be held responsible for their commission? Yet Abbé Gay, in that ascetical work of his which has obtained so unusually wide authorisation and approval (see the DUBLIN REVIEW for July, 1878, p. 229), gives a very different account of this matter; and here surely he represents all ascetical writers without exception. He commemorates that “unhappy *legion* of sins, unknown and concealed from ourselves, from which David besought God to purify his soul.” “Ab occultis meis munda me.” How can I be *purified* from offences, which, being inculpable, have carried with them no defilement?

We suppose that, with most of our readers, such inferences as these will be reductiones ad absurdum of the premiss from which they result. Yet it requires great care to draw out accurately such principles on Free Will, as may sufficiently guard against conclusions so intolerable. This necessary inquiry moreover is so intimately connected with many remarks which we have made in this or preceding articles, and is indeed so necessary as a supplement of those remarks, that we are very unwilling to omit it. The next subject, indeed, which is to occupy us,—the “Reasonable Basis of Morality,”—will itself supply more than one premiss, which will be of great importance in such a discussion. What we hope then to do, is this: After having concluded our treatment of this last-named theme, we propose to suspend for a moment the direct course of our series, and insert an intercalary article, addressed to Catholics; in order that we may handle this domestic question with the carefulness due to its critical importance. We are particularly desirous of submitting our views on this matter to the judgment of Catholic thinkers.


Meanwhile, as we have said, our next article is to be on “The Reasonable Basis of Morality;” and we fully hope that it will be ready for the October number of the REVIEW. Our last consideration of this theme goes so far back as to January 1872; for a large number of our subsequent articles have been necessarily devoted to encountering the assaults brought against us from very opposite quarters, in reference to the *prior* question of

*necessary truths.* Since January, 1872, more than one invaluable treatise has appeared concerning the basis of morality. Mr. H. W. Lucas's thoughtful "Study on Ethics," in the *Month*, for October and November, 1878, will, of course, demand and receive our careful attention. We are here however referring, not to brief papers, however able and valuable, but to elaborate treatises. We would commemorate in particular Professor John Grote's\* masterly volumes on "Utilitarianism" and "Moral Ideals;" and Mr. Henry Sidgwick's work on "The Methods of Ethics." This last work,—though we are very far from being in general harmony with its conclusions,—impresses us as being at once among the most candid and the most suggestive expositions of the case which we ever saw. And since controversy is the necessary law of philosophical thought, it will be at all events a great pleasure, that in this particular instance our principal opponent is to be so unusually truth-loving and single-minded a writer.

WILLIAM GEORGE WARD.

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\* Professor John Grote was brother to George Grote the historian; but belonged to the opposite philosophical school.



## ART. III.—THOMAS MOORE.

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6. *Life and Death of Lord Edward Fitzgerald.* By THOMAS MOORE. 2 vols. London: Longman. 1831.
7. *Travels of an Irish Gentleman in Search of a Religion.* By the Editor of Captain Rock's Memoirs. 2 vols. London: Longman. 1833.
8. *The History of Ireland, from the earliest Kings of that Realm down to its last Chief.* By THOMAS MOORE. 4 vols. London: Longmans. 1835-46.

THE Centenary of the birth of Thomas Moore occurs within the period of the current number of the DUBLIN REVIEW one of the leading founders of which, in 1836, was Daniel O'Connell. Considering the title and the objects of this REVIEW, the exciting era of its projection, the prominent position of its chief founders, and the eminent services, political, religious, and literary, rendered to Ireland by Moore, his Centennial demands more than passing notice in these pages.\* There would at first appear to be no necessity, no room, in fact, for an additional review, even on such an exceptional occasion, of the life, or times, or works of Moore. His works, amply revised by himself, are known in all lands, portions of them, especially

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\* Moore had incurred the temporary displeasure of O'Connell by the Melody "The dream of those days when first I sung thee is o'er," published in 1834; but the projection of THE DUBLIN REVIEW, in which Dr. Wiseman and O'Connell cordially invited his co-operation, led to the restoration of the old friendly relations between Moore and the Liberator.

the "Irish Melodies," being familiar not alone to the whole English-speaking people, but, in translations, to nearly every civilised tongue on earth; his life, the main outlines of which are given as an autobiography in the preface to his *Melodies*, is completed in the posthumous work edited by Lord John Russell; while a full account of his times may safely be sought in the history, biography, and literary criticism of the century since his birth, spread over hundreds of volumes. Nevertheless, we desiderate a *Study of Moore* suited to the Centennial celebration of his birth, 28th May, 1779, which none of the myriad publications relating to him can, as we believe, supply.

We propose mainly to examine Moore's influence on the political condition of Ireland, and to some extent on Great Britain and the Colonies, as regards civil and religious liberty. But, in doing so, we shall freely treat every leading portion of his life and labours, and criticise his whole mission. Conscious of the many points of weakness as well as of strength that make up the personal character of the national poet, we shall deal with the one as frankly as the other.

Moore and O'Connell, born within about three years of each other, and dying within much the same interval, were both of Kerry extraction. The primitive habitat of the O'Connell clan was, however, Thomond—Limerick, and Clare—while that of Moore's forefathers was the historic principality of Leix, in Legania, the noble Sept that gave to the confederate Catholics of 1641 the able leader, Roger O'More, grandfather of Sarsfield, Earl of Lucan.

Daniel O'Connell was born at Cahir, about a mile north of the small town of Cahirciveen, on the west coast of Kerry, opposite the island of Valencia, 5th August, 1775; while Thomas Moore, whose father had removed, as an humble adventurer, from Kerry to the metropolis, was born in Aungier Street, Dublin. The Moores, after their removal to Kerry, sunk into an extremely humble position, so that it was only after much toil in Dublin that John Moore, the father of the national bard, was able to start in business in the liquor trade in the metropolis. Moore, in his autobiography, frankly describes his father's family as very obscure, his uncle, Garret, being the only one that he knew, although he says that numbers of his Kerry relations commenced writing to him when he began to make a figure in the world. In 1778 John Moore, of Johnson Court, then of mature years, got married to Anastasia Codd, eldest daughter of Thomas Codd, of the town of Wexford, who was engaged in the provision trade, and had also followed the business of a hand-loom weaver.

A small fortune and an excellent wife transferred John

Moore from the public-house, or wine store, in the short lane known as Johnson Court, between Grafton Street and Clarendon Street, to a modest grocery establishment, 12, Aungier Street, corner of Little Longford Street, where our "Bard of Erin" was born. Kerry and Wexford, two prominent patriotic counties, united their blood in Moore, who was destined to record their deeds and depict their scenery in immortal lyrics. No more patriotic father, no more devoted Catholic mother, ever was given to poet than watched over the childhood and youth of Moore. Irish of the Irish, and Catholic of the Catholics, they emerged from the penal laws with the courage of convictions sanctified by suffering, and intensified with the traditions of more than two centuries of persecution. The butcheries of Cromwell in the Bull-ring of Wexford, and the Protector's bulletin in New Ross, regarding freedom of worship, were familiar tales to Moore's mother. It was only in 1745, after the victory won by the Irish at Fontenoy, and the invasion of Scotland by Charles Edward, that the viceroy, the Earl of Chesterfield, permitted, by proclamation, the Catholic chapels, known officially as *Mass Houses*, to be opened in Dublin, and then only on the humane ground that many lives had been lost by the felonious and clandestine celebration of mass on Christmas Day in a private apartment in a back lane, when the loft broke down; while in 1758, quite within the recollection of Moore's father, who was born in 1741, the Lord Chancellor laid down from the bench in Dublin, at the trial of Mr. Saul, a Catholic merchant, "that the laws *did not presume a Papist to exist in the kingdom*; nor could they so much as breathe there without the connivance of the Government."

The Desmond wars; the Plantation of Munster; the O'Neil risings; the Plantation of Ulster; the Court of Wards; the Civil War of 1641; the Cromwellian settlement; the transplantation of Connaught; the Jacobite and Williamite war; the exiled Irish Brigades; and the penal laws of William III., Anne, and the earlier Georges, form the chief outlines of the religious strife from the Reformation to the last quarter of the eighteenth century, when O'Connell and Moore were born. In the fierce and continuous struggle the Irish had risked all for their Faith—

Son and wife,  
And land and life,  
In the brave days of old—

and came out of the conflict the poorest, but one of the proudest peoples in Christendom, with Faith and Nationality synonymous. The Earl of Clare, Lord Chancellor, although the son of an apos-

tate, and a political renegade, testified in his speech, in 1800, in the Irish Parliament, advocating the Union, to this identity of religious devotion and patriotism—"The old distinctions of native Irish and degenerate English, and English of blood and English by birth" were, he said, "forgotten; all rallied round the banner of the Popish Faith, and looked upon the new Protestant settlers as the common aggressor and enemy; and it is a melancholy truth that, from that day, all have clung to the Popish Religion, as a common bond of union, and an hereditary pledge of animosity to British settlers and the British nation."

To understand the position of Irish Catholics at the time of Moore's birth, and appreciate the sincerity and courage with which he espoused their cause and pleaded their claims, we must examine briefly the historical events which ushered in that period. The legislative independence of Ireland, carried in 1782, when Moore was less than three, and O'Connell not seven, years of age, was the growth of an agitation which had been long and steadily progressing. It may be said to have assumed its first formidable shape when Molyneux, protesting against the laws passed in England for the destruction of Irish trade and commerce, published, in 1698, with a dedication to the King, his famous work: "The Case of Ireland being bound by Acts of Parliament in England Stated." Swift and Lucas followed up the agitation opened by Molyneux, Grattan and others stimulated the national claim and carried it to a success in Free Trade and the Act of 1782, through the foreign difficulties of England, and the powerful influence of a National army in the Volunteers. Swift, in the "Drapier's Letters," in 1723, had adopted and avowed the principles of Molyneux, and declared for national autonomy. Flood sat for Kilkenny from 1759; Anthony Malone for Westmeath from 1760, and Grattan took his seat for the borough of Charlemont, in 1775, a few months after the birth of O'Connell, which brings us close to the nativity of Moore. The seven years' war which closed in 1763 by the peace of Paris, and the breaking out of the struggle with the American Colonists, powerfully promoted the aims of the Irish patriots; while agricultural distress at home and growing sectarian differences led to the formation, for the first time, of secret societies in Ireland, societies that took various forms, as White Boys, Peep o' Day Boys, Hearts of Steel, Wreckers, Hearts of Oak, Orangemen, Ribbonmen, Defenders, United Irishmen, and others.

The so-called era of the legislative independence of Ireland, carried by Grattan in 1782, when Moore was not quite three years of age, is still an historical illusion to all but men of fair reading. It was a victory of the more liberal portion of the



Palesmen and of the older settlers over the British Government and their Placemen; but the Catholic and native population, then about three-fourths, or 2,100,000 of the 2,800,000 inhabitants, were wholly excluded from almost all civil recognition in the country. It was on the 4th November, 1778, a few months before Moore's birth, the Act was passed enabling Catholics to hold land on lease for lives or years concurrently, or upon lease of 999 years; although, the year before, the same Legislature rejected, with indignation and horror, as an aggression on Protestant ascendancy, a bill to enable Catholics to obtain leases for 99 years. The serious defeat of the British arms in America was the motive for the change. About the same period, Catholics were permitted to open school, provided they obtained the license of the Protestant bishop, and complied with other specified conditions. Catholics were excluded, through the oaths prescribed, from every civil, military, and municipal office. From 1727 to 1793, or sixty-six years, they were denied the elective franchise. Degradation and misery seemed to have attained almost their lowest condition, yet there was lower still in store for Catholics. In 1778, the Government finding themselves without troops to repel privateering on the coast of Ulster, a Militia Bill was passed, and the foundation laid of the Volunteers. Catholics patriotically offered their services in defence of their native country, in which they had scarcely civil existence; but a letter from the Earl of Tyrone to one of the Beresfords, of 28th May, 1779, *the very date of Moore's birth*, prohibited the formation or recognition of Catholic companies of Volunteers. Yet, forbidden the use of arms, Catholics, in Limerick and elsewhere, subscribed large sums to equip the patriotic army. Worse remains to be told. Free-trade and the Legislative Independence of Ireland were carried, but the English Penal Statutes of 1692 were reaffirmed, excluding Catholics from both Houses of Parliament! Such is a meagre outline of the deplorable condition of Catholics in the infancy of Thomas Moore and of Daniel O'Connell.

They were preceded, however, by earnest and able men, Charles O'Connor, of Belanagare, Dr. John Curry, author of the "Historical Review of the Civil Wars," John Keogh, Edward Byrne, Richard McCormack, and others, who had laboured for the Catholic cause and promoted associations for the purpose. Later on, most of the leading Protestant patriots strenuously supported the Catholic claims, foremost amongst whom were Grattan, Burke, Curran, Fitzgerald, and Tone; while Wyse, Dr. Drumgoole, Dr. MacNevin, Denis Scully, and other able Catholics, joined the agitation at a more advanced stage.

Thomas Moore was born 28th May, 1779, at 12, Aungier

Street, Dublin, a house of business that still remains—bearing his bust on its front—and was baptised in Townsend Street Catholic Church, or chapel, as such were then apologetically called. His parents lessened their rent by letting the drawing-room floor of the grocery and spirit establishment in lodgings, and there, on the night of Moore's birth, a convivial party, of whom Jerry Keller the noted barrister was one, was assembled. On their being informed of the disturbing character of the orgies, an adjournment was moved to a neighbouring tavern, Keller adding, "*pro re nata*." Free Trade, the "Volunteers," the Legislative Independence of Ireland, slight relaxations of the Penal Code, American Independence, and the French Revolution were amongst the chief events of Moore's childhood. The Irish metropolis was, at the time, one of the gayest and most cultured cities in Europe. The nobility, the leading land magnates, and all the members of the House of Commons had splendid mansions in Dublin. The two Houses of Parliament literally stood unrivalled in the world for their galaxy of orators. Music and the drama acknowledged no criticism superior to that of a Dublin audience. Art was encouraged, and it was at this period all the elegant public buildings in the capital were erected. The Royal Dublin Society (incorporated in 1750), and the Royal Irish Academy for the study of Science, Polite Literature, and Antiquities (incorporated in 1786), of which Moore was an honorary member, and to which he bequeathed his library, are the oldest institutions of the kind in the three kingdoms. Trade and manufactures flourished, and large grants were voted to stimulate the construction of canals, roads, harbours, piers, and every agency for advancing the material prosperity of the country. The publishing trade of Dublin reflected the intellectual energies of Ireland, and some of the most creditable works issued from the metropolitan press.

Moore's education, until he entered the Dublin University in 1794, is deserving of attention. After having spent a short time at an "adventure" school kept in Aungier Street by a man named Malone, a dissipated character, he was placed in the academy of Mr. Samuel Whyte, Johnson Court then one of the most respectable schools of its class in Dublin. About twenty years before Moore entered, Richard Brinsley Sheridan and his elder brother Charles had been there, but, the birch failing to flog brains into Brinsley, the schoolmaster declared him "an incorrigible dunce." For thirty years Whyte's was one of the leading grammar schools of Dublin, yet the man taught English only, Latin and Greek having been committed to ushers. Whyte, however, imparted a graceful elocution, had an eminently dramatic turn, and was

received in the first society in the city. These were the very qualities specially wanted to stimulate the genius of the boy, Moore, who soon became an intense favourite with his schoolmaster. Teacher and pupil took leading parts in the private theatricals about Dublin, so that Moore's mother feared he would adopt the stage as a profession. Whyte was a Protestant, but Donovan, the classical usher, who prepared Moore for college, must have been a Catholic, and deeply tinged with all the rebellious spirit of the period; Moore admits that he imbibed much of his patriotism from him. "From the first," he says, "I was naturally destined to be of the line of politics which I have ever since pursued—being, if I may say so, *born a rebel*." In 1793, when fourteen years of age, his first poetical contribution was published in the "*Anthologia Hibernica*." About the same period, Moore acquired a knowledge of French from La Fosse, a French *émigré*, and of Italian from Father Ennis, a friar, of Great Stephen Street, both of whom frequented the house: the knowledge of which languages rendered him the greatest service throughout his literary career, eminently so in his notes to the translation of *Anacreon*.

Moore tells of the careful preparation for the sacraments, and the solemn scene when his mother brought him to his first confession, so that no pains were spared on his early training as a Catholic. About the same period, a faculty kindred to poetry was strongly developed, the love of music, a passion to which he was more indebted for his fame than to any other gift that he possessed. An old harpsichord, obtained by his father in restitution from a defaulting customer, was the sole musical instrument at 12, Aungier Street; upon this the young minstrel exercised his latent powers. It was superseded, however, by a piano, and in 1793, Mr. Warren, nephew to the illustrious Dr. Doyle, Bishop of Kildare and Leighlin, who, like Moore's mother, was a native of the County Wexford, was engaged to instruct Ellen, Moore's eldest sister, then about thirteen years of age. Thus was laid the foundation of that musical culture to which Moore mainly owes his immortality, through the "*Irish Melodies*." The only other element in the domestic life of Moore, at this period, to which we need refer, is the Debating Society, held in a small bedroom, late at night, when Ennis and Delany, his father's two clerks, were relieved from their counter duties, and, stimulated with glasses of whisky-punch, enjoyed the young master's fervid declamation.

We have now to review the circumstances that led to the Catholic Relief Act of 1793, which opened the Dublin University to Moore. So low was the influence of Catholics in 1791, that they could not get a member of Parliament to

present their annual petition for relaxation of the penal laws. The gifted son of the illustrious Edmund Burke was, that year, appointed Secretary to the Catholic Committee, a position which he held but a short time, when he was succeeded by Theobald Wolfe Tone; and on the 2nd December, 1792, the Catholic Convention, or "Back Lane Parliament," with about 200 delegates, met and adopted a petition to George III. demanding unconditional emancipation. On the 2nd Jan., 1793, Edmund Burke and the Home Secretary presented the deputation of Irish Catholics to the king, who received them graciously and accepted their petition. Dumourier's victory at Jemappes, the general triumph of the Republican arms, and the execution of Louis XVI. dictated a policy of concession, and the Catholic Relief Bill became law on 9th April, 1793. Like the Act of 1782, and even the Act of 1829, the Act of 1793, highly important though it was, re-enacted some of the penal clauses, while the proposal to admit Catholics to Parliament was defeated by 136 against 69 votes. Moore and his fellow-Catholics were now admissible to all the professions. His family having intended him for the bar, he entered the University of Dublin in the summer of 1794, passing a creditable examination, but he does not appear to have proceeded with his collegiate studies till early in the following year. His undergraduate course in Trinity College demands examination, as bearing not alone on the political condition of Ireland, but also on the religious after-life of Moore. Elated with the social elevation, as he admits, and placed to some extent on a level with Protestants, the society and the period turned his head considerably, and he began to show, thus early, some of the weaknesses of his subsequent life. Trinity College was then, and for years afterwards, a powerful institution for promoting proselytism. Sizarships, scholarships, professorships, fellowships, and bishoprics, were the substantial premiums of apostasy. Just at that particular period, the revolutionary spirit of the time strongly imbued the Dublin University with irreligion and with the infidel theories of the Continent. With not more than perhaps a dozen Catholic students in such an institution, and the whole collegiate hierarchy, from the provost to the porters, exclusively Protestant, it was a sad trial for any Catholic to be exposed, at fifteen years of age, to such peril. Although he may have had rooms in College, he was chiefly an extern, residing at home, and attending the College lectures. He entered under Rev. Robert Burrowes, Fellow of Trinity from 1782, author of the well-known humorous song, "The night before Larry was stretched" (*hanged*), who, after various ecclesiastical preferments, became Dean of Cork in 1819, and

died in 1841. Although Catholics were, at the time, and for about eighty years afterwards, until the passing of Fawcett's Secularisation Act of 1873, excluded from foundation scholarships (exhibitions worth about 70*l.* a year for four or five years), Moore stood amongst the candidates, when his answering was pronounced such as to secure to him a scholarship, provided he took the sacrament in the College chapel, as a test of his Protestantism—a vile bait for apostasy, which Moore strongly denounces in his *Memoirs*. At one of his Term examinations Moore gave in an English poem, instead of the usual Latin theme. For this the examiners commended him, which led to his obtaining from the College board, as a premium, the "*Travels of Anacharsis*," with a certificate that the same had been awarded to him "*propter laudabilem in versibus componendis progressum*." In 1799 Moore took his degree as B.A., and closed his connection with the University of Dublin.

During his undergraduate course, intimate association with such a mass of freethinkers and infidels, with their sneers at his simple and sincere faith, led him to appeal to his mother, a year or two after he entered Trinity College, to release him from the irksomeness and humiliation of periodical confession. Some of the fellows, professors, and scholars were apostates. The Vice-Chancellor was John, Baron Fitzgibbon, Lord High Chancellor of Ireland from 1789; appointed Vice-Chancellor in 1791; who had sat for the University, 1778-82. His father, who had been a Catholic, was also a lawyer, and rose from obscurity to eminence; he was an apostate in religion, and his son a renegade in politics. On being appointed Attorney-General in 1783, he turned round, joined the Government, opposed Reform, the Volunteers, and Catholic Emancipation, and became the truculent and unscrupulous tool of the party of corruption. Lecky, describing the period, says: "There appears, indeed, to be little question that, during the later years of the Ministry of Pitt, it was the firm resolution of the Government not only to resist the attempts to purify Parliament, but also, steadily and deliberately, to increase its corruption. Fitzgibbon, afterwards Lord Clare, was the chief agent in attaining this end."

The "United Irishmen" had established a lodge in Trinity College. Founded October, 1791, by Wolfe Tone, in Belfast, as an open political association, it was not till some years later that it became a secret and oath-bound society, for membership in which the penalty of death was decreed by Parliament. Government had paid spies, who kept the Castle fully informed of all the current proceedings; and on learning the location

of a branch in the University, it was determined to hold a visitation, which was conducted by Fitzgibbon, Earl of Clare, with the notorious and foul-mouthed Dr. Duigenan, M.P., as his assessor. Moore gives a full and vivid narrative of this visitation in his preface to the fourth volume of his published works, while his "*Memoirs, Journal, and Correspondence*," edited by Lord Russell, contains a still more detailed account of the transaction. Robert Emmet, when summoned, answered by denouncing the proceedings, and requesting that his name be removed from the College books. Several of those compromised absented themselves. Numbers of students basely betrayed their brother conspirators, as Moore says, "either as voluntary informers, or else were driven by the fear of the consequences of refusal to secure their own safety at the expense of companions and friends." Expulsion from Trinity College meant, also, ostracism from all the professions and utter social ruin; while death was fixed, by statute, as the penalty of proven membership of the "*United Irish Society*." The founders and prominent promoters of that society were Protestants and Presbyterians, and, as already stated, it began its existence in Belfast. At a later stage, when it became located in Dublin, a few Catholics joined the directory. Moore gives a touching account of his escape from the association, his intense ardour notwithstanding, through the Catholic instincts and sagacity of his mother and family.

He received a summons from the College authorities, to appear as a witness before the Court of Visitors, and the scene is graphically recorded by himself.

The history of his share in this visitation of Trinity College, in the memorable '98, just before the rising took place, not only gives a picture of the poet and patriot at the age of eighteen, but takes us back to those troubled times when a man could hardly love his country or his faith without making himself a rebel. Moore adhered steadily, through life, to the principles of civil and religious liberty sanctioned by the Catholic Church. It need hardly be said that his "*Liberalism*," as publicly professed, was not what is meant by Liberalism in the mouths of too many writers and speakers of the present day. To be a Liberal in Moore's day was to wish that the Catholic Church and the people might be as free as the Church of the law and the dominant race. Naturally, such principles have found little favour in Trinity College.

The foundation of Adam Loftus and Queen Elizabeth repudiated Moore, outside whose gates his statue—hideous though it is as a work of art—happily finds, like that of Grattan, public position. The statues of Burke and Goldsmith are



within the College rails; but, though both were students, statesman and poet were totally opposed to the narrow and exclusive Protestant genius of the Planters and the Colonial spirit of the foundation. Swift and Goldsmith were degraded there; while Grattan's portrait was taken down, when his brilliant patriotism incurred the displeasure of the Government and his name was removed from the roll of Privy Councillors. These and other Irish patriots are often credited to Trinity College; but their patriotism was in defiance of the spirit of the Dublin University, not inspired by it. These, however, were all Protestants, while Moore was the first Catholic of genius that, for two centuries, had entered its unhallowed portals without paying the awful penalty of apostasy, and becoming a renegade to the political principles of his race and nationality. Moore, referring in his *Journal* to the proceedings in Trinity College, on the occasion of the visit of George IV. to Dublin, in 1820, thus feelingly adverts to the slight cast upon him in the Dublin University:—

Find that Lord Powerscourt, with whom the King dined the day he embarked from Ireland, was courageous enough to have a song of mine, "The Prince's Day,"\* sung before him, immediately after "God Save the King," and that his Majesty was much delighted with it. The song is laudatory, for I thought at the time he deserved such; but, on reading it rather seriously over, I find nothing in it to be ashamed of. What will those cowardly scholars of Dublin College say, who took such pains at their dinner the other day to avoid mentioning my name; and who, after a speech of some Sir Noodle, boasting of the poetical talent of Ireland, drank, as the utmost they could venture, "Maturin, and the rising poets of Erin;" what will these white-livered slaves say to the exhibition of Lord Powerscourt's? The only excuse I can find for the worse than Eastern prostration in which my countrymen have grovelled during these last few weeks is, that they have been so long slaves they know no better, and that it is not their own fault if they know no medium between brawling rebellion and foot-licking idolatry.

Trinity College has, to the last, slighted and ignored Moore; so much so, that, in the current preparation for the Centennial celebration, the Provost, in answer to the application of the Provisional Committee, presided over by the Lord Mayor of Dublin, Sir John Barrington, flatly refused to have his name placed on the committee; while the Professor of English Literature, Mr. Dowden, a literary man of some reputation, also refused, on the ground that Moore had no claim, as a poet, to such distinction, Professor Dowden's highest estimate of him

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\* "Though Dark are our Sorrows," to the air of "Patrick's Day."

being that of an agreeable songster. Trinity College had one of the last penal laws passed against Catholics, excluding them from the Chair of Physic in the University, while admitting candidates professing every other form of Christianity; it opposed Catholic Emancipation; Orange Lodges are institutions still connected with the University; whilst, years after its secularisation by Fawcett's Act, half a century after Catholic Emancipation, and nearly a century after the passing of the Relief Act of 1793, the provost, vice-provost, senior fellows, junior fellows, all the professors and lecturers, save one, all the foundation scholars and every office-bearer, are Protestant, or, at least, non-Catholic. Such is the foundation of Queen Elizabeth, endowed from the confiscated estates and the alienated Church property of Ireland, three centuries after its institution. Thoroughly anti-Catholic, strongly anti-national, and therefore ready to repudiate Moore, one of its most distinguished *alumni*, because of his devotion to Ireland, Trinity College is the most gigantic living remnant of offensive English domination in the country. Yet there are some so politically blind that they cannot see an educational grievance on the part of the millions of Irish Catholics, who are affectionately invited to that institution as the supreme seat of liberal culture in the kingdom, one specially suited, by its history and its constitution, to promote fidelity to faith and fatherland amongst the native race in Ireland.

We have dwelt at considerable length on Moore's undergraduate course in Trinity College, on grounds far wider and more important than mere biography. The exciting scenes and personal associations of the period inspired, as he himself frequently states, some of the most brilliant productions of his muse. It was then that his musical genius, one of the chief sources of his fame, was first developed; while the fervid enthusiasm and ghastly incidents of the time, and the tragic fate of many of his nearest and dearest friends, found historic embodiment in the immortal lyrics which he afterwards gave to the world. Moore, as he himself records, "though never regularly instructed in music, could play over the airs with tolerable facility on the pianoforte;" and he continues, "Robert Emmet used sometimes to sit by me when I was thus engaged; and I remember one day his starting up, as from a reverie, when I had just finished playing that spirited tune, called 'The Red Fox,' exclaiming, 'Oh that I were at the head of twenty thousand men marching to that air!'" In the second number of the *Irish Melodies*\* we find that splendid and stirring tune, one of the

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\* While the second lyric in the first number of the *Melodies* celebrates the victory of Clontarf, 1014—"Remember the glories of Brian, the Brave."

most spirited of military marches, reviving one of the brightest and proudest eras in the national annals, the opening of the eleventh century, when Malachy *Mor*, supreme monarch of Ireland, and Brian Boromhe, King of Munster, overthrew the Danes, whose incursions for three centuries had nearly stamped out the ancient learning and civilisation of the country:—

Let Erin remember the days of old,  
Ere her faithless sons betray'd her ;  
When Malachi wore the collar of gold,  
Which he won from her proud invader ;  
When her kings with standard of green unfurl'd,  
Led the Red-Branch Knights to danger ;  
Ere the emerald gem of the western world  
Was set in the crown of a stranger.

On Lough Neagh's bank, as the fisherman strays,  
When the clear cold eve's declining,  
He sees the round towers of other days  
In the wave beneath him shining ;  
Thus shall memory often, in dreams sublime,  
Catch a glimpse of the days that are over ;  
Thus, sighing, look through the waves of time  
For the long faded glories they cover.

And, referring again to Emmet, born the year before Moore in a neighbouring street, and to their sympathetic musical tastes, he says :—

How little did I then think that in one of the most touching of the sweet airs I used to play to him, his own dying words would find an interpreter so worthy of their sad but proud feelings ; or that another of those mournful strains would long be associated in the hearts of his countrymen with the memory of her who shared with Ireland his last blessing and prayer.

Thomas Addis Emmet, second son of Dr. Robert Emmet, State Physician, was born in Cork, in 1764, and was his brother Robert's senior by fourteen years. A highly distinguished student in Trinity College, he entered the medical profession, in Edinburgh, but relinquished it for the Irish Bar, to which he was admitted in 1790. He joined the Catholic committee, and threw himself ardently into the advocacy of their claims. He soon attained a rising position at the Bar ; supported the case of James Napper Tandy in the prosecution against the Viceroy, the Earl of Northumberland, on a national question ; and in 1795, defending some charged with administering the United Irishmen's oath, he solemnly took the oath himself, in public Court, in proof of the sincerity of his argument. In 1797 he joined the directory of the United Irish Society, and, in March, 1798, by the treachery of Reynolds, was arrested, and after a

year's imprisonment was sent, with many others, to Fort George, in Inverness. In 1802 he was liberated, spent some time in Holland and France, and in 1804, after the execution of his brother Robert, proceeded with his family to the United States, and died in New York in 1827, having attained a leading position at the American Bar. A public monument is erected to his memory. His brother Robert, also a member of the Society of United Irishmen, was expelled Trinity College, in 1798; kept aloof from active participation in the rebellion; and went to Holland, in 1802, to meet his brother on his liberation. After various diplomatic interviews, seeking aid for a renewed rising in Ireland, to which he offered his fortune and his life, he returned to Dublin, October, 1802, and, undeterred by the total failure of 1798, organised the abortive rising of 23rd July, 1803, at the head of about a hundred men. This attempt led to the death of Lord Kilwarden, and to his own execution, 20th September, 1803, at the age of twenty-four. He had worked, for months, in a *depôt* in Marshalsea Lane, off Thomas Street, organising his scheme of attack. Dr. Madden says:—

There he lay, at night, on a mattress, surrounded by all the implements of death, devising plans, turning over in his mind all the fearful chances of the intended struggle, well knowing that his life was at the mercy of upwards of forty individuals who had been, or were still, employed in the *depôts*; yet, confident of success, exaggerating its prospects, extenuating the difficulties that beset him, judging of others by himself, thinking associates honest who seemed to be so, confiding in their promises, and animated, or rather influenced, by a burning sense of the wrongs of his country, and enthusiastic in his devotion to what he considered its rightful cause.—Madden's "United Irishmen, their Lives and Times."

Thomas Addis Emmet was, as we have said, a member of the Catholic Committee, and his chivalrous, though ill-starred, brother Robert uttered, just before he sallied out into his misguided revolt in Thomas Street the fine and thoughtful sentiment—"There is one grand point, no leading Catholic is committed; we are all Protestants, and their cause will not be compromised."

This brief description of the Emmets was essential to our narrative, as an interpretation of some of the most popular of the Melodies. Referring, years afterwards, to the display of Robert Emmet's genius and patriotism in the debates in the College Historical Society, Moore says:—

I have heard little since that appeared to me of a loftier, or, what is a far more rare quality in Irish eloquence, purer character; and the effects it produced, as well as from its own exciting power, as from the susceptibility with which his audience caught up every allusion to

passing events, was such as to attract, at last, the serious attention of the fellows; and, by their desire, one of the scholars, a man of advanced standing and reputation for oratory, came to attend our debates, expressly for the purpose of answering Emmet, and endeavouring to neutralise the impressions of his fervid eloquence.

Emmet had, unknown to her father, secured the affections of Sarah Curran, daughter of the illustrious John Philpot Curran, to whom he was privately engaged to be married. After the failure of the deplorable attempt in Thomas Street, 24th July, he remained concealed, on the south side of Dublin, in order to obtain an interview with his betrothed, before effecting his escape, which he might have done; but he was arrested in Harold's Cross, 25th August: tried, and found guilty, at half-past ten o'clock at night, 19th September, and executed the following day, at one o'clock, on a gibbet erected in front of St. Catherine's Church, Thomas Street, the scene of his unsuccessful attempt at rebellion. He ascended the scaffold with firmness, and in a loud voice addressed the crowd:—"My friends, I die in peace, with sentiments of universal love and kindness to all men;" and, in a few minutes, he was first hanged and then beheaded. Emmet refused to allow his counsel, Peter Burrowes, to put forward any legal plea in his favour, and, before sentence was passed, in a loud and firm voice, but with great dignity of tone and bearing, he uttered his memorable appeal:—

Let no man write my epitaph; for as no man who knows my motives dares now vindicate them, let not prejudice nor ignorance asperse them. Let them rest in obscurity and peace; my memory be left in oblivion, and my tomb remain uninscribed, until other times and other men can do justice to my character. When my country takes her place among the nations of the earth, then, and not till then, let my epitaph be written.

Moore embodies this last appeal of his attached friend in the exquisite lyric to an air that Emmet loved:—

Oh! breathe not his name, let it sleep in the shade,  
Where cold and unhonour'd his relics are laid;  
Sad, silent and dark be the tears that we shed,  
As the night-dew that falls on the grass o'er his head.  
But the night-dew that falls, though in silence it weeps,  
Shall brighten, with verdure, the grave where he sleeps;  
And the tear that we shed, though in secret it rolls,  
Shall long keep his memory green in our souls.

While the parting and passionate farewell of Emmet's soul, just before his execution, addressed to Miss Curran, will live as long as the language finds a place in the tongues spoken by civilised man:—

When he, who adores thee, has left but the name  
 Of his fault and his sorrows behind,  
 Oh! say wilt thou weep, when they darken the fame,  
 Of a life that for thee was resign'd?  
 Yes, weep, and however my foes may condemn,  
 Thy tears shall efface their decree;  
 For Heaven can witness, though guilty to them,  
 I have been but too faithful to thee.  
 With thee were the dreams of my earliest love;  
 Every thought of my reason was thine;  
 In my last humble prayer to the Spirit above,  
 Thy name shall be mingled with mine.  
 Oh! blest are the lovers and friends who shall live  
 The days of thy glory to see;  
 But the next dearest blessing that Heaven can give  
 Is the pride of thus dying for thee.

The sad and touching history of Sarah Curran, "who shared with Ireland Robert Emmet's last blessing and prayer," is told by Moore in the charming historiette, "She is far from the land where her young hero sleeps." In 1805, two years after the death of Emmet, she reluctantly accepted the proposal of marriage of Captain Sturgeon, nephew of the Marquis of Rockingham, with whom she proceeded to the Mediterranean; but, sinking into despondency and ill-health, she died, on her way home, at Hythe, in Kent, 5th May, 1808, and found "a grave where the sunbeams rest, when they promise a glorious morrow," in Newmarket, County Cork, the birthplace of her father. Moore feelingly depicts her exile and return:—

She is far from the land where her young hero sleeps,  
 And lovers are round her, sighing;  
 But coldly she turns from their gaze, and weeps,  
 For her heart in his grave is lying.  
 She sings the wild song of her dear native plains,  
 Every note which he lov'd awaking;—  
 Ah! little they think who delight in her strains  
 How the heart of the Minstrel is breaking.  
 He had liv'd for his love, for his country he died,  
 They were all that to life had entwin'd him;  
 Nor soon shall the tears of his country be dried,  
 Nor long will his love stay behind him.  
 Oh! make her a grave where the sunbeams rest,  
 When they promise a glorious morrow;  
 They'll shine o'er her sleep, like a smile from the West,  
 From her own lov'd Island of sorrow.

The only other reference which we propose to make to lyrics inspired by the intimate personal friendships and dismal incidents



of this horrible period is the "Origin of the Harp." Edward Hudson was compromised in 1798 and imprisoned in Kilmainham Jail for some months, where Moore visited him. He was one of the thirteen Leinster Delegates seized at Oliver Bond's, March, 1798, and was sent to Fort George, in Scotland. Moore, in his "Life of Lord Edward Fitzgerald," records that on visiting Hudson, before his removal to Scotland, he found that, "to amuse his solitude, he had made a large drawing, with charcoal, on the walls of his prison, representing that fancied origin of the Irish harp which, some years after, I adopted as the subject of one of the Melodies :"—

'Tis believ'd that this Harp, which I wake now for thee,  
Was a Syren of old, who sung under the sea ;  
And who often at eve, thro' the bright waters rov'd,  
To meet, on the green shore, a youth whom she lov'd.

We have now reached an important point in Moore's life. Having obtained his degree, in the University of Dublin, in 1799, he proceeded to London in March, that year, with two objects : to enter for the Bar at the Middle Temple—the chief ambition of his family—and to seek encouragement for the publication, by subscription, of his translation of the "Odes of Anacreon," with notes ; upon which he had bestowed much careful study, spending all his available time in researches in Marsh's Library, near St. Patrick's Cathedral, for that purpose. His guineas, and—what to her was dearer—a *scapular*, were stitched by his mother in the waistband of his pantaloons, and thus, after a tedious journey, he reached London. Through the favour of Lord Moira, an intimate friend of the Prince of Wales, Moore was permitted to dedicate his "Anacreon," published in 1800, to his Royal Highness ; while, during the next two or three years, he kept some of his terms at the Temple but irregularly, so that he was never called to the Bar. In 1802 Moore, flushed with the success of his "Anacreon," published his "Juvenile Poems," under the *nom de plume* of "Thomas Little." For the warmth and moral laxity of these he has been severely and justly condemned. Opinion is divided regarding the merit of Moore's translation of "Anacreon," high authority deeming it inferior, but all critics are unanimous as to the interest, the research, and the value of the luminous notes which are attached to the Odes. From a moral point of view, however, it would have been far better that the amours and voluptuousness of the Pagan world six centuries before the Christian era should have been left buried in the dead languages in which they are recorded. The publication of his "Juvenile Poems" (Little's) admits of even less defence. Jeffrey, in the *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1806, charges Moore with a deliberate

attempt, in his "Juvenile Poems" and in his "Odes and Epistles," dedicated to Lord Moira, published 1806, to corrupt public morals, which led to an immediate challenge to the Scotch reviewer, and an intercepted duel at Chalk Farm. When they met, the bullet fell out of Jeffrey's pistol, while it was said Moore's had none, when the parties were arrested by the officers from Bow Street—a meeting immortalised by Byron, in 1809, in his "English Bards and Scotch Reviewers :"—

Health to great Jeffrey ! Heaven preserve his life  
To flourish on the fertile shores of Fife,  
And guard it sacred in his future wars,  
Since authors sometimes seek the field of Mars !  
Can none remember that eventful day,  
That ever-glorious, almost fatal fray,  
When Little's leadless pistol met his eye,  
And Bow Street myrmidons stood laughing by ?

On the publication of this severe satire, Moore wrote to Lord Byron demanding explanation or satisfaction, but the correspondence, owing to Lord Byron's absence abroad, only closed late in 1811, with an entire reconciliation between all the parties, when Byron, Moore, and Campbell dined at the house of Samuel Rogers, the first time that they had met. We must also record, to the credit of Moore, that, in the later editions of his works, revised by himself, he suppressed the more objectionable of the amatory effusions in his "Juvenile Poems."

The appointment of Moore, late in 1803, as Registrar to the Court of Admiralty at Bermuda, led to singular influences on his life. He loved his family intensely, and as his parents were growing old, and two daughters dependent on them, he was anxious to be enabled to contribute somewhat more than he did (100*l.* a year) to their support. The Earl of Moira, afterwards Marquis of Hastings, upon whom he called at Donington Park, Leicestershire, on his second visit to London, obtained the post for him. It was not the first or the last time that a literary man had been appointed to a similar Colonial office, intended as a sinecure. Before he had been apprised of the precise location of the situation or its emoluments, he wrote to his mother :—

I fear, however, it is a situation not in either of these countries; and I fear it *solely* from the violence which a *wider* separation would cause to your feelings, my dearest mother. As for my own part, I should not consider any sacrifice of either comforts or society at all to be avoided, if it provided me a permanent subsistence, and the means of providing for those I love. I have hopes that even if it be necessary to leave this country, the place may be considerable enough to allow you all to accompany me.

In this affectionate declaration to his mother, we learn Moore's dependent position, at the age of four-and-twenty, and his intense affection for his family. The 22nd September, 1803, Moore sailed from Portsmouth for Bermuda, and returned, landing at Plymouth, 12th November, 1804. During this interval he visited, besides Bermuda, where he tarried only a short time, the leading cities on the Atlantic seaboard, in the United States, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Boston, and Saratoga, and then travelled through Canada, from Niagara, mainly along the lakes, to Nova Scotia. The impression made upon Moore by the Republican institutions of the United States was disappointing and disadvantageous. But Moore, at this age, was not a trained, still less a philosophical, politician; his Catholic feelings leaned with Burke to Conservatism, as opposed to Revolution; while his stay of a few months in the United States was too brief, as he frankly admits, to afford him any correct idea of the practical working of the young Republic, then eighteen years, or only half a generation, in existence. He attended, in Washington, the *levée* of President Jefferson, who had drawn up the Declaration of Independence; which he mentions as a high distinction. Yet, from that city, Moore addressed lines to Viscount Forbes, afterwards Earl of Granard, describing social and political life in the United States, which depict the country in the darkest hues. We give one or two characteristic extracts from this bitterly severe sketch:

Already, in this free, this virtuous State,  
Which Frenchmen tell us was ordained by fate,  
To show the world what high perfection springs  
From rabble Senators and merchant Kings,  
Even here, already patriots learn to steal  
Their private perquisites from public weal,  
And guardians of the country's sacred fire,  
Like Afric's priests, let out the flame for hire.

\* \* \* \*

Who can with patience for a moment see  
The medley mass of pride and misery;  
Of whips and charters, manacles and rights,  
Of slaving blacks and democratic whites;  
And all the piebald polity that reigns  
In free confusion o'er Columbia's plains?  
To think that man, Thou just and gentle God!  
Should stand before Thee with a tyrant's rod  
O'er creatures like himself, with souls from Thee,  
Yet dare to boast of perfect liberty!  
Away, away, I'd rather hold my neck  
By doubtful tenure from a Sultan's beck,

In climes where Liberty has scarce been named,  
Nor any right but that of ruling claimed,  
Than thus to live, where bastard Freedom waves  
Her fustian flag, in mockery over slaves;  
Where—motley laws, admitting no degree  
Between the vilely slaved and madly free—  
Alike the bondage and the license suit,  
The brute made ruler and the man made brute.

Moore's strictures are strong and severe, and were repeated in 1819. But he little supposed that about the celebration of the centenary of his own birth, in 1879, the United States would contain fifty millions of inhabitants, of whom fully fifteen millions are of Irish birth or Irish blood; that the slavery which he warmly denounces would be abolished; that Republican institutions would have survived foreign war and domestic rebellion; and that, extending from Atlantic to Pacific, and from the great lakes to the Gulf of Mexico, the United States would occupy a fore most position amongst the nations of the earth. But if he gave offence by his moral and political criticisms on the character of Republican institutions, he gave delight by his brilliant sketches of American scenery which, for vivacity and freshness, are not surpassed by any of his works. Of the melodies inspired by that scenery, it is sufficient to refer to his Canadian boat song, "Faintly as tolls the evening chime," and the ballad, "I knew by the smoke." Those poems relating to America were published in 1806, and dedicated to the Earl of Moira.

Moore records that even in 1807 he had intended to resume the keeping of his terms, and get called to the Irish Bar; but the engagement to publish the "Irish Melodies," the greatest work of his life, postponed for ever the fulfilment of this intention. Edward Bunting, musician and composer, born in Armagh, in 1773, was present at the memorable assemblage of Irish Harpers, in Belfast in 1792, the last that has taken place, from which period he entered on the collection and publication of his "Ancient Music of Ireland," a copy of which Moore first saw in 1797. This work supplied him with most of the airs for his "Melodies." Sir John Armstrong Stevenson, whose name is so closely identified with Moore's "Irish Melodies," born in Crane Lane, Dublin, between Dame Street and Essex Street, in 1762, was the orphan son of a poor coachmaker. Left without father or mother when only nine years of age, he was adopted by a benevolent musical instrument maker, under whose fostering care he developed such musical talents, and evinced such genius in composition, that he secured appointments in the two Protestant Cathedrals of Dublin, Christ

Church and St. Patrick's; while, in 1800, the degree of Doctor of Music was conferred on him by the Dublin University; and in 1803 he received the honour of knighthood. When Power, the enterprising musical publisher, entered into an engagement with Moore, in 1807, to write the words for a series of "Irish Melodies," part of the stipulation was that Sir John Stevenson was to be entrusted with the musical arrangement, or setting them to harmony. The terms were, in the words of his letter to his mother, "the Powers give me *five hundred a year* for my music; the agreement is for *seven years*, and as much longer as I choose to say." As the publication of the "Melodies," in ten numbers, commenced in 1807, and extended over twenty-seven years, this, if literally carried out, implies that Moore received 13,500*l.* for these 124 lyrics, twelve in each number, being at an average rate of nearly 110*l.* for each melody, or about 5*l.* per line. The annals of literature afford, from the commercial standpoint, no parallel for this premium; yet such was the intense popularity and success of the enterprise that the investment proved an El Dorado to the spirited publisher. The twelve melodies of the first number are a study. Moore selects some of the earliest and brightest phases of Irish history to revive the memory of national glories and inspire hopes of the social and political resurrection of the country, then in the lowest state of despondency. Its Senate suppressed; its native gentry beggared, and their successors absentees; an alien Church and an alien oligarchy ruling the land; four-fifths of the population civil helots in their native country; excluded from Parliament; excluded from the corporations; excluded from every higher grade of the civil service; education virtually denied them, save through apostasy; Christendom exhibited no spectacle more wretched than the Catholics of Ireland in 1807, when Moore essayed to dramatise her story in those marvellous lyrics that will last as long as the human race. In the first number he touched "The Harp that once through Tara's Halls," taking back the public mind some twelve to eighteen centuries, to St. Patrick, the *Seanchus Mor* and the *Lia-Fail*, and reviving all the early glories of Ireland, Pagan and Christian, associated with an air touchingly plaintive and tender. The war song, "Remember the glories of Brien the Brave," in the same number, brings the venerable victor of Clontarf and the expulsion of the Danes before the popular mind. In a later number, the same glorious period is commemorated in "Let Erin remember the days of old," a lyric already noticed in connection with the name of Robert Emmet. And, while these melodies depict the military prowess and chivalry of the Irish people in the early part of the eleventh century, the exquisite

ballad, "Rich and rare were the gems she wore," describes the high moral condition of the country at the same period, and the traditional reverence, preserved through ages, of the Irish race, for female purity :—

On she went, and her maiden smile  
In safety lighted her round the Green Isle ;  
And blest for ever is she who relied  
Upon Erin's honour and Erin's pride.

Passing to a later era, Moore crystallises in a setting of matchless melody, the historiette of the Statute of Kilkenny, 1367, with its savage penal enactments against the language, the dress, the habits, the sports, the music, the minstrelsy, nay, the existence of the Irish people. The Irish maiden passionately appeals to her minstrel lover, implores him to quit the Pale, and not dock his *coulín* (long locks), shave his upper lip, or abandon his harp under the Anglo-Norman mandate :—

Tho' the last glimpse of Erin, with sorrow I see,  
Yet wherever thou art shall seem Erin to me ;  
In exile, thy bosom shall still be my home,  
And thine eyes make my climate wherever we roam.  
To the gloom of some desert or cold rocky shore,  
Where the eye of the stranger can haunt us no more,  
I will fly with my *Coulín*, and think the rough wind  
Less rude than the foes we leave frowning behind.  
And I'll gaze on thy gold hair as graceful it wreathes,  
And hang o'er thy soft harp, as wildly it breathes ;  
Nor dread that the cold-hearted Saxon will tear  
One chord from that harp, or one lock from that hair.

And passing from early and mediæval times to only three or four years before, Moore, over the fresh grave of Robert Emmet, sings "When he who adores thee," and "Oh ! breathe not his name, let it sleep in the shade," already noticed. Then the bard inculcates union amongst her sons as the supreme remedy for his country's misfortunes in the incomprable air "*Eibhlín a rúin*" ("*Aileen Aroon*") :—

Erin, thy silent tear never shall cease,  
Erin, thy languid smile ne'er shall increase,  
Till, like the rainbow's light,  
Thy various tints unite,  
And form, in heaven's sight,  
One arch of peace !

Nor was the first number of the Melodies without social and scenic Irish contributions. We have the stirring lyric, "Fly not yet," and the graver one, "As a beam o'er the face of the Waters may glow," to the air, "The Young Man's Dream" (its



modern form being "The Groves of Blarney"); while "The Meeting of the Waters," happily blending scenery with sentiment, carries us to a locality known to all Wicklow tourists, the Vale of Avoca, between Rathdrum and Arklow :—

Sweet vale of Avoca ! how calm could I rest  
In thy bosom of shade, with the friends I love best,  
Where the storms that we feel in this cold world should cease,  
And our hearts, like thy waters, be mingled in peace.

The publication of this first number of the "Irish Melodies" in 1807 produced a profound sensation. The fair occupants of the drawing-room hailed the work as a novelty, a fresh, racy, and welcome one, in lyric music ; while politicians and statesmen were startled at the new departure in Irish agitation, or sedition, as many called it, and the unexpected pleading of the case of Ireland in the *salons* of the British nobility and aristocracy by their own families. Success was instantaneous and overwhelming.

The Melodies, concurrently with many other works by Moore, appeared in numbers irregularly from 1807 to 1834, according as the pressure of other engagements enabled him to prepare them. As they form the greatest and most enduring effort of his genius, we shall notice their influence collectively, without reference to their date or their mode of publication. Moore alone is responsible for their subject. If we proceed to analyse the matter of the Melodies, we may divide them generally into historical, legendary, social, scenic, and æsthetic, leaving, unclassified, several lyrics of great merit. Of the historical lyrics not yet noticed, one of the most interesting is the allegory, "The Irish Peasant to his Mistress," the latter being the Irish Catholic Church during the Penal Laws ; it is perhaps the most touching of all the Melodies :—

Through grief and through danger thy smile cheer'd my way,  
Till hope seem'd to bud from each thorn that round me lay ;  
The darker our fortune, the brighter our pure love burn'd,  
Till shame into glory, till fear into zeal was turn'd.  
Yes, slave as I was, in thy arms my spirit felt free,  
And bless'd even the sorrows that made me more dear to thee.

"Oh, blame not the Bard" is a spirited and frank apology for the folly of his youthful muse, and concludes with a pledge and a prophecy eminently fulfilled :—

But tho' glory be gone, and tho' hope fade away,  
Thy name, loved Erin, shall live in his songs ;  
Not ev'n in the hour when his heart is most gay,  
Will he lose the remembrance of thee and thy wrongs.

The stranger shall hear thy lament on his plains;  
 The sigh of thy harp shall be sent o'er the deep,  
 Till thy masters themselves, as they rivet thy chains,  
 Shall pause at the song of their captive and weep.

Kindred to this is the last lyric in the sixth number, intended, then as a farewell with which to close the work in 1815:—

Dear Harp of my country! in darkness I found thee,  
 The cold chain of silence had hung o'er thee long,  
 When proudly, my own Island Harp, I unbound thee,  
 And gave all thy chords to light, freedom, and song!  
 The warm lay of love and the light note of gladness  
 Have waken'd thy fondest, thy liveliest thrill;  
 But, so oft hast thou echo'd the deep sigh of sadness,  
 That ev'n in thy mirth it will steal from thee still.

Dear Harp of my country! farewell to thy numbers,  
 This sweet wreath of song is the last we shall twine!  
 Go, sleep, with the sunshine of Fame on thy slumbers,  
 Till touch'd by some hand less unworthy than mine;  
 If the pulse of the patriot, soldier, or lover,  
 Have throbb'd at our lay, 'tis thy glory alone;  
 I was *but* as the wind, passing heedlessly over,  
 And all the wild sweetness I waked was thy own.

Of the more spirited and popular melodies of a political character, the following may be briefly cited, "Like the bright Lamp that shone in Kildare's Holy Fane," a hopeful passage from which O'Connell frequently quoted:—

The nations have fallen, and thou still art young;  
 Thy sun is but rising, when others are set;  
 And tho' slavery's cloud o'er thy morning hath hung,  
 The full noon of Freedom shall beam round thee yet.  
 Erin, oh Erin, tho' long in the shade,  
 Thy star will shine out when the proudest shall fade.

"The Minstrel Boy," "Oh, where is the Slave so Lowly," "Oh, for the Sword, of Former Time," "Song of Innisfail," "Oh, the Shamrock," "While History's Muse," "Weep on, Weep on," "Forget not the Field," "The Parallel," "Shall the Harp then be Silent," "Oh, the Sight Entrancing," "Before the Battle," "After the Battle," "Sublime was the Warning," "Song of the Battle Eve," and "Though Dark are our Sorrows," are typical specimens of those patriotic lyrics. One other passionate and touching melody we cannot forbear to cite at length:—

Remember thee? yes, while there's life in this heart,  
 It shall never forget thee, all lorn as thou art;  
 More dear in thy sorrow, thy gloom, and thy showers,  
 Than the rest of the world in their sunniest hours.

Wert thou all that I wish thee, great, glorious, and free—  
First flower of the earth, and first gem of the sea,—  
I might hail thee with prouder, with happier brow,  
But, oh! could I love thee more deeply than now?

No, thy chains as they rankle, thy blood as it runs,  
But make thee more painfully dear to thy sons—  
Whose hearts, like the young of the desert-bird's nest,  
Drink love in each life-drop that flows from thy breast!

It is to be recollected that over the whole period from 1807 to 1829, agitation for Catholic Emancipation was proceeding in Ireland, in one form or another, by occasional public meetings, by the labours of the Catholic Board and the General Committee of Catholics, by petitions to Parliament, and, from 1823, by the work of the great and formidable Irish Catholic Association. It is now, after a lapse of 50 to 70 years, impossible to estimate adequately the powerful support that the muse of Moore gave to the Catholic cause and to Ireland. Confining our attention, for the present, to the Melodies, we may point to the political tact and social skill displayed in some of them, as pleas for Emancipation. When acting in the famous private theatricals, in the city of Kilkenny, 1808-9, Moore made the acquaintance of all the gentry of that county, amongst others, of Colonel Bryan, of Jenkinstown Park, a Catholic gentleman of property, whose ancestral house had been an asylum for the clergy during the time of persecution, and whose son has sat in Parliament for the county Kilkenny, since 1865. A *fête*, in honour of the Prince of Wales's birthday, was given at Jenkinstown, for which Moore wrote "Though dark are our Sorrows," to the air of St. Patrick's Day, one stanza of which is:—

Contempt on the minion, who calls you disloyal!

Tho' fierce to your foe, to your friends you are true;

And the tribute most high to a head that is Royal,

Is love from a heart that loves liberty too.

While cowards, who blight

Your fame, your right,

Would shrink from the blaze of the battle array,

The standard of Green

In front would be seen,—

Oh, my life on your faith! were you summon'd this minute,

You'd cast every bitter remembrance away,

And show what the arm of old Erin has in it,

When roused by the foe, on her Prince's Day.

The Prince of Wales was highly complimented at this Catholic lyric, and when it was sung before him (as George IV.), at dinner, at Lord Powerscourt's, the evening before he left Ireland, in 1820, he betrayed visible signs of emotion. A few years

afterwards, the victor of Waterloo was thus addressed by the Genius of Erin :—

Yet, still the last crown of thy toils is remaining,  
 The grandest, the purest, even *thou* hast yet known ;  
 Though proud was thy task, other nations unchaining,  
 Far prouder to heal the deep wounds of thy own.  
 At the foot of that throne for whose weal thou hast stood,  
 Go, plead for the land that first cradled thy fame,  
 And, bright o'er the flood  
 Of her tears and her blood,

Let the rainbow of hope be her Wellington's name !

George IV. and the Duke of Wellington opposed Emancipation until 1829, when both reluctantly ceded it, and fully verified Moore's prediction uttered years before.

The "Legendary Lyrics," always beautiful, are frequently political as well as historical and literary, as, for example, "Silent, oh Moyle," "By that Lake whose gloomy shore," "St. Senanus and the Lady," "By the Feales wave benighted," and "The Valley lay smiling before me." The scenic lyrics surpass, if not in graphic power, at least in sentimental and tender association, most of the Melodies, and Moore visited all the picturesque localities which he describes—Avoca, Glendalough, Arranmore, Glengariffe, Innisfallen, and Killarney. Of the arbutus and myrtle springing through the limestone rocks in Killarney, he says :—

Rocks, through myrtle boughs,  
 In grace majestic frowning ;  
 Like some bold warrior's brows  
 That love hath just been crowning.

To the echoes

He listened—while high o'er the eagle's rude nest,  
 The lingering sounds on their way loved to rest ;  
 And the echoes sung back, from their full mountain quire,  
 As if loth to let song so enchanting expire.

It seemed as if ev'ry sweet note that died here,  
 Was again brought to life in some airier sphere,  
 Some Heav'n in those hills, where the soul of the strain  
 That had ceas'd upon earth was awaking again !

The domestic affections, in the "Irish Melodies," are treated, on the whole, with such purity as to atone, to some extent, for the laxity and warmth of "Little's Juvenile Poems." "Believe me, if all those endearing young charms," addressed to his wife, is scarcely equalled in the language. "Go where Glory waits thee," "We may roam through this World," "Love's young Dream," "'Tis the Last Rose of Summer," "The young May-Moon," "Drink to her," "I'd Mourn the Hopes," "As slow

our Ship," and "To Ladies' Eyes around, Boys," are amongst the gems of this class of Melodies.

The social and sentimental songs of the Melodies are as characteristic of Ireland as the historical lyrics. "And doth not a Meeting like this," and "They may rail at this Life," were both sung, for the first time, at the banquet to Moore, at Morrisson's Hotel, in 1818; while amongst the others are, "One Bumper at Parting," "Farewell, but whenever you welcome the hour," "I saw from the Beach," "Drink of this Cup," "When through Life unblest we roam," "Quick, we have but a second," and "Sing, sing! Music was given."

Moore's fame being more deservedly associated with the Irish Melodies than with any of his other numerous works, we may be pardoned, on such an occasion, for placing this summary of their matter before our readers. Irish and national those Melodies emphatically are. The subjects are exclusively Irish; the poet Moore was Irish; Stevenson the musical editor was Irish; MacIse the artist who admirably illustrated the melodies was Irish; and Power the spirited publisher was Irish. No other country can lay claim to so eminent, so national, a distinction, in lyric literature. We owe a passing word of tribute to Sir John Stevenson, the gifted colleague of Moore, to whose birth and fame we have already referred. This is not the time nor the place to discuss the peculiarities of Irish music, upon several aspects of which the opinions of scientific men, and even of archæologists, differ. It was an early accusation that Sir John Stevenson had disfigured and spoiled the special character of the Irish airs in the Melodies, by his management of the harmony; this imputation Moore adopts as applying to himself alone, and exonerates his colleague from the responsibility, as he himself selected and arranged all the airs. We refer our readers for an exhaustive discussion of the subject of Irish music to the late Professor O'Curry's "Lectures on the Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish" (3 vols.), delivered in the Catholic University, especially the able "Introduction" (vol. i. pp. cccclxxxiii. to end), by Professor W. K. Sullivan; to Bunting's "Ancient Music of Ireland;" to Dr. Petrie's "Collection" on the same subject; to Levey's "Dance Music" of Ireland; and to other recent works. In the ablest of these scientific dissertations it is argued, with unanswerable power, that while the musical archæologist, or collector of ancient airs, would be unfaithful to his trust should he modify any of the tunes which he may collect, not so the modern harmonist, who may, with advantage, alter or adapt any ancient air provided he does so with the least violence to the characteristic

features of the music. Sir John Stevenson held that his symphonies and accompaniments were altogether subordinate to the Melodies themselves, and modestly remarked to Dr. Petrie, "I would recommend any person who means to sing them to purchase a piano about the value of 5*l.*, for it will be then likely that one may have a fair chance of hearing very little of the instrument, and something of the melody and the poetry." Sir John Stevenson died at Headfort, Kells, County Meath, 14th September, 1833, nearly twenty years before Moore, aged seventy, at the residence of his daughter the Marchioness of Headfort. Moore deplored his loss in a monody of touching beauty, "Silence is in our Festal Halls," which fitly concludes the Irish Melodies with the following modest stanza :—

Yes, Erin, thine alone the fame,—  
 Or, if thy bard have shared the crown,  
 From thee the borrow'd glory came,  
 And at thy feet is now laid down.  
 Enough, if Freedom still inspire  
 His latest song, and still there be,  
 As evening closes round his Lyre,  
 One ray upon its chords from thee.

The marriage of Moore in 1811 was an important incident in his life, and it affords a fitting opportunity of saying a word on what cannot be considered other than a painful subject—his religion. His wife was a Miss Bessy Dyke, whom he met at Kilkenny, where both of them took part in the private theatricals which were at that time so popular with the Irish aristocracy.

Miss Dyke was Irish, but a Protestant. It was a union of sincere affection on both sides, but it turned out badly for Moore's religion and, probably, for his personal happiness. He certainly never denied his Catholic faith, or professed any belief in Protestantism ; to this his Protestant biographer, Lord John Russell, bears strong testimony :—

He was bred a Roman Catholic, and, in his mature years, he published a work of some learning, in defence of the chief articles of the Roman Catholic Faith. Yet he occasionally attended the Protestant Church, he had his children baptised into that Church, and when the head of his own Church was restored to his throne, he dreaded the consequence of that triumph to the liberty which he prized. Yet he always adhered to the Roman Catholic Church, and when in London attended the Roman Catholic Chapel in Warwick Street (misprinted Wardour). His answer to a person who tried to convert him to Protestantism was nearly in these terms: "I was born and bred in the faith of my fathers, and in that faith I intend to die."



Till the end, he attended Catholic worship, when in London, in Ireland, and on the Continent. He relates himself how he wept at the music in Warwick Street Chapel, and was edified by the sermons. And he has written a book, the "*Travels of an Irish Gentleman in Search of a Religion*," which, with one or two abatements, a Catholic priest might think himself happy to have been able to write. But he certainly went to the Protestant Church without scruple, at least during the latter part of his life, when he was residing in Wilts. Three of his five children were brought up Protestants—the other two died infants—and his unfortunate eldest son rewarded him by making him thoroughly miserable. "Why do people sigh for children?" he wrote to his wife. "They know not what sorrows will come with them." The fact about his religion seems to be that, although convinced of the truth of Catholicism, he cared little or nothing, practically, for any form of belief, and was satisfied with himself when his heart was touched, or when religious music brought the tears into his eyes. His private life was irreproachable; and much allowance must undoubtedly be made for his indifference. He was made to feel in his very youth the stigma of a persecuted creed, and he had not strength of mind to stand fast by his principles. His political and literary friends were, mainly, Protestants, or worse. The greater part of his life was spent in England and in the country, where priests were few and religious opportunities rare. Had Moore died before 1847, in full possession of his faculties, instead of in 1852, when he had, for years, lost them, within reach of Catholicism, who can doubt that his early teaching and his Catholic instincts would have borne fruit, and that like another Irishman of genius, the celebrated Father Prout (Rev. Francis Mahony), he would have been truly repentant for the temporary looseness of his religious practice. Meanwhile, his genius is Catholic, and though he has offended morality in some of his early writings, he has hardly uttered a serious word that can be construed into a slight on Church or Pontiff. We may not admire the *man*, patriot though he was, and deep his genius, as he lacks that moral fibre without which even genius cannot claim our respect. But it is something to be thankful for that the immortal melodies on which his fame rests are not disfigured by a sneer at Faith, while his best prose work is a defence of Catholicism.

Lord John Russell discusses the charge brought against Moore of having neglected the education of his children, and solemnly declares, from personal knowledge, and with all the evidence before him, that such charge is wholly groundless, the

contrary being the fact. Through Lord Grey and Sir Robert Peel, Moore obtained places in the Charter House, London, for his two boys; but several entries in his Journal show that, when in London, he and Tom, his eldest and only wild son, attended mass in Warwick Street Chapel, and sometimes Tom alone. Moore made a sad mistake in the choice of a profession for his sons, as Lord John Russell admits, neither being physically, and one not morally, fit for the army. Of the second son little need be said, as he sunk early aged nineteen; but the elder mainly helped to close his father's life in grief and misery. Moore purchased a commission for him in 1838; he was constantly in trouble by his bad conduct; incessantly involving his father in heavy debt; and he ultimately sold out in India; when his father obtained a commission for him in the French service, in Algiers, where he died, in 1846.

In 1808 appeared "Corruption" and "Intolerance," and the following year, "The Sceptic," the first two being political, "Addressed to an Englishman by an Irishman," and the last, on the early Schoolmen. All three were comparative failures, and made no lasting impression, proving clearly that satire, as applied to any great subject, lay beyond the genius of Moore. His Operatic Farce of "The M.P., or the Blue Stocking," published in 1811, the year of his marriage, notwithstanding some passages of the most refined and beautiful sentiments, and a few good lyrics, was also a failure. The publication of the "Irish Melodies" proceeded, the fifth number having been issued December, 1813. That year Moore struck a new vein of composition which, if it has not enhanced his permanent and higher fame, vastly promoted his popularity and improved his finances. "The Twopenny Post Bag; or, Intercepted Letters," by Thomas Brown the Younger, was published in 1813, and ran through fourteen editions in thirteen months, although it was an intensely bitter satire on the Prince of Wales and the Government. It was then that Moore commenced to write political squibs in the *Morning Chronicle*, the leading Whig and Liberal organ, edited by his friend Mr. Perry; and also in the *Times*, the leading Tory organ, edited by Mr. Barnes, another personal friend of his. These satirical and pungent pasquinades, eagerly read by the public, brought him an income of 500*l.* a year. He fearlessly lashed the political corruption, religious bigotry, and intolerance of the time; and, from the Prince of Wales to "Paddy" Duigenan, of Dublin, left no typical exponent of despotism unassailed. The "National Airs," which include some of Moore's very best lyrics, were commenced in 1815, and his "Sacred Songs" the following year; meantime he continued the composition of the "Irish

Melodies," the sixth, and one of the best, numbers of which appeared in 1815. In that number appeared "When first I met thee warm and young," popularly, but without foundation, supposed to be a reproachful address from Caroline, Princess of Wales, to her husband, afterwards George IV., for his domestic unfaithfulness; whereas, we have Moore's own authority that it was purely political, and designed to expose the tergiversation of the Prince of Wales in relation to the Liberal promises of his earlier life. Another of the melodies of that number is on the Duke of Wellington, "While History's Muse," already noticed. And amongst the other lyrics are "Where is the slave so lowly?" "Come, rest in this bosom," "'Tis gone, and for ever," and "Dear harp of my country," proving the vigour and the industry of Moore's life, his other works considered, at this period.

When Moore first visited London, in 1799, he went to private lodgings, like most law students. Afterwards he lived, 1802-3, at Lord Moira's seat, Donington Hall, Leicestershire, where he stayed a short time after his marriage, when he removed to Kegworth, and thence to Mayfield Cottage, in 1812, close to Ashbourne, in Derbyshire, not far from Donington Park, in order to avail himself of Lord Moira's extensive library. It was in Mayfield Cottage, which Moore describes as a "poor place, little better than a barn; but we at once took it and set about making it habitable and comfortable;" that he wrote the best of his melodies and a great portion of his poems, including "Lalla Rookh." This remarkable poem appeared in 1817, but Moore had conceived the idea of it as early as 1811, and had determined to write such a poem in 1812. He received three thousand guineas from Longman for "Lalla Rookh;" the whole poem is an Irish allegory, under Oriental imagery. As he admits himself, "the same spirit which spoke in the melodies of Ireland found a home in the East." Lord Jeffrey, writing of "Lalla Rookh," November, 1817, in the *Edinburgh Review*, said:—

There is a great deal of our present poetry derived from the East, but this is the finest orientalism we have had yet. The Land of the Sun has never shone out so brightly on the children of the North, nor the sweets of Asia been poured forth, nor her gorgeousness been displayed so profusely to the delighted senses of Europe. The beauteous forms, the dazzling splendour, the breathing odours of the East, seem, at last, to have found a kindred poet in the "Green Isle" of the West.

The work went through seven editions in one year; was soon translated into as many languages, Oriental and European; and before Moore's death the editions had exceeded twenty. The work cost him intense study and protracted preparation,

which were rewarded with magnificent success. His own account of its inspiration is as follows :—

It was to the secluded life I led during the years 1813-16, in a lone cottage, among the fields in Derbyshire, that I owed the inspiration, whatever may have been its value, of some of the best and most popular portions of "*Lalla Rookh*." It was amidst the snows of two or three Derbyshire winters that I found myself enabled, by that concentration of thought which retirement alone gives, to call up around me some of the sunniest of those Eastern scenes which have since been welcomed in India itself as almost native to its clime.

That it was the history of Ireland and the cause of Irish Catholics which inspired Moore in the felicitous selection of his Oriental allegory, we have his own specific assurance. Admitting his readers into the workshop of Parnassus, he points to the numerous inchoate plans, sketches, and crude models of an Oriental poem, all of which, after much labour, he had to reject as failures. He then says :—

But at last, fortunately, as it proved, the thought occurred to me of founding a story on the fierce struggle so long maintained between the Ghebers, or ancient fire-worshippers of Persia, and their haughty Moslem masters. From that moment, a new and deep interest in my whole task took possession of me. The cause of tolerance was again my inspiring theme; and the spirit that had spoken in the melodies of Ireland soon found itself at home in the East.

We do not here discuss the literary merits of "*Lalla Rookh*," upon which the world, for more than sixty years, has expressed its opinion, but only observe that even this splendid work, whose subject and locality seem most foreign to his native land, drew its inspiration from his intense love of Ireland.

Just at this time, 1816-17, when Moore was rapidly approaching the zenith of his popularity, he lost two attached friends, two distinguished Irishmen, Richard Brinsley Sheridan and John Philpot Curran. Sheridan, Curran, Grattan were types of the great Irishmen of that brilliant age who loved and honoured Moore, not less as an ardent patriot than as a gifted poet. Fearlessly he exposed the cruel neglect of Sheridan, from royalty downwards, in the sad struggles before his death :—

Oh! it sickens the heart to see bosoms so hollow,  
And spirits so mean in the great and high-born;  
To think what a long line of titles may follow  
The relics of him who died—friendless and lorn!

How proud they can press to the fun'ral array,  
Of one, whom they shunn'd in his sickness and sorrow ;—  
How bailiffs may seize his last blanket, to-day,  
Whose pall shall be held up by nobles to-morrow!

And, describing, indignantly, the shameful neglect towards this illustrious Irishman, Moore asks :—

Was *this*, then, the fate of that high-gifted man,  
 The pride of the palace, the bow'r, and the hall,  
 The orator, dramatist, minstrel, who ran  
 Through each mode of the lyre and was master of all ;—  
 Whose mind was an essence, compounded with art,  
 From the finest and best of all other men's pow'rs ;—  
 Who rul'd, like a wizard, the world of the heart,  
 And could call up its sunshine, or bring down its show'rs ;—  
 Whose humour, as gay as the fire-fly's light,  
 Play'd round every subject, and shone as it play'd ;—  
 Whose wit, in the combat, as gentle as bright,  
 Ne'er carried a heart-stain away on its blade ;—  
 Whose eloquence—bright'ning whatever it tried,  
 Whether reason or fancy, the gay or the grave,—  
 Was as rapid, as deep, and as brilliant a tide  
 As ever bore Freedom aloft on its wave !

And, similarly, we have to note the death of the illustrious Grattan, in 1820, another of Moore's attached friends, and the splendid monody, "Shall the harp then be silent."

We may refer to one or two other incidents about this period of Moore's life, in proof of his popularity, and of the general appreciation of his unflinching patriotism and loyal attachment to the Catholic Church and cause. Byron, in 1814, about to publish "*The Corsair*," resolved to dedicate it to Moore. Byron, knowing that Moore was engaged in writing "*Lalla Rookh*," included the following graceful and generous passage in the dedication :—

The wrongs of your own country, the magnificent and fiery spirit of her sons, the beauty and feeling of her daughters, may there be found ; and Collins, when he denominated his *Oriental* his *Irish Eclogues*, was not aware how true, at least, was a part of his parallel. Your imagination will create a warmer sun, and less clouded sky ; but wildness, tenderness, and originality are part of your national claim of Oriental descent, to which you have already thus far proved your title, more clearly than the most zealous of your country's antiquarians.

Mr. Murray, the publisher, having objected to this passage, on the ground that it would do harm to Moore, Byron sent it, and also another dedication, giving Moore his choice, with this letter :—

As it would not be fair to press you into a dedication, without previous notice, I send you *two*, and I will tell you why *two*. The first, Mr. Murray, who sometimes takes upon him the critic (and I hear it with astonishment) says, may do you *harm*—God forbid ! this, alone, makes me listen to him. The fact is, he is a damned Tory, and has, I

dare swear, something of *self*, which I cannot divine, at the bottom of his objection, as it is the allusion to Ireland to which he objects.

Moore, with true spirit, accepted the dedication complimentary to his name and nation, an acceptance warmly endorsed by Lord Byron in the following characteristic intimation to Mr. Murray, dated 15th January, 1814 :—

Mr. Moore has seen and decidedly preferred the part your Tory bile sickens at. If every syllable were a rattlesnake, or every letter a pestilence, they should not be expunged. Let those who cannot swallow chew the expressions on Ireland.

Here is a memorable tribute to Moore's unflinching devotion to Ireland.

"Byron's Journal," in 1813, contains numerous records of his intense admiration of Moore, especially of his "Irish Melodies," "Lalla Rookh," and others of his works not being then composed. He gives an equilateral triangle, as a *Gradus ad Parnassum*, upon the vertex of which he placed Scott, as "the monarch of Parnassus, and the most English of Bards." Rogers is placed next. Moore and Campbell in the third place. Southey, Wordsworth, and Coleridge next; with "the many" at the base. It is to be recollected that Scott was then in the zenith of his glory, and so was Rogers; while Moore's only great work was the few numbers of the "Melodies" then in course of publication. Yet Byron, at the base of his triangle, wrote :—

I have ranked the names upon my triangle more upon what I believe popular opinion, than any decided opinion of my own. For to me, some of Moore's last Erin sparks—"As a beam o'er the face of the waters," "When he who adores thee," "Oh blame not," and "Oh breathe not his name,"—*are worth all the epics that were ever composed.*

In the spring of 1818 Moore visited Paris for the first time, in company with Samuel Rogers, and during his brief sojourn wrote "The Fudge Family in Paris," of which five editions were published in a fortnight, his share of the profits being 350%. Their popularity was unbounded.

We have said little of the feeling towards Moore in Ireland, since he first left it, in 1799. In the earlier years, afterwards, he frequently visited Dublin, but in May, 1818, after an absence of some years, on his return from Paris he paid a visit to his native city, when he was entertained at a public dinner, at Morrisson's Hotel, Dawson Street, June the 7th, under circumstances of unusual distinction. The Earl of Charlemont presided, and two hundred and twenty of the leading Liberal nobility and public men in Ireland were present, amongst whom may be named Lord Cloncurry, Sir C. Molyneux, Sir C. Morgan, Mr. Burrows, O'Connell, Sheil, Plunket, W. H. Curran, Maturin, Phillips,



Sam Lover, &c. Old John Moore, then seventy-eight years of age, was an honoured guest, and shared the deserved triumph of his gifted son. Moore sung, for the first time, his two touching songs, "And doth not a meeting like this make amends," and "They may rail at this life." And it was at this banquet that Samuel Lover sung his first song in public. The proceedings were of the most enthusiastic character, the assembly being thoroughly representative, so that, thenceforth, Moore must be regarded as the national bard of Ireland. Lord Byron, writing from Ravenna to the father of the Earl of Beaconsfield, after reading of the reception accorded to Moore in his native city, says:—

The times have preserved a respect for political consistency, and, even though changeable, honour the unchanged. Look at Moore; it will be long ere Southey meets with such a triumph in London as Moore met with in Dublin, even if the Government subscribe for it, and set the money down to secret service. It was not less to the *man* than to the *poet*; to the tempted but unshaken *patriot*; to the not opulent but incorruptible *fellow-citizen*, that the warm-hearted Irish paid the proudest of tributes.

On the urgent invitation of his noble old friend, the Marquis of Lansdowne, Moore finally settled down for life at Sloperton Cottage, Devizes, Wiltshire, not far from Bowood, in a thatched cottage and garden, which he rented at 40*l.* a year.

In July, 1823, he visited Ireland with the Marquis of Lansdowne, and made a tour of a month through the south. His father and mother then lived in Abbey Street, Dublin, and as his father died 17th December, 1825, aged eighty-four years, it was the last time he saw him. The tourists drove to Carlow, where the illustrious Dr. Doyle, Bishop of Kildare and Leighlin, then resided, and thence to Kilkenny. Here Moore renewed his old acquaintance with his theatrical haunts of 1808-9; Cavanagh's, where Bessie, her mother, and sister lodged; the charming walk by the right bank of the Nore, where they had often strolled; and Kilkenny Castle, the splendid seat of the Butlers, overhanging the river. Kilcash, Clonmel, Lismore, Youghal, Cork, and Cove were visited, at which last Moore's eldest sister Kate resided with her husband, Mr. John Scully. From Cork the party proceeded through Mallow, Kanturk, and Millstreet to Killarney, Moore calling on Sir W. Wrixon Becher, and Lady Becher (Miss O'Neill), his old dramatic friends, at Ballygeblin, near Mallow. The guest of the Earl of Kenmare, the owner of the chief portion of the Lakes, Moore's intense enjoyment of the unrivalled scenery of Killarney and Glengarriffe finds lasting and beautiful expression

in "Sweet Innisfallen," "'Twas one of those dreams," and "Fairest, put on awhile"—

Lakes, where the pearl lies hid,  
And caves, where the gem is sleeping,  
Bright as the tears thy lid  
Lets fall in lonely weeping.  
Glens, where Ocean comes,  
To 'scape the wild wind's rancour,  
And harbours, worthiest homes  
Where Freedom's fleet can anchor.

In Killarney, as in the city of Cork, all the gentry called on Moore, and amongst those who waited on him in Kenmare House was Daniel O'Connell. In Moore's reception by the Earl of Kenmare, the wealthiest Catholic peer in Ireland, in a mansion that afterwards received Queen Victoria, and in the attention shown by O'Connell, we can note the respect felt for his principles as a Catholic and his patriotism as an Irishman, combined with high admiration for his genius as the national bard of Ireland. A similar testimony was offered in the great public banquet given to him in 1818; while a public dinner was declined by him, at his visit to Dublin in 1815, when he and his wife first returned to Ireland after their marriage. We shall have occasion to remind our readers of many demonstrations of this and other kinds as proofs of the high estimation in which Moore was held by his contemporaries, and as practical refutation of the attempts now being made in some quarters to depreciate, not alone his literary merits, but his personal and political character. Moore returned from Killarney by Tralee, Ardfert, Listowel, Foynes, Adare, Limerick, Roscrea, Maryborough, Dunamase, and Naas, visiting every spot of scenic or of historical interest; and, passing through Leix, the ancient principality of the sept of the O'Mores, he reached Dublin the 16th August, and returned to Sloperton Cottage.

We now approach the publication of what may be regarded as Moore's prose works, the first of which was "Memoirs of Captain Rock, the celebrated Irish Chieftain, with some Account of his Ancestors," which appeared early in 1824. The work is an able, masterly, and powerful explanation and defence of Irish discontent, fearlessly exposing its causes—the injustice and misgovernment of England—and suggesting the remedies. In three weeks a second edition appeared, the *Times*, its Tory and anti-Irish proclivities notwithstanding, noticing it in the following flattering terms:—

There are few writers who, in the language of painting, possess the same faculty of massing their tints and grouping their figures as the

author of this lively yet solid and instructive publication. He seems to have found the true royal road to knowledge, divesting an obscure and unattractive history of whatever could alarm the indolent or perplex the dull, while the love of justice, humanity, and liberty breaks out through every apostrophe of the author, however he may affect to veil his emotions under sarcasm, levity, or scorn.

Considering the intensely Irish and anti-British spirit that pervades every page of "Captain Rock," this review is highly creditable to the candour of the *Times*. Sydney Smith, in the *Edinburgh Review*, is still more pronounced in its praise. He says :—

Moore has here borrowed the name of a celebrated Irish leader, to typify that spirit of violence and insurrection which is necessarily generated by systematic oppression, and rudely avenges its crimes; and the picture he has drawn of its prevalence in that unhappy country is at once piteous and frightful. Its effect in heightening our horror and indignation is, in the long run, increased, we think, though, at first, it may seem counteracted, by the tone of levity, and even jocularity, under which he has chosen to veil the deep sarcasm and substantial terrors of his story. We smile at first, and are amused; and wonder, as we proceed, that the humorous narrative should produce conviction and pity—shame, abhorrence, and despair!

Appearing at a period of agrarian suffering and disturbance, and at the opening of the great agitation which in a few years carried Catholic Emancipation, "Captain Rock" secured to the cause of Ireland the support of the most influential section of the press in Great Britain, and confirmed the Liberal party in the justice and the wisdom of conciliating the Irish people.

The "Life of Right Hon. Richard Brinsley Sheridan" (2 vols.), commenced in Paris, but abandoned or delayed on account of the writer having to wait for letters and papers, was published in 1825, and a second edition appeared the same year. Moore's "Life of Sheridan" establishes his fame as an able and faithful biographer and a charming prose writer, a fame which his subsequent works fully confirm.

Moore's visit to Scotland in the autumn of 1825, where he was so warmly received by Sir Walter Scott, Jeffrey, and the leading men in the country, was another brilliant success, and a most gratifying incident, cementing, as it did, a lifelong and warm friendship between the "Wizard of the North," Jeffrey, the prince of critics, and the bard of Erin. Moore was enthusiastically received at the theatre in Edinburgh, where he went with Sir Walter, and in Lockhart's "Life of Scott" there is a graphic account of the gratifying impression made on the great novelist by Moore's visit.

"The Epicurean," an Eastern tale in prose, which had been

commenced in Paris, in 1820, as a poem, but abandoned, was published in 1827, dedicated to Lord John Russell. It proved one of the most successful of all his works, the sale having been enormous, and was soon translated into French, German, Italian, and Dutch.

Lord Byron had placed in Moore's hands, at Venice, in 1819, a white leather bag, saying, "Look here," holding it up, "this would be worth something to Murray, though *you*, I daresay, would not give sixpence for it." "What is it?" Moore asked. "My life and adventures." On hearing this, Moore raised his hands in surprise. "It is not a thing," said Byron, "that can be published during my lifetime; but you may have it if you like. There, do whatever you please with it." Taking the bag, Moore said, after warmly thanking Lord Byron, "This will make a nice legacy for my little Tom, who shall astonish the latter days of the nineteenth century with it." Byron added, "You may show it to any of your friends you think worthy of it." Byron's Journal, in that parcel, closed in 1816; but, near the end of 1820, he wrote from Ravenna, sending Moore an additional packet, which brought his life to nearly that date; in which letter he suggested to Moore to obtain an advance from Longman or Murray on the manuscript, with the stipulation not to publish till *after* Lord Byron's death. Moore, acting on this recommendation, sold the manuscript to Murray for two thousand guineas, subject to the conditions stated. Lord Byron died at Missolonghi, 19th April, 1824, and immediately the idea of the publication of the work was entertained. Lord Byron's executors and Lady Byron had a moral claim to see the Journal, and, on examining it, protested against its publication. Moore thereupon agreed to repay Murray the two thousand guineas, and, when he obtained possession of the manuscript, destroyed it. For this unselfish act on Moore's part he has been censured by many as unfaithful to his trust; but in the opinion of most people his conduct proves the depth and sincerity of his friendship for Lord Byron. Moore entered into a new arrangement with Murray to bring out the "Letters and Journals of Lord Byron, with Notices of his Life," in three volumes, from such materials as they could collect; and in January, 1830, the public, long expecting the publication, were startled by the appearance of the first volume; the work being dedicated to Sir Walter Scott by his "affectionate friend, Thomas Moore." Of its success, and the biographer's execution of his difficult and delicate task, we have no need to speak. Byron was an ardent friend of Ireland, a devoted admirer of Sheridan, Curran, Grattan, Moore, and all the Irish patriots,

and an unflinching supporter of the Catholic claims ; hence the publication cannot be dissociated from Irish politics.

The "*Life of Lord Edward Fitzgerald*," in two vols., published in 1831, is perhaps one of Moore's most popular productions, his name being one of the most loved, his fate one of the saddest, and his life and sacrifices the most touching, to the Irish populace. Moore saw Lord Edward Fitzgerald but once, in passing through Grafton Street ; and on the night of the intended rising, May, 1798, Moore was ill, but he recollected the putting out of the street lamps as the preconcerted signal for commencing the insurrection. The preface is frank and spirited, defying the adverse criticism regarding the motives that influenced him in the undertaking, while the execution of the work is a fascinating and finished specimen of biography.

This was followed, in 1833, by the publication of a remarkable work, differing widely, in subject, from any of Moore's other publications—"Travels of an Irish Gentleman in Search of a Religion," the dedication of which is, "To the people of Ireland, this defence of their ancient faith is inscribed, by their devoted servant, the editor of Captain Rock's Memoirs." Catholics had then been emancipated only four years ; Parliamentary Reform was under discussion ; the Tithe Question, the Church Establishment, and the Appropriation Clause were pressing to the front ; schemes of popular education were currently discussed ; the expiring Kildare Place Society's proselytising plan, through an open Bible, and the new national system, which was said to banish or to mutilate the Holy Scriptures, had each its ardent supporters ; while in Parliament, in the press, and throughout all the leading organs of public opinion, Catholic doctrines were assailed as polemically unsound and politically dangerous. It was at this excited and critical juncture Moore's memorable controversial work opportunely appeared. He records in his Journal that he had a conversation with Lord John Russell, informing him that he was about to publish such a work, his object being to prove that Catholicity is the primitive and apostolical Creed of Christendom, against the truth of which Protestantism can make no pretence of successful attack. Lord Russell attests, by his silence, the fidelity of this record. The work was received everywhere, especially amongst Irish Catholics, with unbounded welcome. Priests held it in hand in the pulpits or on the altars in Ireland, and, Sunday after Sunday, delivered courses of instruction from it to their flocks, supplementing "*Milner's End of Controversy*" with an Irish layman's ably put arguments. Moore records, in his Journal, November, 1834, a conversation in reference to

the "Travels of an Irish Gentleman in Search of a Religion," in which he says :—

All I have said, in that book, of the superiority of the Roman Catholic religion over the Protestant in point of antiquity, authority, and consistency, I most firmly and conscientiously believe, being convinced that the latter faith is but a departure and schism, widening more and more every day, from the system of Christianity professed by those who ought to know most about the matter, namely, the earliest Christians. Thus far my views with those of my hero (the gentleman), and I was induced to put them so strongly upon record, from the disgust I feel, and have ever felt, at the arrogance with which most Protestant parsons assume to themselves and their followers the credit of being the only true Christians, and the insolence with which, weekly, from their pulpits, they denounce all Catholics as idolaters and Anti-Christ.

Bishop Doyle, then the foremost prelate in point of ability in the Irish Episcopate, himself an Augustinian, and a native of Wexford, the birthplace of Moore's mother, said of the work : "If St. Augustine were more orthodox and Scratchinbach less plausible, *it is a work of which any of us might be proud.*" This remarkable work was followed by the publication, in 1835, of "The Fudges in England," a sequel to "The Fudges in Paris," being a further exposure, in a vein of the keenest wit and the most scathing sarcasm, of the Irish Church Establishment, the Bible Societies, and Protestant ascendancy. The intense opposition displayed by Moore to the Irish Church Establishment finds fitting recognition from his witty friend, Sydney Smith, himself, in his "Letters of Peter Plymly," having been one of the most vigorous assailants of that institution, now happily defunct. An American artist, named Newton, was engaged on a portrait of Moore when Sydney Smith visited the studio to see the work. The artist, gratified at the interest which his distinguished visitor evinced in the picture, said, "Well, Mr. Smith, what do *you* think of it?" when he answered, "It's a most striking portrait, Mr. Newton; a most excellent likeness; but don't you think you could throw into it a little more hatred of the Church Establishment?"

The British Association, recently founded, held its first meeting in Dublin, August, 1835, and Moore was led to visit again his native city, where he arrived 8th August. His father, as already stated, died in December, 1825; his mother, on the 8th May, 1832, aged sixty-eight years; both were buried in St. Kevin's churchyard, near their former residence, Aungier Street, where six of their children now lie buried. His sister Nell, who lived at 11, Cumberland Street, was then the only member of Moore's family living in Dublin. The meeting of the British



Association opened 8th August, under the presidency of Provost Lloyd, Trinity College, father of the present Provost, and who became President of the following meeting of the Association in Dublin, in 1857. In the attitude of the Irish Government and the position of Catholics, Moore witnessed a marvellous change from his previous visit in 1823. Emancipation and Parliamentary Reform carried; thirty Catholics in the House of Commons; the foundation laid of the Disestablishment of the Anglican Church; Lord Melbourne, Prime Minister; the Marquis of Normanby, Lord Lieutenant; Lord Morpeth, Chief Secretary; Thomas Drummond, Under-Secretary; Lord Plunket, Lord High Chancellor; O'Loughlen (afterwards Sir Michael), the first Catholic Attorney-General; with several Irishmen in the Ministry—as Spring Rice, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Lord Duncannon, Lord Privy Seal; and his noble friend the Marquis of Landsdowne, Lord President of the Council; and Lord John Russell, Home Secretary. Moore justly felt, in this marvellous change, some gratification at the triumph of civil and religious liberty, which he had so ably advocated for over thirty years. He attended the meetings of some of the sections of the British Association—Babbage, Colby, Hamilton, and a number of eminent *savans*, foreign and British, being present. Moore was entertained by the Lord Lieutenant and the Chief Secretary, and by Provost Lloyd and the Fellows in Trinity College. But amongst the honours extended to him there was none he prized more than a banquet given to him at the Presbytery attached to the pro-Cathedral, Marlborough Street, by the Very Rev. Peter Cooper, at which the venerable and revered Archbishop Murray and several leading dignitaries were present. Amongst the distinguished laity still living who were at the banquet is the patriotic Dr. R. R. Madden. That banquet gave the stamp of recognition of the oldest and most esteemed prelate in Ireland, the Archbishop of Moore's native diocese, over which Dr. Murray had ruled from 1809, to the personal character as well as to the genius and patriotism of the national bard. Moore paid, on this occasion, an affectionate visit to 12, Aungier Street, the house in which he was born. On the night of the 15th August he visited the Theatre Royal, when a memorable scene occurred. The poet being expected, and the city being thronged with visitors, the house was filled to overflowing. The plays were "The Jealous Wife," "Born to Good Luck, or an Irishman's Fortune," and the farce "Paddy O'Rafferty." Macready, Miss E. Tree (afterwards Mrs. Charles Kean), and Miss Huddart appeared, while Power played in the farce. The music was all Irish, and was chiefly from the "Melodies." The rapturous cheering for Moore so

interrupted the performance that he was compelled to address the crowded house from his box, between the acts. He opened his address by praying that he possessed the eloquence of their own O'Connell, that his words might reach their ears as their cheers had reached his own heart. And, continuing, he said:—

I cannot say that I am altogether undeserving of your kindness, for if I said that, it would be paying but a bad compliment to the opinion of my friends. I do confess that I have this claim upon my countrymen, that I have endeavoured to be the interpreter of those feelings which breathe through the fine Melodies you have just been hearing. (Cheers.) But, as I have elsewhere said and sung of the Irish harp, the Melodies are yours, not mine:

If the pulse of the patriot, soldier, or lover,  
Have throbb'd at our lay, 'tis thy glory alone;  
I was but as the wind passing heedlessly over,  
And all the wild sweetness I wak'd was thy own.

(Immense applause.)

In one of the songs which I composed, I ventured upon a prophecy:—

The stranger shall hear thy lament on his plains;  
The sigh of thy harp shall be sent o'er the deep,  
Till thy masters themselves, as they rivet thy chains,  
Shall pause at the song of their captive, and weep.

That prophecy has been fulfilled. (Rapturous cheering.) The stranger has sympathised with her wrongs and her sorrows. I am enabled to assure you that upon the banks of the Vistula the "Irish Melodies" are sung, and the sentiments that they breathe are caught up and adapted by that gallant people, the Poles, to their own situation. (Great applause.) I beg to assure you that there is no honour to which I can aspire which I would so highly prize as that of being considered "The Poet of the People of Ireland." (Loud cheers, often renewed.)

Such was Moore's public reception in his native city. On the 25th August he left Dublin to visit Wexford, the birth-place of his mother—he had previously visited Kerry, his father's native county—and saw some attached friends. He passed *en route* through the Vale of Avoca, where he had not been since he wrote the exquisite melody thereon, and during his stay in the county of Wexford he received an ovation worthy of that patriotic people. In the town of Wexford he visited the fine Presentation Convent, where he played on the new organ in the Nuns' Chapel, and planted, by request, in the convent grounds, a myrtle to commemorate his visit. To his friends, the Boyeses, of Bannow, Lord Carew, and other leading families, Moore paid visits, and returning to Dublin 29th August, landed in Liverpool 4th September.

In 1835 the Government of Lord Melbourne, as one of its first acts, conferred on Moore a pension of 300*l.*, in recognition of his eminent service to literature; and no name that has ever been inscribed on that branch of the Civil List more eminently deserved the national honour. Moore was then fifty-six years of age, more than half of which he had devoted to the elevation of literary culture, the refinement of æsthetic taste, and the enlargement of popular liberties upon the basis of constitutional government and national rights. In most countries of Europe a patent of nobility, an adequate fortune, and an exalted position in the State would have been the reward of such services. As to the vulgar idea that he sacrificed his personal independence or the freedom of his political opinions, his whole previous, apart from his subsequent, life is sufficient refutation. An ardent Liberal from feeling, tradition, and conviction, in common with all Irish Catholics for the last century, Moore never would accept any such compliment from a Tory Government, and, in point of fact, declined a pension for his mother.

Moore's "*History of Ireland*" is the last of his works to be noticed. Sir Walter Scott and Sir James Mackintosh having written histories of Scotland and England for "*Lardner's Cyclopædia*," Moore, when applied to, reluctantly agreed to write the history of Ireland, in a single volume. The work expanded to four volumes, dedicated to Thomas Boyse, of Bannow, and was so long in hands that the last volume, which closes with the death of Owen Roe O'Niell, in 1646, was not published until June, 1846; and it is generally supposed that this volume is the production of another pen, from Moore's notes. His advanced years, the heavy labour of editing the complete collection of his poetical works, in ten volumes, his general incompetency for such a serious work as a history of Ireland, and the want of available materials, should have deterred him from the task. In connexion with the compilation of the work, Moore paid his last visit to Dublin, in 1839. It was there he found that he had entered on an undertaking to which he was quite unequal. He visited the Royal Irish Academy with the late Dr. Petrie, then the most accomplished and one of the most erudite archaeologists in Ireland. The late Eugene O'Curry, the eminent Irish scholar, then engaged in connexion with the Ordnance Survey, happened to be in the Academy when Moore came in, and in a lecture delivered by him, as Professor in the Catholic University of Ireland, in 1856 (the illustrious Dr. Newman being Rector), Professor O'Curry relates the incidents of that unexpected visit:—

At the time of his visit, I happened to have before me on my desk

the books of Ballymote and Lecain, the "*Leabhar Breac*," the "Annals of the Four Masters," and many other ancient books, for historical research and reference. I had never before seen Moore, and after a brief introduction, and explanation of the nature of my occupation, by Dr. Petrie, and seeing the formidable array of so many dark and time-worn volumes by which I was surrounded, he looked a little disconcerted; but, after a while, plucked up courage to open the book of Ballymote, and ask what it was. Dr. Petrie and myself then entered into a short explanation of the history and character of the books then present, as well as ancient Gaedhlic documents in general. Moore listened with great attention, alternately scanning the books and myself; and then asked me, in a serious tone, if I understood them, and how I had learned to do so. Having satisfied him upon these points, he turned to Dr. Petrie, and said, "Petrie, these huge tomes could not have been written by fools, or for any foolish purpose. I never knew anything about them before, and I had no right to have undertaken a '*History of Ireland*.'" And, continues O'Curry, "Three volumes of his history had been before this time published, and it is quite possible that it was the new light which appeared to have broken in upon him on this occasion that deterred him from putting his fourth and last volume to press, until after several years; it is believed he was only compelled to do so at last by his publishers, in 1846.—"O'Curry's Lectures on the Manuscript Materials of Ancient Irish History" (p. 154).

And in a subsequent one of the same course of lectures (page 441), in the Catholic University, that year, Professor O'Curry, while crediting Moore with "his well-earned popularity and his character in other respects," returns to the former adverse criticism on his history—at least, the ancient portion—with more emphatic severity:—

Moore discovered his total want of qualification for such a task, too late; but he was candid enough to admit it, without qualification. Against his work, then, I should directly warn you. The account he gives of ancient Erin is nowhere to be relied on; it is taken entirely from English authorities, not merely hostile in feeling, but even themselves ignorant of the facts of the case on which they wrote. So that there is, perhaps, no one event of ancient Irish history accurately given by Moore; and there are innumerable passages in which the most important facts are wholly misrepresented, in the gross and in detail. I do not accuse the poet of any intention so to write the history of his country. Far, far from it. I believe he intended honestly to tell the truth; but he knew of no authorities but those which I have just alluded to; he did not understand the language, and had not even heard of the existence of our great MSS. books till after his first volume had appeared (the volume in which the early history is treated); and when he did discover his mistake, he was, I have the best reason to believe, heartily sorry that he had ever undertaken a

task which was, it was said, suggested rather by the author's publisher than by his own special tastes or study.

This honest and able criticism by the lamented and distinguished Professor O'Curry we entirely adopt, and we recognise in it a most powerful argument in support of Irish Catholic claims for a university, from whose chairs the faith, the history, the archæology, and the nationality of Ireland may be put forth and defended with equal eloquence.

Having reviewed at such length the chief works written by Moore, and dwelt on their political and religious influence, a duty which we deemed imperative in view of the proposed celebration of his Centenary, 28th May next, in Ireland, we may fittingly conclude by reminding a generation which knows little of Thomas Moore except his *Melodies* that he has a right to be judged by his contemporaries. That he was a true-hearted Irishman there cannot be the shadow of a doubt. Bishop Doyle admired and welcomed him; Archbishop Murray hailed him as his country's friend. A living Irishman, whose name is as mighty as either—John MacHale, Archbishop of Tuam—whose life reaches back to Moore's early boyhood, has now the satisfaction of placing his name prominently on the Centennial Committee.\* Lord O'Hagan will deliver the Centennial Oration, and Denis Florence McCarthy will write the Ode. And we may mention, to show more clearly the estimation in which Moore's own generation held him, that when Bishop (afterwards Cardinal) Wiseman was editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW, he asked the poet, through Mr. Bagshawe, to continue in its pages Dr. Lingard's review of Dodd's "*Ecclesiastical History*."

But surely his works and his words speak for themselves. The "*Life of Lord Edward Fitzgerald*" is national; the "*Life of Richard Brinsley Sheridan*" is national; the "*Life of Lord Byron*" has a national drift; "*Captain Rock*" breathes patriotism in its every page. But his *Melodies* are enough. It may be safely said that since the days of Tyrtæus himself no poet has

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\* Archbishop MacHale thus writes of him in his preface to his translation of "*Moore's Melodies*" into Irish:—"The genius of Moore must ever command admiration; its devotion to the vindication of the ardent faith of Ireland, and the character of its injured people, must inspire every Irishman with still more estimable feelings. Seated amidst the tuneful followers of Apollo, he essayed the instrument of every Muse, and became master of them all; sighing, at length, for some higher and holier source of poetical feeling, he turns to the East, and listens with rapture to its poetical melodies; subdued by the strain, he lets fall the lyre, seizes the harp of Sion and Erin at once, the emblem of Piety and of Patriotism, and gives its boldest and most solemn chords to his own impassioned inspirations of country and of patriotism."

ever forced his countrymen and his country's oppressors to realise and feel his country's passionate cry as Moore has done. The Melodies have not stirred up rebellion or forced Bills through Parliament. But, like the shower and sunshine of Ireland herself, they have quickened the good seed in millions of hearts, and prepared a whole generation of thinking men and sensitive women to speak the right word and do the just thing when the moment came.

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ART. IV.—AN EXAMINATION OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S "PSYCHOLOGY."—PART VIII.

(Continued from p. 163, No. 167.)

CHAPTER XVIII.—PERCEPTION IN GENERAL.

THE constituent portions of this chapter are as follows : § 352. The term perception does not signify any truly scientific division, for it is applied to such varied mental states. § 353. It is opposed to sensation. § 354. Sensation is undecomposable ; perception is decomposable into relations. § 355. The higher the perception, the greater the number and variety of the relations classified by its act. § 356. These relations, as they are but modes in which we are affected by sensations, have next to be analysed into those of greater and greater generality up to primordial kinds, and we have then to see what these express.

Herein Mr. Spencer begins (p. 244, § 352) by pointing out the extremely different characters which different perceptions present. His illustrations, however, are all of the gross material kind. He contrasts, in the first place, the perception of a minute dot on paper with that of a vast landscape. Now, both these may be cognized through the senses, without the exercise of intellect, as we may conceive to be possible with brutes. He misses the point ; the contrast is not between a simple and a complex sense-cognition, but between both these and the intellectual comprehension of either, as being *essentially* what it is, a dot or a landscape. The confusion is clear, for he says : "When looking at a landscape, and turning our eyes to different parts of it, we cannot say how many perceptions take in the panorama, or where each perception ends." Here he evidently jumbles up together two distinct things, to say nothing of emotions—(1), the sense-cognitions which give the intellect its materials ; and (2), the intellectual judgments



thus elicited. It is most true that the sense-cognitions are indistinct and indefinitely numerous, but the intellectual judgments are sharp, clear, distinct, and definite. We may judge, *e.g.*, that the purple of the distant mountains is exceptionally vivid; that it is more so than on a previous visit to the spot with a friend who sketched them; that the colour is largely due to atmospheric causes; that a distant church is one in which we heard a sermon which had an important effect on our after-career; that the railway train running in the mid-distance is the one bringing to us the London papers; that the sunset is of that kind which we have heard is likely to be followed by rain; that the great valley before us was a sea when the oolite was being deposited, &c. &c. Perception is a judgment accompanied by an intuition of real existence in ourselves or others. It is the apprehension of a fact, whether of an incipient evil desire arising in our mind, or of a distant nebula. Perception is the name applied to a group of mental states, multitudinous and different indeed, but nevertheless of a perfectly distinct group, a truly scientific division. With much truth our author next declares (p. 246, § 353) that a great distinction is to be drawn between perception and sensation. Though, *mirabile dictu!* he tells us that "it is only in later times that this distinction has been currently acknowledged." There are many strange, not a few startling assertions in the Psychology we are examining, but I do not recollect to have ever met, not only in it but in any book I ever read, an assertion so strange and startling as that just quoted. It has often been objected to Mr. Spencer that he has never taken sufficient trouble to acquaint himself with the works and ideas of his predecessors; but no objection of the kind could have prepared us to find him so absolutely ignorant that the doctrine he considers a novelty was the one and the only one universally held and taught throughout Europe for hundreds of years; a doctrine, moreover, which has never been dropped and which the overwhelming majority of those who have been taught philosophy at all have always had put before them as an unquestionable certainty, and this from Quebec to Buenos Ayres, and from Munster to Mindanao.

True, however, as is the thesis he maintains, certain criticisms are needed as to his mode of advocacy. He says first: "Manifestly every sensation, to be known as such, must be perceived; and hence, as thus considered, all sensations are perceptions." In a sense this is, in another it is not true. Every sensation to be *known* as such must in one sense be perceived indeed; but that it should be so requires the presence of that persistent self-conscious intellect the existence of which Mr. Spencer denies. Therefore, that cannot be the sense in which

Mr. Spencer makes the assertion ; and this is the plainer from his adding : " thus considered, all sensations are perceptions." He evidently means that a sensation to be perceived must have attained a certain amount of intensity. " Only then," he says, " can I be said to experience them as sensations." Here, again, is ambiguity. A sensation must have a certain degree of intensity to be felt, and if not felt, it cannot be " experienced;" but it can be felt without being experienced " as a sensation." For the expression " as a sensation" must refer to the intellectual apprehension of it; for if it referred to sensibility, how could a sensation be experienced otherwise than " as a sensation?" whereas it may be felt and felt acutely without its psychological character being adverted to. That a sensation should be known " as such" it needs to be felt, and at the same time to be intellectually perceived as a *fact*, and to be recognised as a psychical fact of a certain order. The more correct expression is not to say that the sensation *itself* purposely attended to is *perceived* but that it is *felt with attention*, and that the *fact* of its existence is " perceived." He continues:—" A mere physical affection of the organism does not constitute a sensation proper." I should think not; it could constitute no " sensation," proper or " improper;" and any physical condition whatever, if spoken of as a " sensation," would be very " improperly" so called. But this is no doubt a mere slip. Mr. Spencer must know too well the difference between subjective and objective to confound a physical state with a psychical one. His meaning may appear from the context. He goes on then:—" While absorbed in thought, I may be subject to undue heat from the fire," &c.; . . . " and though my sentient organs are very decidedly affected, I may yet remain unconscious of the affections."

Now here, again, we have truth and error. By the affection of a sentient organ must, of course, be meant an *appropriate* affection. Music to the eye, odour to the finger, are not " affections" at all. It must also be presumed that the sense-organ is in a healthy state. The odour of a violet will not affect the nostrils of one who has a very severe cold; but if a healthy organ is affected by its appropriate stimulus an affection must result which normally no one would question as being a sensation. As Mr. Spencer truly says, however, the attention may be absent, may be otherwise absorbed, and there may be no consciousness of sensation. It may be, however, that the fact that a decided affection has taken place becomes evident by after-attention. Thus, it has occurred to me when walking along the street, suddenly to think I had passed some object, and on returning have found the impression correct, and

yet have been confident that while passing my consciousness and attention were otherwise absorbed, and that I had not consciously experienced a sensation, though it was evident my organs of sense had been affected. Is such an unfelt feeling to be called a sensation or not? It seems that a decided affection of a sentient organ under the limits mentioned must be a sensation, for its only activity *is* to feel in a certain definite way. On the other hand, it may be that there are unfelt psychical impressions which are the elements of sensation, and ordinarily elicit it, though exceptionally, as in the case supposed, may fail so to do. Anyhow it is certain that the affections in question, whether or not they are felt, are certainly not known, knowledge being an intellectual act. No brute *knows* any of its sensations, though it feels them, nor does it know\* the fact of their existence, though it feels its feeling.

These perceptions, however, differ, according to Mr. Spencer, widely from "perception proper," which he regards as being "the cognition of an external object." This is a mere arbitrary distinction. Self-perception is, to say the least, as distinct and vivid as any other.

He then considers the dictum that sensation and perception "co-exist in degrees of intensity that vary inversely." He imagines, in illustration, a jagged body felt with increasing pressure till the pain becomes acute, and he considers that this experience contradicts the dictum, because at first all attention is given to the perception, and ultimately all to the sensation. But the fact that the attention is so occupied at first is no reason for denying the co-existing sensation through which alone the perception is possible. To show that this is so, let the touch be diminished till nothing is felt, and where will then be the perception. Similarly at the other pole. There is still abundant perception, only far too abundant, but the nature of the perception is changed, not the nature of the intellectual affection. From advertent to the form and nature of the jagged body we have come to advert to something causing pain, or it may be to the fact of the existence of the painful sensation. If we did not know our sensations of pain, there would be little need to dread them. I deny then the mutual exclusion which Mr. Spencer asserts. He says that it is impossible that "the subjective and objective phenomena" (our sensations and qualities of the jagged body) should ever "be thought of together with equal clearness." No doubt; but no one supposed they could be. If sensation and intellect are distinct, there is nothing to prevent the co-existence, when feel-

\* Though S. Thomas says, "*Sensus cognoscat se sentire*," he uses the word "*cognoscat*" laxly, and employs the term "*scire*" to denote the act of knowing intellectually.

ing jagged body, of a medium intensity of sensation and a medium intensity of intellectual apprehension; and this is all that is needed for the truth of Sir William Hamilton's dictum. That things *can* be felt and thought simultaneously is within the power of any one's ready experience.

In the next section our author distinguishes (p. 251, § 354) between perception and sensation, as between the decomposable and the undecomposable. As perception consists of judgment with intuition of reality, reposing upon either consciousness or sensation, I have no wish to dispute the distinction in this respect between it and sensation, though I deny that the active act of perception is decomposable into an automatic classification of like relations. He then (p. 253, § 355) affirms that the higher the perception, the greater are the number and variety of the relations grasped by it. As perceptions do differ in the number of implicit and explicit judgments they contain, this too may be passed by. Finally (p. 254, § 356) he prepares for succeeding chapters by announcing the need of analysing the sense-relations and relations between relations (which, according to him, constitute perceptions) into those of the greatest generality. As to these relations he observes, "They can be nothing more than certain secondary states of consciousness, arising through connexions of the primary states." What is the true implication of this passage? As "nothing more" than "secondary" states of consciousness, it seems to be implied that they are of a rank inferior to the primary ones. All depends upon the meaning given to the ambiguous term "states of consciousness," and what sort of states is implied. Of course, Mr. Spencer's unfortunate system prevents him from implying what is the truth—namely, that they are implicit judgments, which the intellect is endowed with the power to abstract from sensibles—judgments which contain the ideas—being, number, reality, truth, substance, accident, cause, effect, just as sense is endowed with the power of making evident colour, sound, &c.

He says, any mental states besides sensation "must be such as result from combinations of their original ones." The expression "result from" implies that they are no more than what occasioned them; the expression "result through" would be better. The latter expression might be accepted, and perceptions, and sense cognition would so appear as the two diverse results of sensation acting upon two radically different kinds of soul—the sensitive soul of brutes and the intellectual soul of man.

One fundamental error must not be passed over. He says: "Unable as we are to transcend consciousness, we can know

a relation only as some modification of consciousness." But we can transcend consciousness, and we do so in the intuition of our own *Ego*, in which the subject is an object. In the trustworthiness of memory,\* detailing to us facts of past experience, we have a sure and indisputable bridge to carry us across the abyss which separates the subjective and objective worlds. In concluding the examination of this chapter, I would call attention to the ambiguity which accompanies that favourite expression of Mr. Spencer—"states of consciousness"—the use of it is especially misleading, as it necessarily implies the existence of that substantial and persistent *Ego* which his system denies. For the word "consciousness" itself necessarily implies permanence; and states of consciousness, which must mean a succession of such states, is a self-contradictory term without such implication. For without something which persists nothing could succeed. Any number of changes, or even a single change, is impossible to consciousness, save by an entity existing *through* them.

After all Mr. Spencer can urge, a perception remains a mental state, consisting of implicit or explicit *judgment*, with an intuition of reality, and is poles asunder from a feeling of relations between relations. In it there is always a perception of fact, of real existence, of subject and object. This is even so when one's own thought is perceived, for then the subject is objectivised. Mere feeling, on the other hand, to use an inexact expression, though it may feel a relation between relation, cannot *know* it. It can know neither subject nor object, neither relation nor related things; it can "know" nothing.

The simplest element of knowledge is a judgment, and this act is no "feeling," nor even does it embrace "feelings," though it is elicited through them. This may seem surprising to some reader, but let him reflect on the two judgments, "That flower, is of the order of lilies," and "Nothing can be and not be at the same time, and in the same sense," and he will see that "feelings" exist in neither. As to the former judgment, we can easily imagine the feelings excited by lilies; and it may seem, at first, that these enter into the perception, because the imaginations of them (*i.e.*, feelings) evidently co-exist faintly—with the perception. But they exist *beside* the perception, they do not survive *in* it. They can be recalled by attention, together with the perception, and therefore the latter is not made up of transformed sensations. But meditation and examination of consciousness will show that the imaginations form no part of the act of

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\* See "Lessons from Nature," Chapter I.

perception itself. If this is the case with the former judgment, *à fortiori* it is the case with the second; and if it was the case only with the second, this would suffice to show that a perception may contain no feeling. But it cannot, in us, but be accompanied by feeling. In the abstract judgment referred to, there must exist in the mind simultaneously with the act of judgment, certain sensations (sensible phantasmata) answering to a thing being and not being at the same time, and in the same sense. But the co-existing sensible support of the perception is not the perception itself, any more than "swimming" is made of limbs (or tail) and fluid, though without these "necessary occasions" no swimming can take place. Judgments, perception, inference, are those of the intellect—what are the parallel phenomena of sense?

In the first place, as there is evidently so much which takes place unconsciously in the soul as regards the organic functions of the body, and as it is reasonable to suppose that for every physiological nervous change or neurosis there should be some psychical change or psychosis, it may well be that there are unfelt psychoses which form the ultimate elements of sensation, our organisation not being adapted for their appreciation save by their multiplication and accumulation. There may then really be those unfelt sensations, which certainly seem to exist; but of sensitive modifications of which consciousness can take cognisance "sensations" form the lowest term. Sensations by their complex recurrence give rise in the souls of brutes to feelings of relation. I say in *souls* of brutes, for unless an animal has also a persistent immaterial principle which endures and unites manifold sensations into a synthesis, or *sensus communis*, it could no more feel than we could without our soul. Without such a psychical synthetising principle no feelings could be aggregated or segregated, as Mr. Spencer represents them to aggregate and segregate. The sensations give rise in it to a new single feeling, beside which the occasioning feelings persist in association. The sight of a stick awakens in the dog the image of painful experiences with which that vision has been formerly associated: this associated feeling may be said to be a feeling of relation, though the expression is misleading, as tending to imply a perception of relations for the existence of which in them brutes give us no evidence. When the chick just hatched immediately pecks at seeds, it has no perception of relations, though the superficial observer might at the first be deceived into thinking it had such. More and more complex associations of sensations give rise to more and more complex associated feelings, which may be termed "sense-cognitions;" and when certain of the associated feelings are



roused by sense, the other absent ones tend to rise in the imagination and induce actions; and when this is the case we have organic inference, which simulates our process of ratiocination. But all this is different indeed from intellectual perception and inference. As I understand my own nature, I fully believe that the occurrence of sensations are the occasions for the intellect to emit that power with which it is endowed of apprehending that which is in no way in the sensations, or in any combination of them. This power is called abstraction, and in a sense it is abstraction, as in another sense it might be called creation. It is an abstraction in the sense in which the intellect may see (abstract from) sermons in stones and good in everything, on the occasion of the sensations excited by the action of external objects. Certainly no complication of sensations can explain our perceptions of truth, identity, or reality, as qualities existing in objects of intuition. These the consideration of the remaining chapters of this sixth part may make clearer and more evident.

#### CHAPTER XIX.—THE RELATIONS OF SIMILARITY AND DISSIMILARITY.

The contents of this chapter may be summarised thus: § 357. Similarity is the most complex of relations. We may have similar co-existences or sequences, and should see what is common to the two. § 358. This is a similarity which may be imperfect (involving connature of relations whose antecedents are connatural) or perfect (involving also the co-intension of such connatural relations). § 359. Complete consciousness of similarity is consciousness of the co-intension of two connatural relations between states of consciousness respectively connatural but not commonly co-intense; and ordinary resemblance contains many such. Dissimilarity is the reverse of this. Both it and similarity must be further analysed by analysing their most general relations.

In this short chapter our author first points out (p. 256, § 357) that similarity, the most complex of relations, is (as it is predicated of most natural objects) made up of a plexus of co-existent similarities. Similarities of sequence are complicated by compositions of causes and effects, but we so obviously think of composite causes and effects as related in the same way that a simple cause and effect are so related, that we may confine our attention to simple ones. He concludes by saying that, "choosing some primitive type of each, we have to consider what there is common between similar co-existences and sequences." I would only note here, in passing, that, as might

be expected, Mr. Spencer makes no distinction between perceptions of similarities of sequence, and perceptions of similarities of causation.

Next (p. 257, § 358) he selects as examples of similarities of co-existence and sequence, two similar triangles and the sequence of heat on compression, each resolving itself into "either equality of relation or likeness of relations." I would only here, by the way, enter a *caveat* against the forms of expression used. In apprehending the likeness between triangles or between calorific effects of pressures, what the mind adverts to are not the "*relations*," but the "*facts*." The similarity may be intued or inferred, and either intuition or inference may be justified by a statement of relation; but the intellectual act is the perception of similarity, with which co-exist certain mental images, which, when the mind adverts to them, may be said to present similar relations. We are next invited to consider "what this likeness of relations implies." In the first place it is said to imply likeness of relations, the antecedents and consequents of which are respectively alike in kind, but not in degree, the likeness being either qualitative or quantitative and quantitative, and either in kind only or both in kind and degree—*i.e.*, it may be imperfect (involving connature in relations, antecedents and consequents respectively), or perfect (involving also the co-intension of such connatural relations).

Mr. Spencer then (p. 259, § 359) says, that "speaking most generally, the consciousness of similarity arises when two successive states of consciousness are severally composed of like states of consciousness arranged in like ways; and when complete it is a consciousness of a single similarity, or a consciousness of the co-intension of the two connatural relations between states of consciousness, which are respectively like in kind but commonly unlike in degree." Therefore ordinary similarities consist of a multitude of such. Dissimilarity is a consciousness of these conditions inverted. The further analysis of the relations of similarity and dissimilarity consists in the analysis of the more general relations—co-intension, non-co-intension, &c. Not to fill pages unnecessarily, I confine myself here to remarking that a perception of complete similarity is a perception that two objects are alike in both quantity and quality,—that they only differ numerically; and I deny that the mind is in any way occupied with "*relations*," otherwise than as a fact which can be analysed into facts which can be expressed as relations. But the consideration of this will come before us again under the head of Likeness.

## CHAPTER XX.—THE RELATIONS OF CO-INTENSION AND NON-CO-INTENSION.

Here the following matters are treated of: § 360. Subjectively, co-intensive relations are either primary or secondary. § 361. The co-intension of such secondary relations is the co-intension of changes in states of consciousness. § 362. The co-intension of such primary relations is likeness in degree between feelings like in kind. Co-intension is predicable of relations.

First, Mr. Spencer distinguishes (p. 261, §360) co-intensive relations between simple states of consciousness, which states hold together other states of consciousness (primary relations of co-intension), from co-extensive relations between *relations* among such simple states of consciousness, which states hold together other states (secondary relations of co-intension).

First, he treats (p. 261, § 361) of the latter, saying, "To know two states of consciousness as related, implies a change of consciousness. That there may be a relation, there must be two states between which it subsists; and before there can be two states, definitely contemplated as such, there must be some change of state." These changes differ very widely, both in kind and degree, and are "themselves cognizable as states of consciousness . . . on which the transitions from state to state are the things contemplated." Now, by the way, I must protest once more against Mr. Spencer's mode of expression. When wood and iron are explored by the hand, what is adverted to, when temperature is noticed, is not the transition from touch to sensation of temperature, but the objective facts, intellectually apprehended, which those sensations and their relation as apprehended by a persistent consciousness reveal! He then goes on:—"However, it may seem that the change itself can be nothing additional to the states themselves, it is unquestionable that we have the power of thinking of the change itself, as something more than the two states individually considered" (a remark somewhat akin to a truism); and this is explicable, he says, inasmuch as the change is a sort of "shock." But, anyhow, he adds (p. 265), "In passing from an impression of the brightest green to one of bright green, and from one of bright green to one of pale green, I am conscious of two changes, which are the same in kind, but different in degree. And to say that I am conscious of these changes as such or such, *is to say that they are states of my consciousness.*" Therefore, such changes are classifiable as the "original" [note the word!] sensations are, as connatural, co-intense, or the opposites.

Now, here we have first the misleading implication of a

permanence really denied in the phrase above put by Mr. Spencer in *italics*, and then we have an adjective applied to sensation, which implies that they are the "originals" of the perceptions they give rise to, which, therefore, can be but such sensations transformed. He now proceeds to develop the implication into more expanded error. He tells us: "As, however, changes in consciousness are nothing else than what we call relations, there can be no phenomena of consciousness beyond its successive states and the modes of succession of its states."

I am sitting under a tree, absorbed in considering Mr. Spencer's *Psychology*; suddenly my attention is diverted by the fall of a nestling on to the book. It is not plain what can be the good of calling this change, a relation! The substantial *Ego* was meditating on psychology, and is thinking of young nestlings. They are two activities of my intellect, and they are, therefore, most intimately related to me; but, save for the exigencies of a hypothesis, the latter character little requires to be brought into prominence. The assertion that there are no phenomena in consciousness beyond its states will be taken to mean, what is, in fact, Mr. Spencer's contention, that there is no substantial, persistent, self-conscious *Ego*, which underlies its states. But, as before pointed out, we can have no psychical change or series of changes without a psychical something persisting through the series; a something which strings the passing feelings upon a persistent *psychical* unity.

The bearing of his conclusion he tells us is that "relations, subjectively considered, being nothing but changes in the state of consciousness, it follows that the co-intension of relations is the co-intension of such changes; or, in other words, likeness in degree between changes like in kind."

In the last section (p. 266, § 362) he notices primary relations of co-intension—likeness in degree between feelings like in kind—and he says the "equality" of their intensities is co-intension. It must be pointed out here, as we pointed out before,\* that Mr. Spencer constantly misuses the term "*equality*," the proper meaning of which is "exact resemblance as to quantity."

#### CHAPTER XXI.—THE RELATIONS OF CO-EXTENSION AND NON-CO-EXTENSION.

The contents of this chapter may be thus shortly stated: § 363. Co-extension is equality in lengths of series of united

\* DUBLIN REVIEW, January, 1878, "Examination of Mr. Spencer's *Psychology*," Chapter iv.

sensations of motion and touch. § 364. The relation of co-extension is the likeness of two (visual or tactual) compound states of consciousness (severally produced by the consolidation of what were originally known as serial states) in respect of the number and order of the elementary relations of co-existence which they severally include. Herein co-extension is first defined, and then relations of co-extension. Co-extension is defined (p. 267, § 363) by the help of the representation previously made (when treating of space), that "all modes of extension are resolvable into relations of co-existent positions." This, of course, I deny again; extension is a primary intuition of the intellect revealed to consciousness by incident impressions of co-existent position. Letting this again pass, we may note that Mr. Spencer next reverts to his representation that a series of co-existent positions is known to the developed mind by simultaneous nerve-excitations, which symbolise those successive excitations which he represents as being the ultimate expression of all phenomena of extension subjectively considered. Therefore, he says, extension must be (in its primary form) a succession of special connatural states of consciousness—viz., those produced by the united sensations of motion and touch. Therefore, two equal extensions become known as two equally long series of such sensations.

He then (p. 269, § 364) defines the relation of co-extension as in the summary given at the beginning of the examination of this chapter. In concluding my notice of it I may observe that neither in it, nor in preceding chapters, can I find any explanation of our intuitions of the abstract ideas "kind" and "degree" in themselves,—ideas, either of which the intellect may evolve in the perception of a single relation.

#### CHAPTER XXII.—THE RELATIONS OF CO-EXISTENCE AND NON-CO-EXISTENCE.

Herein Mr. Spencer asserts as follows (p. 271, § 365): The relation of co-existence must be originally compound, since two things cannot simultaneously occupy consciousness. No apparent simultaneity of consciousness can disprove their original seriality (p. 271, § 366). The relation of co-existence is learned through the reversibility of successive impressions, or their receivability in any order with equal facility (p. 277, § 367). The relation of co-existence is primarily a union of two relations of sequence, which are such that while the terms of the one are exactly like those of the other in kind and degree, and exactly contrary to them in their order of succession, the two relations are exactly like each other in the feeling which accom-

panies the extension. Or it may be defined as two changes of consciousness, which, though absolutely opposite in other respects, are perfectly alike in the absence of strain (p. 277, § 368). This is indicated *à priori*. For how is it possible for objective rest to be signified by subjective motion, save by the constantly changing consciousness changing in such a way that its changes neutralise each other, and so represent to itself a no-change?

But, supposing that "serial experiences never cease to be used" (p. 274); granting that the *how* the perception of co-existence is arrived at is correctly represented, yet the intellect sees that "co-existence" is an objective reality, is *more than* equality in facility of reversal of feelings. It sees that it is an objective reality so disclosed to us, but which may be well conceived as being disclosed in quite other ways to intelligences which do not possess material organs of sense. The idea of "co-existence," when once got, and however got, is seen to be a fundamentally different thing from its occasions, while the conception of material extended things which co-exist can be well understood as being able to excite in any sentient, a sense-cognition—a practical sense of material things co-existing—and of occasioning in an *intelligent* organism the idea of co-existence in the abstract.

#### CHAPTER XXIII.—THE RELATIONS OF CONNATURE AND NON-CONNATURE.

Here (p. 279, § 369) the relation connature is said to be of two kinds,—that between primitive mental states and that between relations. Changes of consciousness may vary more as they become more composite. Hence those various orders of changes, dissimilarity, non-co-intension, non-co-extension, non-co-existence. But "relation of connature is not decomposable into other relations;" when the changes produce like feelings, "we know nothing more than that we have the like feelings. It is true, as will be shown in a subsequent chapter, that it is possible to say specifically what we mean by asserting the likeness of these feelings; but beyond this it is impossible to go" (p. 280). As to the likeness between two simple feelings, when we assert their likeness, we express an intuition of which all we say is "that we have it." "Though, as will be by-and-by seen, it may be otherwise expressed, it cannot be decomposed." To this I may remark, that to know nothing more than that we have certain feelings, is to know an immense deal. It is indefinitely more than to have a new feeling generated by antecedent feelings. It is at once a perception of self, of truth, of reality, of substance, of modification, of mode of modification,



and particular mode of modification. Mr. Spencer fails altogether to grasp the significance of the idea of which he here treats, as is also the case with the other abstract fundamental ideas considered by him.

He also neglects even to attempt any analysis of the difference between the two abstract ideas themselves—(1) a difference in kind, and (2) a difference in degree. He also speaks of equivalence, but he says nothing of the real nature of the idea equivalence in itself. Yet it seems that these, in a Psychology, should either be analysed, or else explained as being ultimate intellectual elements incapable of analysis.

#### CHAPTER XXIV.—THE RELATIONS OF LIKENESS AND UNLIKENESS.

The components of this chapter are—§ 371. The relations of likeness and unlikeness are fundamental, all inference and intuition proceed by their establishment. § 372. The essential nature in consciousness of the phenomena we signify by likeness and unlikeness is strictly undefinable, because no more general terms exist. It is only describable in terms of its co-ordinate relation, sequence. § 373. The relation of likeness consists of two relations of unlikeness, which neutralise each other; the relation of unlikeness is of two which do not. It is the primordial one, and only describable as a change in consciousness.

In this chapter, Mr. Spencer reaches (p. 281, § 371) what he regards as the most fundamental of all relations, and he recapitulates the conclusion of the preceding chapters of his sixth part as showing that from the most complex and abstract inferences down to the most rudimentary intuitions "all intelligence proceeds by the establishment of *likeness and unlikeness*,"—that "thinking consists" in "the knowing of successive states and changes of consciousness, as like or unlike." Now, in the first place, it is not even true that thinking consists in such knowing or recognition save in very exceptional cases,—in those cases, namely, in which we are engaged in psychological introspection. Intelligence in act consists in the perception of truths of the real and of the ideal orders. Intelligence itself is the power or faculty of such action, and is of course an abstraction—the intellectual persistent *Ego* being the real existence. Mr. Spencer represents intellectual activity, direct perception, inference, &c., as a series of sensations and shocks—a profoundly irrational conception. As reasonable would it be to represent a cathedral as a co-existence of stones and mortar, omitting all reference to the labourers, builders, architects, and founders; as well as of the plans and intentions

of each—the immediate, mediate, and ultimate ideas and motives which all enter into the building of a cathedral, and as necessarily so, as do its stones and mortar.

Our author next (p. 283, § 372) tells us, that as no more general relations exist, these relations (likeness and unlikeness) cannot be defined, though expressible in terms of the only remaining and co-ordinate relation, that of sequence; the two relations being the necessary complements of each other. He also represents likeness and unlikeness as respectively made up, the latter of two states of consciousness forming the antecedent and consequent of a real *change* in consciousness; the former of two states of consciousness of a change that leaves consciousness in the same condition as before, and so is in one sense *no-change*.

Finally (p. 284, § 373), he explains the foregoing by describing a relation of likeness as one in which the two relations of unlikeness neutralise each other. The relation of unlikeness, he says, often consists of three states of consciousness, A, B, and the transition state  $\alpha$ . "But the primordial relation of unlikeness consists of two states only. . . . When any one state of consciousness is directly supplanted by another state, there is established a relation of unlikeness." That there is an objective change is doubtless true, that there is established a corresponding sense-relation is also no doubt true, but this is no perception of "unlikeness." It is the ground and foundation of such perception, it is the occasion which elicits the perception from the intellect, but it is not and cannot be that perception.

At the end of the examination of the last (23rd) chapter the complaint was made that Mr. Spencer neglected all attempts at analysis of such perception as likenesses of kind and degree, and of the meaning of equivalence; and here it must be reiterated, with the addition that no notice is taken of the conception "Quality,"—the perception, that is, not of material qualities, of material objects, not the classing of like impressions with like, but the perception of the abstract idea "quality" in itself. This abstract idea is manifested in its fulness in such inquiries as these, but it exists latent in every *intellectual* perception of qualities of objects. How does it get there? certainly not from that which has it not, any more than the sensation blue is due to the non-blue objects which by light touch the retina. Our sensitive organism is so endowed as to give forth the potentially existing sensation "blue" when the incidence of due objects occasions its elicitation into act; and just as it is with our sensitive nature so also is it with our intellectual nature. The intelligent *Ego* is so

endowed as to give forth the potentially existing idea "quality" when the incidence of due objects occasions its elicitation into act. To imagine the lower can itself give forth the higher is, indeed, to put the cart before the horse. It is like the folly so common, of thinking that it as difficult to conceive mind being the cause of matter as it is difficult to conceive matter being the cause of mind. Mind is evidently the higher conception, it includes necessarily not only thought but being and substance, or continued being; if then mind once exists, it is easy to conceive matter as formed by the elimination of thought from a part of mind, but it is impossible anyhow to conceive mere matter as giving itself that which it has not, and which by the hypothesis nowhere exists! To return to our immediate subject. Mr. Spencer says explicitly that "likeness" is ultimate; but is he sure of this? What does he say of "identity?" As far as I have observed, he nowhere really adverts to the conception, for in § 312, in speaking of "the same" he represents it as merely signifying "indistinguishable from." But identity is certainly a primary intuition, and from it, it might be contended, "likeness" is built up as a combination of a certain amount of identity with non-identity; it might, therefore, be represented as a certain amount of identity. If two things are identical, they are completely alike; if they are indistinguishably alike, save for numerical difference, they are not identical, or they are identical save the unlikeness as to number. Suppress this remaining unlikeness and they become identical. I do not, however, think it reasonable to represent the idea of "likeness" as a form of "identity," and certainly not "identity" as a form of "likeness." However obtained, the two ideas are very distinct ones, and neither can exist without the other. "Likeness" is unappreciable by a mind which does not know "identity," for non-identity is implied in likeness, and to say of anything that it is the *very same* as another is to imply that it is not merely *like it*.

#### CHAPTER XXV.—THE RELATION OF SEQUENCE.

This chapter may be summarised as follows: § 374. This relation is only the other side of the last; for the changes in consciousness are here regarded as to their *order*, instead of (as before) as to their *contrast*. § 375. These relations may be classified as ideally reversible—reversible with ease, with difficulty, or as irreversible. § 376—*i.e.*, as fortuitous, probable, or necessary. The classing of sequences implies the making them the terms of secondary sequences.

This is the final chapter on relations, and it begins (p. 286, § 374) by affirming that sequence is but the other side of likeness, for "sequence is change; and change, as known by us, is the unlikeness of a present state of consciousness to a past state."

Change *as known by us*, once more, is very rarely an unlikeness between states of consciousness, however inevitable, in the *order of being*, such mental unlikenesses may be to our knowledge of "change." The ultimate relation, he declares, "is nothing more than a *change* in the state of consciousness;" and when we think of the *contrast* involved in such change we have "likeness;" and when we think of the *order* of such change we have "sequence."

Of course when we advert to contrast we must already have the ideas "likeness" and "unlikeness;" but the order of sequence is not reducible to an equivalent for unlikeness. The ideas sequence and either likeness or unlikeness are fundamentally distinct. No doubt two things cannot be sequent without being "unlike" in the times of their occurrence, but at the same time these cannot be sequent without being also alike as to their relation to a sensorium successively impressed, according to the ideas of either space or time. Therefore, every sequence involves both likeness and unlikeness simultaneously. Mr. Spencer next treats of the classification of sequences into those which can easily, with difficulty, or not at all, be reversed in imagination,—the imaginations being faint states, which recall sensations—*i.e.*, which recall vivid states. He says, "While the original states, which we know as two sensations of sound, are vivid, the two ideas, which we find may be transposed, are faint repetitions of them. And this it is which distinguishes one of these reversible sequences from a co-existence. If the successive states of consciousness A, B, can be made to occur in the opposite order, B, A, without any diminution in vividness, the relation between them is what we know as co-existence. But if the states A, B, when they occur in opposite order, can be made to do so only as the weak states *b*, *a*, the relation between them is that of reversible sequence." This passage is very noteworthy. For surely the notes of a piano—a whole octave of notes—can be reversed or repeated in any order of succession with equal vividness; therefore they ought to be a co-existence. We ought to be able to perceive an extended sound. Similarly, if odours successively perceived in reversed, and any order of succession, with equal vividness, we ought then to perceive a solid smell!

These three orders of possible reversibility he represents as corresponding to the ideas accidental, probable, and necessary;

and as an illustration of the impossibility of transposition, he instances the impossibility of ideally reversing the relation between a blow and an antecedent motion. But the conception "blow" includes "motion." We can think of distinctive effects, such as may result from the motion of a blow, without thinking of the motion; but of course we cannot think of  $a + b$  without thinking of both  $a$  and  $b$ .

Lastly (p. 289, § 376), he reiterates this classification in three groups, adverting to the varying degree in which the presentation of one term in consciousness recalls the other. He declares that the statement serves to show that the classification of sequences is itself effected through other sequences, and involves at the outset the ideas of *like* and *unlike*; while the process of testing them is an observation of *likeness* and *unlikeness* between feelings. Since, then, he urges, "relations of likeness are relations of sequence, it results that the classing of sequences implies making them the terms of secondary sequences." And "as all relations are finally reducible to one, which is nothing else than a *change* in consciousness, it follows, even *à priori*, that all relations among the changes in consciousness must themselves be other changes."

In concluding the notice of this chapter it may be observed that, in spite of classification of orders of sequence, no word is said as to the conception "cause," nor, in spite of the mention of necessary association, is anything said of the conception "necessity" itself.

#### CHAPTER XXVI.—CONSCIOUSNESS IN GENERAL.

The following are the sections of this chapter: § 377. A change in consciousness is the element out of which are composed all cognitions (§ 378) in orderly succession. The development of consciousness is the organisation of these changes, especially by their associative consolidation. § 379. In reality, they are indefinitely complex and insensibly minute.

In his chapter on consciousness, Mr. Spencer begins by declaring (p. 291, § 377), that successive decompositions of phenomena of intelligence have brought us down to the simplest, which is "nothing else than a change in the state of consciousness. This is the element out of which are composed the most involved cognitions. Analysis leaves us no alternative but to hold that the perception of a vast landscape consists in a multitude of co-ordinated changes; and that of co-ordinated changes also consists the most abstract conception of the philosopher." But this seems a very inadequate and very erroneous account, unless "out of" be meant (which, of course, Mr.

Spencer cannot mean) to signify "induced by,"—i.e., that such changes are the mere material occasions of intellectual action, as the supposed luminous waves are the occasion of the sensation of light. Just as so to view sensation would be to omit all account of the sensitive faculty of the organism; so to treat intelligence is to omit all account of the intellectual faculty of the subject. Similarly the expression "consists in" must mean (to be rational) that a perception is in part produced by means of such changes (as its sensible occasions), that they minister to it, not that they *compose* it. To ascend Mount Blanc we must move the feet; but it is a very inadequate account of the process to describe it as so *composed*, however elaborate may be the classification of the foot-movements.

He goes on to say that the result obtained is the one indicated *à priori*. "To be conscious is to think; to think is to put together impressions and ideas; and to do this, is to be the subject of internal changes." Now, in the first place, this is a very inadequate account of "thinking," for it omits all reference to any perception of truth and reality. Merely as it stands, however, it implies what Mr. Spencer denies, for if "to think" is to "put together," who puts together?" A set of feelings—"feelings proper" and feelings of relation (Mr. Spencer's ideas)—it is here plainly admitted cannot by themselves form thought; to exercise thought is to "put them together." How can this be done without that substantial mind denied in the first chapter of the second part,\* and denied ever since? Besides, his representation might be paraphrased thus: "To alimentate is to eat; to eat is to put jaws and food into a relation of contact; and to do this is to be the subject of muscular contractions; therefore, alimentation consists of muscular contractions." He, then, having asserted change to be a necessary condition of consciousness (a point disputed before—see DUBLIN REVIEW, October, 1874, p. 498)—continues as follows: "If, then, incessant change is the condition on which only consciousness can continue, it would seem to follow that all the various phenomena of consciousness are resolvable into changes," which is as if he said, "If, then, fluid is the condition on which only a floating boat can continue, it would seem to follow that all the various phenomena of a floating boat are resolvable into fluid." Mr. Spencer, of course, may mean, "If, then, incessant change is the only component of continued consciousness, it would seem to follow that the various phenomena of consciousness are resolvable into changes; which is equivalent to saying, if a given slice is exclusively composed of bread and butter, it

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\* See DUBLIN REVIEW, October, 1874, p. 496.



would seem to follow that it is resolvable into butter and bread." Afterwards, he repeats his former error; he says: "We can become conscious only through the changes caused in us by surrounding things." This would be a sad thing, both for brutes and men, if it be taken to mean, as it may, and by many will be supposed to mean, "In becoming conscious we are passive, the *whole effect* is produced by the action of surrounding things"—a representation which ignores our sensitive and intellectual faculties. If the man had not an innate faculty of sensation, things might play about and on him for ever, without eliciting a sensation. If the man were sensitive, but his rationality from some cause was dormant, things might play about and on him for ever, and their relations might shock him right and left for all eternity, without eliciting a single thought.

Next, our author expands (p. 292, § 378) his statement, saying the changes must form an *orderly* series: "The changes form the raw material of consciousness, and the development of consciousness is the *organisation* of them." But what organises? Mr. Spencer would reply that this is the work of the Unknowable; all those, however, who are conscious of the existence of their own separate and individual mind, would declare that it is its innate power, ignored by Mr. Spencer, which organised knowledge from the materials of sense. He tells us: "When there is a change from state A to state B, and from state B to state A . . . each change constitutes a phenomenon in consciousness; and the recurrence of such changes becomes a consciousness." BECOMES! Here we have a positive and explicit assertion, as gratuitous as false, that the occasions of a thing become the very thing itself. In concluding the section, Mr. Spencer directs attention to the agglutinative and associative consolidation of feelings—facts which enable us so satisfactorily to account for the highest phenomena presented in the lives of animals.

Finally (p. 296, § 379), he insists on the enormous multitude and complication of the acts which occasion intelligence, as well as their minuteness, and he says that the account he has given will serve to make comprehensible how, "out of change, kind of change, degree of change, facility of change, arrangement of change, &c., the infinitely varied states of consciousness may be elaborated. And it will serve to suggest how, by the ever-progressing consolidation of changes, there can arise out of internal phenomena, originally successive, the means of representing those extremely complicated phenomena of co-existence which constitute the external world." It may, indeed, constitute for too many a powerful *suggestio falsi* as to the representation of the external world. As far as sense-representation goes, even

a gorilla does that ; but such psychosis is no clue to an explanation of intelligence, and needs no scintilla of either νοῦς or λογός. As to the earlier part of the passage last quoted, it is easy to think of things which are like or unlike as to kind, order, degree, facility, &c., differing as to the kind of feelings they occasion ; but the existence of such differences is something very different from our having a *consciousness* of such likeness or unlikeness. The feelings excited by objective conditions are very transitory, and are necessarily so, but the perceptions they excite may be very enduring ; *à fortiori* is enduring the very consciousness itself. Unless it persisted through the feelings which affect it, no knowledge of them or their effects—no knowledge at all—would be possible. No feelings of relation can themselves be the consciousness of their existence, qualities, or effects—*i.e.*, a perception. With that perception, the occasions of it persist beside it, and remaining in themselves distinct, are yet synthesised through it. As before said, the likeness of feelings and the consciousness of such likeness are poles asunder. Sequence is a necessary condition of the former, and is as necessarily absent from the latter. Mr. Spencer's error and fallacy as to consciousness are parallel to his error with regard to sensation and vitality. To imagine life—that self-cyclically-evolving force—as itself evolved from those physical forces which it unifies into a single activity ; to imagine sensitivity as itself evolved from those vital activities which it co-ordinates and unifies ; to imagine a *sensus communis* to evolve from mere sensations, which without it would have no unity or common centre ; to imagine thought to evolve from mere sense-cognitions, to which it alone gives significance and unites in perception—all these suppositions, one and all, err by the same vice : that of putting the effects for the cause and taking that which is ultimate as the root and foundation.

#### CHAPTER XXVII.—RESULTS.

§ 380. A unity of composition—one form of thought—exists throughout intelligence, as is inferible *à priori*. § 381. The process also is the same throughout—namely, an assimilation of impressions. § 382. An exhaustive definition of mental phenomena is “the continuous differentiation and integration of states of consciousness.” § 383. This harmonises with life in the differentiation and integration of the body ; psychology and physiology being different sides of the same primordial truth.

In this last chapter of his sixth part, Mr. Spencer starts (p. 297, § 380) by remarking that among the truths to be gathered from the foregoing chapters, one of the most significant

is that there exists a *unity of composition* throughout all the phenomena of intelligence. He adds that it must be inferable, even *à priori*, that analysis must disclose some such universal law, for there must be some "form of thought" exhibited alike in the very lowest and the very highest manifestations of intelligence. And this, he says, we have now learned to be an intuition of likeness and unlikeness. But what can be more unreasonable than to call the subjective side of a nervous shock a "form of thought?" That it may be a material *condition* of thought *in us*, concedo; but that it should be a form, nego.

He adds: "The various divisions, therefore, which we ordinarily make among our mental operations, and which psychologists have mostly regarded as making out distinct faculties, have merely a superficial truth." I have elsewhere\* stated what I believe to be the truth in this respect. The representation that the mind possesses different "faculties" is, to a certain extent, a good one, though it may mislead. It is manifest that our mind performs a multitude of acts which more or less differ from and resemble one another; and these acts may be grouped together according to the likenesses and differences which exist between them. Thus, *e.g.*, acts of "judging" may be grouped together in one class, and acts of "willing" in another. Now, as the mind which performs those acts has, of course, the power of performing them, we may properly speak of these different aspects of its power respectively, as the "faculty" (*i.e.* the power) of judging, and the "faculty" (*i.e.* the power) of willing. At the same time, these terms may mislead, on account of the necessity we are constantly under of having recourse to material images as vehicles for expressing incorporeal things. It thus comes about, that, being familiar with different bodily organs, as agents for performing the different bodily actions, the illusion may be produced that there are in the soul analogous distinct parts, for the existence of which reason gives us no warrant.

In his next section (p. 298, § 381) our author proceeds to represent that the *process* of thoughts is the same throughout, namely, an assimilation of impressions. He says (p. 299), "When regarded under its fundamental aspect, the highest reasoning is seen to be one with all the lower forms of human thought, and one with instinct and reflex action, even in their simplest manifestations." Now pure reflex action is action in which sensation has no part; how then it can be one with the latter, and how the latter (sensation) can be one with perception from which emotion is absent, is paradoxical indeed. It is a mere assertion of Mr. Herbert Spencer's, and it is also a gross

\* See the *American Catholic Quarterly Review* for April, 1878, p. 301.  
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confusion. We have in all animated beings external sensible manifestations and internal activities perceptible only through their results, phenomena of the body (animal or vegetable), and activities of the soul (animal or vegetable); the latter are psychoses in the widest sense of the word. In organisms duly qualified the presence of psychoses results in sensations, and in some if not all animals, there may result a sense-cognition. In a rational nature, sense-cognitions are the occasion of the elicitation of intellectual acts, in which alone consciousness properly so called first appears. This view harmonises the facts without violence or omission. Mr. Spencer's view omits all explanation of the higher acts of reason, and does violence to reason itself, it making the greater itself contain the less. Mr. Spencer has throughout represented perception as the assimilation of relations to relations antecedently perceived, and he has even said (p. 299) that unlikeness itself cannot be known save by classing it with what is similar and antecedently known. This necessarily lands us in a *regressus ad infinitum*, and by itself suffices to demonstrate both the profound irrationality of Mr. Spencer's system and the power of the intellect to apprehend ideas directly. Here as elsewhere, as I said, Mr. Spencer makes every intellectual act a classing of relations, but he nowhere explains the idea "relation" itself—our conception of relation as relation. To obtain the conception "relation," we must have the conception of that which is not relation, and yet this is a conception which in Mr. Spencer's theory we can never obtain, for we have no experience of anything save as related, and no single thought which is not itself a classification of relations. The abstract idea "relation" by its very existence suffices to demonstrate that we have ideas beyond and above experience, although experience is, in us, a necessary antecedent to their manifestation to consciousness. Our author then proceeds (p. 300, § 382) to give an exhaustive definition of mental phenomena as "*the continuous differentiation and integration of states of consciousness.*" Then in his last section (p. 301, § 383) he points out the harmony existing between this definition and his definition of life, a harmony which he says ought to exist, "when we remember that the laws of structure and function must necessarily harmonise." The ultimate generalisations of psychology and physiology must be, as they here appear, different sides of the same primordial truth; both are expressions of the same fundamental process of Life." That this harmony should indeed exist follows no less from the theory of evolution held by me than from that held by Mr. Spencer. If my view is right, that harmony should indeed exist, there must be, according to it, a harmony between the phenomena of

life and those of sentience, and even a harmony between those of human intelligence and sentience, because, in us, our purest intellectual acts are necessarily accompanied by corresponding sense-phantasmata. So that, though there is no direct connection between sensation and thought, there is a secondary and as it were accidental connection between them, due to the connection of sensation with phantasmata, which are for us the necessary occasion and accompaniment of thought. My formal law\* of evolution is continuous progress by the unfolding of latent potentialities through the action of incident forces in harmony with a pre-ordained end, and exhibiting a succession of changes from indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to definite, coherent heterogeneity.

The whole of this sixth part may be summarised as follows:—What Mr. Spencer calls "the highest kinds of compound quantitative reasoning is an intuition that ratios which are severally equal to certain other ratios that are unequal to each other, are themselves unequal," an axiom which is embodied in another, one concrete form of which is—"relations which are equal to the same relation are equal to each other," and this intuition is implied in every step of quantitative reasoning. It is also implied in qualitative reasoning; in analogical and inductive reasoning, and in the syllogism; and thus all reasoning whatever proceeds by establishing a definite relation between two definite relations. Classification, naming, and recognition are all forms of inference, and so also is perception; and therefore all these are forms of the same intuition. The secondary, secundo-primary and primary attributes of bodies are perceived by a complex classification of unconditional, conditional, and doubly conditional impressions with their likes—*i.e.* through establishing likenesses between relations. The perceptions of space, time, and motion are brought about through the establishment of equivalence between series of successive and co-existent sensations of touch and successive muscular impressions. Perception of resistance (which is a primordial impression) consists in the classification of relations between muscular tension and will with like relations before experienced, and perception in general is a classification of relations of successive degrees of generality. These are similarity, co-intension, co-extension, co-existence (primarily a union of two relations of sequence), connature, likeness, sequence and their opposites.

Consciousness consists of an organised orderly succession of changes of intuitions of likeness and unlikeness. There is one process also throughout—namely, the assimilation of impres-

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\* "Lessons from Nature," p. 361.

sions; and mental phenomena altogether may be defined as the continuous differentiation and integration of states of consciousness.

Otherwise stated, the contents of this sixth part may be represented as follows:—Mr. Spencer has herein contended that in the highest compound quantitative reasoning the relation of equality is involved in the most various ways, and that likeness of relation is involved in all reasoning; that classification and recognition imply perception of likeness in different degrees, while perception of any object also implies that it is thought like some other before known. He has represented the perception of body presenting its three orders of attributes, as a classing of the several attributes, their relations to each other, and the conditions under which they are disclosed, with like attributes, relations, and conditions. He has represented that our perceptions of space, time, and motion arise by a discovery of the *equivalence* of certain states of consciousness, serial and simultaneous, while the relation of likeness is involved in the thought of any particular space, time, or motion. He has also sought to show that the higher orders of relations are severally resolvable into relations of *likeness* and *unlikeness*, the terms of which have certain specialities and complexities. The following definitions have been given:—

1. *Similarity*—The co-intention of two connatural relations between states of consciousness which are themselves *like* in kind but commonly *unlike* in degree.

2. *Co-intension*—Likeness in degree, either between changes in consciousness that are like in kind, or between states of consciousness that are like in kind.

3. *Co-extension*—The likeness of two composite states of consciousness in respect of the number and order of the elementary relations of co-existence which they severally include.

4. *Co-existence*—Two sequences whose terms are exactly *alike* in kind and degree, exactly *unlike* or opposite in their order of succession, and exactly *alike* in the feeling which accompanies their succession.

5. *Connature*—The likeness in kind either between two changes in consciousness or between two states of consciousness.

6. *Unlikeness* itself is a change in a state of consciousness, wherein the contrast between its terms is thought of.

7. *Sequence* is a change in a state of consciousness, wherein the order between the antecedent and consequent states is thought of.

Finally, he has represented all mental phenomena as a series



of continuous differentiations and integrations of states of consciousness, by the association of impressions in all degrees of increasing complexity.

In his own words (p. 298, § 381) he tells us that we have seen "that all reasoning is definable as the classification of relations,—that the perception of an object is possible only by the classing of a present group of attributes and relations with a past group,—that the constituents of any complex perception must be severally classed with previously-known constituents of the same order,—that not even the simplest attribute or relation can be known until there exist others with which it can be ranged, the relation of unlikeness itself being only cognisable as like previously-experienced relations of unlikeness." He also further tells us, that we have seen that the condition on which alone consciousness can begin to exist is the occurrence of a change of state, necessarily generating the terms of a relation of unlikeness,—that consciousness can continue only while relations of unlikeness are being established, or during *differentiation*,—that the states arising can become the elements of thought only by being known as like certain before-mentioned states, or during *integration*; and therefore *continuous differentiation* and *integration* is the definition of mental action,—a definition which harmonises with that of life, as might be expected from the necessary relation between psychology and physiology.

In fact, then, the essence of this sixth part is the contention that subjective psychology shows every thought or perception whatever to be a feeling of relations between relations, and all thoughts to be ultimately reducible to aggregated and segregated feelings of shock, which are the psychical side of physiological nervous shocks—the ultimate psychical shock being either a feeling of unlikeness or of sequence, according to the direction taken by thought.\*

I, on the other hand, maintain that, in all the illustrations used and representations given, essential parts of the perceptions or thoughts are ever omitted, and the mere materials of thought represented as being the thought itself.

To recapitulate my contention, I must remind the reader that, at the end of my examination of the first eight chapters of Mr. Spencer's sixth part, I claimed to have shown that the process of ratiocination is *not* a process of establishment of relations between relations, but is "the conscious intellectual recognition of a truth as a *necessary consequence* of truths

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\* His expression (p. 286) is: "According as we think of the *contrast* between the antecedent and consequent states, or of their order."

antecedently known ; to have shown, therefore, that Mr. Spencer had failed to apprehend the very essence of the ratiocinative process symbolised by the formal inferential word *therefore*, and had failed to reduce it to a perception of relation between relations. As to classing, naming, and recognition, I have herein shown that they are *not* various forms of one process of inference, examples being given of classifications non-inferential,\* and of truths immediately known. Moreover, I have pointed out, naming as characterised by a purpose of denotation, and recognition by a simultaneous apprehension of identity and difference.

As to the perception of special objects I have contended that we can at least directly perceive both our thoughts and a coloured surface, but, in fact, perception of external objects is really primary ; and if perception were not primary, we should get a *regressus ad infinitum*.

The unreasonableness of Mr. Spencer's view is shown by his declaration, that "unlikeness itself is only cognisable as like previously-experienced relations of unlikeness" (p. 299). For in this way we could never begin to apprehend unlikeness, whereas our apprehension of it is easily to be understood if our mind be, as it already potentially is, endowed with the power of perceiving it at once and directly in the occurrence of the requisite sensational stimuli. Thus perception, recognition, classification, and inference, are separate and distinct acts and powers, in which the intellect when aroused begins simultaneously to energeise.

As to the secondary and primary qualities of bodies, I have contended that he here, as elsewhere, treats the subject of sensations (secondary qualities) as passive ; the perception of these qualities, and also of the primary qualities, being a classing of the several attributes, their relations to each other, and the conditions under which they are disclosed, with like attributes, relations and conditions. I, on the other hand, have contended that they are *all* due to the activity of the subject, which, on the occurrence of the requisite sensational stimuli, has the power of *feeling* various sensations, of thinking various ideas, and amongst them the unanalysable primary conceptions,—duration, extension and sequence, which are (like all other ideas) far more than the material "beggary elements" into which Mr. Spencer would analyse them.

Space, I have contended, is not "a consciousness of countless co-existent positions with freedom of motion," but an abstrac-

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\* See DUBLIN REVIEW for January, 1878.

tion from extension—the enduring mutual exclusion of all extended things.

Similarly, Time I believe to be an abstraction from succession,—the enduring succession of all succeeding events. Again, the idea "motion," instead of being the establishment of a relation of simultaneity between a relation of co-existent positions and one of sequent positions, is, I have contended, a primordial and fundamental idea, with which the above-cited conditions quite fail to correspond.

As to resistance, I contended, and I maintain fully, he has in no way really resolved the primitive idea into any classification of similar relations.

Perception itself I asserted and assert to be a power of the soul co-existing with sensation and not resolvable into a classification of relations, for it involves the intuition of reality and the apprehension of truth.

It is the same with the general relations involved in perception, those of similarity, co-intension, co-extension, co-existence, connature, and their opposites. If my arguments are valid, each is an entirely distinct idea, incapable of any real analysis of the kind which Mr. Spencer suggests, though such analysis may reveal the material conditions for the elucidation of such ideas.

"Unlikeness" and "sequence" he admits to be primordial; but I contend that "identity" is at least as much so, in spite of the complexity of material elements which may serve to elicit it.

Finally, the idea "consciousness" is for me an ultimate perception of an abstract, drawn from the concrete—the ego conscious. The very essence of consciousness is persistence; and the supposition that it could be composed of an aggregation of its states, a glaring absurdity, since all of these must succeed to it, while it is a *Punctum stans*, reviews the procession of events, both in the extended world and in the order in which extension is absent.

My results, then, of course, contradict those of Mr. Spencer. Instead of one, there are a multitude of "forms of thought," or rather, "innate powers of apprehending objective truth." The process in itself varies greatly,—as in intuition and inference, recognition, classification, &c.,—but in its sensational basis, it is indeed one, reposing as it does on phantasmata of the sensitive power; and this basis again reposes upon organic changes, all of which have both their objective (physiological) and subjective (psychical) sides; so that although ideas themselves, such as those of identity, difference, necessity, virtue, intellect, moral obligation, and God, have no direct material concomitants, yet

such concomitants go with the phantasmata which subserve to elicit them on different occasions or in different men. For instance, the idea "God" is not conceived as being truly represented by "a word," "a light," or "a man sitting on a throne;" but it is impossible to think of Him without having these or analogous phantasmata before consciousness,\* and such phantasmata require a material concomitant.

The radical fault of Mr. Spencer's Psychology, that which is here most strenuously contended against, is the endeavour to resolve our higher faculties into our lower; an endeavour as fundamentally irrational as would be to represent adequately a Babylonian palace by mention of nothing but its component bricks,—an endeavour mischievous in the highest degree, since its success would be necessarily fatal at once to intellect, morality, and will. The first it misrepresents, the second it renders impossible, the third it speculatively denies the existence of, and tends with fatal efficacy to weaken and ultimately paralyse in reality.

The clear apprehension, on the other hand, that man possesses a fundamentally distinct power,—intellect, which is enabled through sensation to give forth and apprehend ideas which contain much more than sensations ever gave,—which contain the substance of that of which sensation is but the shadow,—ideas which respond to objective reality, and really make known to us objectivity as it is in itself; such an apprehension as this justifies the validity of our moral judgments, and gives adequate support to that most wonderful of all possible gifts, our power of free will.

In his next (seventh) part Mr. Spencer plunges into pure metaphysics, and develops the full scope and ultimate meaning of his whole system.

ST. GEORGE MIVART.

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\* See an excellent article in the DUBLIN REVIEW for July, 1878, p. 150.

## ART. V.—THE CHRISTIANS OF THE EAST.

## THEIR PRESENT CONDITION AND THEIR HOPES.

**T**HIS article is written in answer to the request which the DUBLIN REVIEW has been pleased to make to me. I have pleasure in adding my contribution to the labours of the distinguished writers who direct that important periodical.

The last war between the Russians and the Turks, and the treaty of Berlin which re-established peace between those two antipathetic nations, have profoundly modified the legal status of the Christians of the Ottoman Empire, and apparently ought to ameliorate to a great extent their condition, not only in European but also in Asiatic Turkey. The religious liberties which the Congress of Berlin has authorised at the special solicitations of the plenipotentiaries of France and England, concern all the Christians in general, without distinction of sect or rite. We do not say, however, that all Schismatic Greeks and Uniat Greeks, Schismatic Armenians and Uniat Armenians, Nestorians, Jacobites, Chaldeans, Uniat Syrians, Maronites and Melchites, are equally benefited, or will all be able to profit equally by the new state of things. The Schismatic Greeks, who are by far the most numerous, will in all probability derive special advantages from the stipulations concerning Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia; just as the Maronites have in their favour the Regulation of the Lebanon of 1868.

But before entering into details of these particular stipulations we must explain the decisions which concern, equally, all the Christian communities, and also the general position of those communities in the Ottoman Empire; our object being, chiefly, to make known the present condition of those Oriental Christians of every rite who are united with the Church of Rome, and the hopes which may reasonably be entertained for their proximate future.

In order to understand the decisions of the Congress of Berlin, to grasp them in all their bearings, to see the difficulties which their execution may and must encounter, it is necessary to have before one's eyes the present and the past of Ottoman rule, to take into account the doctrines and tendencies of Islamism, as also the fanaticism of the Mussulman populations. A glance backwards over Mahometan history and religion is therefore opportune.

When Mahomet appeared at the commencement of the seventh century and began to preach Islam, his first efforts

were directed against the polytheism and idolatry of the Arabs, the principal seat of which was the Kaaba of Mecca. Mahomet appeared at the outset less hostile towards Jews and Christians. In the Korân, which he puts forth as a revelation from God,\* he claims to be the prophet and envoy of God to revive the sole true religion which Adam, Noe, Abraham,† Moses, Jesus, and all the prophets had taught, but which both Jews and Christians had corrupted. He frequently praises the books of the Old Testament and the Gospels from which he takes the dogmas of the one God, the Creator, omniscient, all-powerful and merciful, of the immortality of the soul and of a future life which, in his sensual dreams, is a life of mere pleasure and voluptuousness.‡ Not only does he praise Moses, but he celebrates the miracles and the sanctity of Jesus. He makes God say: We gave the book of the law to Moses, and we sent after him other apostles. We have granted to Jesus the son of Mary manifest signs, and have strengthened him with the spirit of sanctity.§ “After the other prophets we sent Jesus the son of Mary to confirm the Pentateuch: We gave him the Gospel containing light and direction, giving admonition to those who fear.”|| “The angels said to Mary: God announces to thee his Word. He shall be named the Messiah, Jesus the son of Mary, honoured in this world and in the other, one of the confidants of God.”¶ But he neutralised, later on, these testimonies, by mixing his own folly with the Gospel story, and by denying the divinity of our Saviour and His death on

\* Mahomet protests frequently that he is not an impostor, that he has not invented the Korân, that the Korân, or book *par excellence*, was revealed by God, and carried to Mahomet from heaven by the angel Gabriel. See “Korân,” Sûra, x. 38; xi. 1—11; xiv. 1; xvi. 66—92; xvii. 106; xviii. 1—6; xxi. 5; xxii. 43; xxvi. 193; xxxiv. 42—47; xlv.—xlvi. *et passim*.

† He especially claims that Islamism is the religion of Abraham. “They say to you: Be a Jew or a Christian and you will be on the right way. Answer them: We are of the religion of Abraham, a true believer, who was not of the number of idolaters.” “Korân,” Sûra, ii. 129. Cfr. Sûra, 60—89; iv. 124; xvi. 125.

‡ This is how Mahomet describes the paradise of true believers:—Those who believe and do good, shall have the gardens of Paradise for a dwelling—gardens of delights, traversed by rivers of a water which never corrupts: there shall be rivers of milk the sweetness of which never fails, rivers of wine pleasant to drink, rivers of pure honey, every sort of fruit. The believers shall wear robes of silk, bracelets of gold and pearls, and shall be seated on green cushions and magnificent carpets. In this place of delights the sun will not make its burning rays felt, nor the winter its rigours. They will be attended upon by children gifted with eternal youth, and they shall espouse young maidens with large black eyes. They will possess all they desire. “Korân,” Sûra, xviii. 107; xxii. 23; xlvii. 16—17; lii. 17—28; lv. 46—78.

§ “Korân,” Sûra, ii. 81. Cfr. Sûr. ii. 130 and 254.

|| “Korân,” Sûr. v. 50.

¶ “Korân,” Sûr. iii. 40.



the cross. "God," he says, "has no son at all. Jesus is in the eyes of God just what Adam is, whom He formed from the dust of the earth by saying: Be thou, and he was."\* "Those who say that the Messiah, the son of Mary, is God, are infidels."† He appears to admit all monotheistic religions to salvation when he says: "Those who have believed, those who have followed the Jewish religion, the Christians, the Sabæans, and whoever have believed in God and in the last day, and have practised good, all these shall receive a recompense from their Lord."‡ He goes further, and makes God say: "Let there be no violence in matters of religion."§ But he corrects himself later on, treats Jews and Christians as infidels, declares them condemned, as such, to the fire of hell, and demands the most absolute belief in the Korân and obedience to God and to His prophet, who is Mahomet. "The religion of God is *Islam* (resigning oneself to God); whosoever desires another worship than *Islam*, that worship will not be accepted from him, and in the next world he shall be among the number of the miserable."|| "Abraham was neither Jew nor Christian; he was pious, and resigned to God (Mussulman), and he gave God no companions." "O believers, form no connections with any but yourselves." "Take not for friend either Jew or Christian." "Fear the fire prepared for unbelievers. Obey God and the Prophet, in order that you may obtain the mercy of God."¶ He goes yet further. Not only does death for Mahomet's religion render men happy in the sight of God; not only does he repeat at every page that it is necessary to believe and obey God and Mahomet in order to be happy in the other life, and that infidels—those who refuse to believe—are cursed of God and reserved for the fire of hell, but he incites the faithful to a *holy war* against unbelievers. "The true believers are those who have given shelter to the Prophet and assisted him." "O Prophet, rouse believers to the combat. Twenty brave men from among them shall conquer two hundred infidels; a hundred of them shall put a thousand to flight." "The sacred months being passed, kill the idolaters wherever you find them, make them prisoners, beset them . . . . Make war on those who do not believe in God or in the last day; who do not hold as forbidden what God and his Apostle have forbidden. And on those among the men of the Scriptures who do not profess the true religion, make war

\* "Korân," Sûr. iii. 52; xliii. 81.

† "Korân," Sûr. v. 19. He repeats the same thing, Sûr. v. 76—79; xix. 16—36.

‡ "Korân," Sûr. ii. 59. Cfr. Sûr. v. 73. § "Korân," Sûr. ii. 257.

|| "Korân," Sûr. iii. 17—79.

¶ "Korân," Sûr. iii. 60—114—126; v. 56.

until they pay tribute with their own hands and are subjected." "Say to the Arabs of the desert: We shall call you to march against powerful nations; you shall combat them until they embrace Islamism. If you obey, it will bring you a grand recompense; if you hang back, as you have already done at other times, painful chastisement shall be inflicted on you."\*

We shall scarcely wonder at these contradictions of the Korân if we reflect that Mahomet promulgated it, according to need, in detached sheets, at times widely apart. In the beginning of his pretended mission the pseudo-prophet appealed only to persuasion. He announced himself as sent to preach, not to do violence. The true Mussulman ought to suffer insult without desire of vengeance; preaching and moral influence were to be the only weapons which his disciples should use for the propagation of the worship of the true God: he himself preferred to leave Mecca rather than employ force against his enemies. But after his flight to Medina,† finding that he was sufficiently supported, he pretended to have received from God the order to destroy infidelity even by the sword; he armed his followers, had recourse to force, preached the "Holy War," and imposed his doctrines by arms. No less than twenty-seven warlike expeditions were led by the Prophet himself, without counting those conducted by his generals. Sword in hand, he established the new worship at Mecca. It was the bravery of his generals that subjugated the Arab tribes of the desert to Islamism, propagated the new doctrines in Syria and Mesopotamia, and (soon after the death of the Prophet) in Persia and as far as the Indus, in Asia Minor, in Palestine, in Egypt, in Africa, in Spain. The sword and victory—these were the propagators of Islamism. The Caliphs, the successors of Mahomet, in their immense conquests employed no other means of persuasion than their arms.

If we believe on this point the Nestorian and Jacobite historians, the chief of the believers was more gentle towards the Christians of Arabia, and to the Nestorians of Mesopotamia, than he was towards Jews and idolaters. Elmacin‡ relates that Mahomet had said—"He who treats a Christian cruelly shall have me for his enemy on the day of judgment." According to this author, he was contented with imposing tribute on the Christians who applied to him for protection. The celebrated Maphrian Jacobite, Gregory Barhebræus, gives the tenor of a diploma granted by Mahomet to Said, prince of the Jacobite

\* "Korân," Sûr. viii. 66—75; ix. 5—29; xlviii. 16.

† The flight to Medina marks the Mussulman era, called the Hegira, or Flight. At a later period the Hegira was fixed at the 16th July, 622.

‡ "Historia Sarracenica," i. 13.

Christians of Nagran in Arabia. This diploma forbids Mussulmans to molest Christians, to alter their laws and customs, to oblige them to march to battle with Mussulmans, or to force Christian servants either to embrace the Mussulman faith or to follow its prescriptions. By the same diploma the Mussulmans are commanded to help the Christians, should need be, in building churches: the tribute to be paid by the poor is fixed at four "zouzes,"\* that of the rich and of merchants at twelve "zouzes"—priests and monks are exempted.† Amri relates that a similar diploma was granted to the Nestorian patriarch Jesuiab of Gadala.

However this may be, the Caliphs, Mahomet's successors, were very severe to the Christians. Not only did they subject them to tribute, deprive them of all political right, exclude them from their armies and from all dignities, refuse to accept their evidence before the tribunals, ruin them by every species of exaction, but they destroyed the entire Christian communities of Palestine, Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor, and laid the hardest possible yoke on all the Christians who had been obedient to those perpetual enemies of the Caliphs—the Emperors of Constantinople.

It is to be remarked, however, that whenever the Caliphs tolerated Christians they left with each sect its own churches and sacred property, and favoured no one sect at the expense of the others. If during several centuries the Nestorians obtained special favours, and could spread themselves in Persia and the Indies, it was because they furnished skilful secretaries to the Caliphs of Bagdad, and it was at the expense of neither the Armenians nor the other Christians. A thing equally worthy of being remarked is that the Mussulmans left each sect and rite to be governed by its own Patriarch and bishops. The Patriarch was, and still is, the head spiritual and temporal of all the faithful of his patriarchate. All temporal affairs—births, marriages, deaths, wills, divisions of property, civil and criminal causes—depend upon him. But he cannot exercise his functions until he has obtained from the Caliph (from the Sultan) a "Berat," or diploma, investing him with the charge; and his temporal powers will be more or less ample according to the tenor of this diploma. Often among the Jacobites and Nestorians, and later among the schismatic Greeks, these diplomas were the result of favour, of intrigue, and of simony. Hence the numerous schisms in the different churches; hence also the intermeddlings of Mussulman princes both in the

\* Two shillings and sixpence.

† See Barhebræi, "*Chronicon eccles.*" Ed. Lamy et Abbeloos, sec. ii. 117—269.

religious quarrels of the sects, and in the controversies which more than once troubled the faithful united to Rome. The vexations to which Mgr. Hassoun was subjected by the Turkish Government and by the false Patriarch Kupelian are a recent example of this.

After Mahomet II. had by his victorious wars, and especially by the capture of Constantinople in 1453, destroyed innumerable churches, massacred or dispersed thousands of Christians and changed the sumptuous basilica of S. Sophia into a mosque, he saw the necessity of re peopling Constantinople, and returned to more humane sentiments. He recalled the Christians, gave back some churches to them, and granted to the Patriarch Gennadius, along with the investiture of his charge, the powers and privileges which the Caliphs at different times had conferred on the Christians. The "Berat" conferred on him authority spiritual and temporal over the Greek Church, and declared that the Sultan, "wishing to free him from every exaction, forbade anything whatever to be demanded of the patriarch under pretext of tribute, or any molestation or violence to be offered him, and exempted himself and the Christian prelates who should succeed him from every tax or public contribution."\* These immunities were extended to the patriarchs of the different sects in the Ottoman Empire. They were renewed by the *Hatti Houmayoun*, mentioned in the Treaty of Paris in 1856.

This investiture of the Patriarchs by the Sultan led to simony in the schismatic Greek Church. The first successors of Gennadius were elected and approved without difficulty. But a contest having arisen, the Patriarch Simeon bought his "berat" at the price of a thousand gold ducats. The sum increased as time went on, until more than once the patriarchate became the lot of the highest bidder.

The concessions of Mahomet II. remained the basis of Mussulman jurisprudence until the *Hatti Houmayoun* of 1856, which has not abolished but enlarged and modified them. These concessions rendered the condition of the Christians in general tolerable. Unfortunately they were often violated. Christians, whatever they may do, are always in the eyes of the Mussulmans but Giaours (infidels), cursed in the Korân; and fanaticism appears to revive against them periodically. How many times since Mahomet II. have they had their dwellings pillaged, their goods sequestered, their churches ransacked! How many massacres can we reckon from the taking of Constantinople to the Crimean war! And since then, in spite of the formal promises of the Sultan mentioned in the Treaty of Paris, in

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\* Cfr. Lequien, "Orient. Christ.," i. 147.

spite of the intervention of England and France, to whom the Porte owes the conservation of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, have we not had massacres in the Lebanon, Damascus, Dyeddah, and Bulgaria? And this, without counting isolated crimes.

The practice followed by the Sultans, of subjecting, even in temporals, all Christians of the same rite to its patriarch has created the gravest difficulties for both bishops and the faithful, whether Nestorian or Jacobite, Armenian or schismatic Greek, who wished to unite themselves to Rome and shake off the yoke of heretical or schismatical patriarchs. These Christians deprived of the protection of the patriarch found themselves, both in goods and person, at the mercy of the ever-fanatical Mussulmans. On the other hand, they incurred the anger of a patriarch armed with civil and judicial authority, who subjected them to every sort of vexations. It is clear that, under such a *régime*, the advance of Catholicism was often impeded. It would have totally ceased but for the energetic efforts of the delegates of the Holy See at Constantinople, and the intervention of France, whose traditional policy has always protected the Oriental Catholics.

A new order of things and, as it were, a new era appears to open for the Eastern Christians with the Treaty of Berlin. To understand aright the stipulations of the Treaty in favour of the Christians, it is necessary to carry oneself back a few years. After the Crimean war, by the advice and at the entreaty of the Powers who had given him the victory, the Sultan issued the celebrated "*Hatti Houmayoun*,"\* in which he decrees that: "The powers granted to patriarchs and bishops of the Christian rites by the Sultan Mahomet II. and his successors shall be put into harmony with the new position which our generous and benevolent intentions assure to those communities. The principle of nominations to the patriarchate shall, after revision of the regulations now in force, be exactly applied, conformably to the tenor of their firman of investiture. The properties, movable and other, of the various Christian clergy shall not be touched; at the same time the temporal administration of the Christian communities or of other non-Mussulman rites shall be placed under the protection of an assembly chosen from each of the different communities, composed of both clergy and laity. The Sublime Porte will take measures to assure to each worship, whatever may be the number of its adherents, full

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\* *Hatti Houmayoun* of the 18th Feb. 1856. It was published in several languages.

and entire freedom of action. . . . No one shall be constrained to a change of religion." This decree, which ratified and enlarged the concessions made to the Christians after the taking of Constantinople by Mahomet II., was communicated to the Congress of Paris, which mentions it in Article IX. of the Treaty,\* in these words:—"His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, in his solicitude for the well-being of his subjects, having granted a firman which, by ameliorating their condition *without distinction of religion or race*, solemnly records his generous intentions towards the Christian population of his Empire, and wishing to give a new proof of his sentiments in this respect, has resolved to communicate to the Contracting Powers the said firman which has emanated spontaneously from his will. The Contracting Powers recognise the high value of this communication. It is clearly understood that it does not in any case *give the right to the said Powers to interfere either collectively or separately with the relations between His Majesty the Sultan and his subjects, nor with the internal administration of his Empire.*"

Although the Congress of Paris thus adopted, in some sort, the decree relative to the Christians, yet this final clause left everything in the end to the goodwill of the Sultan. In the years immediately following the Treaty of Paris, the Sultan appeared to be anxious to fulfil his promises concerning the Christians. Thus it was that, in 1857, Mgr. Hassoun obtained a "*berat*" which recognised him as spiritual chief of the Armenian Catholics of Constantinople with all the immunities and privileges granted to patriarchs. But in the provinces the Turkish officials abated none of their exactions against Christians, and the *Hatti Houmayoun* was a dead-letter. Scarcely four years after the Treaty of Paris Mussulman fanaticism let loose the Druses against the Maronites, and France was obliged to interfere in the Lebanon.

Meanwhile, Russia protested without ceasing against the abuse of power of which the so-called Orthodox Greeks were the victims. To entreaties she joined threats. France on her side worked in favour of the Catholics, and England did not remain inactive; she counselled the Sultan to draw himself more towards modern ideas, to decree the equality of all his subjects and to reform the administration of justice, in order to avoid a conflagration and to take away from Russia all pretext for the intervention she desired. This led the Sultan Abdul Aziz to publish the *firman* of the 12th December, 1875, in which he reforms the collection of taxes; restricts the tax for

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\* Treaty of Paris, of 30th March, 1856.



exemption from military service, which is no longer to be paid by Christians except between their twentieth and fortieth years of age; establishes district courts and courts of appeal and a supreme court; takes measures for securing the impartiality of judges; permits non-Mussulmans equally with Mussulmans to be elevated to that office; renews the powers accorded to patriarchs, and permits Christians to acquire real estate in the parts of the Empire where they could not previously, "wishing to insure to them the enjoyment, on a footing of the most complete equality, of the provisions of the law concerning landed property."

"All classes of our subjects," says the Sultan, "who live under the shadow of our imperial protection are in our sight and in our sentiments of justice, on the *level of a perfect equality*. Hence we confirm the powers with which patriarchs and other spiritual chiefs have been endowed for the affairs of their respective communities, as also for the free exercise of their worships, conformably to the existing privileges and exemptions of the said communities. All affairs, whether touching the authority of the said spiritual chiefs or their wants and the jurisdiction of their particular councils, shall continue (within the limits of the rights and authorisations which have been granted them) to be the object of our entire protection, and all facilities shall be accorded for the founding and construction of their schools and other national buildings.

"As all classes of our subjects have at all times free access to public distinctions and offices, according to their merit and capacity, we confirm the admission to such positions of our non-Mussulman subjects whose integrity and capacity shall have been ascertained."

Some months later Abdul Aziz was dethroned and replaced by his nephew Mourad IV., who had scarcely taken the reins of government into his hands when he was, in his turn, replaced by Abdul Hamid, the present Sultan. By these events the firman of reforms became in its turn a dead-letter.

Meanwhile, the Christians of Bosnia and Herzegovina demanded reform, and began a revolution;\* Serbia stirred

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\* The Catholics took no part in it. Lord Derby, in a letter of the 26th June, 1876, bears them this testimony. "Her Majesty's Government," he writes, "cannot regard the insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina as being exclusively or chiefly a revolt against a local oppression in civil or religious affairs. The reports which it has received show that the insurrection has arisen from other causes, and is now fomented and sustained for an object which has evidently a general and political rather than a local and administrative character. In support of this estimate I may mention the fact that the Roman Catholic population has not associated itself with the movement, and that those Christians who have not joined the insurgent bands have continued, during the late troubles, to be unmolested."

itself and prepared for war; Mussulman fanaticism excited itself to the assassination of the European Consuls at Salonica. Soon afterwards the Bulgarian massacres raised the cry of blood to heaven. We well know the terrible and disastrous war which ensued and brought the Russians to the gates of Constantinople. The Congress of Berlin has re-established peace between the two nations, and sanctioned new guarantees for all the Christians of the Ottoman Empire without distinction of rite or race. Article 62 of the Treaty of Berlin contains the following important stipulations, which totally change the legal *status* of Christians of every sort in the Ottoman Empire:—"The Sublime Porte having expressed the wish to maintain the principle of religious liberty, by giving it the largest possible extension, the Contracting Powers take note of this spontaneous declaration. *In no part of the Ottoman Empire shall difference of religion be objected to in any one as a motive of exclusion or of incapacity in what concerns the exercise of civil and political rights, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the practice of the different professions and industries. All shall, without distinction of religion, be admitted to give evidence before the tribunals. Liberty and the exterior performance of all worships are secured to all; and no impediment shall be offered either to the hierarchical organisation of the different communions, or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs.*

"Ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks of all nationalities travelling in Turkey in Europe, or Turkey in Asia, shall enjoy the same rights, advantages, and privileges.

"The right of official protection is recognised to the diplomatic and consular agents of the Powers in Turkey, both in regard to the persons above-mentioned, and their religious, charitable, and other establishments, in the Holy Places and elsewhere. The rights acquired by France are expressly reserved, and it is clearly understood that no attempt shall be made against the *status quo* in the Holy Places. The monks of Mount Athos of whatever nationality shall be maintained in their possessions and former privileges, and shall enjoy without any exception complete equality of rights and prerogatives."

The stipulations concerning ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks, are a reproduction of Article 22 of the Treaty of San Stefano, with the important difference, however, that what the Treaty of San Stefano specifies for Russians alone is extended to all nations.

Thus freedom of worship, the admission to offices of all subjects of the Sultan without distinction of race or belief, the equality

before the law of Christians and Mussulmans—this is no longer promise or an act emanating solely from the spontaneous wish of the Sultan, as it is in the Treaty of Paris, and in the firman of the 12th December, 1875; it is an article of international treaty; it is a command given under the most solemn form, and sanctioned by Austria, England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Turkey—that is to say, by all the Great Powers of the world assembled in Congress. It no longer depends on the Sultan to make a dead-letter of it at his pleasure or that of his ministers. The Sultan has no longer the right to reply to complaints, or to the Ambassadors of the Powers: “No one has a right to interfere in the interior administration of my Empire. My relations with my Christian or Mussulman subjects concern only myself; I alone am judge of the reforms to be introduced, of the liberties to be granted.”

The Congress of Berlin has at last, then, demolished the diplomatic fiction that the Sultans had themselves initiated concessions in favour of their Christian subjects which had really been suggested to them, and often even extorted from them by pressure. The Sublime Porte had succeeded in preventing the insertion of an article on religious liberty in the Treaty of Paris by insisting on the Sultan's firm resolves, and on the necessity of preserving his *prestige* and authority. The Ottoman plenipotentiaries strove in vain to persuade the Congress of Berlin by the same reasoning; in vain Caratheodori Pasha gave the strongest assurances as to the Sultan's intentions on this point, and said:—“The constant traditions of the Sublime Porte, its time-honoured policy, the instinct of its populations, all demand this: through all the Empire religions the most varied are professed by millions of the subjects of the Sultan, and no one has been interfered with in his belief or worship; the Imperial Government is determined to maintain this principle, and to give to it all the extension it admits of.”\* All this would not do. The Russian plenipotentiaries insisted that the mistakes, of which the Christians had so often been the victims, should not be committed again. “It is important,” said the aged Prince Gortschakoff,† “that the inhabitants of the provinces which have not been declared independent by the Congress, should have their possessions, lives, &c., secured to them, but not by promises upon paper which may, like preceding ones, be followed by no result.” After the vote for Article 62,

\* “Congress of Berlin,” meeting of the 4th July. Ali Pasha expressed himself in the same sense before the Congress of Paris in his memorandum of May, 1855. The extremely vague words which close the speech of Caratheodori Pasha should be remarked.

† Meeting of 26th of June.

Count Schouvaloff added, "The Russian plenipotentiaries have had especially in view to avoid the disappointments which followed the Treaty of 1856. Many articles, stipulating improvements for the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire, have never been put into execution. Whence resulted for Europe frequent troubles, war, and at last the assembling of this Congress. We ought not to find ourselves a second time in the presence of the like difficulties."\* Russia would have wished to put Article 62 under the collective guarantee of the European Powers, but the Ottoman plenipotentiaries opposed it, affirming "that the resolutions of the Congress should be put into execution with the shortest possible delay; that the Sublime Porte assuredly regarded its signature as obligatory, and considered itself bound to put into execution engagements which it should subscribe in the same manner as the other signatories to the Treaty; but it refused either to admit control over itself, or, in its turn, to control other States pledged equally with itself."† After a long discussion the Congress rejected the collective, coercive, or diplomatic guarantee asked for by Russia, and was satisfied with the natural obligation of the Treaty; at the same time taking note of the declarations made by the Turkish plenipotentiaries. The Sublime Porte has solemnly pledged himself to make the necessary reforms "with the least possible delay." If, this time, the Sultan does not content himself with paper promises, as Prince Gortschakoff justly complained he had previously done; if the reforms pass from the domain of right to that of realisation; if the Sultan, limiting himself no longer to the assurances which remain valueless of the *Hatti Scherif* of 1839, of the *Hatti Houmayoun* of 1856, and of the *Firman* of 1875, is willing and able to fulfil the obligations contracted at the Congress at Berlin, a radical change will be realised in the Ottoman Government and a new era will open, not for the Christians alone, but for the whole Empire.

Meanwhile, let us not cherish an illusion. To attain this result something more is needed than the goodwill of the Sultan. Many difficulties must be surmounted in order to bring the law into operation; inveterate habits have to be overcome, as well as the antipathy of some, the fanaticism of others, and the corruption of functionaries, who, as has been well said,‡ have displayed for twenty years back more talent in eluding laws and promises

\* Meeting of 9th July. † Meetings of 9th and 11th July.

‡ Brunswick, "Le Traité de Berlin," Paris, 1878, p. 251.

than would have been needed to reform the administration of the whole Empire. Reforms will encounter very great obstacles in the inveterate habits of the Mussulmans. We know how difficult it is to execute a measure repugnant to a population which is dominant as this people is dominant in Asiatic Turkey. A still greater obstacle are the teaching and tendencies of Islamism—we have already explained this. The Mussulmans are fanatics and fatalists; they are born enemies of all other religions; not only does the Korân condemn to eternal flames infidels and all who do not believe Mahomet, but it orders their extermination. If Mahomet made a difference, at certain times, between infidels and Christians, at other times he treated them equally. The Mussulmans, to-day as heretofore, treat Christians as Giaours or infidels. They regard them as enemies, or at least as the basest of the base. True, Mussulman princes do not massacre them except in war; beyond that they are content with tribute; some of them have shown themselves really kind towards Christians; but none the less the disciples of Christ have never been placed on a footing of equality with the disciples of Mahomet. This is the first time that such equality has been solemnly inscribed in a treaty.

On the other hand, however, the necessity in which the Sultan is placed, of not provoking another Eastern war which might be fatal to Turkey, the assurances given to the Congress of Berlin by the Ottoman plenipotentiaries, the authority of France which has always protected Catholic interests in the East, the preponderating influence of England, more than ever interested, since the Convention of the 4th of June last, in the destinies of the Turkish Empire, are so many motives which may assure us of the prompt execution of the reforms, and of the possibility of overcoming the difficulties which those reforms will raise. The Sultan has already given a proof of his goodwill in the *berat* which he has just granted to the Patriarch of the Uniat Chaldeans, and of which we shall speak later; he has given other proofs of it also by the nomination of a certain number of Christians to employments of considerable importance.

England showed in the Treaty of Berlin what her influence can effect. She has done more. By a special agreement concluded with the Sublime Porte, on the 4th June, 1878, she obliged herself under certain conditions to join with Turkey for the defence, even by arms, of the Ottoman possessions in Asia. In return his Majesty the Sultan ceded into the hands of England the occupation and the administration of the island of Cyprus, and promised her to introduce the necessary reforms regarding good administration and *the protection of Christian and other*

*subjects of the Sublime Porte in the territories in question.* England has thus become, henceforth, the protector of the Oriental Christians. Independently of what she had done in concert with the other Powers at the Congress of Berlin, she exacted, by a special agreement, the protection of the Christians, as the condition of her support. She stipulated, not as did Russia in the Treaty of San Stefano, for one community only, but for all the Christian communities without distinction. The Marquis of Salisbury has declared in explicit terms:—"The interests of France, as a great Catholic Power, in the Lebanon and in the holy places of Palestine, have always been scrupulously respected by England. We have not in any way a thought of swerving from the line of conduct previously followed by the Queen's Government. The efforts of Great Britain will tend for the future, just as at the Congress of Berlin, to insure equality of rights among individuals of every religion; but the Queen's Government does not recognise an obligation of charging itself with the special defence of any one of the religious communions which exist in Turkey in Asia."\*

To France, the time-honoured protectress of Catholic interests in the East, falls the honour of having first proposed to the Congress of Berlin to sanction religious liberty in Turkey. The proposition of M. Waddington was at first restricted to Bulgaria; but the Congress extended it, successively, to Roumelia and to the other provinces of the Empire. Whilst proposing the liberty of worship, France did not abandon her special protection of Catholic interests in the Lebanon, in the Holy Places, in Bulgaria and elsewhere, and the Congress has continued to France her glorious mission by the words—"The rights acquired by France are expressly reserved."

M. Dufaure, the late Prime Minister of France, points out the action of the French plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Berlin, in favour of religious liberties, in these words:—"It has been granted you to cause the maxim of liberty for all modes of worship to prevail in the organisation of the territories freed from Ottoman Suzerainty, and to obtain the maintenance of the arrangements equally with that of the immunities of the Catholic Church in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. You have brought about the insertion in the very text of the Treaty of Berlin of a clause which expressly sanctions the privilege we have enjoyed for centuries in regard to protection both in the Holy Places and in other countries of the Turkish Empire. . . . The Roumanians, the Greeks, the Catholic population of the Mirdites linked to us by a long tradition of kind services, have in turn

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\* Letter of the 7th August to the English Ambassador at Paris.



experienced the beneficent effects of your initiative.”\* As we have said, the Congress, before extending its prescriptions to the whole of Turkey in Asia, had stipulated for religious reforms and liabilities in the States declared independent, Montenegro, Servia, and Roumania,† in the principality of Bulgaria ruled for the future by a Christian Governor,‡ and in Eastern Roumelia, which will also have a Christian Governor.§ Although the different arrangements stipulated for in favour of Christians be the same for all these States as for the rest of the Turkish Empire, it would be a great mistake to suppose that the position of the Christians and the realisation of the reforms will be the same throughout. On the contrary, there will be great differences. For first, Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro are henceforth independent of the Mussulman Government of Constantinople. The princes of Servia and Montenegro profess the so-called Orthodox Greek religion, and are united to the Russians, their liberators; and the dominant religion is the Orthodox Greek. There will then be no difficulty for the Greeks. These princes will also be desirous, we cannot doubt, to observe towards the Uniat Greeks the prescriptions of the Congress. In Bosnia and Montenegro the Mussulman population nearly equals the Catholic population. As these countries are occupied and administered by Austria,|| there is every guarantee that religious liberty will there be faithfully preserved. The same will hold of Roumania under the government of Prince Charles. Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia are, according to the Treaty, to be governed by Christians; the preservation of religious liberty is a condition of their new existence. It is easy to conceive what influence this state of things will have on the reforms to be introduced. By virtue of a special convention of the 4th June, England occupies and administers the island of Cyprus; she will not delay introducing there the prescribed reforms. The Congress also came to special decisions regarding the isle of Crete. It requires that the *Regulations* of 1868 be there scrupulously applied, and those modifications introduced which shall be judged equitable.¶ Analogous regulations will be introduced in the other parts of Turkey in Europe, and submitted for the approbation of the European Commission appointed for Eastern Roumelia. Such is the wish of the

\* Letter of the 13th July to M. Waddington, French plenipotentiary at Berlin. Cardinal Franchi charged the Nuncio at Paris, Mgr. Meglia, to thank, in the name of His Holiness, the French Government for the efforts made by it “for preserving in the East full liberty for Catholics in the exercise of their religion.”

† Treaty of Berlin, Art. 20, 35, 44. ‡ Art. 1 and 5. § Art. 13 and 20.

|| Treaty of Berlin, Art. 25. ¶ Treaty of Berlin, Art. 23.

Congress. The following are the principal dispositions of the Regulations of 1868 which here concern us:—The Governor-General, or *Vali*, is assisted by two councillors, chosen, the one from among the Mussulman officials, the other from among the Christian officials. The island is divided into *Sandyaks*, administered by *Mutessarifs*, who are to be partly Mussulmans, partly Christians. The Mussulman *Mutessarifs* are to be assisted by Christian *adjutants*, and the Christian *Mutessarifs* by Mussulman *adjutants*. Inferior officials are to be taken as required from among the Mussulman or Christian officials. The administrative council of each mixed *Sandyak* shall include the *Mutesarif*, the bishop and the members, Mussulman and Christian. The general administrative council shall include the Governor, the two Councillors, the Metropolitan, various other officials, and six other members (of whom three are to be Mussulmans and three Christians), chosen by their respective communities. There shall be mixed tribunals, the judges of which shall be chosen by the population. These tribunals shall have cognisance of all causes—civil, criminal, and commercial—between Christians and Mussulmans. There shall be a Mussulman religious tribunal for cases between Mussulmans, and a Christian one for cases between Christians.

A protocol of the Congress preserves the immunities of the Mirdites, a Catholic population, in these terms: \* “The Mirdite populations shall continue to enjoy the privileges and immunities of which they are in possession *ab antiquo*.” The Lebanon, which is inhabited by a Catholic nation, the Maronites, is not within the stipulations of the Congress, and remains subject, under the influence of France, to the Regulation of 1866. Nothing new has been settled in regard to the Holy Places. As to Armenia, “the Sublime Porte engages to carry out, without further delay, the ameliorations and reforms which are required by local needs in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds.” †

Such are the stipulations of the Congress of Berlin in favour of the Eastern Christians. We have brought into view, in a summary manner, the obstacles which will oppose their execution—the doctrines and tendencies of Islamism, the corruption of Mussulman officials, and the inveterate habits of the Sublime Porte. To enable the reader the better to judge the future of Catholicism in that immense Empire, it is necessary to consider in turn each of the Christian communions of Turkey.

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\* Meeting of 4th July.

† Treaty of Berlin, Art. 61.

More than fourteen millions of Christians, under the names of Greeks, Armenians, Bulgarians, Wallachians, Nestorians, Chaldeans, Syrians, Maronites, Melchites, or Copts, live scattered through the immense Ottoman Empire and the provinces which have just been taken from it.

Nine-tenths of these Christians languish in schism and separation, as they have done for many ages, from the mother and mistress of all the Churches, whose seat has been fixed by Divine Providence at Rome. Except the higher clergy, they are for the most part sunk in profound ignorance of the truths of faith, a consequence of persecution and of the severity of the officials under whom they live. They scarcely know religion except by the magnificent rites and beautiful prayers of their ancient liturgies. Many of them are heretics or schismatics without any idea of it. Numbers, no doubt, will be excused for their good faith. Truly worthy are the Oriental Churches of the interest which the Congress of Berlin manifested for them by the decisions we have just related. It was with reason that Sir A. H. Layard and M. Fournier constantly pleaded for them at Constantinople, in the name of the English and French Governments. Their titles to our compassionate and devoted charity are innumerable.

It was, in fact, in the East that the son of God made man for us appeared, and there by his life, death, and resurrection, condescended to accomplish the work of man's redemption. It was in the East that the Gospel of light and peace was first preached by the divine Saviour Himself and by His disciples, and that so many Churches flourished, illustrious by the names of the Apostles who founded them. In course of time, and during many centuries, bishops, martyrs, and so many others renowned for their sanctity and doctrine, rose from the midst of the Eastern nations. All the world celebrates the glories of Ignatius of Antioch, of Polycarp of Smyrna, of the three Gregories—of Neocæsarea, of Nyssa, and of Nazianzus, of Athanasius of Alexandria, of John Chrysostom, of the two Cyrils—of Jerusalem and of Alexandria, of Gregory the Armenian, of Ephrem the Syrian, of John Damascene, of Cyril and Methodius, apostles of the Slavs, without speaking of so many others almost innumerable, who also shed their blood for Jesus Christ, or acquired for themselves an immortal name by their learned writings and their saintly deeds. Another glory of the East is the remembrance of those numerous assemblies of bishops, more especially of those Ecumenical councils, which were there held, and in which, under the presidency of the Roman Pontiffs, the Catholic faith was defended against the innovators of those times, and confirmed by solemn judgments.\*

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\* Letter of His Holiness Pope Pius IX. to the Christians of the East, 6th January, 1848.

Such are the reasons which challenge our warmest interest in the Christians of the East. The Sovereign Pontiffs, in every age, have made continual efforts to lead them back to the true faith and unity. Their first effort was to draw the Nestorians and Monophysites from heresy, but Persian invasions, Mussulman conquests, and the feebleness of the Greek Emperors paralysed their endeavours. Later, when Michael Cerularius, by completing in 1054 the great division begun by the craft of Photius, and kept up by the intrigues of policy, had separated nearly all the Eastern Christians from Rome, the Sovereign Pontiffs laboured unceasingly for the extinction of Greek schism. Under the impulse of their efforts the Council of Lyons in 1274 made an attempt at union, which had only a transient success. The Council of Florence in 1439 was more fortunate. It brought back to the Roman Church, not only the Greeks, but also the Armenians, Jacobites, and Ethiopians, whom Eugenius IV. had invited to the Council. But scarcely had the Greeks set out on their return home, scarcely had Metrophanes, the Patriarch of Constantinople, ordered by an encyclical the execution of the decrees of Florence through all the East, when the craft and intrigues of Mark of Ephesus broke the union which had just been effected.\* The fall of the Greek Empire, and the capture of Constantinople by the Turks, consummated the rupture. Never again, to this day, has the longed-for union been brought about.

The Churches of Russia—Catholic for a long time—followed into schism the Church of Constantinople, on which they depended. A patriarch was established at Moscow, towards the end of the sixteenth century, for all the so-called Orthodox Churches of the whole of Russia. Peter the Great transferred all the powers of this Patriarch to the Holy Synod, and the Russian Church was completely separated, *de facto* if not *de jure*, from the Church of Constantinople, and withdrawn from all jurisdiction or influence of the Byzantine Patriarch; though she followed the same Greek rites, and held the same dogmatic errors, and formed equally a part of the schismatical Greek Church.

All the Orientals, nevertheless, did not relapse into schism with Mark of Ephesus. There were Greeks, large numbers of bishops, priests, and faithful, at Constantinople, Kieff, and elsewhere, Armenians, Syrians, Copts, who persevered in union

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\* The successor of Metrophanes, Gregory Mamma, still continued attached to the Union, but he had to quit Constantinople, and retired to Rome, where he died.—Cfr. Lequien, *Oriens Christianus*, i. 309.

with Rome. At different epochs attempts at union were made, which had partial success. The missionaries whom the Sovereign Pontiffs sent into all the East and into Russia made numerous conversions. Under Clement VIII., in 1595, the Lithuanians and the Ruthenians abjured schism, and remained united to the Roman Church until 1839, when the cunning of the Emperor Nicholas replunged them into schism. On the other hand, Kollonies, Bishop of Gran, brought back to the pale of the Church a hundred thousand Greek schismatics of Transylvania. In 1552, Soulaka, patriarch of the Nestorians of Kurdistan, abjured heresy with some of his followers. Thus, we find, at the present day throughout the East, Christians who are united to the Roman Church by the profession of a common faith, and by obedience to the same Sovereign Pontiff, whilst they preserve the discipline and rites which they received from the Ancient Fathers before their separation. To distinguish them from their brethren who remain in schism and heresy, the name of *uniat* or *united* is given them.

Scarcely was Pius IX. seated in the chair of St. Peter, when he, like his predecessors, took specially to his heart the interests of the Oriental Churches. As early as the 3rd of August, 1847, he concluded with the Emperor of Russia a concordat which gave to the Catholics hopes, which were, alas ! too soon blighted. By virtue of this concordat, there were in Russia a Catholic Archbishop, and six bishops of the Latin rite. The faithful belonging to the Oriental rite were to be governed by priests of their own rite under the jurisdiction of the bishops of the Latin rite until the Holy See could give them a bishop of their own.\* On the 6th January of the following year he wrote to the Christians of the East a touching letter, wherein he guarantees to them the preservation of their ancient liturgies, "so fitted, by their magnificence, to inflame the piety of the faithful, and impress respect for the Divine mysteries." In this same letter, wishing to remove from them every pretext for remaining in schism, he promised to the clergy who should submit themselves to the preservation of their dignities. He said: "As to the sacred ministers, priests, and pontiffs of the Oriental nations who shall return to Catholic unity, we have deliberated and determined to maintain the attitude which was held by our predecessors on so many occasions, both in the times immediately preceding those in which we live and anterior to them. We will continue to them their rank and their dignities, and we shall count on them, not less than on other Catholics of the East, to preserve

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\* Brief of Pius IX. to the Bishops of Russia of 3rd July, 1848.

and propagate among their peoples the worship of the Catholic religion.”\*

These words of the Supreme Pontiff had not the success he desired; nevertheless, he did not give up the hope of seeing his prayers granted. This he repeated to these same Orientals twenty years later, when inviting them to the Œcumenical Council.†

Nevertheless, he treated, through his Nuncios, with the Sultan, for an alleviation of the yoke on the Christians of the Turkish Empire, and for facilitating their relations with Rome. In 1853, he gave the Uniat Church of Wallachia a hierarchy of its own rite, and renewed on that occasion the constitutions of his predecessors on the preservation of the Oriental rites.‡

*The Association for the benefit of the Eastern Christians*, established at Rome in 1848, and which unfortunately was not able to maintain itself; the *Œuvre des écoles d'Orient*, founded at Paris, at the time of the Crimean war, and which did so much good when the Christians were massacred in Syria in 1860; the *Œuvres des Eglises unies d'Orient*, founded at Brussels in 1853, after the movement had declared itself in Bulgaria in favour of reunion; the *Association of Prayer*, founded by Père Schouvaloff for the conversion of Russians and Greeks; all these works were actively encouraged by the Sovereign Pontiff Pius IX. As conversions multiplied, the Pope erected at Rome, in 1862, a special congregation under the presidency of the Cardinal Prefect of the Propaganda, to examine and decide everything concerning the rites, the discipline, and other affairs of the Oriental Churches.

Meanwhile, under his influence, missionaries spread themselves over the East, maintaining ancient missions and founding new ones. At the present time the Jesuits are established in the Lebanon, where they have founded the magnificent College of Gazir, with professors versed in all the Oriental languages, and a printing office which, in its beautiful edition of the Arabic Bible, rivals the best presses in the world; the Dominicans are at Mossul, teaching, keeping school, and printing liturgical and class books in Chaldean; the Mekhitarists of Vienna and Venice furnish the Armenians with priests instructed in the rites, discipline, literature and history of their nation; the Carmelites are at Bagdad; the Franciscans guard the tomb of Christ and

\* His Holiness Pius IX., “*Litteræ ad Orientales*,” 6th January, 1848.

† “Although these words of peace and charity,” he said, “have not obtained the success which we so eagerly desired, we have never lost the hope of seeing our humble and fervent prayers heard by the most compassionate and most merciful Author of peace.” Sept. 8th, 1868.

‡ Allocution of 19th Dec. 1853.



the sanctuaries of Palestine; they evangelise at Aleppo, in Wallachia, in Egypt and Abyssinia; the Lazarists have a college at Antoura, and missions at Constantinople and in Persia; the Christian Brothers, the Sisters of Charity, and the Sisters of S. Joseph fulfil their missions of devotion in the schools and hospitals in Constantinople, Egypt, and elsewhere. Under the auspices of the missionaries, and by the alms of the Christians of the West, churches have risen from their ruins, and seminaries, colleges and schools for both sexes have been established at Gazir, Antoura, Beyrout, Constantinople, in Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor, Chaldea and Persia. Even monastic life has been revived among the Chaldeans, and the monastery of Raban Ormuz has already furnished several bishops. The devotion shown by the Sisters of Charity and by the missionaries at Constantinople, Smyrna, Beyrout, Cairo, and elsewhere, during the Crimean war, during the cholera and the massacres of Syria, the devotedness of those angels of charity at this moment, towards the wounded, the orphans, the abandoned victims of the terrible war which has just ended, has affected Mussulmans as well as Schismatics, and effaced many prejudices. Now that the decrees of the Treaty of Berlin open a new era of greater liberty for all Christians without distinction, it would appear that a more serene and brighter day dawns for the Catholics of the Ottoman Empire; once more hope springs up strong, and God's blessing is on the future.

The schism which divided the Uniat Armenians is quietly dying away; the new Chaldean Patriarch, closely united to Rome, has received his *berat* of investiture. The Sultan has already admitted several schismatic Christians to high grades; one of his plenipotentiaries at Berlin was a Greek. Catholics also will be able to attain to offices; and although more than one difficulty must still be looked for, as well from the Schismatics, who are extremely obstinate, as from the fanatic Turks, regeneration appears to have begun in Asia.

The Eastern Christians form various churches, some separated by heresy or by schism from the centre of unity, others united with the See of Rome. There are the Nestorians who err about the person of Jesus Christ, and deny the divine maternity; the Monophysites (Jacobites, Copts, and Ethiopians) who, like Eutyches, will admit but one nature in Jesus Christ; the Greeks (Greeks properly so called, Bulgarians, Roumanians and Russians) who deny the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son, and Purgatory; the Armenians, who share in a great measure the errors of the Greeks. All these sects deny the primacy of the Pope, and refuse him obedience. The Christians

who have renounced the errors of their sect, and submitted themselves to the Holy See, preserve their ancient discipline and rites, and form so many distinct communions united by the profession of the same faith and by obedience to the same Roman Pontiff, the successor of S. Peter, the Vicar of Jesus Christ and head of the whole Church. Often, especially when speaking of rites, all the churches, both Schismatical and Catholic, are denominated *Eastern Churches, Eastern Christians, Eastern rites*. What is to be understood by a rite? What are the Eastern rites?

Man owes to God, his Creator, the homage of all his being, of his body as of his soul. Religion ought not to restrict itself to the interior, but to manifest itself outside. To interior worship exterior worship should be added. The various sensible forms which exterior worship puts on are called *rites*. Rites, then, constitute and distinguish the sacred ceremonies, the divine office. In the Christian Church there are seven sacraments, each of which is administered with peculiar rites; but the sacrifice of the Mass forms the chief part of divine worship; rites, therefore, are specially connected with the liturgy.

From time immemorial the various nations of the East have celebrated the holy sacrifice of the Mass in their ancient languages and with their own rites. The venerable Thomas of Jesus does not hesitate to trace this diversity of rites up to Apostolic times. "The Apostles," he says,\* "wisely established different rites according to the diversity of nations." These rites have been modified and developed by time, but always conformably to the character, habits, and customs of each people, so that they have remained distinct. The Nestorians and the Monophysites when separating themselves by heresy, and the Greeks when separating by schism, though with alterations, preserved nevertheless the ancient rites in use with them anteriorly. At this day, when they return to the fold, they retain the same rites, purged of errors, or of alterations which schism or heresy had introduced.

The rites in use among Eastern Christians are:—

1. The *Greek* rite, followed by the Greeks of Turkey, of the Ionian Islands, and of Greece, the Bulgarians, Servians, Montenegrins, Wallachians, Georgians and Russians. The Uniat Christians belonging to these various nations follow the same rite. The uniat and non-uniat Greeks employ in their liturgy the *ancient Greek*; the Russians, Bulgarians, Servians, and Montenegrins, the *Slav*; the Wallachians and Georgians, their own language; the United Wallachians, the *Wallachian*

\* "De Conversione Gentium," lib. vii. cap. 7.

or *Roumanian*; the Melchites or United Greeks of Syria and Egypt, the *Arab* language.

2. The *Armenian* rite, followed, with the *Armenian* language, by the united and non-united Armenians of Russia, Turkey, Persia, Gallicia, and Venice.

3. The *Chaldean* rite, followed by the Nestorians of Turkey, Persia, and Malabar. These heretics celebrate the Holy Sacrifice in the *Chaldean* tongue, which is also done by the United Chaldeans of Persia and Kurdistan.

4. The *Syriac* rite, followed by the Jacobites of Syria and Mesopotamia. The Jacobites employ in their liturgies, except for the rubrics, the *Syriac* language, which is the same as the Chaldean language, but written with slightly different characters. The United Syrians follow the same rite. The Maronites employ also the *Syriac* language, whilst they follow a rather different rite.

5. The *Coptic* rite, followed, in the *Coptic* language, by the Copts, uniat and separated, of Egypt. The non-uniat Copts are Monophysites like the Jacobites.

6. The *Abyssinian* or *Ethiopian* rite, followed, in the Gheer language, by the Monophysite Abyssinians, and by the Uniat Ethiopians.

The Eastern Christians are extremely jealous of their ancient rites. To detach them from the Roman Church, or to prevent their union with her, it is often sufficient to make them believe that their rites are threatened—a manœuvre which has succeeded more than once, though it was all the while a calumny on the tact of the Roman Church and of the Holy See. For the Church and the Pontiffs have always desired the conservation of the Oriental rites. They have preserved them and had them observed, even where it seemed legitimate to abolish them. We will establish this fact by numerous and unexceptionable documents.

S. Augustin, in his letter *ad Januarium*, had already taught that no change ought to be made in received usages concerning the Mass, the Eucharist, and the celebration of feasts in particular churches, when those usages contained nothing blamable or contrary to faith and morals. "As to what regards the particular usages of different countries this salutary rule ought to be followed: whatever is not contrary to faith or morals and tends to edification, should not be found fault with when we see it in the way to be established or already established. On the contrary, we should seek to praise and imitate, unless the weakness of our neighbours places an obstacle thereto."\*

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\* *Miror sanè quid ita volueris, ut de iis quæ variè per diversa loca observantur, tibi aliqua scriberem, cum et non sit necessarium, et una in*

S. Gregory the Great, in his letter to Leander, Bishop of Seville,\* speaks in the same strain. We might also cite S. Jerome, S. Gregory of Nyssa, and Theodoret, who think that each country should preserve its own ancient rites. Such is the rule always followed by the Roman Pontiffs.

When the Greeks, separated from the centre of faith, first by the ambitious Photius, and then by Michael Cerularius, wished to return to the Roman Church, the Popes always demanded the profession of the *Filioque*, of the dogma of Purgatory, and of the primacy of the Roman Pontiff; but at the same time they desired that the Greek rite should remain untouched. In the ninth century, in the patriarchates of Alexandria and Jerusalem, there were some Churches of the Latin rite; Michael Cerularius had them closed. At the same time there were at Rome and in Italy some Greek Churches; S. Leo IX. might have closed them by way of reprisal; on the contrary, he desired that the Greek rite should be continued in them.

When the Crusaders, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, had taken Constantinople, Pope Innocent III. established in that city a Latin patriarchate. He even gave to that patriarch jurisdiction over the Greeks who came over in large numbers; but he recommended him to change nothing in the Greek rite, unless he found in it something either heretical or dangerous to the salvation of souls. The Fourth Council of Lateran made a decree exactly in this sense.†

Innocent IV., replying to Daniel, king of the Russians, permits bishops and priests to offer the Holy Sacrifice with leavened bread, and to follow such rites of their own Church as are not tainted with heresy. About the same time the Latins found themselves in contact with the Greeks in the Island of Cyprus. The latter were molested by the Latins, who wished to make them abandon the Greek rite. Innocent IV. interfered twice in their favour, and commanded his legate, to whom he had given full power over the united Greeks of

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his saluberrima regula retinenda sit, ut quæ non sunt contra fidem, neque contra bonos mores, et habent aliquid ad exhortationem vitæ melioris, ubicunque institui videmus vel instituta cognoscimus, non solum non improbemus, sed etiam laudando et imitando sectemur, si aliquorum infirmitas non ita impedit ut amplius detrimentum sit. *Epist.* 25 ad *Januarium*, n. 34.

\* "Epistol," lib. i. 43. These two letters ought to be read through.

† "Licet Græcos diebus nostris ad obedientiam sedis apostolicæ reverentes fovere ac honorare velimus, mores ac ritus eorum quantum cum Domino possumus, sustinendo, in his tamen illis deferre nec volumus nec debemus, quæ periculum generant animarum, et ecclesiasticæ derogant honestati." Hardouin, "Collect. Concil." vii. 22.

Cyprus, Syria, and Palestine, as also over the converted Maronites and Jacobites, to put down these attempts of the Latins, and to continue to each nation its own rites.\*

Alexander IV. renewed the decrees of his predecessor. When the Greeks, under the Emperor Michael Palæologus, came to the Council of Lyons to announce their return to union, they begged the favour of the preservation of their rites so far as they contained nothing contrary to faith. The Council deferred to their wishes. The union was renewed in 1439 at the Council of Florence, always with the condition that nothing in the rites should be changed.†

Two constitutions exist, of Leo X. and of Clement VII., in which those Latins are blamed, who, in spite of the declarations of the Council of Florence, had condemned the Greeks for employing leavened bread for the Sacrifice, and giving communion under both kinds even to infants. Pius IV. in his constitution "Romanus Pontifex" goes further. He decrees that Easterns living in Latin dioceses should be subject to the Latin bishop, but should follow the rites of their own Church.‡ At the time of the well-known reunion of the Ruthenians to the Roman Church in 1596, Clement VIII. followed the same line of conduct as his predecessors. Soon after, as the rumour spread that the union would cost the Ruthenes their ancient rites in the recitation of the Psalms, in the Mass, and the administration of the Sacraments, Paul V. protested that the Holy See desired the preservation of those rites in everything unless where contrary to faith, or destructive of the union. Need we mention all that Gregory XIII., Gregory XV., and Urban VIII. have done for the Easterns? The Propaganda is their work. Not only did they institute a congregation of Cardinals to be specially occupied with missions, but they erected seminaries at Rome for the Greeks, Armenians, Maronites, Syrians, Chaldeans, and Copts, and added a printing office to the Propaganda, whence are issued liturgical books for the different branches of the Oriental rite.§

Few Popes have occupied themselves with the care of the Easterns more than Benedict XIV. Everywhere he shows himself concerned to preserve their rites. If he submits the

\* Cfr. Benedicti XIV. Constitut. "Allatæ sunt," of May, 1755, n. 9, in ejusdem Bullarii Tom. IV.

† Ibid., n. 10—12.

‡ Ibid., n. 13.

§ The Propaganda Press has published since the end of the sixteenth century, Missals, Breviaries, and Rituals, in the Greek, Armenian, Chaldean, Syriac, and Coptic languages, after manuscripts brought to Rome, and collated by the best Orientalists. It would be too long to give a list of them.

Copts to a stranger bishop it is because that bishop is of their own rite;\* if he gives to a Latin bishop—finding himself obliged thereto—the power of ordaining the Ruthenians of Dalmatia, he is careful to choose a bishop who knows their rites, and he is to observe them in the ordinations;† if he annuls an irregular election among the Maronites, he takes care to give them a patriarch of their own nation, and to confirm their national synod;‡ if he busies himself with the Greek Melchites of the patriarchate of Antioch, it is to forbid any change in the rites and usages of that Church, and to declare null and void changes introduced by unenlightened zeal. We ordain, says the Pontiff,§ that henceforth each and all the rites of the Greek Church, and the usages transmitted by the Fathers, be observed. . . . We permit only the Patriarch and bishops to correct and take away abuses which may have been introduced by the error of the people, the fraud of heretics, or the perversity of the times. We permit the establishment—with prudence—of new exercises of piety if the increase of the people's devotion needs them. Consequently, the Pope re-established the Mass of the pre-sanctified during Lent (except on Sundays and Saturdays), and the fasts which had been abolished. He forbids changes of rite, and desires that missionaries will not entice those Christians to the Latin rite, not even by baptising infants.

A little before he had regulated in detail everything concerning the discipline and rites of the Greeks and Albanians established in Italy and Sicily. The Italo-Greeks preserve the Greek rites and form of baptism, and of the other Sacraments; Communion under both species, even for infants after baptism, the use of leavened bread, &c. The Greek priest must celebrate according to the Greek rite even among Latins, and the Latin priest in Latin even among Greeks; and both must observe the Gregorian Calendar, and obey the Latin bishop under whose jurisdiction their residence is. Children belong to the rite in which they were baptised, and are to be baptised according to the rite which their parents follow. All the complex questions which may be raised by residence among Latins, and by translation from the Greek to the Latin rite, are resolved in the Constitution "*Etsi pastoralis*."

Fourteen years later Benedict XIV. had occasion to return for the last time to the question of Oriental rites. He examined the matter under all its aspects in the celebrated

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\* Constitutio "Quemadmodum ingenti," of Aug. 4, 1741.

† Constit. "Singularis Romanorum," of Sept. 1, 1741.

‡ Constit. "E sublimi sedis," of Oct. 4, 1742.

§ Constit. "Demandatam," of Dec. 24, 1743.



Constitution "*Allatæ sunt*," of the 17th May, 1755.\* It was on this occasion a missionary of Bassora made known to the Holy See that the Uniat Armenians and Syrians were not able to have a church at Bassora; they came to the Latin church, and there their priests said Mass in Armenian or Syriac—in a word, followed their own rites, even as to the Calendar and fasts. The missionary asks if it would not be better, for sake of uniformity in the same church, that all should follow the Latin rite. The Pontiff answers, as the Propaganda had done before, that *no innovations should be made*; "*Nihil innovandum*." Then, having rehearsed all that the Sovereign Pontiffs have done for the maintenance of the Oriental rites—at the same time allowing that certain theologians had had too great a prejudice against those rites because they were not sufficiently acquainted with them—the Pope continues: "To sum up all in a word, when Greeks and Eastern schismatics were to be brought back to Catholic unity, the Sovereign Pontiffs were obliged to root out and eject from their minds the errors of Arius, Macedonians, Nestorius, Eutyches, Dioscorus, of the Monothelites, and others, in which they were unfortunately sunk; at the same time they preserved to them intact their rites and discipline such as they were before the schism, in their ancient liturgies and rituals. The Sovereign Pontiffs have never required from those who return to the Catholic faith to abandon their own rite and embrace the Latin; because this would be the ruin of the Oriental rites; which they have never attempted; which also has always been, and still is, contrary to the desires of the Holy See. . . . The missionary, desirous of leading back to unity Eastern schismatics and Greeks, ought, therefore, first to use all his efforts and energy to banish from their minds the errors opposed to the Catholic faith, errors which their ancestors adopted in order to have a pretext for withdrawing themselves from the obedience and submission due to the Roman Pontiff as head of the Church." After establishing that the Easterns are to be convinced by the writings of their ancient Fathers, the Pope continues: "The missionary's only calling is to bring back the Eastern to the Catholic faith, and not to the Latin rite.† Nevertheless this rule of prudence and wisdom has never prevented, and never will prevent, the Sovereign Pontiffs from repressing the abuses which may arise in the Eastern rites, or authorising certain changes when they have good reason for so doing. Thus the Holy See has over and over again con-

\* All these Constitutions are to be found in the Bullarium of Benedict XIV.

† Constit. "*Allatæ sunt*," n. 18, 19.

demned the addition to the Trisagion made by Peter the Fuller, Patriarch of Antioch. Thus, also, it has abolished the custom of keeping all through the year the host consecrated on Holy Thursday, for viaticum to the sick.\* Thus, again, the Holy See has permitted the Armenians and Maronites, conformably to the ancient traditions of their Churches, not to use leavened bread for the Holy Sacrifice; has permitted, under certain restrictions, the communion of the laity under both species; has allowed (to all Greeks, except the Ruthenians) the custom of mixing with the precious Blood a little hot water to mark the fervour of the faith;† has recommended the Gregorian reform of the Calendar to the Easterns, but has not imposed it except on the Italo-Greeks.‡ The Maronites adopted the Gregorian Calendar in their National Synod of 1736, but they did it quite of their own accord.

The rule so well traced and defined by Benedict XIV. has been maintained by his successors. To be brief, it will be enough for us to cite Pius IX. of holy memory. The august Pontiff, in the thirteenth year of his pontificate, wrote to the bishops of Russia to recommend to their vigilance the faithful of the Greek, Ruthenian and Armenian rites living in their dioceses, until such time as he should be able to give them bishops of their own rites.

You are, he says,§ too enlightened to be ignorant that the care of Catholics of all the Eastern rites, and jurisdiction over them, when they have no bishop of their own, falls to the Latin prelate in whose diocese they live, and that it is recommended to him to take care that the divine offices are celebrated according to the various rites, the Sacraments administered by competent priests of each rite approved by him, and that he must exercise authority over those Catholics in the manner prescribed by the Fourth Council of Lateran.

A little further on the Pontiff adds :—

*We pray you to devote all your care to the conservation and defence of the rites of the Eastern Churches. It is, indeed, a thing well known to you, venerable brothers, that the rites of the Oriental Church commend themselves by their origin and their venerable antiquity, that they come in great part from the Holy Fathers; that they have always been held in the greatest esteem by the Roman Pontiffs, our predecessors, and that the Apostolic See has exercised such zeal for the conservation of these same rites that it has forbidden an Eastern rite to be abandoned without an express permission. So it was decided in a general way by our predecessor Benedict XIV. in several apostolic letters; Clement XIV. and Pius VII., also our predecessors, when*

\* Constit. "Allatæ sunt," n. 28, 29. † Ibid., n. 22—27.

‡ Ibid., n. 42—46.

§ Brief to the Bishops of Russia, of July, 1848.

renewing the decrees of Urban VIII., have more specially insisted on this point.\*

Thus spoke the Pontiff to the Latin bishops. Some months before he had spoken in the same strain to the Oriental bishops.

As among other things, he said to them,† it has been made known to us that, in the Ecclesiastical régime of your nations, certain points, through the misery of past times, remain either uncertain or regulated otherwise than is proper. We apply ourselves with joy, in virtue of our apostolic authority, in order that all may henceforth be disposed, and ordained, conformably to the rules of the sacred canons and to the traditions of the Holy Fathers. We will maintain intact those special Catholic liturgies of yours, which you rightly honour, although they differ in many things from those of the Latin Churches. For your liturgies have been equally honoured by our predecessors as being recommended by the venerable antiquity of their origin, and written in the languages spoken by the Apostles or by the Fathers, and as containing ceremonies of a splendour and imposing magnificence fitted to excite the piety and veneration of the faithful for the holy mysteries.

The Holy Father then adds, to take away all pretext from the separated Easterns, that he will secure their dignities to the priests and bishops who return to unity.

Pius IX. renewed these assurances, *à propos* of the Wallachians, in his allocution of the 19th December, 1853, in his Encyclical to the Armenians of 2nd February, 1854, and later when he instituted in the Propaganda a Special Congregation, exclusively charged with what regards the rites, discipline and correction of liturgical books of the Eastern rite. "The Holy See," he says, "does not demand from the Orientals the abandonment of rites venerable by their antiquity and by the witness of the Holy Fathers. It only demands one thing—that nothing be introduced into them contrary to Catholic faith, dangerous to souls, or opposed to ecclesiastical virtues." The Pope renews these same declarations in the Bull "Reversurus" of the 4th July, 1867, against which the schismatic Armenians have cried out so much and so unjustly.

These numerous documents, these evidences constantly renewed and always the same, manifest superabundantly the respect, and the unfailing desire of the Sovereign Pontiff for the conservation of Eastern rites. In questions of discipline and hierarchy the Sovereign Pontiffs have been oftener obliged to interfere for the correction of abuses, and for the preservation of the rights of the Holy See in virtue of its primacy. This we shall see when relating the history and the situation of each of the Churches of the Eastern rite.

T. J. LAMY.

\* Decrees of Urban VIII. of 7th Feb., 1624; of Clement XIV. of 12th April, 1774; and of Pius VII. of 13th June, 1802.

† Letter to the Orientals, of 6th January, 1848.

## ART. VI.—CATHOLICS AND THE SCHOOL BOARDS.

1. *Notes on the Education Question* By the Right Rev. Bishop Ullathorne. London: Richardson and Sons. 1857.
2. *Report of the Catholic Poor School Committee for 1871.*
3. *The Tablet* of August 10 and 31; September 7, 14, and 21, 1878.

WHEN the Education Act came into force, in the year 1871, Catholics found themselves doubting and hesitating considerably as to the effect this important measure would have on Catholic schools, and as to whether they could conscientiously co-operate with it. Many, indeed, had from the first objected to have anything to do with Government inspection or Government grants. Government was to them a power essentially hostile to the Church, and they feared its emissaries even when they brought gifts. The Bishops, it is true, had, in 1847, decided that Government aid and inspection might be accepted by our schools; but, it was urged, they had only permitted this, and did not enjoin it. It was only slowly, therefore, and gradually that Catholic schools came to be "put under Government," as it was termed; while some, to the very last, continued to hold out and would have nothing to say to it.

Certainly it would have been a grand and noble position for Catholics to take up, had they altogether refused, few in numbers and mostly of the poorest classes as they were, to look at Government aid, and maintained their own schools in efficiency and independence. This would have been both desirable and admirable—had it been practically possible. But this was more than doubtful. It implied a very great deal of courageous enterprise at the outset, and of enduring perseverance in an up-hill and most disheartening work. "Looking," says Bishop Ullathorne in reference to this subject, "only at the material part of the question, who will say that under existing circumstances the Catholic community is anything like as adequate to accomplish this without pecuniary aid from another source as with that aid?" (p. 11). Ecclesiastical superiors chose the least of two evils; and who will venture to blame them? They declined to commit themselves to a hazardous undertaking, in which success was problematical and failure would have been fatal. They knew what they had to fear and what they had to rely upon, and it cannot be doubted that they acted prudently and wisely in accepting Government inspection.

It is, however, important to remember that the system, as accepted by the Bishops, was not one which left out religion. On the contrary, religious instruction was required, and in the case of Church of England schools the children were examined in it, as in other subjects, by Her Majesty's Inspectors. But this could not be allowed in our schools, and the arrangement was therefore made that in their case, as also in that of some other denominations, the inspectors should not examine in religious knowledge, but the managers of the schools should certify that the religious instruction had been properly attended to, such certificate sufficing for the payment of the grant. The Poor School Committee Report for 1871 explains and enlarges on this point as necessary for the understanding of the subsequent change.

What we have especially here to note is, the attitude of the Government in respect to the union of religious with secular instruction. During the whole of this period (*i.e.*, from 1847 to 1871) this union was a condition of all grants, though the mode in which it was carried out differed in the various religious communities with which the Government had to deal.

In the Anglican Schools, indeed, the Privy Council determined, by the examination of the inspector in the schools, and by the questions given in its papers to teachers who wished to obtain the certificate, how much religious instruction it would require, and what should be its quality. But in Dissenting schools, as in Catholic, it left the religious community to determine both the amount and the quality of the religious instruction.

During all this period the Government repudiated practically, by giving it no grants, the notion of what has now come to be called secular education. It said, in fact, by its acts—there is no education without religion, but as you, with whom we have to deal, are at issue as to what religion is, we do not enter into your differences, but require of each of you to educate your child in religion as you understand it. It followed, of course, that the inspection was more thorough in the schools of the Established Church, as it embraced both religious and secular instruction, while in the case of the other two classes of schools just mentioned the religious community was more free, so much so, indeed, that it could neglect, if it chose, the religious instruction left to its care.—*Poor School Committee's Report for 1871*, p. 2.

This system continued till 1871; but it was felt that, however satisfactory it might be in its working with existing schools, it fell short of doing all that was wanted. Large numbers of children were still left unprovided for in districts where the schools were inefficient in quality or insufficient in quantity. Some system of national education was, it was argued, necessary. The chief obstacle was what was called the "religious

difficulty." A system that left out religious instruction would not be accepted by the nation, and, on the other hand, all felt it to be unreasonable to interfere with the right of parents to have children brought up in their own belief. At length, after a good deal of discussion and agitation, the Education Act was finally agreed to. The Poor School Committee Report for 1871 describes its provisions and the character of the system which it introduced.

The Act established a new mechanism—the School Board—in order to reach that portion of the population which the voluntary and denominational school had not touched. But it likewise recognised all that these schools had done, and proposed to continue to them the Parliamentary grant which for so many years they had been receiving (p. 7).

After enumerating the chief alterations in the conditions for obtaining grants in denominational schools, the Report goes on to explain the position of the State (represented by the Education Department) with regard to the Church, under the Act and the code which it sanctions and supports.

The idea of the old system was that there was no education without religion; the Act, without saying anything on the speculative truth, withdraws the State's supervision altogether from the subject of religion, and declares that it will make its grant for secular instruction only. We may here note two things. First, that the position thus taken up with regard to the various religious communities is simply neutral. It does not favour one more than another. It is the propagandist of none, the guardian of the freedom of all. For, secondly, with regard to religious instruction, this is put under a certain restriction of time, but under no restriction of quality. As to time, four hours continuously (?), two in the morning attendance, and two in the afternoon, are to be given to secular instruction. This constitutes that for which the State makes its grant; this is the subject-matter which it variously inspects, and pays according to its efficiency. But outside this time it permits religious instruction, and does not claim to interfere with its quality or with the use of the school-room. It by no means claims to impose the use of certain books; but only that religious instruction shall not be given during certain hours. And so far as history is taught at all in the secular instruction of the school, it does not require that the books used in the school should set forth particular views as to history. To do so would at once destroy its neutrality (p. 11).

Thus the Act of 1871 introduced a very important change in the Government system of education, inasmuch as (1) its action was no longer confined to inspecting and assisting voluntary and denominational schools, but it now went further, and provided for the enforced establishment of an adequate supply of "undenominational schools" throughout the country; and (2) the



Government, while still recognising the existence of religious instruction in denominational schools, ceased to provide or to inspect, or to pay for, such instruction. Secular instruction alone was what it would henceforth concern itself. Religious instruction might or might not be a part of the school course as the managers pleased, but for the future the Education Department washed its hands of all responsibility in this and made its regulations for efficient instruction in secular subjects only.

It was upon the passing of the Education Act, and in view of the changes introduced by it, that the excitement amongst Catholics, already alluded to, took place. The Archbishop of Westminster issued a pastoral in which he referred to it. Canon Oakeley put forth a pamphlet entitled "Education to be real must be Denominational," and subsequently wrote some letters in the *Tablet*, in which he argued that the new regulation, which must henceforth be accepted by all schools claiming grants, made it practically impossible to continue giving sound religious education in our schools. These and some other papers were commented on in the DUBLIN REVIEW in April, and again in July, 1872. The reviewer, after quoting a long passage from the pastoral, remarks that the Archbishop implies throughout that the recent legislation had not separated Catholic schools from the Catholic Church. He maintains, in opposition to Canon Oakeley, that the Church's authority is not removed from Catholic Government-aided schools, and that it is still quite possible, though somewhat more difficult, to maintain them as places of religious education. "The recent Act," it maintained, "had inflicted severe injury on Catholic schools which receive Government help; yet not such fatal injury, but that, by proportionally increased efforts, these might be made to continue *thoroughly Catholic* in spirit and in tendency."

This controversy, which then died away, has lately been revived in the pages of the *Tablet*. The question has been taken up by Mr. Ryley, who is plainly not representing himself only in the matter; in fact, he says that he has "sought correction and enlightenment amongst friends and acquaintances," and though he admits that his view "is not a general one," yet he feels supported in it both by the learning and ability of some who agree with him, and by the unsatisfactory character of the answer given by his opponents. However, he argues the question with all the power and pertinacity which belong to his character. Whatever can be said for his view of question is said by him. We cannot do better therefore than make him the representative of one side of the case, selecting from his letters the several points that go to make up his argument.

Yet, before stating his case it is necessary, in order to its being

understood, to call particular attention to the fact that the controversy in the late series of the DUBLIN REVIEW, though appealing to the same authorities and using the same arguments, is not directed to exactly the same question as the later controversy in the *Tablet*. We beg the reader's attention to this point, which is essential to avoid confusion. The Education Act recognises and deals with two essentially different classes of schools, though both are equally designated "Public Elementary Schools." The one class consists of the *Voluntary and Denominational Schools* that were in existence before the passing of the Education Act. The second class consists of schools created by the Act itself, through the agency of School Boards. These are designated "School Board Schools," or simply Board Schools, and are purely secular and undenominational. The latter owe their existence to this Act, while the first have an independent existence under their own managers, who are not, indeed, obliged to put them under Government inspection at all. They are not coerced by the Act, but they are materially affected by it, because it sets forth a "new code" of regulations in accordance with which all grants must now be made. And these regulations, though they do not make religious instruction impossible—indeed, they recognise it—yet confine it within certain limits and hamper it with troublesome regulations.

Now, the controversy that was raised in 1872 in the DUBLIN REVIEW was on the subject of *Catholic* Public Elementary Schools and on the regulations of the Education Act and the code as they affected the freedom of religious instruction, and it raised the question whether it was any longer possible, *if we applied for Government grants*, to give a real Catholic education in our schools. But the question lately discussed in the *Tablet* concerns the other class of schools,—the undenominational schools, created by the Act, and commonly called School Board Schools.\* And the two points raised by Mr. Ryley are these: Can Catholics conscientiously attend these schools; and can Catholics conscientiously sit on the School Board, which establish and manage those schools.

This last question depends somewhat on the first. For if

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\* Whilst I, he says, have been writing about "Board Schools" every one has been thinking about, and applying what I may have advanced against Board Schools, to what are ordinarily called "Catholic Mission Schools," or "our Poor Schools." Going to the Article in the DUBLIN REVIEW I find that Board Schools are not once named or alluded to in it, though its argument is applicable to them. The Article is an attempt to meet some difficulties raised by Canon Oakeley, and to allay his "misgivings" as a manager of a "Mission School" in receipt of the Government grant, and so subject, within somewhat indefinite limits, to Government control. (Oct. 12.)

Catholics can lawfully—*i.e.*, conscientiously—attend such schools, this would of itself seem to prove that Catholics may establish and manage them. But if such schools fall under the condemnation of the Church, in such a sense that no Catholic can conscientiously attend them, this would be a strong argument against a Catholic being able conscientiously to have anything to do with them.

Now Mr. Ryley's argument is that Catholics cannot lawfully—*i.e.*, conscientiously—come forward as administrators of School Boards, inasmuch as these Boards have for their object to set up schools of a kind that cannot be conscientiously frequented by Catholics.

I contend that these Board Schools are unlawful, in the proper sense of the word; and from their unlawfulness I infer that Catholics cannot overtly accept them nor still more administer them. (*Aug. 20.*)

His first point, therefore, is to show why they cannot be frequented by Catholics. For this purpose he takes the 47th and 48th condemned propositions of the Syllabus, which run as follows:—

The best constitution of civil society requires that popular schools which are open to children of every class . . . be exempted from all authority of the Church . . . and subjected to the absolute will of the civil and political authority [so as to be conducted] in accordance with the tenets of civil rulers, and the standard of the common opinions of the age. And the 48th condemned proposition is:—“That method of instructing youth can be approved by Catholic men, which is disjoined from the Catholic faith and the Church's power, and which regards exclusively, or at least principally, knowledge of the natural order alone, and the ends of civil life on earth.” (*Aug. 31.*)

2. His next authority, to show the affirmative teaching of the Holy See on this point, is the letter of the Holy Father to the Archbishop of Freiburg, *Quam non sine*, of 14th July, 1864. Of this he says:—

This letter was addressed to the Archbishop on the occasion of its having come to the knowledge of the Holy Father that certain ordinances were in preparation in the Grand Duchy of Baden, by which the education of youth was more and more removed from the salutary *magisterium* and vigilance of the Catholic Church, and the Holy Father highly praises the episcopal zeal, courage, and energy of the Archbishop in combating against whatever might in any way contract the free exercise of his episcopal ministry. “Certainly,” says the Holy Father, “no one can be ignorant that the most sad and deplorable condition into which the society of the day more and more lapses is derived from the so many grievous machinations which are directed towards removing daily more and more the most holy faith of Christ, religion, and its saving doctrine from public institutions and private families, and towards limiting and shackling its healthful vigour.”

Surely this is a picture by no means overdrawn of our own deplorable state. The Holy Father then points out how little astonishing it is that these machinations should be specially directed against public institutions for the education of youth, and declares "that thus human society is by degrees deprived of the true Christian spirit which alone can stably preserve the foundations of public order and tranquillity, and form and moderate the truly useful progress of civilisation, and set before men all those helps which are necessary for gaining the last end after their abode in this mortal life—that is to say, the attainment of eternal salvation. "And indeed (continues the Holy Father) a method of education which not only exclusively concerns itself with the science of natural things and the ends of social life in the world, but which departs from the truths revealed by God, must, in its wanderings, fall under subjection to the spirit of lying; and an education which forms, without the aid of Christian doctrine and moral discipline, the tender mind of youth, whose impressionable hearts are thus directed towards vice, cannot but bring forth a race which, moved only by depraved desires and its own judgment and impulses, will bring the greatest calamities as well on private families as on the State." And further on the Holy Father declares that "if this most pernicious method of teaching, disjoined from the Catholic faith and from the authority of the Church, is of the greatest detriment to individuals and to society when the question is of teaching literature and the severer studies, and to the education in schools and public institutions provided for the better circumstanced classes of society, who is there, the Holy Father asks, who does not see that far greater evils and injuries must flow from this method if applied to the schools for the people?" And the Holy Father further declares that every measure tending to separate these schools from the Church is of the greatest detriment to her, and to the schools themselves; and he says that "all those who falsely contend that the Church ought to abdicate or suspend her salutary moderating action towards these schools for the people really mean nothing else but that the Church should act against the commands of her Divine Author, and be wanting in the exercise of the most weighty duty, divinely committed to her, of caring for the salvation of all." In continuation, the Holy Father, in the plenitude of his apostolical authority, declares emphatically that "wherever, in whatever places or regions, the most pernicious project is either undertaken or perfected of expelling the authority of the Church from schools, and the young are unhappily exposed to injury in the matter of faith, then that the Church not only ought to strive with her utmost effort, and spare no pains that the young should have education and necessary Christian instruction, but is also under the obligation to warn all the faithful, and to declare to them that such schools, directed against the Catholic Church, can by no means in conscience be frequented."

3. He maintains with reference to this letter that it is "an Œcumenical utterance to which the authority of the Holy See attaches," "its *ex cathedra* character is universally admitted," and therefore its authority cannot be evaded.

4. He points out that the Brief, though addressed to a particular Bishop, lays down a universal rule, and that we cannot therefore plead that it is not addressed to us, "wherever, in whatever place." He calls attention to

The words of the letter of Pius IX. to the Archbishop of Freiburg importing the universality of the condemnation and the absence of any expressed or implied exception in the words declaring it to be the duty of the Church to warn the faithful that such schools can by no means in conscience be frequented. The ground of the condemnation is given—viz., the danger to faith and morals and the evils accruing to families and the State.

And again—

If the Pope forbids anything universally, it is for those who would limit the extent of the prohibition to prove any exception they may allege to exist. I find it difficult to conceive how a universal prohibition can be stretched, unless it be attempted to apply it to something outside the scope of the prohibition, which here is not pretended. (*Sept. 14.*)

5. He secures this last point, however, by insisting that Board Schools come precisely under the description of those condemned :

The class of schools of which the Holy Father speaks are those which are withdrawn from the *moderatrix auctoritas* and the *salutifera vis* of the Church. And he defines the description of education which he condemns as *sejuncta a Catholica fide, et ab Ecclesie potestate*. With respect to schools of this description provided for the education of the people, as distinguished from the better circumstanced classes, the Holy Father emphasises his condemnation by asking *ecquis non videt, multo graviora mala et damna ex hac methodo derivare, si eadem in populares inducatur scholas?* And he adds: *In eisdem scholis religiosa præsertim doctrina ita primarium in institutione et educatione locum habere, ac dominari debet, ut aliarum rerum cognitiones, quibus juvenus ibi imbuitur, veluti adventitiæ appareant.* So that what is condemned is not only a method of education independent of the authority of the Church, but one in which religious doctrine does not hold the first place, and does not so *dominate* that other subjects are to be considered as *accessory*. Can anything be more clear, express, and decisive, or more distinctly include Board Schools, in which not only *religiosa doctrina* not only does not hold the first place, but from which it is expressly excluded? (*Sept. 7.*)

6. He shuts the door against any attempt to *minimise* :

I am fully aware of the charitable ingenuity of theologians in such interpretations of declarations of the Holy See as will lighten the burdens laid on the consciences of the faithful. Within certain limits *minimisers* perform a useful and charitable function, which I have always thought is too much decried by the more zealous advocates of the authority, and interpreters of the utterances, of the Holy See. In the present

case I cannot see how the most extreme and even perverse ingenuity can take Board Schools outside the description of schools which the Holy Father condemns as dangerous to families and to the State. The Holy See is not devoid of the charity which I attribute to the minimising class of theological interpreters, and I can offend no one if I add that in the exercise of the supreme pastoral office it is wiser and more far-seeing. Our late Holy Father would certainly not have expressly charged the ecclesiastical authorities to warn the faithful that "wherever, in whatsoever places or countries" such schools were founded, they could not *in conscience* be frequented by the faithful unless he had meant all that he said. The notion that he has laid an unnecessary burden on the consciences of the faithful, or that exceptions existed of which he lost sight, seems to me undutiful and even revolting. I have no fear that such a pretence will be put forward. (*Sept. 7.*)

7. Further, this decision of the Holy See is only what the language of our Bishops and our own Catholic sense should have convinced us of:

If these documents had not reached them, yet the testimony of the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster that these schools banished Christianity from the schools of the kingdom, and would gradually starve out Christian voluntary schools (see Supplement to the *Tablet*, 29th June, 1878), or the denunciation of these schools by the Bishop of Nottingham as "infidel schools" would have been enough to hold such schools up to all Catholics as pestilent abominations. Even if these denunciatory opinions never reached the eye or ear of such Catholics as rejoice in or tolerate these schools, still I should have thought that unaided Catholic instinct would have revolted against the impious attempt of the Liberalistic sect to banish not only the Catholic faith, but all dogmatic teaching, from these schools; to deceive and corrupt the minds of the rising generation by exalting secular teaching as the one thing necessary, and to dishonour Almighty God by the express exclusion of the worship due to Him. Daniel was cast into a den of lions for transgressing a like law. He was under whatever obligation the State could impose not to worship God by prayer for thirty days. In Board Schools the prohibition only extends to a specified time each day. (*Aug. 10.*)

Mr. Ryley professed to desire that his difficulties and objections should be discussed and criticised. But there was little public notice taken of his able letters. The remarks made by the *Tablet*, in answer to him, were pointed and valuable; but the whole matter was soon suffered to drop, and this we think for a very sufficient reason, to which allusion will be made at the end of this Article.

First of all, however, it is necessary to answer Mr. Ryley's points, one by one.

The first need not be discussed. There is no difference of opinion as to the meaning of the 47th and 48th propositions of



the Syllabus. The point at issue is not, what is the best system, or that which Catholics are bound to aim at. The Church claims as part of her office to instruct the young and train them in the practice of religion. No system which does not provide for this can satisfy her just demands. The opposite principle is condemned by the two propositions of the Syllabus. There is no disagreement as to that which is most desirable in itself. But Catholics have it not everywhere in their power to set up what schools they please, or to lay down what shall be the educational system of the country in which they live. Here we are a small minority, and public opinion, which practically rules and overrules what is done, does not go along with us. Whatever it might be right or wise to do in the way of enforcing religious instruction in all schools, yet we cannot do as we please. We are none of us contravening the propositions of the Syllabus; but the matter is not in our hands. We cannot help ourselves.

But passing over the general question of what system of education is best in itself or can be approved by the Church, we have, it is contended, in the *Freiburg* Brief an infallible utterance binding Catholics what course they are to take under the very circumstances first described—viz., when the State takes this matter into its own hands and sets up secular schools of its own. Can Catholics have anything to do with such schools? Here are two questions—(1), Are we bound by the Brief? and (2), What is its meaning?

As to the first of these points there is again practically no question between Mr. Ryley and ourselves. No one has maintained, as far as we know, that the Brief is not an infallible utterance, and that we need not therefore mind what it says. To remind Catholics that they cannot evade the teaching of the Holy See is to imply that they want to do so. Although it may not be evident on the face of it that the Brief is an *ex cathedra* utterance, and its infallible character is not so universally admitted as Mr. Ryley seems to think, yet, on either hypothesis—to use the language of the reviewer of 1872—we quite recognise the duty of reverencing its authority and following its leading.

But what is the actual teaching of the Brief? Let us mark carefully what it says:—

Certainly, indeed, when, in whatever places and regions a most pernicious plan of this kind were undertaken or accomplished of expelling from schools the Church's authority, and when youths were miserably exposed to loss concerning the faith, then the Church not only would be bound (deberet) to attempt everything with intensest effort, and never spare any pains that the said youths should receive the necessary Christian instruction and education, but also would be compelled to admonish all the faithful, and declare to them that such schools being

adverse to the Catholic Church, could not in conscience be frequented.

Now let this passage be carefully marked. It is the only passage in the Brief which in any sense lays down a definite rule or command. The greater part of the document is extremely general. "The importance of the *Freiburg* Brief," said the DUBLIN REVIEW in commenting on Canon Oakeley's letter, "consists not in its laying down any rule which binds under all possible situations, but in its placing before Catholics the true ideal of popular education." The point of the controversy as to its bearing on Board Schools is contained in the passage just cited from it. It is admitted on all hands that the Brief contains a most important teaching as to what the Church holds in regard to schools. She claims the right, in every school, to teach religion without interference. She condemns all schools into which the civil power will not allow her to enter, or in which it presumes to hamper her action. There is no question among Catholics on these points. But the question—and a most weighty question it is—which we contend is not decided by the Brief is, can a Catholic child under any circumstances attend a school from which the Church is thus excluded? In England, in Belgium and in America, the Bishops, not without the consent of the Holy See, have practically answered the question, by permitting it to be done where there is no Catholic school and where there is no proximate danger to faith. We may be permitted to add, that common sense and common ethics would lead us to the same conclusion. But what does the Brief say? We contend that it says the very same thing. What schools are they which it declares "cannot in conscience be frequented?" Certain schools which the Church was to brand and condemn. And what are the notes of such schools which are to determine the Church to brand them? These notes are two; Mr. Ryley has only discussed one, and quite overlooked the other. The first is, that "the Church's authority is expelled" from such schools; and as to this we are quite agreed. The second is (we have *italicised* the passage in the citation from above), that children be exposed to dangers concerning the faith. These two "notes" being found in conjunction, the Church is to admonish the faithful that they must avoid such schools. In other words, when there is a "secularised" school, and when by frequenting that school there is danger to the children's faith, that school must be banned and branded. This is the decision of the *Freiburg* Brief. And its teaching is just what we might have expected. The Brief does not absolutely and *pro semper* (to use the technical phrase) forbid any Catholic child to frequent a secularised school; but it points out that when such schools are dangerous to the children's faith then they are to be avoided.

This consideration seems to dispose of the difficulty raised by the words of the Brief. We are far from saying that Board Schools may be frequented even when there is little or no danger to faith; this is a matter we are coming to presently. And it is also, undoubtedly, a question of pressing moment whether and how far there is proximate danger to faith in attendance at such schools. But it will be useful to have put the controversy on its proper ground.

Before proceeding further it may be useful to point out that the English Government, in establishing the Board Schools, has not, on the face of things, acted out of formal hostility to the Church. It has not made attendance at the Board School a "test" of orthodoxy, like a former Government did in regard to attendance at church. The Government, whatever we may say of individuals and their motives, have done what they could to respect the religious convictions of Catholics. We say they have done *what they could*—that is, what the state of political feeling allowed. Recent legislation began by a system of grants to denominational schools, in which religious instruction was a part of the school course. After many years' trial it was found that there still remained large numbers of children who were receiving no education. The provision of schools was in populous districts utterly inadequate, and where it was sufficient yet public feeling would not tolerate parents being compelled to send their children to a school of a different denomination from that to which they themselves belonged. The managers of the existing schools, and Catholic managers above all, would not hear of any Government interference in the matter of religious instruction. What then the Government did was to leave the existing denominational schools to receive as before those who would go to them, but to supplement these schools by a sufficient number of undenominational schools, so as to provide for all being educated, and to prevent any refusal to attend under the cloke of objection to the religious instruction. The number of schools in which religious instruction was a part of the school course was not lessened by the Act; indeed, a large addition to it was allowed, and both then and now Catholic parents, as well as those of other denominations, are free to choose the school to which they will send their children. There was nothing in the nature of this measure which proved it to be one directed against religion or the authority of the Church. What it did was this; seeing that the population was one of many religious denominations, it set up some schools in which the subject was left alone, making, however, some stringent regulations to protect "religious liberty," and to prevent any unfair attempts at proselytism. The English Government could not help this "godless" legislation; and,

quite apart from the question of the moral lawfulness of such an Act of Parliament, what we insist on is, that the Act was not dictated by formal hostility to the Church. This feature alone gives it a very different aspect before Catholic theology from that which is presented by the Bavarian legislation to which the *Freiburg* Brief relates.

Then let it be remembered that the State is quite within its rights in insisting on education in what are called "secular" subjects. The writer of the article in our number for April, 1872, says on this subject:—"Hardly a theologian can be named in these islands whose name carries with it so much weight as F. O'Reilly, and he, while strongly urging that the State is bound to provide for its subjects due secular instruction,\* does not hint at their being any usurpation involved *ipso facto* in the enforcement of such education." And the Archbishop of Westminster is quoted on this point:—

In putting forward this assertion of indefeasible parental rights, we are not denying to the State the right to protect itself from the dangers which arise from an uneducated population. If parents suffer their children to run wild, to grow up in ignorance and crime, the State has a right, full and sacred, to protect itself against the pestilence and the havoc of its criminal classes. It has a right to punish the parent for neglect of his natural duty, and to compel him to discharge it. Compulsory education, as a penalty on neglect, and a protection against social danger, is undeniably within the competence of the State.

This fair defence of the Government action is regarded by some as evidence of blindness to the plain purposes and design of the secularists. Are we so short-sighted as to put any confidence in the Act and Code and their administration by the Education Department? Can we not see to what it all leads? Are we Catholics so simple as not to perceive that it is the thin end of a scheme which will in the end thrust religion entirely out of our schools?

To this we reply, that we have no evidence to show the existence of a design of this sort on the part of the Government. If there is evidence of such a design it is a pity that it is not produced, in order that Catholics, being convinced of its reality, may unite in opposition to it. But it would seem that this is only surmise and suspicion, arising from the traditional distrust of meeting with fairplay in a country which so lately persecuted the Church. On this point Bishop Ullathorne says:

Reflections, not always carefully measured, are passed on those who,

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\* "Queries as to Irish Education," by Rev. F. O'Reilly, S.J., "The Month," of March, 1872, p. 195.

with the best motives, devote themselves to the cause of education, confiding in the Government system. Discussion is expedient; we cannot take our path so safely without its lights; but imputations are neither expedient nor helping to the common cause. Nor, whilst pointing out and even strongly insisting on the dangerous tendencies which lie hidden in the Government plans, is it necessary to attribute them as so many artful designs to their projectors: for this may often be untrue. And this is quite certain, that the system was not planned with reference to Catholics in particular.

Without the slightest doubt there are "dangerous tendencies in the Government plans;" and there always will be in those of any Government which excludes or ignores the Church. There is an influence at work, shaping the Acts and Codes which regulate modern education quite distinct from the spirit of Whig or Tory, of Conservative or of Radical. It is the spirit of secularism, indifferentism, agnosticism—by whatever barbarous name it may be called; and it requires no prophetic insight to understand whither it would carry us. Against this spirit the pastors of the Church have to be thoroughly on their guard at every step which legislation takes. But meanwhile it may be a lesser evil to accept, for the sake of incidental advantages, a system which modern legislation offers them, than to stand aloof altogether, and so perish of cold because they will not warm themselves at a dangerous fire.

Reverting, now, to the inquiry—Can Catholics conscientiously frequent a Board School, let us observe that this main question must be discussed under three very different suppositions.

There is, first, the case of Catholics who have schools of their own within reach, so that they are not in any way compelled to send their children to Board Schools, and could only wish to do so for the sake of supposed advantages as to secular instruction. Secondly, there is the case of the parents who have none but Board Schools within reach, and must forego secular instruction for their children altogether unless they send them to these schools. And thirdly, there is the case in which they have not only to suffer this privation, but even to undergo fine or imprisonment if they do not obey the law which compels them to send their children to some "efficient elementary school."

We will make some observations on each of these three cases.

As to the first, there is no need of recondite argument. The first principles of theology lay down the primary duty of taking care of the soul. The Catechism teaches that we are bound to take more care of it than of the body, and that it is a duty of parents to take care of their children's souls and to bring them up in the fear of God. Parents are bound to have their children instructed in religion. And as amongst ourselves that know-

ledge is ordinarily acquired at school, they cannot under ordinary circumstances conscientiously send their children to schools where their religious instruction will be neglected, having it in their power to send them to schools where it will be attended to. Again, parents are bound to guard the faith and morals of their children. They cannot, therefore, in conscience send them without cause to any schools in which they have reason to suppose that their faith or morals will be exposed to serious danger. There are cases which are not ordinary ones which will be presently adverted to; but under ordinary circumstances we suppose that a priest would feel bound to refuse absolution to a parent who persisted in sending his child to a school in which its spiritual good would be in these two ways neglected and exposed to danger. In the 1st Provincial Synod of Westminster, § VIII., those who have care of souls are directed to teach parents that God must be severely angry with those who for the sake of a temporal benefit "do not hesitate to send their children to uncatholic (acatholicas) schools with at least a danger of ruining their faith."

This danger is in various places spoken of as a grave one, and parents cannot knowingly and without cause expose their children to grave spiritual danger without incurring grave sin.

But the next case is not so clear, and it is upon this that the discussion mainly turns—Can a Catholic conscientiously send his child to a Board School if he has *no* Catholic school within reach, or none which offers him such an education as he may reasonably demand? Putting aside for the present the consideration of the law compelling him, what is his duty as a Christian parent? He is bound to guard his child's faith and morals, and to take care that he receives religious instruction, and he is also bound to provide him with such secular instruction as is to fit him for his position in life. If he cannot give or procure for him this secular education without grave and imminent danger to his spiritual good, he would, we contend, be bound to sacrifice the child's temporal to his spiritual good. But he would not, it would seem, be bound to do this simply from general fear that his child might take harm. To give up the duty of secular education he ought to have a clear view of such a danger, arising either from his own practical conviction or from the warnings of his superiors. Ordinarily the decision of his duty does not rest on his own view of the matter, but is practically decided for him by the known effects of a particular course of action or by a decision given by authority for general guidance. But a decision of that sort would have to be a clear and indubitable one, in order to its binding a man to act in a different way from what his own judgment and conscience would dictate.



Now it seems to us a consideration of great weight that no such decision has been come to by our own immediate ecclesiastical superiors. Mr. Ryley endeavours to prop up this part of the argument by quoting some words of M. Veuillot, a highly esteemed layman, as he designates him. He quotes also expressions taken from a pastoral of the Bishop of Nottingham, and from a speech of the Cardinal Archbishop in condemnation of schools in which secular instruction is given without religious—very strong expression, certainly; but falling short of a decision that Catholics cannot under any circumstances let their children frequent such schools; nor have we heard of any Bishop, still less all of them, making such a decision for the guidance of the faithful. Indeed, Mr. Ryley does not seem to think that such a decision has been made by our Bishops, but that it ought to be made, seeing that the *Freiburg* Brief has made the matter clear. But it may be contended that the Bishops' not having taken such a step is a reason for thinking that they did not think it clear.

We have already, however, argued that this is not the meaning of the Brief. We may add that such an interpretation is not in accordance with the action of the Holy See on some other similar occasions, and cannot therefore without very cogent proof be taken to be the true one. In early times the Christians were in very similar circumstances to our own, but it appears that they were allowed in Rome itself to frequent the Pagan schools for the sake of the secular instruction which they could not otherwise obtain; their religious education being attended to elsewhere, or at home. Nor must it be forgotten, as it often is, that there is nothing wrong in itself, and apart from circumstances of danger to faith or morals, in receiving secular instruction separately from religion. It is done in Catholic countries every day, without scruple or difficulty. No objection is felt, even by parents who desire before all things to bring up their children as good Catholics, in sending them out day by day for instruction in different subjects of secular learning.

But let us come to a case in our own times, and one in which the children could not but be exposed to some danger to their faith.

When Canon Oakeley argued in 1872 that Catholics could not attend schools from which the Church authority had been expelled, he was answered that Pius IX. had been specially consulted about a case nearer home than Freiburg—viz., the Irish National Schools, which are also removed from the Church's authority; and the Holy See upheld that, under existing circumstances, Catholics may be permitted conscientiously to attend them. And the writer remarks with great force: "What the Pope had

expressly sanctioned in one place, he could not intend by this Brief to declare unlawful in all places."

The *Tablet*, however, has brought forward an instrument still more decisive of the question, inasmuch as, though subsequent to the Freiburg Brief and referring to it, it yet speaks in a sense favourable to a wide interpretation of its meaning. It is "A circular of the Sacred College of Propaganda," addressed towards the end of 1875, to the Bishops of the United States, who had applied to the Holy See for directions with regard to Catholic children frequenting the public schools of that country. The circular, after quoting the words of Pius IX. in the above-named letter, goes on to say :—

Meantime it does not escape the notice of the Sacred College that sometimes the circumstances are such that Catholic parents can with a good conscience send their children to the "public schools." Only they must have sufficient reasons for doing so; it is to the conscience and to the judgment of the Bishop that it appertains to decide if such reasons exist in any given case. *Ordinarily it would be a sufficient reason if there is no Catholic school in the place, or if that which exists is not capable of giving to the children an education suitable and proper to their condition in life.* But in order that these "public schools" may be frequented without sin it must be made clear that the danger of perversion (which always exists more or less in that system) is not a proximate but a remote one. Consequently it must always be ascertained whether, in the particular schools which are in contemplation, the danger of perversion is so great that it cannot be overcome; whether, for example, things are taught there which are contrary to Catholic doctrine or to good morals, or which cannot be heard or done without hurt to the soul: for such a danger, it is evident, must be absolutely avoided, even at the cost of life.

The sentence we have italicised is deserving of particular attention, as the circular recognises the want of a "suitable" Catholic school as ordinarily a sufficient cause to justify Catholics in frequenting secular schools. Catholics in America are indeed placed in circumstances of similar difficulties to our own, and the question has been examined into and discussed by them more fully than amongst ourselves. Here is a citation from Father Konings's "Moral Theology," which is precisely to the point:—

Schola Catholica, licet optimum et ordinarium medium sit ad hunc finem obtinendum (sc. ad sufficienter Catholicæ institutioni parvulorum providendum) non est tamen *unicum*; ergo sub negatione absolutiōnis cogi nequeunt parentes ad hoc precise medium adhibendum, supposito quod ex unâ parte schola publica non sit proxime periculosa, ex alia vero quod filii vel per parentes ipsos, vel per alios, in doctrina Christiana sufficienter instruantur.

F. Konings, let us remark, defines schola *publica* (common,

public, national schools) in the exact words of the *Freiburg Letter*, "A Catholica fide et ecclesia potesta sejuncta."\*

There still remains the third case, on which a word will suffice. It is the case of those who being in places where there are no Catholic schools are compelled by law, enforced by punishment, to send their children to Board Schools. As the *Tablet* puts it: "Did Pius IX. mean that in a country where the State compels parents to send their children to school, and in places where there is no school but a secular school, Catholics cannot in conscience send their children to such a school, although provision be made for their religious instruction out of school hours?"

Now if the arguments adduced in regard to this second case are sufficient to do as much as to cast a reasonable doubt on the obligation of Catholics to abstain from sending their children to Board Schools, where by so doing they must forfeit for them all secular education, much more do such arguments become decisive when the question is of suffering pain and punishment as well. Nothing short of a distinct decision of the Holy See, interpreted and enforced by the local ecclesiastical authority, could make this a duty binding on the conscience. If there is any doubt about the question the ordinary principles of theology come in to release Catholics so placed from their difficulty. For *lex dubia non obligat*; no man is bound to subject himself to pains and penalties in order to fulfil an obligation of the existence of which he is not certain. Again, when the meaning or extent of a prohibition is doubtful it is fair and allowable to restrict it to its narrowest interpretation.

Having said thus much on the lawfulness of Catholic children frequenting Board Schools, there remains the question whether Catholics can conscientiously sit on the School Boards. The argument has been used that if it is not lawful for Catholic children to attend these schools, it cannot be lawful for Catholics to co-operate in establishing and maintaining them. But this does not follow. For School Boards have another function, that of compelling school attendance; and this school attendance may be, if the parents so elect, at denominational schools and not at Board Schools only, and Catholic members might take part in this portion of the work without mixing themselves up with the other. And they might take part even in the other, at least so far as to watch over the interests of the children who are sent to such schools on compulsion. They would fulfil a useful office if they made use of their position—a position in which they represent the interests of their constituents—to mitigate the dangers and difficulties to which

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\* His pamphlet, "*De absolute parentibus qui protem scholis publicis sen promiscuis instituendam tradunt, neganda necne*," has received the approbation of several American Bishops. (Boston, 1874.)

the children are exposed, and to reduce the effects of a measure, which they regard as unfair and mischievous, to the smallest possible dimensions. Then, too, they are the guardians of the public money, and may watch over its expenditure, and see that it is spent fairly and economically. All this even on the supposition that Catholic children may not attend such schools.

Father Konings (whom we have already quoted) has written on this question in America, and takes the same view of it. Speaking of the lawfulness of co-operating in the carrying on of such schools, he says :—

Nisi spes fundata adsit fore ut suo influxu eas (sc. scholas publicas) notabiliter minus damnosas reddant, curatores scholarum publicarum (he means School Board members) *quæ proxime periculosæ sunt* absolvi nequeunt; *cæterarum* vero per se absolutione indigni dici nequent, quin et *laude* digni sunt, si eo fine munus acceptent aut retineant ut libri et magistri, qui Catholicorum puerorum fidei aut moribus periculosi sunt, procul a schola habeantur.

There can, however, be no question whatever about the lawfulness of Catholics sitting on School Boards if, as we have contended, Catholic children may under certain circumstances lawfully frequent Board Schools. It becomes, therefore, entirely a question of policy. Is it in the interests of Catholic education that Catholics should belong to these Boards, and take part in their deliberations? There is no single answer to be given to this question. Its solution depends on the circumstances of each locality, which might make it possible to turn the position to good account in one case, and impossible in another. Yet as a general rule we venture to think that the good a Catholic can do on a School Board depends more on his practical acquaintance with school work than on any other single consideration. The School Boards have got a practical work before them, which is by no means an easy one, and in which, meantime, success is important. Any one, therefore, who unites to ordinary good sense a knowledge of the work, not in theory only, but because he has had personal encounter with its difficulties, is sure to be listened to. And the influence he will thus acquire at the Board will give him power to do much in mitigating the mischief of the system, and even turning it into an instrument of good. But the position of Catholics on School Boards is at best an awkward and anomalous one. Ordinarily they must be in a small minority, and unless they obtain a position which commands respect, their recommendations will be only set aside as those of persons who are theorists—unpractical and incompetent. In such circumstances their unpopular doctrines and ideas will probably become still more distasteful, and they will not be un-

likely to do fresh injury to the cause whose interests they desire to serve.

Thus far we have put together what has been urged, or may be urged, on an important question, without, however, any intention to lay down the law or to impose our interpretation on others. Our purpose has been not so much to decide the question as to elucidate it. It is, indeed, difficult always to avoid speaking too dogmatically in one's own sense. But while we disdain any intention to impose our view of the matter upon others, we may fairly call on those who differ from that view to do what we on our side are ready to do—viz., leave it to the judgment of our ecclesiastical superiors, to whom by their office and position it belongs. Without disrespect we are inclined to say in the language of a certain story, "What is the use of keeping Bishops at all" if you don't leave it to them to settle such questions as these? By their holy office they are appointed not only *sanctificare et consecrare*, but also *regere et gubernare*. What does this mean but that they are to interpret, administer, and enforce those theological laws and principles which it is the office of the supreme authority in the Church to determine and promulgate. It is no part of a true loyalty to the Holy See to skip over the heads of our more immediate superiors, as if they could not be quite trusted to act up to the spirit of the decrees delivered to them. So in ecclesiastical matters it is the Bishops who are to rule what is the practical bearing of an utterance of the Holy See and its applicability to our own case. So rules the Holy See itself. "It is to the conscience and judgment of the Bishop that it belongs to decide if such reasons exist in a given case." We should like to claim from Mr. Ryley and others who think with him some sympathy for some of us "who gravely doubted until ecclesiastical authority had given its judgment whether Catholics would act wisely in uniting their schools on any terms with the State,"\* but who nevertheless acted with loyal deference to that judgment when once it was given. The only way of practically recognising the responsible position of the Bishops is to accept *their* interpretation of what is *our* duty; and if *they* do not call on their subjects to make great sacrifices, or to resist to blood in maintaining a certain course, it is but reasonable to think that they know what they are about, and that it does not come from their lacking wisdom or zeal in protecting the spiritual interests of their subjects and maintaining the authority of the Holy See. We have already noticed the remarkable silence and want of response to Mr. Ryley's energetic appeal in the pages of the *Tablet*. May not this fairly be put down to its being felt

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\* DUBLIN REVIEW, July, 1878, p. 178.

that it belonged to the Bishops to interpret the teaching of the Holy See in its true spirit, and that if they did not enforce the provisions of a particular decree it was not from oversight, but because it did not really apply to our case.

We venture to go further, and suggest the principle which may have influenced the Bishops in acting as they have done in this question. The spirit that pervades moral theology and characterises the personal action of the Holy See itself is not one that takes delight in making things difficult in the practice of the Christian life, but making them easy. The spirit that animates the Holy See in its practical dealing with its subjects is pre-eminently one of gentleness, considerateness, tolerance, and moderation. It insists, indeed, on a full recognition of, and submission to, the right principle, but is ready to make every reasonable concession and allowance in practice. We seem to recognise in the considerate action of the Bishops in this question a more true representation of the spirit of Rome, than if they had, so to speak, pushed matters to extremity in their practical enforcement of principles.

But indeed those who would advocate carrying out every theological principle and decision of the Holy See to the letter, and under all circumstances, violate the first principles of moral theology itself. Moral theology is a practical science. A practical science is one in which principles have to be learnt, and also the way to apply principles in practice. In the study of astronomy, of practical mathematics, of law, of medicine, the rules and first principles must indeed be known and ever borne in mind as the guides to a true issue. Yet he is a mere theoriser, and will achieve no practical success, who has not also learned that in the use and application of those principles many abatements, and modifications, and adaptations must needs be made, and that that which is true in the abstract is only partially and incompletely true in life and practice. This is so eminently the case in moral theology that he is considered to have attained the highest distinction in it who best knows how to deal with those difficult cases in which principles seem to clash with principles. And this is done not by any means through giving up, or even derogating, from the laws of God or the decisions of the Church, but by guarding against too exclusive an attention to one aspect of the case, and viewing it in the light of all the theological principles that bear upon it in every direction.

We cannot do better than conclude with these words of the Bishop of Birmingham :—

It strikes me that some of the writers of numerous articles and letters on the subject have not gone into both sides of the questions they handle, and have consequently taken extreme views. Very useful no



doubt such extreme views are for arousing attention to the subject, but they are not of much avail for practical purposes (p. 1). Again at p. 10:—It is very well for certain writers to say that we can do everything and ought to do everything, and only want the will and the proper method. Those gentlemen are not in the thick of the work and feel not the rough pressure of its difficulties. Let them look round the entire compass of the facts, and through them. Let them put their shoulders fairly against the wheel, and feel for a few years the weight of the load and the steepness of the ascent, and they will have something to tell worth the listening. There is such a thing as being too hard at work to talk much, and then the talkers get the better of the workers. Not that I would not have them to talk, for it has its uses, but I would have them well to understand when they talk of men at their work.

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#### ART. VII.—ALCOHOL: ITS ACTION AND USES.

*The Contemporary Review* for November and December, 1878, and January, 1879. London: Strahan and Co.

THE numbers of the *Contemporary Review* to which I have referred at the head of this article, contain, as is well known to most readers of periodical literature, a series of papers by physicians of eminence on the action and uses of alcohol. The subject is one of such great present interest, that they appear to have attracted a considerable amount of attention, but it may be doubted whether the general reader has gained anything very definite from their perusal. Not only do they differ greatly in intrinsic merit, but they deal with such different aspects of a very wide question, and manifest such divergence of opinion on points of detail, that it may not be easy to discern the substantial agreement which exists between them. Indeed, if they suggest anything on first reading, it is rather to confirm the popular notion of the disagreements of doctors, than to suggest any practical rules for men's guidance.

I shall endeavour, in the following pages, to collect, not merely from these papers but from the very abundant medical literature on the subject, what is certain and established as to the action of alcohol, and the practical results of our knowledge of the subject.

And here I am met at the onset with a radical objection. One of the ablest of these essayists—Mr. Brudenell Carter—has expressed a very common feeling when he says that “the claims of chemistry and physiology, in the actual state of those branches of inquiry, to regulate our habits in conformity with their

fleeting hypotheses, are as ludicrous as anything that Swift imagined in the University of Laputa."

Now I could conceive that this objection might come from one who had not kept pace with the progress of these sciences; but it is difficult to understand how it can be raised by such an accomplished member of our profession—one who in this very article has shown that he is well aware of the substantial advance they have made of late years. No doubt, unfounded theories are every day put forward by the numerous students of physiology and chemistry, as will always be the case with any science which attracts many ardent workers. But through the whole, there has been a steady progress and deepening of one knowledge of the laws which regulate living beings; one hypothesis has succeeded another—*vere profectus, non mutatio*—because each has in turn been supplanted by one capable of explaining the increasing accumulation of facts. At any rate, in this particular case, there seems to be no need for Mr. Carter's caution. The latest teachings of science as to the action of alcohol are in perfect harmony with what has long been recognised by experience, and they are of great value in clearing away the mistaken theories of a former generation, which have been in their day most powerful for evil.

The first effect of alcohol, and the only one which can in any proper sense be called stimulant, is to irritate the nerves of the stomach: this excitement being conveyed to the nerve-centres, and resulting in dilatation of the blood-vessels in the brain, through which the blood flows more rapidly and more abundantly than usual. The activity of the brain is thus increased—its waste material being more quickly removed, and fresh food more freely supplied—and this gives rise to a feeling of increased vigour and animation. Any tolerably strong alcoholic drink will produce this effect, which differs in no way from that caused by such warm drinks as soup or coffee, by ginger, capsicum, and other irritants; these being sometimes applied (as in the case of snuff) to other nerves connected with the brain, but in all these causes the action is only a temporary one, the vessels that were dilated for a moment return to their ordinary size, and the circulation to its habitual rapidity; while the stimulant action of alcohol is speedily followed by its important and characteristic effects, of which I have now to speak.

These are due to its action upon the nervous tissues, of which it arrests and paralyses all the functions: in technical language it is an anæsthetic or narcotic, and by no means a stimulant. At first sight such a statement may appear absurdly paradoxical, so that men of science may well be excused for having been so slow to find a clue which was far from obvious.

It is indeed clear that the stupor and insensibility of a fit of

drunkenness prove that alcohol has a power to arrest the functions of the brain, which may even go so far as to kill ; and it is then as plainly a narcotic as chloroform or opium. But surely all the less grave symptoms even of intoxication seem to point the other way. The flushed cheek and flashing eye, the rapidity of movement and of speech ; nay, the flow of eloquence and thought, the joyful heart and freedom from anxiety and care, what do they imply but increased vigour and stimulation rather than loss of power ?

The solution of this difficulty, important enough in itself, has a farther interest, as a good example of the various and apparently opposite results which may be produced by the same cause acting upon such a complex machine as the nervous system.

Alcohol, then, as soon as it enters the blood, comes into contact with the nerve-tissue which surrounds the smaller arteries and veins and regulates their size. When this is numbed by the presence of alcohol it allows the muscular walls of the blood-vessels to relax, and the blood flows more quickly and abundantly through them. This is but a prolongation in another way of the stimulant action of alcohol which I have already described, and, like it, produces a sense of vigour and an increased rapidity of imagination. But this effect is not confined to the head, it extends to all the vessels of the body save those of the internal organs, which are governed by a nervous influence peculiar to themselves. The surface becomes flushed and the temperature rises a degree, or even more. Presently the benumbing influence spreads to the nerve-centres in the brain, which are the more easily influenced because in a state of momentarily heightened activity from increased supply of blood. The first points to be attacked are those highest in the scale of complexity, and therefore most easily thrown out of gear, which govern all the inferior parts of the nervous system and guide them to their ends by combining their various actions and arresting such as would be injurious or useless. The controlling influences of fear, shame, and the like are among the first to be lost, and to this more than to the increased activity of the brain the brilliancy, wit, and happiness of an after-dinner speech are due. At the same time the burden of care, which weighs down all the children of men, is for the moment lightened, for it is less keenly felt—and this is the most highly prized of all the boons of alcohol. That the seeming vigour of the mind is in this stage apparent and not real, is proved by the inaptitude to attend to any subject requiring earnest thought which co-exists with all this readiness and liveliness of speech. The higher nerve-centres which serve imagination and memory are incapable of combined and harmonious action, and their controlling influence being lessened the lower ones run on unchecked,

just as when the controlling influence of the brain over the heart is removed it exhausts itself in tumultuous and violent action.

The finer muscular actions of speaking, playing musical instruments, writing, &c., are affected—not that the movements are yet impossible, but that the perfect combination of many motions required for such purposes has been broken. The lips and tongue no longer move harmoniously together in speech, the touch is less perfect on the violin or piano, the gait becomes tottering and unsteady. I may be spared dwelling on the farther progress of intoxication when the poison spreads to the rest of the brain, and the victim lies in a stupor which is hardly to be distinguished from the gravest results of injury or disease. These are unhappily but too well known to us all, and every one will admit that *they* at least are the results of a narcotic and not of a stimulant.

Meanwhile, another considerable effect of alcohol is being worked out. It will be remembered that the surface of the body became warmer in the early stage of its action from the dilatation of the vessels, and more abundant supply of blood to them. Now, the animal heat is maintained by a balance struck between two opposite tendencies, the heat developed in the internal organs, and the cooling which the blood undergoes on the surface by its contact with the external air and by sweating. When the blood is collected in the internal organs (as under the influence of cold), the temperature rises, or is maintained, in spite of exposure; while if the “cooling area” be more abundantly supplied, the temperature falls. And this is what is found by observation to occur after alcohol has been taken. The momentary rise of temperature (which even then only applies to the surface of the body) is succeeded by a fall, which lasts for some hours, and is often greater than that observed in almost every other case of poisoning or disease—the late Dr. Woodman having often found the thermometer more than 8° below normal during alcoholic coma, even in persons who afterwards recover. The power of resisting cold is proportionately decreased, and many a poor wretch has died from exposure when under the influence of drink whose life would otherwise have been saved.

There is yet another way in which alcohol tends to lower the animal heat, and that is, by the chemical changes it undergoes in the body. This branch of my subject has been less fully cleared up; but the following general statements will be sufficient for the ordinary reader. There is evidence to prove that under exceptional circumstances of disease or deprivation of food, alcohol is capable of supplying all the needs of the body, and is then a true food. But ordinarily, this is not the case: the greater part of the spirit taken into the body passes out unchanged, and the remainder does not seem to be capable of such

perfect oxidation as would assist in maintaining the temperature, and supporting life. Yet it is greedy for oxygen, and contrives to divert a part of that which is being continually supplied through the blood, forming with it probably aldehyde and other compounds, which are then got rid of. This has the effect of diminishing the rate at which combustion is generally carried on; the amount of carbonic acid and urea produced are diminished, and in their place, fat and uric acid tend to accumulate: as a result of lessened tissue-change the temperature falls.

The more remote consequences of habitual and excessive indulgence in alcohol are due, partly to this disturbance of nutrition, partly to the continued effect upon the nervous system; but there is no need that I should go farther into these.

I shall venture to sum up shortly the principal results upon which I have been dwelling, before remarking upon the practical consequences of the teaching of physiology. It cannot be too often repeated, or too widely known, that (with the slight exception I have mentioned above) alcohol is not a stimulant, but a narcotic and a sedative. It does not increase the healthy activity of any organ of the body, although it may allow of disorderly action; but it depresses and lowers the normal rate of life. To say this, is not to condemn its use in health, still less in disease; but it is to supply an explanation of its reasonable employment. It was natural, perhaps inevitable, that the physicians of a former time should have looked upon it as a stimulant: but the error has had most pernicious consequences. The authority of medicine has not only been invoked as a cloke for indulgence; but, most lamentably, physicians were led to prescribe alcohol for delicate children and women, and so to lay the foundation of drunkenness with all its infinite misery.

When we have said that alcohol is a narcotic, we have found the true key to its extensive use. If a drug could be discovered which should be a real stimulant to the brain, it would be a *φάρμακον φόβου* such as Plato fabled, making men realise more vividly their miseries, and none would willingly taste it a second time. Like opium (and in a less degree, tobacco) alcohol helps to give a momentary respite from care, and its wide-spread use is a significant comment on the vanity of human life: when we add to this its evanescent stimulant effect, and the frequently pleasant taste of its compounds, we shall need no farther explanation of its value to men.

From what I have said of its action it will be seen that alcohol may be of service in three different ways—as a narcotic it may be powerful to check the restless activity of an over-worked or over-worried brain: and for this reason it will be always in requisition where the struggle for existence is keen.

And this (I may note in passing) seems to me the explanation of a point raised by Sir J. Paget, which has been thought a strong objection to total abstinence. He remarks that the Easterns, and those races which use alcohol sparingly or not at all, are far less vigorous mentally and bodily than those who take it more freely : and the statement is no doubt true of the present day, although in past history it is subject to so many exceptions that it loses much of its value. I should rather be disposed to say that although the craving for spirit is great among savages, it also distinctly follows, and does not precede, that high pressure and rapid pace which increase as civilisation advances :—men drink because they are civilised, and are not civilised because they drink. There is one very serious drawback to this action of alcohol. Its narcotic effect cannot be obtained without some lessening of the clearness and activity of thought : and this is certainly affected by a very moderate quantity of drink. I have questioned many persons who, having been always temperate, have become total abstainers, and have almost always been assured that they were conscious of an increased mental vigour and aptitude for work, and my own personal experience has been the same. Too little stress has been laid upon this advantage, which those who have to use their brains, and can live without alcohol, would be loth to forego.

Secondly, alcohol may be of service by lessening tissue-change : and this may be a very considerable gain when, from any cause, the waste of the body is excessive, or when sufficient food to maintain its repair cannot be purchased or digested. Total abstainers are often large eaters, and, when they fail, perhaps most frequently do so from being unable to digest the amount of food they seem to require. Here again the evil effects of drink lie close to its benefits, the varied mischiefs of gout, hepatic and renal disease, being due to the same cause which in moderation may be so useful.

Finally, alcohol is sometimes needed for its power of dilating the smaller blood-vessels. The most important examples of this kind of action are to be found in some forms of disease where the circulation is impeded, and where the sluices (so to speak) may be opened by alcohol, and relief given to the over-taxed heart. This is not the place to dwell upon these ; but in health the same effect is familiar to all in the power of spirit to counteract the results of cold, which (as I said above) contracts the vessels of the surface, and accumulates the blood in the internal organs. It may therefore often be suitably taken *after* exposure to cold, to restore the balance of the circulation : but in the face of the overwhelming evidence we possess that it lowers animal heat, it should be avoided before or during such exposure.



The chief practical rules which physicians have drawn from their experience agree thoroughly with these teachings of physiology. There seems to be a general consent, that any healthy adult, who can eat and digest sufficient food, and sleeps well, can usually become a total abstainer. He will probably find himself the more capable of hard work, and of enjoying life in the highest sense, for abstaining. When he fails, it will be most likely either because he cannot assimilate food enough, or because his occupation is one causing much worry or annoyance, which will therefore be relieved by a narcotic. When taken in such a case, the quantity should not exceed two or three glasses of sherry a day, or an equivalent amount of other liquors, and all, or nearly all, should be taken at one meal, so as to give time for the system to be rid of alcohol for some part of the twenty-four hours.

As to age, the old Greek rule would still be generally endorsed: fermented drinks should not be taken before eighteen, very sparingly between eighteen and thirty, and more readily as age advances. Sickly and delicate children, especially, are the worse for it, since it checks their appetite for food, and interferes with nutrition. For women there is more need for caution in its use than for men, as it aggravates the very *ἀμαχανία συνουκῆν ὠδίνων τε καὶ ἀφροσύνας*, which causes it to be more eagerly desired.

There are many persons in whom a very small amount of alcohol produces flushing, giddiness, headache, and other symptoms of nervous disturbance. These should be warned to shun it; and still more earnestly should those be cautioned, who have an unnatural craving for its narcotic effects, or who have been in the habit of taking it in excess, that their only safety is in total abstinence. And I may here remark, the old opinion which still lingers in the public mind, that an excessive quantity of alcohol should not be stopped at once, but "tapered off," is a pernicious error to which medicine now gives no countenance. The experiment is being daily tried on the largest scale in our gaols, where habitual drunkards are suddenly transformed into total abstainers, and never I believe with any bad results.

It will, I fear, be felt with some disappointment by the partisans or opponents of total abstinence that if I have said all that science has to teach on the subject, I have supplied neither side with any decisive arguments. But this would be beyond the physician's province quite as much as to decide whether and what penalties should be inflicted for drunkenness. It is for him only to give an account of that side of this great question which lies within his ken, and to this I have endeavoured to confine myself.

Yet it will be seen that any discussion of this subject must start from two points which I have already sufficiently dwelt upon, but which are of such importance that I venture to repeat them.

The first is, that alcohol whether for good or for harm does not exalt but depresses healthy action, is a sedative and not a stimulant.

The second is that every healthy person may with perfect safety at least make a trial of total abstinence. If then such an one, feeling that the demon of drink which possesses this land is only to be cast out by fasting as well as prayer, will not drink wine in which his brother is scandalised, medicine has this encouragement to offer him in his high resolve.

J. R. GASQUET.

#### ART. VIII.—THE MAP OF BRITISH INDIA.

1. *Modern India and the Indians.* By MONIER WILLIAMS, D.C.L. London: Trübner and Co. 1878.
2. *English Rule and Native Opinion in India.* By JAMES ROUTLEDGE. London: Trübner and Co. 1878.

MR. LOWE has come to the conclusion that the possession of India by this country is, at the best, of but little advantage.\*

Mr. Gladstone, rising higher than the low horizon of politics or political economy, informs us that our purpose in holding India is the welfare of India. "If this is not our first object we have no business there at all."† Had he said "duty" in place of "object," he would have been nearer to the truth, though farther off from a startling paradox. And paradox seems of late to have possessed an almost morbid attraction for the ex-Premier. Colonel Chesney, again, is so far of the earth, earthy, that in his reply to Mr. Lowe he takes no leaf out of Mr. Gladstone's book, but limits himself to statements which must commend themselves to the good sense of most Englishmen.

Considering the array of interests involved, of the army of officials, of the merchants, distributors, producers, and consumers, who gain a livelihood from, or whose convenience and prosperity are bound up with, our connection with India, it may be said that the effect on them, and by consequence on the people of this country generally of whom

\* *Fortnightly Review*, November, 1878.

† *The Nineteenth Century*, February, 1878, p. 226.

they form so considerable a part, of the loss of India, which Mr. Lowe regards as a matter of trifling importance, would really amount to a tremendous calamity, affecting every class of English society. For all this trade and all this field of employment would be sacrificed if we surrendered our possession of that country.\*

We shall see later on the full force of this reasoning, when our numbers in India and the position held by our countrymen there are under consideration.

Miss Florence Nightingale, in a very remarkable Paper contributed to *The Nineteenth Century* in August last, is much of Colonel Chesney's way of thinking.

We have taken, she says—

Their lands and their rule and their rulers into our charge for State reasons of our own. Nay, the hour is coming, and even now is, when for "State reasons" we are annexing, or preparing to annex, or to re-organise, or to "protect"—by whatever name we call it—huge and immeasurable territories because they lie between us and them (p. 193).

Mr. H. J. S. Cotton shuts his eyes to the past and to the far future. He makes no statements as to our object in obtaining India, nor inquiries about its ultimate service to us; but plainly sets down our one object at present. "The simple keeping of the peace must be the main object."† As a matter of fact we have possession of India, and, according to this high authority, it seems likely to occupy all our spare time to keep the peace there, and let all other interests look out for themselves. There is much plain truth in these short statements.

Such are a few of the many opinions entertained by recent writers upon India. They have reference, it is true, but to one question. Other and equally important questions have recently been raised, and received answers equally diverse. Yet questions and answers unmistakably point one way. They show the increasing interest taken in India; the craving on the part of all classes for further information as to every item of her social, political, religious, and military organisations; and, above all, the necessity for full enlightenment as to her state before committing ourselves to farther legislation for her welfare.

Encouraging as such signs are to all well-wishers of our mighty Eastern Empire, the warnings and lamentations of the friends of India are, to a certain extent, still true.

In allusion to the Report of the Commission upon the Deccan Riots, so frequently and aptly quoted by Miss Nightingale, with an anguish which she fails not to impart to her readers,

\* *The Nineteenth Century*, February, 1878, p. 236.

† "The Prospects of Moral Progress in India," *Fortnightly Review*, September, 1878.

she despairingly exclaims : " But none ask for the Report. No one Englishman in Parliament or press has asked for the result. There is not a single Member of Parliament who has called for it. We do not care for the people of India."\* So too, among many others, " An old Punjaabee," in the same bitterly sad and indignant strain, throws India, so to speak, in the face of his neglectful countrymen.

All deference [he writes only on last year] is due undoubtedly to an intelligent and well-educated public opinion, but, unfortunately, in regard to India, the public opinion in England is neither intelligent nor well-informed. We shall probably be well within the mark if we assume that there is not more than one in five hundred of educated Englishmen who has the remotest conception of what the North-West frontier is, of what nationality the tribes which inhabit it are composed, or of the policy pursued towards them ; and if England will not educate itself so far as to acquire some little knowledge of its most important possession, then the public opinion in England should not be taken into account.†

Unfortunately, public opinion will not be set aside in this off-hand but undeniably just fashion. It will exert its omnipotent influence over those whom it sends to rule over and legislate for India, and hence the crying necessity for its thorough education in reference to every important Indian topic.

Stronger still is the testimony of another—

As to the ignorance of India and its wants, which is nearly universal in this country, and even conspicuous in some of our most distinguished University men—our first-class men and wranglers, our professors and writers, our magistrates and legislators (happily, however, not in all)—I cannot do better than quote the words of Mr. Hurry-Chand Chintamon, who came from India to be present at the Congress of Orientalists held in London at the end of 1874. In my own experience among Englishmen, he says, I have formed no general indifference to India, but rather an eager desire for information. But I have found a Cimmerian darkness on the manners and habits of my countrymen, an almost poetical description of our customs, and a conception no less wild and startling than the vagaries of Mandeville or Marco Polo concerning our religion.‡

And again—

Even our ablest Indian statesmen have to confess ignorance about many things.§

Again—

It may be very true that the old ignorance and apathy of Parliament have passed away, and that the commencement of an Indian

\* *Nineteenth Century*, Aug., 1878, p. 212.

† "The Punjab North-West Frontier," by An Old Punjaabee, p. 121.

‡ "Modern India," by Monier Williams, p. 224.

§ *Ibid.*

debate no longer acts like a dinner-bell on hungry members. Yet I venture to assert . . . that urgent need exists for securing by early training a more solid foundation of correct knowledge on all Eastern subjects among all classes of the community; in other words, that the neglect of Oriental knowledge, as a department of education, calls for immediate attention at the hands of our educators.

Finally—

As to Indian history, all that can be said, I fear, is that the minds of most men are a perfect blank—a complete *tabula rasa*.\*

Nearly forty years before Macaulay, one of India's ablest and truest friends, had in his own marvellous style said much the same. He had contrasted the knowledge possessed by educated men of the history of the South American Continent conquered by foreigners, with the utter ignorance of Southern India, conquered by ourselves, and recorded his verdict against his countrymen in these stinging and reproachful words: "It might have been expected that every Englishman who takes any interest in any part of history would be curious to know how a handful of his countrymen, separated from their home by an immense ocean, subjugated, in the course of a few years, one of the greatest Empires in the world. Yet, unless we greatly err, this subject is, to most readers, not only insipid, but positively distasteful."†

"Who can say what it is that governs Indian trade? What European trade do we find in India? Are the mills an evil?"‡ "What is the attitude of the natives of India to our Government? Why are we (native Indians) treated as if in mental capacity and moral tone we were all inferior to Europeans? Why are we never allowed to rise to the highest executive appointments? Why are those of us who compete for the Civil Service forced to go to England for examination? . . . Why cannot justice be administered more cheaply and directly, and with fewer delays?"§

But, after all, it is clear that these and other earnest and able writers are speedily removing the ignorance of which they so justly complain, and are in themselves eminent witnesses to the gradual decay of the evil they deplore. And it will be my humble endeavour to follow in their footsteps, and from time to time to lay before the reader the results of inquiries upon the many-sided subject of India; above all, to present him in the end with as clear a conception as, after careful research,

\* "Modern India," p. 229. † Essay on Lord Clive.

‡ "English Rule in India," by J. Routledge, p. 196.

§ "Modern India," by Monier Williams, p. 85.

can well be arrived at, of the position and action of the Catholic Church among these vast populations.

What, then, are the questions which every intelligent and educated Englishman ought to be able to answer in regard to India? These are some of them—by no means all. What do we know of the simple geography of India? Are we aware and have we ever taken it into our account that “in India there are almost as many races, languages, and climates as in Europe; almost as much difference between provinces and presidencies as between Russia, England, and Spain?”\* That “India, which is in all respects a complete world in itself, seems to include all the climates of all countries?”† How are these several annexed kingdoms now governed? What is the physical, social, moral, educational, and religious condition of their several peoples? And as to border States—huge realms inevitably to be annexed at some not far in the future day—how do we as a nation and as rulers of India stand at present with them? Again, what do we know of the results of the Mutiny? What lessons have we learned from this gigantic and terrible uprising against our Sovereignty? Even from our own point of view, what have we done to prevent a recurrence of similar horrors? What effect has the transference of India from the old Company to the Crown had upon its people? And upon its civil and military administrators? Finally, what would our position be if any favourable opportunity, backed by foreign encouragement or religious fanaticism, should at any time, and as stealthily as in 1857, lead to another rebellion? These and many other such queries our English education ought, in consideration of the intimate connection between this country and India, to have brought long ago and frequently to our minds. Yet only within the last half-dozen years, in spite of the Mutiny, which passed off as a mere horrible episode, has public opinion been courted with reference to them. If this change for the better has arisen from the fact of the Crown now standing in place of the Company, the routine, red-tapeism, and centralisation, so loudly complained of by “old Indians,” are not, putting them at their worst, unmitigated evils.

At first sight, indeed, our ignorance would appear to be altogether unexplainable. For how few are the families among our nobility and gentry who have not, or have not had, near relatives serving in India in civil or military capacity?—to say nothing of the army of commercial men and their followers alluded to by Colonel Chesney, and whose existence comes out

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\* *The Nineteenth Century*, 1878, p. 194.

† “Modern India,” by Monier Williams, p. 113.



prominently in the Blue Book upon Statistics of British India. There we find that in 1877 the value of imported merchandise amounted to thirty-five millions of money, and of exported merchandise to sixty millions.\* Merchants, however, run mostly in their own groove, and for the most part attend to little beyond their special occupation. Sir John Kaye hits off the English trader in Calcutta in a perfectly true, if not altogether complimentary manner:—

Experienced in the ways of commerce, active, enterprising, intelligent, but with little knowledge of the native character save in its trading aspects, and little given to concern himself about intricate questions of Indian policy. The name of "Ditcher" had been given to him, as one who seldom or never passed beyond the boundary of the Mahratta ditch. The railway had done something to diminish this inclusiveness; but still many of the European residents of Calcutta knew little of the great world beyond, and were prone, therefore, to attach undue importance to the busy commercial capital in which they were buying and selling, and were holding their household gods. Their idea of India much resembled the Chinese map-maker's idea of the world. The City of Palaces, like the Celestial Empire, covered, in their minds, nearly the whole of the sheet.†

And the "City of Palaces" may be taken as a fair specimen of other cities.

As to military men, they are notoriously the least observant of travellers at all times. They have a society of their own, and go rarely much outside of it. And in India they have been, with their wives and families, so complete and distinct a body, that intercourse, save of the most necessary and ordinary kind, between them and the inhabitants, as distinguished from their native servants and private soldiers, has seldom existed. Besides, "the sojourn of English regiments is very uncertain, and often for a very brief period, so that the officers have no inducement to study the language, without a knowledge of which it is of course impossible to arrive at any just estimate of the character of the people."‡ Civil service officers far surpass military men in their knowledge of both the country and its people, and this was especially so under the Company's rule,§ as we shall notice later on. But even these laboured under the great disadvantage of being a dominant race ruling nations ever remarkable for secrecy and caution, and since their subjugation to us clinging to this habit with an almost fanatical fervour. And as to the effect of the knowledge—whether of soldiers, civil servants, merchants or others—upon their friends and relations at home, Colonel

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\* "Statistical Abstract relating to British India, from 1867-8 to 1877-8," pp. 53-64.

† "Sepoy War," vol. ii. p. 113. ‡ "The Punjab, &c.," p. 160. § *Ibid.*

Chesney puts the matter in a clear light, though in reference only to one of the chief characters, in his pleasing and instructive Indian novel, "*The Dilemma*"—(Vol. III. p. 31.)

Until of late they had maintained a fairly regular correspondence during his absence; but while his mother's letters were duly filled with all the gossip of Wiltonbury, whither she had moved on his father's death, about a set of people of whom he knew nothing, he had become sensible by degrees that the details of Indian life with which his own letters had been filled at first were not readily understood, and only created a simulated interest, and so gradually his letters had become briefer and more silent about himself, as well as more infrequent, and thus a sort of barrier of indifference had grown up between them, arising out of the want of common sympathies.

Again, of another he tells us:—

Cunningham did not possess the sort of literary power which alone could have enabled those unacquainted with the scenes among which it was spent to realise his mode of life; and under the feeling that his letters had no real interest for the reader when they passed beyond mere personal topics, his correspondence, though still affectionate, gradually became brief and infrequent.\*

These are true pictures evidently drawn from real life, and convey to us the state of mind of the majority of those few who have the literary power to write the result of their observations, if they had but encouragement from home to do so. But "we do not care for the people of India."

And should the reader doubt Miss Nightingale's impassioned verdict, let him run through the Honourable Miss Eden's letters. There he will find literary ability enough to grapple with every portion of the many-sided subject. But she seldom, if ever, gets below the surface of high-life daily occupations and amusements. First, because, like all her compatriots, she suffers from a home sickness which is incompatible with keen interest in India: "At the end of this whole year of India, it seems to me that I have lived with all of you and with nobody else."† Secondly, because she wrote to correspondents who were clearly all of the stamp under consideration, and she provided wares suitable to her market. Here are some of them: "The smallest possible quantity of fatigue is the grand aim of an Indian day."‡ "The moon is the only good thing I know in India."§ "It is an abominable place. I do not mean so much for us, who come for a short time and can have a fleet, or an army to take us anywhere for change of air if we have pains in our sides, but for people who earn their bread in India, and must starve if they give it up."|| "It is of vital importance

\* Vol. ii. p. 202.

† Vol. i. p. 316.

‡ Vol. i. p. 259.

§ P. 320.

|| Vol. ii. p. 104.

that we should feed our poor yellow Indian minds with constant amusement, so . . . . send off a box of the newest publications once in two months . . . . The more trash the better. We are essentially trashy by nature; write a good deal of trashiness superinduced by India; so only be liberal of any books—but those that concern India—and we shall not complain.”\* True, these letters date back as far as from 1835 to 1840, but if a change for the better has set in, it has only commenced during the past half-dozen years, and is by no means at present at its proper height. In 1842 the Marquis of Wellesley spoke of the general affairs of India as being “so little the study of British statesmen.”†

Out of many contributions to the growing interest in India, I have selected Mr. Routledge’s “English Rule and Native Opinion in India,” and “Modern India,” by Professor Monier Williams, as worthy of perusal. Both partake a little too much of the “Special Correspondent” style; both fall short of one’s reasonable expectations upon a great number of extremely important topics; but both do tell us something evidently learned by the writers of the real opinions held by natives upon many of the questions we enumerated above; and both descend to the low level of the common, if not universal, ignorance of their countrymen, and are not afraid to give information which, under other circumstances, would be positively impertinent. Both, too, were well-fitted to accomplish the end they had in view. Writing for those “who know nothing practically of India,”‡ Mr. Routledge approaches his work “not as a soldier, or a civil officer, or a missionary, or a merchant, but as a dispassionate observer, with many and various means for testing subjects from many sides.” For, “in mines, and mills, and shipyards, and arsenals, and schools, and literary institutions in all parts of the United Kingdom, I had striven to know, not merely the modes of teaching and working, but the habits of thought, where thought was great, and I believe, bravest in England” (p. 3). His researches in India were spread over the five years from 1870 to 1875, and were entered upon as editor of the *Friend of India*, and correspondent of the *Times*, and were continued as commissioner on behalf of the *Times*, to investigate to the fullest all particulars connected with the famine in Bengal. Professor Williams needs but to be introduced to any reader unacquainted with his numerous writings in the department of Oriental literature, in his own brief account of himself. “I was born in India, and have lived

\* Vol. i. p. 220.

† “The Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough,” p. 171.

‡ Preface.

as a child in India, and have been educated for India, and have read, thought, spoken, and dreamt of India all my life" (p. 29).

Mr. Drew Gay's recently published "*From Pall-Mall to the Punjaub*" is hardly the kind of book one would set before readers desirous of becoming well-informed upon subjects that lie beneath the surface. Though pleasant enough reading in its superficial way, it rises no higher than Miss Eden's level. Almost in her own words, and completely in her style, he winds up his account of our countrymen in the East: "To the English whose life is spent in India, the chief thought is how much pleasure may be best extracted from the life they are forced to lead" (p. 395).

Both Mr. Routledge and Professor Williams introduce us to India through its "Outer Portals" of France, Italy, and the Mediterranean, and its "Inner Portals" of Egypt and Aden, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean—"the courtyard of the kindred scenes and life of the still more distant East."\* And, so far as travellers are concerned, the Cape passage may be deemed a thing of the past. But, strange to say, in respect of merchandise, "from various causes the Cape vessels increase in number" (p. 196). Aden is unquestionably the Gibraltar of the Red Sea, and immeasurably increased in importance since the construction of the Suez Canal. And it is as impregnable as Gibraltar, the principal rock being much higher. Many writers style it the "Cinder Fortress;" and no wonder, for "the surrounding scenery is unequalled in ruggedness and sterility. . . . In fact, the whole place may be compared to a congeries of gigantic cinders or heaps of colossal coke."† Yet its position cannot be overrated. And Mr. Routledge is quite within bounds when he styles it, "the gateway to India, and the converging point of different streams of commerce from China, Australia, Japan and South Africa, as well as from all the ports of India." Hence the sharp determination of our Home Government to stand no trifling with this route, particularly at its more important points. As recently as 1874, when the "Cinder Fortress" was threatened by the too near approach of a Turkish force in Arabia, an immediate and stern mandate went forth from London to Constantinople, which would have been followed by instant warfare had not the invaders retired.

Equally strong evidence of the same fact [continues Mr. Routledge] was given earlier, when by an act of sharp practice, which at one time would have led to war, an English officer seized upon the Island of Perim in the very teeth of a French man-of-war, sent to make the seizure for France. Perim might have become a rival fortress to Aden, and it was not merely seized, but also held in defiance of all diplomacy by the British Government (p. 20).

\* "*English Rule*," p. 3.

† "*Modern India*," p. 25.

These are the sober facts. Professor Williams gives the popular story thus :—

A French captain was sent in a man-of-war about five-and-twenty years ago to take possession of the Island (Perim), and touched at Aden. Of course the English commandant was too polite not to ask him to dine, and too hospitable not to ply him with good wine till he had drunk enough to exemplify the old proverb *in vino veritas*, and let out the secret of his expedition. Instantly the English commandant, without leaving the dinner-table, gave private orders for despatching a gun-boat with six sappers and miners, and one engineer officer, who landed on the island, planted the British flag on the heights, and next day were ready to receive the French captain and welcome him to British soil.\*

The geography of India ought to be well known; but it certainly is not. Professor Williams goes to greater lengths than courtesy to the reader permits me to venture, as to the extent and profundity of this deplorable ignorance on the part of the great bulk of educated Englishmen (p. 228). But it is beyond a doubt that if one is to be understood in treating of Indian affairs, it is absolutely essential to begin with every department of them from the beginning. And what are our great map-makers doing? Literally, worse than nothing. I have before me Mr. Wyld's Map of India, with 1877 at its foot. As a matter of archæology, one might feel interested in discovering the precise date of its original construction. As a matter of geography, it has had to be abandoned straightway for others of less pretension and of an earlier acknowledged date than 1877. Of course the railways upon the pretender of 1877 have been superadded, together with a large amount of water-colour, ornamental it is true, but by no means indicating the latest changes in Indian geography. Hence, taken as a whole, it is better calculated to bewilder than to enlighten a student. It is impossible to ascertain from it the border lines even of the three great Presidencies. It is almost impossible to make the explanatory side-notes explain anything but a state of things that has in many particulars long passed away. Its independent states, its collectorates, its military stations, its civil stations, are all incompletely or incorrectly stated. As one instance out of many, it gives the total area of British India under British administration as five hundred and fifty-three thousand of square miles, with a population of thirty-three millions, and native states as covering over two millions of square miles with a population of one hundred and thirty-four millions; whereas the official Blue Book for 1876—the year before the acknowledged construction of this precious map!—sets down the former at over nine hundred thousand of square

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\* "Modern India," p. 23.

miles, with one hundred and ninety millions of inhabitants, and the latter at only five hundred and seventy-three thousand, with a population of forty-eight millions. I am not unaware that with many countries the print work of a map may last many years, and survive in accuracy even many revolutions. But the changes in India have been so enormous, and our opportunities of survey so much greater and so much more brought into requisition during the last twenty years, that it requires more than a readjustment of the water-colouring to form a really accurate and serviceable map. At any rate the colouring should be put on in such a way as to indicate something intelligible to the student desirous of learning the geography of India as it is instead of as it was. And the notes should be either omitted or brought up to the mark, in point of accuracy, of the present time, or, in view of Mr. Wyld's little foot-note, at least to 1877.

Now, as it is mainly by good maps that correct geographical knowledge is conveyed to the mind, so it is mainly by giving the great divisions of such a vast territory as India that a map can be esteemed to be worth having. And these divisions I will set about giving as accurately as possible, following neither Professor Williams nor his critic in the *Times* of June 14th, 1877, Mr. Trelawny Saunders,\* but the official "Statistical Abstract" already referred to, than which there cannot be higher or more accurate authority.

First, then, there is the Presidency of Bengal, with its own Governor, who is appointed by the Home Government, and corresponds directly with the Secretary for India.

Secondly, the Presidency of Madras, governed in a similar manner to that of Bombay. The Madras territory has undergone little change of late; that of Bombay has been increased by the addition of Sind.

Thirdly, the Presidency of Bengal. This Presidency in olden times was under the direct government of the Governor-General, or, in other words, the Governorship of the Bengal Presidency always carried with it the Governor-Generalship of the whole of British India. Owing, however, to the enormous increase of duty in connection with the Governor-Generalship, it has been found expedient to divide the Bengal Presidency, with sundry annexations, into six departments, each ruled by a Lieutenant-Governor or Chief Commissioner who corresponds directly, not with the Secretary of State for India, as do the Governors of Bombay and Madras, but with the Governor-General or Viceroy. These divisions are Bengal Proper; Assam; the North-western Provinces, including (since 1878) the late

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\* "Modern India," p. 115.



kingdom of Oudh ; the Punjaub ; the Central Provinces ; and British Burma.

Fourthly, a peculiar kind of Presidency yet without the name. This consists of nine Provinces situate in various parts of the Empire, and is under the administration of the Governor-General himself. These Provinces are not contiguous to each other, as are the several divisions of the other great departments ; but may be likened to so many islands surrounded by or adjacent to British territory. Originally, all were governed by native princes, controlled by the Governor-General's Presidents or Political Agents. At present, five only remain in this state—viz., Central India and Bundelkhand, Rajputana, Hyderabad, Baroda, and Munnipoor ; while the four others—Ajmere, Berar, Mysore, and Coorg—have fallen at least temporarily under direct British administration.

With the exception of the insignificant portion of territory included in the French and Portuguese settlements,\* these divisions exhaust the whole surface of India ; and the first duty of a map-maker is to represent them with extreme accuracy.

It must not, however, be supposed that the five states set down as governed by native princes are the only native states in India. In almost every quarter there are several. They are dotted all over the country. The sum total of them amounts to nearly five hundred. But none are of any great degree of power or importance, and so all, save those enumerated, have been allowed to remain under the control of the superior of the Presidency or province in which they happen to be situate. Insignificant, however, as they are in point of power, any account of India which did not take them into consideration would at least be incomplete, and any map which did not indicate them would fall, so far, short of perfection. They might be all non-existent for anything in Mr. Wyld's 1877 map to the contrary.

At the risk of proving tedious, I must have recourse again to the statistical abstract for a few more geographical facts, and then touch upon the character of the several races that inhabit British India. For the diversity of race, and the provinces or districts inhabited by each race, form elements in the account of the Empire which must not be overlooked.

Bombay Presidency has four great divisions. These are Deccan, Konkan, Guzerat, and Sind ; and each of these divisions is cut up into several districts. Intermingled with these

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\* Area of French possessions, 178 square miles ; population, 271,460 ; area of Portuguese possessions, 1086 square miles ; population 407,712. (Statistical Abstract, p. 15.) It is to be noted, however, that these possessions lie not all in one piece, but consist of small detached positions in each Presidency.

districts are about twenty native states, exclusive, of course, of any of the nine mentioned above as immediately under the Government of India. The four divisions contain about one hundred and twenty-one thousand square miles, or a territory nearly as large as England, Ireland, Scotland, and the islands in the British seas put together, but with a population of only half what these have, that is, only a little over sixteen millions. The native states range in size from seventy square miles to twenty thousand, with a population, all told, of nearly seven millions.

Madras is divided into twenty-one districts, containing over one hundred and thirty-three square miles, with a population of thirty-one millions. It has but five native states; and these cover less than ten thousand square miles, with a population of a little over three millions.

I have stated the requirements of No. I. of a good series of maps of British India. No. II. should give us Bombay with its divisions, districts, and native states; No. III. Madras with its districts and native states.

In the Presidency of Bengal—Bengal, or, as I have ventured for obvious reasons to style it, Bengal Proper, contains nine divisions, subdivided into forty-four districts, and five native states. Assam is divided into thirteen districts, and is wholly under direct British administration.

The North-Western Provinces had until recently seven divisions, with some thirty-five districts. Since last year Oudh, with its four great divisions and twelve districts, has been added to this province. In the North-Western Province there are but two native states, and neither of these is in Oudh.

The Punjab has ten divisions, thirty-five districts, and thirty-six native states.

The Central Provinces have four divisions, nineteen districts, and sixteen native states.

Finally, British Burma has three divisions and seventeen districts. It has no native states, but, curiously enough, a small territory of two hundred and seventy-three square miles "included in the census, but omitted in the re-arrangement of districts."

Our *good* series of maps ought to furnish one for *each* of these Provinces. And as one out of many instances of the care its framers should have to be *au fait* with the latest intelligence, the foot-note to three districts in the divisions of Pegu, British Burma—viz., Rangoon, Bassein, and Henzada—may be quoted. "The alterations in the area of these districts are due to the creation of a new one, named Thonkwa, in 1875." Or again, the note to Henzada alone: "In April, 1878, the Henzada district was divided into two, named Henzada and

Tharrawaddy."\* Or again: In 1874 Bhadraculum and Rakapiki, with an area of 885 square miles, were transferred from the Central Provinces to Madras.† Nor should it be forgotten that it is less than two years since Oudh was added to the North-Western Provinces, and Oudh is as large as England and Ireland put together, with a population of over eight millions.

As to the nine territories under the administration of the Governor-General, it would perhaps be over-exacting to ask for a map of each, but while the four under our direct control might form one map—viz., Ajmere, with its two districts; Herar, with six districts; Coorg, with six,‡ and Mysore with three divisions and eight districts; each of the native states might surely have a separate map to itself.

There are Central India and Bundelkhand with fourteen districts; Raiputana with nineteen; Hyderabad, Baroda, and Munnipoor. True that Munnipoor has but seven thousand five hundred square miles with a scant population of little over one hundred thousand, while Baroda has but four thousand square miles with a teeming population of two millions; yet Hyderabad and Central India with Bundelkhand are each as large as England and Ireland united, while Scotland would have to be added to make up a territory equal in extent to that of Rajputana alone. To sum up: it seems altogether impracticable to delineate the geography of British India in less than twelve or fourteen maps. It should also be borne in mind that many of the native states enumerated are less independent states than a batch of small communities living nominally under the head of their clan or tribe, though really under the eye of the nearest British resident. The Blue Book gives quite a sufficient number, with ascertained dimensions of territory and number of population, to appal the student and tax the energies of our map-maker to the very utmost; but there are three or four hundred unnamed in it, though probably comprised in others that are named. As it mentions some with territory of but eight and even four square miles, it probably does not exclude any that exist in the midst of one of our districts. But who is to teach us whether this is so or not?

Districts and divisions though absolutely essential to good government, to the administration of justice and to the collection of the revenue, have not much interest for the general student, whose geographical knowledge is *fixed*—if we may be allowed the use of an expressive Americanism—by the chief towns. A word or two, therefore, upon the towns of India.

\* Statistical Abstract, p. 13.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Why do the map-makers, with hardly an exception, omit this territory?

And it will be seen, as we advance, how much geographical and other knowledge follows in the wake of a just idea of these populous centres. To begin, then, with BOMBAY Presidency again. Its capital of the same name has all along been the Liverpool of India; but since the opening of the Suez Canal its importance has considerably increased; and its population is increasing far more rapidly than that of Calcutta—at present amounting to about six hundred and fifty thousand.

Here [says Mr. Routledge] is English life, strong, intellectual, and self-reliant; a Government house, a fort, military lines, law courts, a custom-house, colleges, markets of uncommon excellence, European residences skirting carriage drives open to the sea, jetties and wharves, churches and chapels, reading rooms and libraries, clubs, cotton and other mills—everything, in fact, of all that Englishmen have accustomed themselves to term necessities of civilised (meaning English) life. With an inland trade ever increasing, as the railway system is extended, and a direct communication with England by the Canal, Bombay has put forward substantial claims to become the capital of India. . . . Yet there is something in Bombay that is all its own, and which at least gives it an indisputable right to be called the "commercial capital of the East."

From Bombay start three of the four main Indian railway lines. One to the North, although a gap still remains to be filled up somewhere between Ahmedabad and Kurrachee; one through the centre of India, which meets the grand trunk line from Calcutta to the north at Allahabad; and one to Madras in the south-east, of which the Madras line to the very south of the Peninsula may be regarded as a continuation. There are, of course, many other branch and even main lines; but these three, when completed, will make Bombay a starting-point for most of the important districts in India. Besides the town of Bombay, there are Baroda, the capital of a native state under the Viceroy of India, a visit to which is amongst the most pleasing reminiscences of the Prince of Wales; Surat, with a population of one hundred and seven thousand—and which some two hundred years ago was our first and only Presidency; Ahmedabad, with nearly one hundred and twenty thousand; Kurrachee, with over fifty; and Hyderabad (not the Nizam's chief city), with over forty; thousand all these in (or shortly to be in) direct railway communication with Bombay to the south and the Punjaub, and subsequently Afghanistan, to the North. The Central India railway soon leaves the Bombay Presidency, which consists for the most part of a comparatively narrow strip, with the sea to the west, Beloochistan to the north, and Madras Presi-

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\* "English Rule in India," p. 21.

dency to the south, which last it joins at a point a little below the Portuguese Coast Settlement of Goa. About two hundred and fifty miles from Bombay a branch line leaves it for Nagpoor to the south, a chief town of the Central Provinces, traversing and leading up to the huge districts and extensive Sal and Teak forests visited and described by the late Captain J. Forsyth.\* Farther on another branch line strikes due north to the Ajmere Province, joining, or soon to join there, a branch line from the great Calcutta and the North Railway, connecting Ajmere with Delhi. The Bombay and Madras line runs through two other large towns of Bombay—viz., Poona, with about one hundred and twenty thousand inhabitants, and Sholapar, with over fifty thousand. Of Poona, Mr. Drew Gay tells us that it—

Is without doubt a lovely city. High up among the hills, some three thousand feet above the level of the sea, though actually on a wide plain or expanse of table-land, it is refreshed by brisk breezes, which greatly temper the heat of the sun. If the days are sultry the evenings are cool: even when the sun is highest there is shade under the wide-spreading trees which fill its gardens and overhang its roads. Its houses—I refer, of course, to those occupied by Europeans—are half-hidden by the foliage of plaitain, mango, fig, and tamarind. Beautiful shrubs with bright scarlet leaves, roses by thousands, and myriads of convolvuli are on every hand, and even the hedges of prickly pear lend their own wild grace to complete the scene.†

Railway communication has made it almost a suburb of the capital, wherein—

Wealthy Parsees from Bombay, well-paid civilians, strangers and sojourners though they may be in the land, will come up and build new houses, enclose new gardens, and decorate new bungalows, and the face of Poona where Englishmen live will alter continually. But Native Poona, the city that was captured by the English half a century ago, is the same for ever.

The Madras Presidency starts from a point, as has been said already, a little below Goa, skirting the native states of Hyderabad and the district of Orissa in the Province of Bengal Proper; of Berar to the north; with the sea on its small western and southern coasts, as well as on its extensive eastern side; and terminates at Ganjam. Its capital city is MADRAS, with a population of about four hundred thousand. Of the city itself we are told—

Palaces are everywhere, broad parks and sheltered walks have been added to what was already a grand city.‡ There was scarcely

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\* "The Highlands of Central India."

† "From Pall Mall to the Punjab," p. 73.

‡ Ibid., p. 150.

anything to show that we were not enjoying a summer day's retreat on the English coast. Between us and even the English houses and Government buildings for the most part, a wide promenade and spacious gardens extended. There were English children playing on the beach; English ships of war riding in the offing; the English flag was flying from the flagstaff of that famous old fort\* whence Clive was wont to sally; unmistakably English sailors were wandering along the shore; and the heat for the moment was scarcely more than that of an English July day.†

Mr. Drew Gay's description has rather too much of the *couleur de rose*, as might be expected, perhaps, from the circumstances under which it was made. On the other side Professor Monier Williams informs us that—

A situation more unsuited to a great capital can hardly be conceived. Madras has no harbour, and no navigable river, and the ships anchored in its roads are in constant danger of being driven ashore. . . . Its drainage—if any is possible where the ground is often below the sea level—is so bad that cholera is never absent. Indeed, so far as my experience goes, Madras is inferior to Bombay and Calcutta, not only in a sanitary point of view, but in nearly every other particular.‡

A third authority, while recognising the exposed nature of the so-called harbour of Madras—"There is no shelter; no chance but in meeting and breasting the storm"—argues hopefully for the future from the public spirit, energy, and widespread intelligence of the inhabitants. In topics of conversation, also, he observes—

A Madras drawing-room seemed to me to differ from the usual drawing-rooms of India; the conversation related more to permanent interests. . . . The Madras people argued the case of their harbour with great earnestness, and not as people there one day and removed the next. There was no good harbour, they said, from Comorin to Calcutta on the east coast of India, and none from Comorin to Cochin, where there was a natural harbour, on the west coast. They pointed to the fact that Madras was the centre of the telegraph system to China and Australia; and they asserted that if they had a harbour it would as certainly become also the centre of the China and Australia postal system—a not unreasonable assertion, when it is considered in relation to the fact that Madras and Bombay have a railway communication which can be made in about twenty-four hours, while from Bombay to Calcutta was about sixty-five hours.§

Under its present Governor, the Duke of Buckingham, the projected harbour has been commenced, and—

Untold sums of money are being thrown into the sea in the shape of huge blocks of concrete, each of them about twelve feet long by ten

\* St. George.

† "Modern 'India' p. 121.

‡ Ibid., p. 160.

§ "British Rule in India," p. 311.



feet in breadth, and eight feet in thickness, for the formation of a breakwater, which is to encircle the present pier with two projecting arms.\*

Madras has no railway to Calcutta, the directness of the sea-passage allowing this long link in the great iron circumference of our Indian territory to remain unforged for the present. But there is a good road on, or near, which are several busy towns, such as Nellore, with its thirty thousand inhabitants, Vizagapatam with a few more, and Vizianagram with over twenty thousand. To the left of the Bombay line as it enters the Madras Presidency there is Kurnool with over twenty-five thousand souls, and to the right Bellory with over fifty thousand. This was the region of the terrible famine of 1866-7. But the most noted towns lie to the south, on, or in not very distant connection with, the Madras and Trichinopoly, &c. continuation of the Bombay and Madras line. These are Vellore—the seat of one of the forerunners of the great Mutiny. Here, on July 10, 1806, were massacred by insurgent Sepoys, urged on by native civilians, who “aided the mutineers without sharing the danger,” fourteen officers and ninety-nine soldiers, mostly of the 69th British Regiment, while several officers and men were wounded—some of them mortally.† Retribution was not slow in overtaking the rebel city. Colonel Gillespie, with the 19th Dragoons and some native troops, hastened to its assault, and in a few days the work was done.‡ The population at present is about forty thousand. Following the railway in its south-western course, we leave its branch to run on past Coimbatore, with a population of thirty-five thousand, until it reaches the sea a little below the large town of Calicut, with its population of about fifty thousand. The main line, with Salem to the north-east, and its fifty thousand inhabitants, runs on to Trichinopoly, a city of seventy-six thousand souls, whence a branch through Tanjore, with over fifty thousand, meets the sea on the east coast at Nagapatam, a city also of fifty thousand inhabitants. The main line proceeds due south until it reaches the sea, passing through Madura, with its fifty thousand souls, and leaving Trivandram, the capital of the Travancore district and Cape Comorin, the Land’s End of India, to the south-west. As the Portuguese Settlements are all in Bombay, the French are, with one exception, in Madras, one on the west coast—Mahé, and three on the east—Tanaon, Pondicherry, and Karikal.

CALCUTTA being the capital of British India, as well as the

\* “Modern India,” p. 121.

† “Kaye’s Sepoy War,” p. 230.

‡ Ibid.

chief town of Bengal Proper, has special claims upon attention. It takes its name from the celebrated temple of the Goddess Kali. *Kataka* means a village. And until about 1700 Kali Kataka, or Calcutta, was a mere village close by the Hughli, where the first British factory was established about 1640. Fort William was erected about 1750, mainly for the protection of our merchants and traders from the black-mail levied by wandering armies and Maratta chiefs. Calcutta has now a population of about eight hundred thousand, and in spite of many disadvantages of position seems likely to continue to be the seat of our imperial power. Yet at one time its fate was trembling in the balance. Or, perhaps, to speak more precisely, its popularity as a metropolis has had its ups and downs. Lord Ellenborough styled it—"that most inconvenient place for carrying on the Government."\* The Duke of Wellington, however, thought otherwise, and records his opinion in a very plain but friendly letter, in reply to an assertion of his lordship's that "there is no understanding this country without seeing it. And I am convinced that if it were possible the Government should be carried on in a camp constantly in movement." Since the annexation of Oudh, the Punjaub and Sind, however, some of the Duke's arguments in favour of Calcutta are deprived of much of their weight. For these extensive acquisitions are all more easily reached from England *vid* Bombay. Moreover, the Suez Canal and the Bombay Railway accommodation bring them, and indeed the whole of India, within reach, as was never dreamed of in the days of this correspondence (1840-1845).

I am of opinion [he writes] that Fort William in Bengal is the proper seat of the Supreme Government in India. The provinces administered by the Government of Fort William afford more resources of all kinds than an accumulation of all the rest. They are unattackable by sea as well as by land. The communication with them by sea, however, is perfectly practicable at all seasons; more so than with either of the other two great Maritime Settlements. This is, then, the seat for Great Britain of the Local Government of India, the existence of which must depend upon the maritime preponderance of the Empire. . . . It is true the climate of Fort William is not in all seasons very agreeable, but I believe it is in no way unhealthy, if common care be taken; and there is now at the disposition of those whose duty requires their residence there the use of the sanatorium in the Himalayan mountains, to which the access will every day become more easy and expeditious in the progress of improvement. †

This prophecy has met with remarkable fulfilment, for the

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\* "Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough," p. 303.

† *Ibid.*, p. 303.

railway has now brought Simla (though twelve hundred miles distant) to the door of every well-to-do inhabitant of the metropolis. And in another sense is Calcutta's day of danger past. For, besides direct railway communication to the northern and along the north-eastern boundaries of our Empire, it is now all within three days' journey by rail right across the Peninsula from Bombay.

Under Mr. Routledge's guidance, let us make the round of Calcutta.\*

First, there is Fort William, which is its own mark, and one of the first objects that attracts the attention of a stranger. It has no grand elevation, but from its low-lying ramparts the heavy guns point at once to city and river, and command a great plain on the side of the sea. On the river are vessels of all nations. On shore, innumerable flat-topped palaces—the "city of palaces" is the ordinary name of Calcutta—with broad verandahs, and imposing carriage-drives, and porters (*durwars*) at the gates. Then there are the beautiful Eden gardens, reminding one of Lord Auckland's period of viceroyalty, with the regimental bands to enliven them at eventide. Also, not far from the European residences are the native hospitals and asylums, the native lunatic asylum standing in the midst of beautifully laid-out grounds, cultured and tended by an army of lunatic gardeners; and on the opposite side of the river is the European hospital. The waterworks and drainage are splendid achievements. Then there is the Mint and the great Survey Department; the Cheenee (China) Bazaar, and lower down the river the great West Indian coolie depôts. Close to these is an institution, the domain of the ex-King of Oudh, which ought to make every Englishman think over the responsibilities of such a stewardship as he exercises in India. This is Mr. Routledge's unadridged description of it:—

When the dominions of the King were transferred to the British Government, he was granted from the revenues of his kingdom a large pension, and was allowed to make for himself a little walled town on the banks of the Hooghly. The "Resident" at his Court in 1874 was Colonel Mowbray Thompson, who kindly went with me over the little "Kingdom." Without much trouble, it was quite possible to see how the ex-King could spend his allowance of 10,000*l.* a month, and an additional sum which he receives as rent from a bazaar outside, and still run into debt. He had 6000 subjects who would have fought at his orders; but only fifty, I believe, armed; a Court with all the gradations of rank, as in Oude; two married wives; thirty-nine unmarried wives, called *mahals*, and a hundred others, called *begums*. . . . He had living a family of thirty-one sons and twenty-five

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\* "English Rule in India," pp. 115 et seq.

daughters. He had three or four palaces, in which he spent his days and nights alternately, or at choice; and amid and around all was a menagerie said to be among the finest in the world. The reader may judge. There were 20,000 birds, beasts, and snakes—some in cages, some walking, some flying—in all manner of creeks and crevices and leafy bowers, around a tank or lake 300 feet long by 240 wide, and alive with every kind of fish that money could procure or art tempt to live on the banks of the Hooghly; 18,000 choice pigeons (the King's especial favourites, or dividing that honour with the snakes); pelicans and ostriches; swans, geese, and birds of many names, intermingled with dromedaries, ibis, sheep, and goats of a vast number of breeds. All these, amid the fine foliage and highly-cultivated grounds, formed a remarkable and beautiful scene.

Then there were the snakes, the ordinary kinds possessing to themselves a mountain, in shape like a dome, about thirty feet high, and perforated from top to bottom with holes, the snake retreats; the extraordinary ones—the cobras—kept safely indoors, to be produced when required. The possessors of the mountain, fed with frogs and other delicacies, prowled about, curled themselves up, basked in the sun, or retreated into the shade at will, subject only, like their master, to the law that they must keep within certain bounds, in their case represented by a small trench of water. The cobras, brought out and handled by a short grim man (hereditary to snakes), could hardly, perhaps, be matched for size and the appearance of deadly power. The servants gathered eagerly round to see the grim man wait his turn, and then seize upon cobra after cobra, as in fierce play. This is one of the King's greatest amusements. Some years ago his Majesty had a sore and touching trial. Several thousands of snakes on their way to his little kingdom were seized as dangerous by order of the British Government. Then the ex-King paints, writes songs which are sung by nautch-girls all over India; has dancing girls and musicians for each passing day; and, when the doors of his kingdom are closed at night, is beyond all dispute a monarch. His grounds employed 300 gardeners. His menagerie cost for food 500*l.* a month. What his ladies—wives, mahuls, begums, and others—cost, it would be highly improper even to surmise.\*

The author apologises for the length of his description by referring to the connection between these domains and some important chapters in the history of India. And I must do the same, for though this is not a history of British India, we have not yet finished with the ex-King of Oudh.

Returning to Fort William we come to the shops and hotels round the principal part of Calcutta, which is undoubtedly Government House. It must be acknowledged, however, that the Lieutenant-Governor's house at Belvedere, Alipore, is far superior to it in comfort and beauty of situation.

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\* "English Rule in India," p. 124.

Still the Governor-General is the Great Lord Sahib, and Government House, Calcutta, is the centre of greatness and supremacy in ruling power. For although, even in Calcutta, the power of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal is indisputable, still the Governor-General has a veto upon any of his decisions ; and so recently as in Lord Northbrook's viceroyalty this veto was sternly exercised. What Brighton is to London, Southport to Liverpool, and Blackpool to Manchester, although an inland town, Barrackpore was, until the steam-horse ran between the metropolis and Simlah, to Calcutta. For besides being, as its name implies (Barrack-pore or Barrack-town), a famous station for the troops whose main object consisted in keeping watch and ward over the capital, it was the favourite resort of the inhabitants in their moments of rest and leisure. True, its name ominously occurs in connection with Mutiny, but the Barrackpore Mutiny was in 1824. From Miss Eden's letters it seems that forty years ago the Governor-General and suite spent half their time "in the country" at their Barrackpore retreat, "a charming place, like a beautiful English villa on the banks of the Thames—so green and fresh. . . . The rest of the party all sleep in thatched cottages built in the park."\* "I never saw the place look prettier. The river comes nearly up to the house at this time of the year (July), and makes that poor little snivelling Thames look like a miserable dirty drop of a thing."† In those days, as has been noticed, there was no railway to Simla ; Nynsee Tal, "the smallest of all the mountain stations to which Indians escape from the heat of the sun," was not "within twelve hours' ride by rail," in fact had not sprung into a fashionable resort ; Mussoorie was equally unknown.

Leaving British Burmah to the south-east, with its large towns of Rangoon with one hundred thousand inhabitants, Moulmein with nearly fifty thousand, and Prome with over thirty thousand ; and the Bengal cities of Dacca with its seventy thousand souls, and Moorshedabad with nearly fifty thousand, to the north-east, the student must keep his eye well upon the River Ganges and the Calcutta and Lahore Railway. These pass through or near most of the great remaining cities of the Empire ; and many of these cities have stirring histories in connection with the last great Mutiny. There is Patna with its hundred and sixty thousand inhabitants, like Calcutta and Bengal, the sacred city of Benares with one hundred and seventy-five thousand, Allahabad, fast becoming the grand military centre of India, with one hundred and

\* Vol. i. p. 98.

† Ibid., p. 202.

forty-three thousand, Cawnpore with one hundred and twenty-two thousand, and Agra with one hundred and fifty thousand, all in the North-Western Provinces. Lucknow with two hundred and eighty-four thousand in Oudh; Delhi with one hundred and fifty-four thousand, Amritsar with one hundred and thirty-three thousand, and Lahore with nearly one hundred thousand, in the Punjab, which adjoins Sind, the northern division of Bombay. By following these great towns and noting well their positions, one becomes far better able to find his way about the map of India. And those enumerated have been selected partly from their falling fairly in with our geographical tour through the outlying borders—as opposed to the central portions; partly from their individual importance, for, as is clear from the number of their inhabitants, they are the Birminghams, the Sheffields, the Yorks of India—Calcutta being its London, Bombay its Liverpool, Madras its Manchester; and partly because the great flow of trade, like the rivers and the railways, are in the course indicated. No doubt there are large and important inland towns, such as Bangalore, in Mysore, with its hundred and forty-two thousand inhabitants; Jubbulpore, Nagpore, Kamthi, and others in the Central Provinces, but the majority of the large centres of military, political, and commercial business are not, comparatively speaking, far away from the direction in which a well-informed Government has carried India's iron roads.

Doubtless there is an appearance of tedious wandering in these details. But I venture to submit that they will not be found tedious to the earnest student of India. And for several reasons it has been deemed more advisable in this attempt to bring India home to the reader in many aspects, to keep going the round from the Bombay Presidency to that of Madras, from Madras to Bengal, and leaving British Burmah and Assam to the south-east and north-east, from Bengal through the North-Western Provinces to the Punjab, thus encircling the Central Provinces and some of the great native States—the road of the great railway belt, than to exhaust each individual Presidency or Province at once. There are inconveniences in either plan; but one great advantage in the former is that the geography of India, so much neglected by most, so utterly unknown to many, must necessarily force its way by dint of repetition into the mind.

E.



## ART. IX.—THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

1. *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century.* By Leslie Stephen. In Two Volumes. London, 1876.
2. *History of England in the Eighteenth Century.* By William Edward Hartpole Lecky. Vols. I. and II. London, 1878.
3. *Geschichte des 18en u. 19en Jahrhunderts.* Von F. C. Schlosser. 7 Vols. Heidelberg, 1836-49.
4. *La Femme au Dix Huitième Siècle.* Par Edmond et Jules de Goncourt. Paris, 1862.

THE eighteenth century is, in some respects, the most difficult period in modern history to estimate truly. In the first place, it is almost impossible for us to contemplate it with that measure of impartiality which we may with more reason hope to command in surveying a remoter epoch. The task of writing of it is, indeed,

Periculose plenum opus alæ.

The fires, which were working below the surface of events throughout it, to burst forth at last in the volcanic flames and lava torrents of that world earthquake, the French Revolution, are still smouldering beneath the thinnest crust of treacherous ashes. The blood which was shed in that great convulsion yet stains the instruments of death, and cries for expiation; the grave questions then debated with such terrible earnestness are still unsettled, for the settlement imposed upon the world by the fatal league of Princes, in the interests of their own selfish ambition, has proved utterly hollow and illusory. Yet, living and working in the present, as this eighteenth century still is in one sense, in another it is quite gone from us. Its tone, its temper, its tastes, its political organisation, and its social order, have utterly passed away; no man may bring them back; for all things serve their time. The French Revolution, as one of the clearest heads contemporary with it saw, was "a great crisis—the most astonishing that had hitherto happened in the world's history,"\* and, as a distinguished thinker of our own day has expressed it, "an incident in a great change in man himself, in his beliefs, in his principles of conduct, and therefore in the outward arrangements of society."† Between us and our ancestors of a hundred years ago there is a great gulf fixed. And if we attempt to look across it, and to take a general view of the last century, the scene which meets us is one which may well dazzle and confuse the steadiest vision. Consider the

\* Burke's "Reflections on the Revolution in France."

† J. S. Mill's "Dissertations and Discussions," Vol I., p. 57.

events, the persons that crowd the annals of that brief space of the world's history: the old Bourbon Monarchy slowly rotting away in France; the new Hohenzollern kingdom spreading its roots and extending its branches in Germany; the Hanoverian family gradually becoming acclimatised among ourselves, and firmly settled on the British throne; Poland blotted from the map of Europe; the Holy Roman Empire dwindled to the "shadow of a great name," "phantasmal, not to say ghastly;"\* Marlborough and Eugene; that singular Protestant hero, Frederick the Great; and that equally singular paladin of the French hosts, Maurice de Saxe; Newton and Halley, Pope and Bolingbroke, Swift and Addison, Johnson and Burke, Bossuet and Fénelon, Voltaire and Rousseau, and the whole tribe of the encyclopædists, Jansenism and Methodism, Clive and a nascent Indian Empire, Arkwright and the spinning-wheel, Watt and the steam-engine, the coal and iron mines, and all the new industries which were to transform the North of England, not to speak of

"Puffs, powders, patches, Bibles, billets-doux"—

such is the "mighty maze" which rises before the mind's eye. It is a chaos of facts. Is there any light of philosophy potent to evolve order from them, to enable us to trace principles through and in them?—nay, to deduce practical lessons from them? Is there any art or science applicable to the records of the past? It is a question of grave importance, which can be only touched upon here in the briefest way. There are those who answer it with an emphatic negative, who tell us that history is nothing more than a meaningless chronicle of bygone events, a series of disconnected phenomena, reducible to no rule, and to be judged by no principle; or, at the utmost, a series of pictures, appealing, more or less strongly, to the imagination, and presenting, indeed, matter for reflection, but of no scientific value. This view of history was taken, I believe without exception, by the French *philosophes* of the last century; and it is reproduced in the present day by many estimable persons, who are very far removed from their principles. On the other hand, schools have arisen of late years which claim to have reduced history to an exact science. Thus, Hegel professes to assign, as its great law, the attainment of self-consciousness by the Absolute, through self-explanation; while M. Comte and Mr. Buckle teach us that the solution of its deepest problems is to be found in the successive movements of the human intellect, exhibited primarily in the conquest of man over external nature. I can do little more here than express an emphatic dissent from both these views. Both of them involve the old Epicurean negative of the Divine government of the world, and overthrow the

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\* Carlyle's "Frederick the Great," Book XII., chap. xi.

moral responsibility of man. I believe that history is not a mere empty tale of sound and fury. I believe it has a signification for us, and may, in a true sense, be said to be a revelation. But I do not think that "the objective embodiment of the subjective element in man" is a sufficient account of what it reveals. Still more deplorably erroneous, as it appears to me, is it to assert that the advance of physical science, the conquest of external nature, is the first constituent element in the progress of our race, or that the key to unlock the secrets of the past and the hopes of the future is to be found in the laws of matter, and in what, with an ever-increasing vagueness of meaning, is called "political economy." To those who hold that the first and most momentous fact about man is his possession of the ideas of God and the soul, right and wrong, truth and falsehood, and who remain unconvinced that these ideas are the result of climatic influences or "the product of the smaller intestines," the order of the external universe is quite inadequate to explain the past career and future destinies of our race. To them art and literature are more vitally important subjects of inquiry than commerce or manufactures; what the generations of men thought and believed and worshipped and hoped for, than what they ate or drank, or where-withal they were clothed. It is entirely a question of first principles. If man is nothing more than "an animal endowed with a memory of appearances and faces," and thought is but "the result of the concurrent action of many particles of matter," then the supersensual view of human history is foolish sentiment. But it is the simplest common sense if man is something more, and that something divine. And here I may observe how pregnant with mischief is the vague use of the word "law," now so popular among us. Sir Isaac Newton has, I think, somewhere a remark to the effect that the expression "laws of nature" is fallacious; that the so called "laws" of the physical sciences are in truth only formulæ which help the student to express a sequence of facts. The same may be said, and with greater reason, of the science of history, a science which nothing but the madness of doctrinairism could ever reckon among the exact. That science may be said to consist of two branches: the chronicle of events, and the investigation of causes. In the first place, we have to ascertain the facts, and then to arrange them, to consider their mutual relations and comparative significance. For concrete facts are but the vesture of abstract ideas; transitory phenomena the expression of eternal principles. Of all facts, indeed, our knowledge is imperfect; and the two prime factors in human history are shrouded in mystery. We know that there is a Divine Governor of the world; and we know that He, while

Binding Nature fast in Fate,  
Left free the Human Will.

But what are the limits where the Divine government and the freedom of man's will meet we know not, and no search can make us know. This mark of imperfection is not, however, peculiar to the historical science. It is impressed (the observation would seem to need apology as a mere truism) upon all the sciences, in greater or less measure; even upon the lowest of all, the physical, with which, as is natural, our acquaintance is greatest and most precise. And, if it is impossible for us to attain to more than a very partial and imperfect knowledge of the external facts of the history of humanity, and of the forces of which those facts are the expression, it by no means follows that such knowledge is valueless. In every department of human life we know only in part, and such knowledge is enough for the conduct of life. So in the historical province, I feel convinced, we may arrive at such a knowledge of what past generations of men did, and why they did it, as, to quote a remark of Mr. Mill's, though "quite insufficient for prediction," will be "most valuable for guidance." But the "why" is far more important than the "what." The deepest, the truest, and incomparably the most momentous, portion of the history of human society is not the chronicle whether of wars or diplomacies, or of mechanical inventions, or of physical discoveries, but the account of the ideas which have dominated in the mind of man. This has been expressed by Lamennais with a force and power peculiarly his own, in a passage at the beginning of his great work, "*Tout sort des doctrines*," he writes: "*les mœurs, la littérature, les constitutions, les lois, la félicité des États et leurs désastres, la civilisation, la barbarie, et ces crises effrayantes qui emportent les peuples, et qui les renouvellent, selon qu'il reste en eux plus ou moins de vie. L'homme n'agit que parcequ'il croit, et les hommes en masse agissent toujours conformément à ce qu'ils croient, parceque les passions de la multitude sont elles mêmes déterminées par ses croyances.*"\* Yes; "*tout sort des doctrines: l'homme n'agit que parcequ'il croit.*" Faith, although it be faith in a negation, is at the bottom of all action. The exterior phenomena of history are but the expression of the thoughts which swayed the minds and hearts of men. Not, indeed, that the generality of men are consciously affected by the doctrines current in their times, for, as Swift has said truly enough, the vast majority of the human race are as capable of flying as they are of thinking, but that they "passively take the print" of their age, and are as much under the sway of its ideas as of its language and habits of life; as much or more. The intellectual atmosphere which surrounds them is as truly part of their lives as the physical. Nor—to speak of my immediate subject—is any true conception of the meaning of the history of the last century possible unless

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\* "*Essai sur l'Indifférence*," t. i., c. 1.

we can grasp its dominant ideas and view its transactions in the light of them.

So much may serve to indicate the spirit in which I approach the history of the eighteenth century. I regard that century as the closing years of a period in the history of Europe: as the years in which the ideas animating that period are to be seen in their ultimate development and final resolution. I speak of the period which began with the movement known, according as one or another of its aspects is contemplated, as the Protestant Reformation, the Revival of Letters, the Rise of the New Monarchy, and which ended with the French Revolution—a period which may, with much propriety, be designated the Renaissance Epoch. For this movement was essentially a rebirth, and that which was reborn was Materialism. In every department of human life this character is written upon it. It may have been, it doubtless was, much else. But this is its very form; and I am not here concerned with its accidents. Thus, in religion it is a denial, partial, indeed, and incipient, of the supernatural order, the city of God tabernacling among men, together with the Infallible Chair, whose very mission and *raison d'être* it is to bear witness of that order and to rule in that city. In this supreme place it installs the private judgment of the individual, thus stripping truth of that objective character which necessarily depends upon an authoritative teacher, “for there can be no combination on the basis of truth without an organ of truth;”\* the issue being to throw men back upon the senses as the only criteria of truth, all of which they cannot judge, being as the phrase is, mere “matter of opinion.” It is this in religion. In the political order it is, to use a phrase of Heine’s, a rebirth of that “brutal dominion of Imperial Roman Materialism,” against which, as he reckons, Spiritualistic Christianity was originally a reaction†; its new Monarchy is in substance a reproduction of old Cæsarism. And, if it were necessary, or the occasion allowed, I might go on to tell how in other provinces of man’s activity it was the same; how the arts of design lost their old supersensual inspiration, and were no longer vehicles for the manifestation of spiritual beauty, but, as in the ancient classical times, became restricted to the types presented by mere humanity and the visible world; how a like fate overtook poetry and every other branch of literature. But it is enough for my present purpose to dwell upon two points. The Christian Church is both an Empire and a Philosophy. But her rule and her doctrine, though in the world are not of the world. They both rest upon a supernatural foundation. Upon that foundation she had reared the edifice

\* J. H. Newman “On the Development of Christian Doctrine,” p. 138. Second edition.

† “De l’Allemagne,” vol. i. p. 215.

of mediæval society. She had knit Europe into a Christian Commonwealth, under the paternal sway of the Vicar of Jesus Christ. She had hallowed civil polity in particular States in Christendom, by impressing upon it a religious character through the rite of blessing and crowning princes, ever recognising the limited and fiduciary character of Monarchical Power, and emphatically proclaiming in her ritual the contractual character of the relations between governor and governed, by the solemn stipulations preceding the imposition of the diadem.\* Of this kind was her action in the public order. In the intellectual, to employ Archbishop Trench's happy phrase, she "inaugurated a supernatural rationalism," whence arose those vast structures of the Schoolmen, structures "as marvellous in architectonic completeness of their own as the magnificent domes and cathedrals, which at the self-same time were everywhere covering the face of Europe with novel forms of grace and beauty."† The ideas of the Renaissance were equally hostile to mediæval polity and to mediæval philosophy. They struck at the supernatural foundation upon which both rested. By the end of the sixteenth century those ideas had taken firm root in the European mind, and had begun to germinate. No greater mistake could be made than to suppose that the nascent scepticism was confined to the geographical limits of Protestantism, or that its earliest and most successful preachers were among the nominal adherents of Luther or Calvin. The three writers of the sixteenth century who were most deeply imbued with it, and who—to a great extent unconsciously, perhaps,—did most to diffuse it, were all professed Catholics. They were Erasmus, who contributed more than any one else to bring the scholastic philosophy into disrepute; Rabelais, whose grotesque inventions barely veil the most cynical and audacious scepticism; and Montaigne, in whom we have, in germ, the whole of the philosophy both of Voltaire and Rousseau. As to the public order, if we look upon Europe as a whole, we find that long before the sixteenth century had closed Christendom had become little more than an empty phrase. As Frederick von Schlegel truly observes, "that bond of union, that high fellowship of Christian feeling, which had united its various states was in a great measure dissolved; the different Powers of Europe engaged in a system of alliances, subject to various fluctuations, but all formed on the principle of a mere dynamical equilibrium, just as if Government and social force, even under the influence of Christianity, were nothing but a mere material weight, a lever of physical power."‡ And if, turning from the

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\* As in our own Coronation Office.

† "Lectures on Mediæval Church History," p. 200.

‡ "Philosophy of History," p. 398. English Translation.



general European system, we survey the particular States which composed it, we find the same idea actively at work. It is simple matter of historical fact that at the beginning of the sixteenth century free political institutions were in working throughout Europe, from Castile and Arragon to the shores of the Vistula and the Niemen. By the close of the century the new Cæsarism had made good its position against these local liberties, these class and municipal privileges, these venerable immunities of so many kinds, which had so long been the fortresses of liberty. There were, indeed, exceptions. The United Provinces—their heroic story, stained as it is with loathsome deeds of sacrilege and violence, must surely touch a chord in every English heart—had vindicated their freedom against the perjured tyrant whose authority, according to the tenor of the ancient charters to which he had sworn, was *ipso facto* determined by his violation of them. The Flemings had in the event preserved no small remnant of their ancient autonomous institutions. Liberty still maintained herself in her Helvetic fastnesses. In the Holy Roman Empire the free mediæval polity remained unchanged in many of the smaller States, and especially in the Free Cities. These were bright spots upon the map of Europe. But in the whole of the Iberian peninsula, the whole of France, the greater part of Germany, the New Monarchy was firmly established. A large portion of Italy was enslaved by foreign conquerors, while three of her most famous Republics—Florence, Pisa, and Sienna—had sunk under the not less hateful domination of the Medici. In England, the tact of Elizabeth had led her to soften down the usurpations of Tudor Cæsarism upon English liberty; but she abandoned none of them. “She tampered, as her predecessors had tampered, with personal freedom. There was the same straining of statutes, and coercion of juries in political trials as before; and an arbitrary power of imprisonment was still exercised by the Council. The duties she imposed on cloth and sweet wines were an assertion of her right of arbitrary taxation. Royal proclamations constantly assumed the force of law.”\* And the tendency of Governments towards absolutism was everywhere even more clearly marked in the ecclesiastical province. There was a complete reversal of the relations between the civil and spiritual power which had existed in earlier ages. Then the Church might have applied with truth to herself the words of Sacred Scripture, “By me kings reign and princes decree justice.” Now, it was on the sufferance of kings that she existed; through the decrees of princes that she was permitted, in any degree, to fulfil her mission. Instead of the State depending upon religious sanctions, the Church had come to depend upon political. Material power had taken the place of spiritual. Nay, the Church and ecclesiastical institutions

\* “Green’s Short History of the English People,” p. 394.

became the chosen instruments of despotism. Thus, the Spanish Inquisition was the engine by which Philip hoped to bow the free necks of the people of the Netherlands to his gloomy despotism. And in England the doctrine of the royal supremacy was the Anglican dogma especially cherished as completing the power of the Crown; a denial of it was a bar to the enjoyment of civil rights. The aim of the New Monarchy throughout Europe was to reduce the spiritual order to the position of an accomplice. This aim was attained most easily and directly in Protestant countries. But in Catholic also the ties of allegiance to the Holy See, which stood in the way of it, were ever more and more loosened. "The power of the clergy lost its principal support in the political influence of the Popes, for whilst kings assumed a tone of greater boldness against the Holy See, the Popes, on their side, were obliged to treat with great circumspection in everything relating to temporal affairs."\*

The first stage in the history of Renaissance ideas may, roughly speaking, be said to terminate with the sixteenth century.† It was the period of their rise and propagation. The next stage may be considered to end in 1688, a year which certainly is a landmark, both in the intellectual and political history of Europe. I wish it were possible for me to trace the development, in the seventeenth century, of the new philosophy. It was a period, as Biot expresses it,‡ of "universal fermentation of the European intellect." The mere names of Bruno and Campanella, of Bacon and Descartes, of Gassendi and Torricelli, of Spinoza and Hobbes, of Leibnitz and Bayle, may suffice to indicate how great that fermentation was. But it was reserved for Locke to throw the new philosophy into the shape in which it was most potently to affect the world. He is the very source and fount from which were derived the doctrines of the French *philosophes*, who in the next century were to be the ultimate exponents of the Renaissance principle of scepticism. The "Essay on the Human Understanding," as Heine observes in his mocking way, "became their Gospel—the Gospel they swore by. John Locke," he continues, with a gibe at ourselves (he is ever ready to suspend England upon his upturned nose), "John Locke had been to school to Descartes, and had learnt from him all an Englishman could learn, Mechanics, the Analysis, and the Calculus. There was only one thing he could not comprehend: that was

\* Balmez's "European Civilisation," p. 356. English Translation.

† I suppose we may date their rise from 1453, the year of the fall of Constantinople, when the Middle Ages are generally considered to close. The publication of Montaigne's "Essays" in 1580, and the ruin of the Catholic League by the Battle of Ivry in 1590, may be considered to mark their firm establishment. But the chronology of ideas can never be more than approximate.

‡ J. B. Biot's "Mélanges Scientifiques et Littéraires," vol. i. p. 27.

'innate ideas.' He perfected the doctrine according to which we obtain all knowledge by exterior experience. He made of the human mind a sort of mechanism. The whole man becomes in his hands an English machine.\* In this excellent fooling there is, I think, a perfectly fair account of Locke's philosophy. It was in 1688 that his famous Essay was completed, and in the next year it was given to the world. "From it," as Mr. Stephen justly observes, "we may learn what were to be the dominant ideas of the next century."†

The date, 1688, is at the least as important in the political order as in the philosophical. It indicates the high-water mark in the reign of the sovereign, who is the very type and personification of the Renaissance idea of monarchy. From that year, France and all Europe enter upon a new era in the political order as in the intellectual; an era lasting just a hundred years, and closing with the outbreak of the French Revolution; an era which is the ultimate phase of the Renaissance period. It is this era, exclusive of the great catastrophe which ends it, that I must be understood to mean when I speak of the eighteenth century—the hundred years which date from 1688. But before I enter upon it, it will be necessary for me to survey in some detail the condition of Europe, and especially the position of France and England, in its opening year.

If we consider the European system at the beginning of the second half of the seventeenth century, we find the predominance of the French monarchy the most notable feature in it. England was still convulsed by intestine strife; Spain, suspected a century before, and not without reason, of aiming at universal dominion, had already sunk into incurable decay. The power of Austria, a source of general apprehension after the conquest of the Palatinate, had been effectually restrained in 1648 by the Peace of Westphalia, by which instrument France acquired Alsace, and began the career of territorial aggrandisement distinctive of the reign of Louis XIV. That monarch was then a child of ten, and it was not until the death of Mazarin, thirteen years later, that he assumed the administration of public affairs. Two years before his territories had been further increased, and this time at the expense of Spain. The Treaty of the Pyrenees, signed in 1659, had given to France Roussillon, and had extended her northern frontier to Gravelines. Lord Macaulay, in a passage which is conspicuous among his many brilliant summaries, has well described the kingdom that Louis XIV. began to rule. "The territory of France," he says, "was not quite so extensive

\* "De l'Allemagne," vol. i. p. 65.

† "History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century," vol. i. p. 74.

as at present; but it was large, compact, fertile, well placed both for attack and for defence, situated in a happy climate, and inhabited by a brave, active, and ingenious people. The State implicitly obeyed the direction of a single mind. The great fiefs which, three hundred years before, had been, in all but name, independent principalities, had been annexed to the crown. Only a few old men could remember the last meeting of the States General. The resistance which Huguenots, the nobles, and the parliaments, had offered to the kingly power, had been put down by the two great Cardinals who had ruled the nation during forty years. The Government was now a despotism, tempered by courteous manners and chivalrous sentiments. The means at the disposal of the sovereign were, for that age, truly formidable. His revenue, raised, it is true, by a severe and unequal taxation which pressed heavily on the cultivators of the soil, far exceeded that of any other potentate. His army, excellently disciplined, and commanded by the greatest generals then living, already consisted of more than a hundred and twenty thousand men. Such an array of regular troops had not been seen in Europe since the downfall of the Roman Empire. Of Maritime Powers France was not the first. But though she had rivals on the sea, she had not yet a superior. Such was her strength during the last forty years of the seventeenth century that no enemy could singly withstand her, and that two great coalitions, in which half Christendom was united against her, failed of success.\*

Such was the State which Louis XIV. began to govern in 1661, and which he governed with a strong hand, for well nigh fifty years, upon the principle enunciated in his famous maxim, "*L'État c'est moi.*" To pour contempt upon the parliaments, to confiscate the municipal immunities, to depress the nobles, to enslave the Church; in fact, to overthrow every check upon the direct action of the royal power, were the main lines of his administration. And here, indeed, he but continued the policy of his predecessors, reaping the full fruits of the victories over the ancient free institutions of France which Francis II. had definitively gained, and which Henry IV. and Richelieu had consolidated. But the policy of Louis XIV. went far beyond theirs. He aimed at transforming the character of the monarchy, and he succeeded in his aim. As a matter of fact, the power of the French sovereign had been built up by a series of usurpations as barefaced as any recorded in history—usurpations which had converted him from the first among the Barons to their Lord and Master. This is an incontestable fact of history, but it is a fact which it suited Louis XIV. to ignore, or which,

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\* Macaulay's "History of England," vol. i. p. 155.

very probably, he did not know. Another foundation than the historical was necessary to him for his authority, and he found it ready to his use. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, a new conception of the royal power, first\* originated as it would seem in Protestant England, had become fashionable in France. That conception was formulated in the doctrine of the immediate Divine right of kings, a doctrine which is essentially opposed to the Catholic idea, and to the exposure and confutation of which the two foremost theologians of the age, Suarez and Bellarmine, applied their great intellects. By means of this doctrine, which impressed the seal of the religion of Jesus Christ upon the worst of the political systems of Paganism, Louis XIV. converted the French monarchy from a great hereditary magistracy to a theocratic institution, and placed himself as sovereign upon the footing of David and Solomon; while its complementary tenet of absolute passive obedience carried the royal authority to a pitch of which the Hebrew kings had never dreamed. It was a momentous revolution, nor were its effects by any means confined to the temporal order. It may be said of Louis XIV.'s reign with literal truth:—

State policy and Church policy are conjoint,  
But Janus-faces, looking different ways.

The authority of the Holy See, slight as it had now proved to be in practice, was almost the sole remaining check upon Absolutism, and it was the constant aim of Louis to depress it. The Sovereign Pontiffs were subjected by the Eldest Son of the Church to a series of gross humiliations, at which even Protestants stood aghast. It would be hard to find in all history a more complete and insolent defiance of the primary principles, not merely of justice, but of decency, than was exhibited by Louis towards Alexander VII., in the affair of the Duc de Créqui. His quarrel with Clement X. as to the matter of ambassadorial exemption, and with Innocent XI. regarding the privilege of sanctuary, are consistent manifestations of the same spirit. And the determination of this monarch to reduce the ecclesiastical order to abject obedience by separating it from the centre of unity, found fitting expression in the resolutions of the Assembly of the French Clergy in 1682. Never was there a more bitter irony

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\* I am, of course, acquainted with the theory as to the power of the Head of the Holy Roman Empire, deduced from the jurisprudence of ancient Rome by the legists of Bologna in the time of Frederick Barbarossa: a theory for which Dante endeavours to provide a philosophical basis in his *De Monarchia*. But that theory is essentially different from the Anglican and Gallican doctrine of immediate Divine right, though doubtless containing the germ of it.

than that by which the provisions of the Four Articles are termed "the Gallican Liberties." They were the fetters by which the French clergy were enslaved to the civil power, and trammelled in the exercise of the most essential functions of their sacred ministry. Well did Innocent XI. characterise the action of the French bishops who supported them—Bossuet, alas! conspicuous in the servile throng—as "an abandonment of the holy cause of the liberties of the Church." And bitter reason in the event—as I shall have occasion hereafter to show—had the spirituality of France to bewail their thus burning incense upon the altar of Cæsar. The atrocious measure by which this act of semi-apostacy\* was soon followed, and which, as I shall point out by-and-by, stands in intimate connection with it—I mean the revocation of the Edict of Nantes—was as little prompted by zeal for the Catholic religion as were the insults offered to the Vicar of Christ. It was the manifestation of the Oriental despotism of a monarch who could not endure that his subjects should profess any creed but his. It was the King's religion, not the Pope's,† which the royal dragoons, fit apostles of such a cult, spread with fire and sword. Two years afterwards—significant comment upon the Catholic ardour of Louis!—the ambassador of the most Christian King entered Rome with the military display of a conqueror, and endeavoured, in the teeth of the Pontiff's prohibition, to assert, by force, the obnoxious right of asylum. Ecclesiastical censures were pronounced upon the envoy, and the precinct in which he dwelt was laid under an interdict. Louis retaliated by seizing Avignon, and by shutting up the Papal Nuncio in St. Olon.

The foreign policy of Louis XIV. (I do not reckon his dealings with the Holy See under this head, they belong strictly to his domestic policy) was based upon precisely the same principles as his home administration. In both he stands out as the supreme example of monarchical egotism—the incarnation of the spirit of Renaissance Cæsarism, the arch-exponent of the theory (in the words which I have cited from Schlegel), that government is "nothing but a mere material weight, a lever of physical power." Might is his sole test of right or wrong. Neither moral nor religious consideration, neither sense of honour, nor fear of shame, avail to restrain him from the prosecution of any enterprise which promises to be advantageous. No more solemn engagement could have been entered into than the Treaty

\* So it was judged at the time. "It was observed by contemporaries," Ranke remarks, "that if France remained within the pale of the Catholic Church she stood on its very threshold, ready to quit its enclosure." "Hist. of the Popes," Book VIII., § 16.

† See Ranke, u.s.



of the Pyrenees, by which, upon his marriage, he renounced for himself and his descendants all claims which might accrue through his wife, the Infanta Maria Teresa. No title could be more preposterously bad than that by which six years afterwards, upon the death of his father-in-law, Philip IV., he laid claim to the Spanish Netherlands in right of his Queen. But the new King of Spain was a delicate child: the Regency was in the hands of his mother, a weak woman, and the Spanish Power was utterly unable to resist the large and well-disciplined armies of France, commanded by generals such as Turenne and Condé. The Triple Alliance for a time prevented the French Ahab from obtaining more than a portion of the Naboth's vineyard which he coveted. But the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle lasted only four years. Charles II. was bought by the Secret Treaty of Dover, and then the full wrath of Louis was poured out upon the Republic of Holland which had dared to thwart him in his scheme of plunder. The Dutch, ready, as their noble leader expressed it, to die in the last ditch rather than to yield, did not quail before the "instans tyrannus" or flinch from their firm resolve. With a heroism that took captive the wondering world they called the sea to their aid, and the waters were a wall to them, on their right hand and on their left, as unto the Israelites of old. The iniquitous war that had been levied against them convulsed the whole of Europe, and ended in the territorial aggrandisement of France. By the Peace of Nymwegen, Louis obtained the province of Franche Comté, which extended the limits of the monarchy to the eastern slope of the Jura and the borders of Switzerland. It was in 1678 that this treaty was signed. And the next ten years may be regarded as the culminating period of the career of Louis. Politically considered, France was the arbiter of Europe. Spain, humbled and plundered, had sunk into the second rank of States. The Emperor was fully occupied with dangers from Turkey, and with other troubles of his own. The only Power which could have opposed any serious obstacles to the predominance of Louis was ruled until 1685 by a monarch who was his pensioner, and whose favourite Sultana was his agent. And when Charles II. died, his successor was not less the vassal of the French monarch. But the ascendancy of France was not merely political. In arts, in fashions, in literature, she was also the dictator of Europe. France was the model State which European sovereigns desired to assimilate their own countries. Even the boorish princes of Germany imitated not only the periwigs and the architecture of Versailles, but the public policy of the French monarch. It was natural enough that Louis should revolve vast designs of future aggrandisement, and that Europe should be agitated by the fear of universal dominion. It is not wonderful that in the

intoxication of his success, with none "to stay his hand, or say, what doest thou," he

Assumes the God, affects to nod.  
And seems to shake the spheres.

The rape of Orange, the warlike entry of Lavardin into Rome, the bombardment of Genoa, are all signal manifestations of the supreme arrogance of Louis during this decade. It closes with a deed, surpassing in its lawlessness and wickedness, even the worst of these lawless and wicked acts. The ravage of the Palatinate was one of those crimes which arouse inextinguishable hatred in the breasts of a people, and leave to future generations a terrible legacy of vengeance. A thrill of horror ran through Europe; but Louis was proud of his work of butchery and arson. A medal with the legend "*Heidelberga deleta*," was struck by his order and still witnesses to his satisfaction. This is the supreme achievement of the Monarch whom his age called Great. It affords a true index of the sense in which alone history can allow him that title: great in his enmities, great in his frauds, great in his cruelties and oppressions, great in his profusion of blood and waste of treasure, great in his concupiscence and impiety, in his insolence, his selfishness, and his rapacity. In him the new Cæsarism of the Renaissance culminates. And his career culminates in his Palatinate exploit of 1688. From that year may be dated the open decadence of his power, and the secret decay of his system of government, and of his family. It was as if the stern sentence of the Hebrew prophet had been passed upon him. "Because thy heart is lifted up, and thou hast said, I am God and I sit in the chair of God . . . whereas thou art a man and not God, and hast set thy heart as if it were the heart of God . . . therefore I will bring thee to nought, and thou shalt not be, and if thou be sought for, thou shalt not be found any more, for ever."

It was just one month after the army of Louis had entered the Palatinate, that William of Orange set sail for England. It is not easy to over-estimate the importance of the results which followed directly from his enterprise, and still less of those which followed indirectly. In the first place, it was the death-blow, in this country, to the system in which the Tudors had embodied the political idea of the Renaissance, and which the Stuarts had fortified, chiefly through the help of a subservient clergy. It was a vindication of the old lines of the Constitution, which the Puritan Rebellion had unsuccessfully endeavoured to maintain. It was the proclamation to Europe that, in one nation, at least, there were left freemen who would not bow the knee to the Baal of Absolutism. It was time that some one

should come to the rescue of our perishing liberties, and preserve to the world one example of the free monarchy of mediæval times. Under James, the system of Government in England had approximated very closely to the French model, which he loved. After the suppression of Monmouth's Rebellion, he had at his absolute disposal close upon twenty thousand regular troops. The judges, headed by Jeffreys, were his creatures. The corporations had been packed with his nominees. The House of Commons consisted, for the most part, of high Tories. The doctrines of immediate Divine right and passive obedience still formed the staple of the teaching of the clergy. With such advantages any monarch, possessed of ordinary tact and discretion, might have made his position practically absolute. James, instead of ordinary tact and discretion, possessed a dulness of apprehension and a dogged obstinacy of temper, for the union of which, in one man, it would be difficult to find a parallel in history. It was this character which led him to endeavour to compass his ends by the most hazardous means—means that alienated from him the support of the classes in which he most trusted, and exhibited him to the world as a Prince devoid of faith and honour. Looking to the issue, Englishman, as a body, certainly have no reason to complain of the policy which delivered them from the sway of a race incapable—as four successive monarchs had shown—of ruling Constitutionally, and which substituted a Parliamentary title for an hereditary one. But there is one class of Englishmen—the class whose interests, after his own, James undoubtedly had most at heart—who owe mainly to him the withholding of their civil rights, and the continuance of oppressive laws, for more than a century. It is matter of history that the more weighty of English Catholics, at the time, disapproved of the arbitrary measures of the sovereign. It was from converts, whose characters were doubtful, or whose motives were obviously open to suspicion—the Tyrconnells, the Castlemaines, and the Jermyns—that James found encouragement and support. The saintly Pontiff, who then sat in the chair of Peter, openly blamed his policy. It is a curious and significant fact, that William of Orange, if not aided in his expedition by the money of Innocent XI., which is a doubtful point, had certainly the Pope's sympathy and encouragement.\*

The immediate consequence, then, of the Revolution of 1688, so far as the internal history of our country is concerned, was to

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\* Much exceedingly valuable information on this subject will be found in the seventh volume of Droysen's "*Geschichte der Preussische Politik*." It has long been known that Innocent saw with pleasure the downfall of James. But Professor Droysen's researches have thrown a flood of light upon the Pontiff's share in bringing about that event.

rescue from utter destruction the old mediæval liberties of England, still, thank God, so full of vigorous life; to expel from Great Britain the Renaissance idea of monarchy, and to divert her from the course in which the politics of the Continent of Europe were to flow for another century. The immediate consequence to Continental Europe was to bring about the organisation of those powerful leagues which broke the power of Louis, dispelling his dreams of European dominion, and shaking his monarchy to the very foundations. These were the direct results of the Revolution of 1688. Its indirect results were even more important. I hold it as certain that we were thereby mainly saved from participation in the French Revolution of a hundred years later; and I think I shall be able to show reasons for believing that we owe to it, in a large measure, the preservation of the masses of our people, during the next century, from the contagion of that last phase of Renaissance philosophy, which was of such fatal influence upon the Continent of Europe; and, consequently, the exceptionally large amount of belief in Christianity, as a Divine revelation, at present to be found among us. I consider that the spectacle of the free institutions of England exercised a potent effect in hastening the downfall of the absolutist system of the Renaissance abroad, and that the principles, upon which those institutions still happily repose, are the only principles upon which the union of civil order and rational liberty can be built up, amid the political ruins even now covering the face of Europe. But for the present I pause at the date, 1688—the end of the second period of the Renaissance era: the starting point of the third. During that second period the political and philosophical ideas of the Renaissance had advanced *pari passu*, issuing, as I have observed, the one in Louis XIV., the other in Locke. In the system of the French monarch is the key to the political history of Europe, during the third period of the Renaissance, and, therefore, I have been led to consider it at some length. The course its intellectual speculation was to take is indicated by the works of the English philosopher—the very essence of whose doctrine seems to me to have been seized and expressed in the words, which I have cited from one, the greatness of whose genius was only equalled by his miserable abuse of it. In subsequent articles, it will be my task to follow the development of Renaissance ideas in the eighteenth century, both in the public and spiritual order, upon the Continent of Europe, and also to sketch the peculiar position which this country held, with respect to them. That, indeed, is my proper subject. But it would have been impossible for me to grapple with it, without the preliminary observations which I now bring to a close.

W. S. LILLY.

## ART. X.—CHURCH AND SCHOOL IN FRANCE.

1. *Les Discours Parlementaires de M. Thiers.* Publiés par M. Calmon. Première partie. Paris: Calman Lévy. 1879.
2. *Le Socialisme Contemporain.* Par M. Abbé Winterer. Paris: V. Palmé. 1878.
3. *Pourquoi le Clergé Français est Ultramontain.* Par plusieurs ecclésiastiques très-catholiques mais patriotes. Paris: E. Dentu. 1879.
4. *Les Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes.* Par le général Baron Ambert. Paris: V. Palmé. 1878.
5. *Pourquoi l'Etat paye-t-il les Curés?* Par L. Le Briard. Paris: Oudin frères. 1878.

THE introduction and discussion of M. Jules Ferry's Bill to regulate education in France is the first act of a drama which may have either of various *dénouements*. The indignation and excitement now prevailing in Catholic and Conservative France is unparalleled in modern times. Perhaps the decisive battle will have to be fought on this very point.

The Count de Chambord, in the letter he addressed 15th Oct. 1872, to M. de la Rochette—whose recent loss united all parties in the French Chamber in heartfelt expressions of regret—said, "There can be no mistake about it. The proclamation of a Republic in France has always been and will always be the beginning of social anarchy, the letting loose of licence, the opportunity for utopias of every kind. . . . If the country is weak enough to let itself be carried along by the currents which now disturb it, nothing is more certain than the future; our destination is—the abyss! It is useless to distinguish between the party of violence which promises peace to men and proclaims war against God, and that other party, wiser, it is true, better disciplined, and going to its objects by more circuitous paths; the ends of both are one and the same. . . . The Republic can be only provisional; at bottom, France is Catholic and monarchical." These words were written more than six years ago. Since that time the Republic has existed and has been on its trial. Six years are enough to show which way the stream is flowing, and how fast. There are many who will find in the events of these six years a confirmation only too strong of the emphatic words of the exile of Frohsdorf.

There certainly can be no mistake about it. "The abyss" is

the present destination of France. What the abyss may precisely turn out to be is not so clear. Whether it will be a frightful social convulsion, or national impotence and foreign conquest—this no one can predict. But if separation of Church and State, secular education, an immoral press, and an executive which persecutes religion, if these things constitute an abyss, France is sliding into it.

M. Gambetta himself was frightened by his success in the senatorial elections of January 5th. We have had him preaching moderation ever since. "Dear fellow-citizens," he said to his constituents of the twentieth *arrondissement*, better known as Belleville, "whilst we shall know how to resist the spirit of reaction, we, on our side, will not allow ourselves to be carried away by the spirit of impatience and of rashness; we will not abandon ourselves to the intoxication of success. We shall continue to be men of wisdom, men of good sense, men of opportunity; there is no other successful method in politics." The journals of his party have been carefully and somewhat nervously repeating these counsels; the *Journal des Débats*, the *Siècle*, the *XIXe Siècle*, the *République Française*, the *National*, and other prints, which have been agitating and denouncing and threatening ever since last May, have suddenly calmed down, and begun to spell "moderation," a word which their dictionaries do not hitherto seem to have contained. They are looking tremulously over their shoulders at their followers. They try to soothe them with soft words, as one would calm a savage dog out of occupation for the moment.

The true Conservatives in France, on their side, are tempted to think that there is little choice between Gambetta's "opportunism," and the "thoroughness" of M. Clémenceau. If the latter threatens the knife, the former is getting ready his handcuffs, his gags, and his poison. Whichever section of the Republic gets the upper hand, it will apparently be all the same for the Catholics, with this exception, that the worse the storm is the sooner it will be over.

Events have marched rapidly since Christmas. On January 5 the election of Senators gave the Republicans a majority in the Senate of about 60 (180 Republicans to 120 Conservatives). The Chamber, which had scarcely finished "purifying" itself, was now, by dint of the use of its brute majority, as republican as M. Gambetta had predicted. By the senatorial elections of January it became secure from a dissolution. Three weeks later (January 30), Marshal Macmahon resigned, and M. Jules Grévy was chosen President the same afternoon; M. Gambetta becoming President of the Chamber of Deputies.

At the same time the aged M. Dufaure, president of the



Council of State, or Prime Minister, a statesman who was too weak to stand by the Marshal and too conscientious to take off his hat to the nation's new masters, resigned his post and retired into private life. He is eighty-two, and he now lives in his house at Versailles, cheerful and ready enough to talk, but he will never touch power again. He was succeeded by M. Waddington, the Protestant and half-Anglicized man of business, sensible, moderate, and respectable; and with as much real appreciation of the temper, genius and ultimate course of the French nation as a dissenting minister has of the Pope. This was a revolution; but, as revolutions have gone in France, it was not a revolution to frighten the most timid. The Republican party hailed it with extravagant joy. The Republic, they said, was now founded; deliverance was complete; the machine was equipped; a new era was begun, and the country was entering on a long period of tranquillity and peace.

M. Grévy's first message and M. Waddington's programme were looked for with anxiety. They came in due course. The new President did not allow a week to pass before he let an expectant nation understand what his principles were to be. To tell the truth, the message was more like an after-dinner speech than the messages which countries older in constitutional forms are accustomed to expect from their rulers. M. Grévy would never resist the "national will" expressed by its "constitutional organs"; parliament would be his master. His policy would be dictated by the "real wants," the "undoubted desires," of the country; progress, pacification, tranquillity, security, confidence—these were what France wanted, these were what France must have; and these were what M. Grévy would try to give her. He would protect all legitimate interests; he would resolutely defend the interests of the State. The army would be the constant object of his dearest pre-occupation. He would see that the Republic was served by officials who were neither its enemies nor its detractors. Such was the message. There were those who thought it very tame, after six years of bluster. There were others, also—those who had had the worst of the conflict during those six years—who thought that, although it might have been worse, still it was bad enough. To them these were ominous phrases. The defence of State interests meant war against the Church; the paragraph about the officials meant that the hungry Left would be appeased with the spoils of office; and the expression of deference to the national will meant that any injustice and any despotism would be held right if it was legally voted in the Chambers.

M. Waddington himself has issued no formal declaration of policy. He says that the Deputies dislike programmes; but his

programme is quite understood. He will adhere, as far as necessity will permit, to the Declaration read in both Houses on January 16th. This was the programme of poor M. Dufaure. It was a small treatise rather than a speech. Although it was received by the Senate with only moderate satisfaction, and by the Deputies in chilling silence, it was thought at the time that it was statesmanlike and clever, and that its author could fairly count on several weeks, if not months, of more or less peaceful power. But M. Dufaure fell within the fortnight, and M. Waddington accepted his plan and his programme—modified, however, by the new glosses which the events of each succeeding hour were accumulating for his guidance. That programme commits him to the Concordat (the organic articles probably included); to the dismissal of non-Republican officials; to the revocation of the extremely modified independence of the Catholic Universities; to compulsory education; and to a strict examination of elementary teachers.

As far as the official declarations, therefore, of the present Government of France go, we are assured of a strictly pagan *régime*. When the State recognises the Church, it will be to hold her in check. She will make a bargain with her, but it will be the bargain of a godless master with his useful but suspected servant. And there is sufficient vagueness in the contract to make all those concerned watch with attention the course of events.

We have lately been reading with a fearful interest how the town of Szegedin, in Hungary, has been swept away by water. Szegedin knew its dangers, and it had its embankments; but the rain and the wind combined and broke in upon it. To see how the water is rising in France, and in what danger the programme of MM. Grévy and Waddington already is, it is sufficient to look at the colleagues who surround them, the measures they pass, and the defence they offer. A month ago only three members of the Left Centre remained in the Cabinet of Ministers; M. Waddington himself, M. Léon Say, and M. Marcère. The last has already fallen. The ministerial ship has tossed him overboard, a victim to his own hunger for place. M. Clémenceau was his executioner, and M. Lepère, from the Extreme Left, a member of the Republican Union, has succeeded him as Minister of the Interior. As for M. Léon Say, he, too, is threatened. He rules the money matters of France. People say he allowed, by culpable silence, a financial crisis of five days (from February 22nd to February 27th), and thus brought loss and misery on thousands of bondholders, who threw their five per cent. securities in a panic on the market, at the rumour that the Government was going to convert them. At the beginning of

last month (March) all Paris was in commotion. Thousands were ruined; more than one death from despair or suicide was reported; and one or two financiers made enormous fortunes. M. Léon Say has been asked about this; he has not heard the end of it yet; and he may have to resign. Then M. Waddington will be left, the last bit of "conservative" embankment before the rising flood. Meanwhile the Minister of Commerce (M. Tirard) was one of the founders of the Commune; the Prefect of Police (M. Andrieux, member for Lyons) publicly professed Atheism in the very sight of the crucifix which confronted him as he took his seat as judge, and was deservedly cashiered for it by M. Thiers. Of M. Lepère we have spoken.

So much for the *personnel* of the Ministry. Let us now glance at one or two things that have happened and are happening, and so judge how the water is rising.

There was a discussion in the Deputies on February 16th, on the observance of Sunday. No resolution was actually taken, but the measure was sent to the Committees, and will be heard of again in its evil time. M. Maigne, a "citizen," wanted the abrogation of a law dating from 1814, by which the Sunday's rest is made obligatory. It is true the law has been for a long time a dead letter, especially in Paris, as good Catholics know to their sorrow. But this would not do for M. Maigne. What he wanted was not so much to desecrate the Sunday, which is desecrated as it is with complete effectiveness, but to insult the Catholic religion, or perhaps religion in general. M. de Bassetière, the Catholic Deputy from Vendée, could not let the proposal pass, although the occasion was purely preliminary. He protested against a proposition which "gave the lie to every French and Catholic tradition." Whereupon arose M. René Goblet, an Under-secretary of State, and spoke on the part of the Government. The law of the Sunday's rest, he admitted, was a law which had been inspired by the most "respectable" of sentiments; but it was no longer *en rapport* with our manners; it was contrary to the principle of liberty, and especially to the most precious of all liberties—liberty of conscience. The Left shouted their applause, and M. Clémenceau, as leader of the majority, added magisterially, "and to the liberty of labour!" The Under-secretary went on to say that the law was never acted upon, and that the Government were much concerned to have to do with a law which was not applied. Therefore they agreed to take the proposal into consideration.

Another instructive debate, or rather dispute, for it was hardly more than that, occurred when M. Barodet got General Gresley, Minister for War, to promise to revive the law of "26 Messidor, year III," ordering the *Marseillaise* to be used by the army as the national air. The Duc de la Rochefoucauld

exclaimed that it was to that tune their fathers went to the guilotine. M. de Launay asked if they would invite the Sovereigns to Paris to listen to the *Marseillaise*. "Why," he said, "the Commune was set up to that air and brought back to it." Then M. Jules Ferry threw in, "It is to beat them and to beat you that we want it." M. Jules Ferry is Minister of Instruction.

The "purification" of the public services is another proceeding, full of useful instruction to those who are asking which way power in France is inclining. M. Jules Ferry, the moment he got possession of his portfolio, hastened to dismiss from their function men of European reputation like M. Bouillier, the historian of Descartes, and M. Guillaume, a sculptor whom France ought to cherish in a period of mediocrities and sensualists; and many other eminent names which might be mentioned. The same process was applied to the university by a former Republic; but what happened in 1848-50 ought to have taught anyone who wished to learn, that you cannot supply learning by rampant "patriotism."\* M. Le Royer, the Minister of Justice, rushed in with his pruning knife where even M. Dufaure had held his hand. Procureurs-généraux have been superseded literally by the dozen, and in the smaller appointments hecatombs of capable officers have fallen victims to the anxiety of the men in power to content their greedy followers. One particular scandal should not be passed over. It will be remembered that the Christian Brothers at Caluire sued Challemel-Lacour for defamation. The Procureur-général who conducted the case (as his duty obliged him) was M. Broissard; and the Brothers gained their cause. Will it be believed that M. Broissard was superseded, and that his successor was the very advocate who had pleaded for Challemel-Lacour? The army has been "purged" with equal stringency. The names of Bourbaki, Bataille, du Barrail, de Lartigue, Montaudan are known to every Frenchman, and not unknown in Europe at large. They have fought for France, they have bled for her, and they have spent themselves since her misfortunes in re-organizing her army. They, and others, are now dismissed. All through France, wherever the ubiquitous "government" is represented by a title, a uniform, or a cocked hat, thousands of servants of the State, from generals of division to *sergens de ville*, and from the highest law officers to schoolmasters and postmen, have been turned out of their posts and robbed of their means of livelihood, because the omnipotent bureaucrat in Paris thought he detected disaffection, or because a "patriot" wanted a place. People say, this is only what happens in the United States; the party which carries the Presidency has all the places

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\* See *Le Correspondant*, 25 Fév. 1879.

for four years. This is true; and the best men in America are heartily tired of it, and are looking out for means of introducing permanency in official employments. But in America the victory of Democrat over Republican, or the reverse, merely means the triumph of one purely political party over another; and the sovereignty of each State in its internal concerns considerably modifies the result. In France, not only is authority completely centralized—not only is there nothing equivalent to the corporations, the county magistrates, the local taxing and managing bodies which we have in England, but the issue which divides parties is the broadest and bitterest that can be conceived. It is not Republican against Republican; it is not Republican against Royalist or Imperialist; it is revolution against Catholicism. The majority all but openly proclaims it, and the whole country sees it. Even the English papers have been obliged, in bare decency, to protest against a measure of brute violence of which revolutionary France itself has hitherto afforded no example. It is difficult to imagine the indignation and the dismay of the religious, the conservative and the respectable classes in the country itself. Mgr. Freppel lost no time in writing a warm and earnest letter to M. Dufaure, who began a process which has since grown to much larger proportions.

Permit me to express the indignation which has seized me on reading in a journal, which I need not mention, the names of twenty-six judges (*premier Presidents*), and twenty-six attorney-generals (*procureurs généraux*) of French Courts of Appeal, branded with epithets marking them out to the suspicion of the public and to the strong hand of the executive. I consider that I have read with some attention the history of my country for the last eighty years, and I do not know of anything of a similar kind during the whole period. And I am confident that I am only speaking the sentiments of the general public in calling your attention to proceedings so revolting, which, if they are not put a stop to, will result in nothing less than discredit and peril to the most important institutions of the country.\*

What does Mgr. Freppel and those whom he represents, think of matters now, when the Executive Government of France has been labouring for two months to give effect to the newspaper brutalities which he so eloquently denounces?

The amnesty of the Communists has shown, as clearly as anything else, the feebleness of M. Waddington's government. M. Le Royer, the Minister of Justice, made an extremely eloquent speech, on the 20th February, in behalf of the Government proposition. He had to defend the "partial amnesty" against the fervid rhetoric of Louis Blanc and Loeroy, who demanded a plenary pardon for everybody. It was not difficult

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\* Letter to M. Dufaure, 26 Janv. 1879.

for the Minister to prove that the Commune really meant "treason." But it is almost comic to observe the emphasis with which he insists on the enormous strength of the Government of which he is a member. "Gentlemen," he said to the Deputies, amid the applause of the Centre and Left Centre, "this Government is one of the most powerful which has ever existed in the country. Yes! it emanates from the nation; it is the nation's offspring, and it is proud of it. It has the law in its hand, it will never go to sleep, and every official shall bow to it and do its will." And then, in its might and its pride, the Government led its majority to a vote which inundates France, or Paris, with over a thousand ruffians, whose moral and political principles will certainly not have been improved by penal servitude, and who will probably yet make M. Le Royer and his friends rue the day when they bragged so loud and gave in so basely.

But perhaps the feeblest thing M. Waddington has lent himself to has been the vote of censure on the De Broglie and Rochebounet ministries. We have not by any means heard the last of this. But here is a Government which pretends to be strong and honourable, refusing to prosecute and yet forcing a verdict of guilty. M. Brisson, a furious partisan, read a committee report purporting to be a recital of what he had found out. It was seen very quickly that he had found out very little. Even the *Times* has admitted that, if Marshal Macmahon strained the constitution, yet he kept within the bounds of legality. It was evident that there would have to be a tedious process, involving loss of time and much bitter feeling, and possibly ending in nothing. The obvious course for a "strong government" to take was to say, We will not prosecute, and since we do not mean to prosecute, we must give the accused the benefit of the legal maxim that a man is to be held innocent until he is proved guilty. But M. Waddington got up, on March 13th, and deliberately censured men whom he had never called upon for their defence. They had twisted the law, he said, they had made the magistracy play an unworthy part, they had exercised unheard-of pressure on all the officials; but the country longed for an end of crises, and, therefore, he advised them not to call these accused ministers before them, but to condemn them, and pass on. The majority obeyed. But M. Clémenceau made an omnious protest. This logical and clear-headed inheritor of M. Gambetta's *bonnet rouge* said they ought to impeach, or do nothing. His compact minority, though not much over 100, contains men who helped the present Ministers to their *fauteuils*. They will not love the Government any the more deeply for thwarting them in the matter.

All this shows clearly enough which way the current is setting.



Already there are very loud whispers that M. Waddington cannot stay where he is. If he resigns, then the only possible President of Ministers is Gambetta. But M. Gambetta may well be excused for hesitating before he accepts the post of director of the destinies of France. He is shrewd enough to see that, as a minister, his power would be gone. He has kept a large following at his back by agitation and vague declamation. The moment he is in a position to introduce into Parliament definite measures of his own, he divides his majority. With a divided party he will fall an easy prey to the demagogue who has the longest head and the loudest tongue, and who can therefore best formulate the inarticulate cry of the Revolution. The man is waiting. M. Clémenceau is the Gambetta *arrivant*. A French paper has painted the "moral" physiognomy of the coming leader. M. Clémenceau plays an exact game; he never does anything at random; he never does what is useless or omits what is necessary. He leaves nothing to chance. He sways others because he can command himself. He is naturally a man of brilliant wit, with a turn for quips, jests, and sarcasms of every sort; but whatever rises to his lips, very little passes beyond. He sternly represses whatever seems trifling or compromising. He ruthlessly smothers every pretty phrase that could make him an enemy uselessly. He takes the most austere precautions against any danger on that side. He leads the life of a stoic, drinking nothing but water; and with all that he is ready in a moment to demand an explanation for any personal affront. He has this grand advantage over M. Gambetta, that he has not the risk and responsibility of a troublesome "tail." He was mixed up with the Commune; and this fact will probably help to make the Left Centre shy of him for a time. But sooner or later the day is sure to come when there will be a duel to the death between these two men. Let Gambetta keep every faculty he possesses in good and full exercise, if he wishes to maintain that pre-eminence which, for the moment, he can undoubtedly claim.

Meanwhile, until the triumphant Left comes to blows within its own ranks, bad times may be in store for the Church in France and for Catholic education. The Bill of M. Jules Ferry, now before the Deputies, is not only a foretaste, but will be (if it passes) a very substantial instalment of persecution.

A most useful series of Reports, published by M. Bardoux when Minister of Instruction, give the statistics of Education for the ten years between 1865 and 1876. We cannot print the figures; but those who take the trouble to read them, or even the elaborate analysis now appearing in the *Etudes*, will see it clearly made out that, during those ten years, the staff, the establishments, and the students belonging to ecclesiastical insti-

tutions have increased, in round numbers, more than ten per cent. over those of the Government. This increase has taken place in spite of the many advantages possessed by the Lycées. It must be remembered that every Lycée includes a *professional* school, and that most of them have attached a *petit collège* which is really a primary school on a large scale. They make a heavy bid, therefore, on the one hand for boys destined to any profession, and on the other for boys extremely young, whom their parents naturally desire to keep to the same establishment as they grow older. The Lycées will take charge of a boy from five years old until he is eighteen. Then the Government establishments have an enormous number of free burses. In 1865 there was an average of thirty-three scholars in each Lycée receiving gratuitous instruction; in 1876 the average had risen to thirty-six. If we add to this the proportion of day scholars educated for nothing, we arrive at the astounding fact that, in France, over 14,000 scholars are educated gratis, in the Lycées and communal schools; that is, about one-fifth of the whole school attendance of the country. In spite of all this, the ecclesiastical schools have more than kept pace with the Lycées and the communal schools. There are at present about 78,000 pupils in Catholic schools, against about 79,000 in those of the Government; but this statement omits the pupils of the *Petits Séminaires*, which certainly contain about 30,000 more. Of the 13,000 schoolmasters and teachers about 4000 are ecclesiastics. Of these ecclesiastics perhaps half will be incapacitated from teaching by the present Bill; more, indeed, if we take into account those *Petits Séminaires* which are in the hands of the proscribed congregations.

The measure is intended, not to secure better teaching, or to educate a greater number of the children of the people, but to make the Catholic Universities impossible to expel from the schools a large proportion of the Ecclesiastical teachers, and to crush the Jesuits. The Catholic Universities are to be forbidden to call themselves universities; their pupils will have no guarantee of fairplay before the examining boards; and it seems probable that the arrangement of the examination fees will be such as to tax Catholic pupils unbearably. All Jesuits are disqualified from teaching. This means the suppression of the Colleges they now possess and carry on personally. Every one knows that these Colleges are the best in France; their buildings may not be so vast as those of some Lycées (which are, to tell the truth, simply old Jesuit Colleges "annexed" by former Governments), and their "parks" may be less extreme; but in teaching power, in equipment, and in success they are unsurpassed by any. Half of the teachers belonging to "Congrega-

tions" are disqualified; and it has been proposed already to extend the disqualification to every "congregation" in France. No time will be allowed for Catholics to provide for the vacancies thus caused, and that for a very good reason. When the "brothers" go out, the patriots will come in, and an army of lay instructors will be required, and will somehow be provided.

How much of his Bill M. Ferry will carry through the Chambers, how much he will have to drop, and how many amendments more radical than his own measure he will have to accept, a short time will show. No long time, moreover, will be required to show another thing, and that is, that the Cabinet of M. Waddington will go to pieces on the very rock of its "moderation." This Bill is a far more radical measure than M. Waddington can easily put up with. On the other hand, nothing short of the suppression of the Catholic Universities, the disqualification of all "Congregationalist" teachers, and the expulsion of the Jesuits will satisfy the Extreme Left. The fall of the Ministry cannot be far off.

As a political party, the French Catholics have no organisation whatever. A "moderate" Republic, could it keep its ground, would have nothing to fear from the Catholics. It would oppress them, but they would manage to exist; the inherent life and vigour of Catholic institutions would tell by degrees even on the Left Centre itself; and in time they would see their way to a programme and fight their battles at the elections. But this Republic has now succeeded, most unmistakably, in rousing, not a party, but the Catholic *nation*. As we write, protests and petitions are pouring in upon the Deputies from every quarter of France. As Cardinal de Bonnechose says, the Bill is the most scandalous measure of confiscation which the present century has seen. The millions subscribed, on the strength of a law fully debated, voted and promulgated, in founding the Catholic Universities will be absolutely thrown away. "Never," say the Bishops who preside over the University of Angers, "never will spoliation have been accomplished under more hateful conditions." Let the clergy and the people continue to speak boldly and resolutely, and they will succeed in doing what, in our opinion, they might have done before—they will make the Radicals respect them.

## NOTE TO THE ARTICLE

## "PARENTAL AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF RELIGION."

WE have been requested to correct, on authority which we gladly acknowledge to be unimpeachable, one or two wrong impressions which may have arisen in the minds of readers from the article in the January number of this REVIEW here referred to. That article undertook, it will be remembered, "to do no more than indicate the legal bearings" of a case recently before the law courts. It seems, however, that the *Times* report, from which we took the facts of the trial, was, in more than one particular, not quite accurate. First, in regard to the agreement made before marriage by Mr. Agar-Ellis that the children should be brought up in the Catholic faith. We said, "there was some conflict of evidence as to whether this promise was not subject to some private understanding between the husband and wife that it would not be rigidly enforced." Mrs. Agar-Ellis, however, positively swore at the trial that no such private understanding had ever existed, and we desire to draw especial attention to this, because it settles, for all who know her, at once and for ever the real fact of the matter.

The writer of the article made some remarks on the unhappy lot of children of tender years whose parents disagree in matters of religion; and, no doubt, these observations were pointed, perhaps without sufficient justification, by reference to the case before him. We learn—and we gladly make it known as widely as our pages can make it—that, up to the time just previous to the commencement of proceedings by Mrs. Agar-Ellis, the children knew nothing of the "bitterness of controversy," were not interfered with in their faith, never witnessed religious disputes between their father and mother (none, in fact, taking place), and had in every respect a happy home.

We need only add that we should have thought it utterly beyond question which of the parties in this painful case had our full and respectful sympathy. But in legal questions between husband and wife, on matters touching religion, it is of vital importance to the Catholic body, not so much to know what their own journals think, as to ascertain what the law is. We know well enough what we want, and how the Church would act. But in regard to the law, the religious merits of any particular case are unimportant; the party defeated may be a

Protestant to-day and a Catholic to-morrow; the same legal victory which fills our hearts with dismay, may, on another occasion, call forth our triumph and our thanksgiving. However we may deplore the persecution of Catholic children in a case where the mother is a Catholic, we cannot but remember that it is now settled that they would, on the same legal principles, be saved from a mother who was a Protestant. This may partly explain how it is that Catholic writers have spoken, not so much coldly, as slightly, of a mother who deserves our admiring respect, and of children for whom it is certain that many more prayers have been offered than they will ever know of.

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SANCTISSIMI DOMINI NOSTRI LEONIS  
DIVINA PROVIDENTIA PAPÆ XIII.  
EPISTOLA ENCYCLICA.

*Venerabilibus Fratribus, Patriarchis, Primatibus, Archiepiscopis et  
Episcopis Universis Catholicæ Orbis, gratiam et communionem  
cum Apostolica Sede habentibus.*

LEO PP. XIII.

VENERABILES FRATRES SALUTEM ET APOSTOLICAM BENEDICTIONEM.

QUOD Apostolici muneris ratio a Nobis postulabat, iam inde a Pontificatus Nostri principio, Litteris encyclicis ad vos datis, Venerabiles Fratres, indicare haud prætermisimus lethiferam pestem, quæ per artus intimos humanæ societatis serpit, eamque in extremum discrimen adducit: simul etiam remedia efficacissima demonstravimus, quibus ad salutem revocari, et gravissima quæ impendent pericula possit evadere. Sed ea quæ tunc deploravimus mala usque adeo brevi increverunt, ut rursus ad vos verba convertere cogamur, Propheta velut aurbis Nostris insonante: *Clama ne cesses, exalta quasi tuba vocem tuam.*\* Nullo autem negotio intelligitis, Venerabiles Fratres, Nos de illa hominum secta loqui, qui diversis ac pene barbaris nominibus *Socialistæ, Communistæ* vel *Nihilistæ* appellantur, quique per universum orbem diffusi, et iniquo inter se foedere arctissime colligati, non amplius ab occultorum conventuum tenebris præsidium quaerunt, sed palam fidenterque in lucem prodeuntes, quod iampridem inierunt consilium cuiuslibet civilis societatis fundamenta convellendi, perficere adnituntur. Ii nimirum sunt, qui, prout divina testantur eloquia, *carnem quidem maculant, dominationem spernunt, maiestatem blasphemant.*† Nihil, quod humanis divinisque legibus ad vitæ incolumitatem et decus sapienter decretum est, intactum vel integrum relinquunt. Sublimioribus potestatibus, quibus, Apostolo monente, omnem animam decet esse subiectam, quæque a Deo ius imperandi mutuantur, obedientiam detrectant, et perfectam omnium hominum in iuribus et officiis prædicant aequalitatem.—Naturalem viri ac mulieris unionem, gentibus vel barbaris sacram, dehonestant; eiusque vinculum, quo domestica societas principaliter continetur, infirmant aut etiam libidini permittunt.—Praesentium tandem bonorum illecti cupiditate quæ *radix est omnium malorum et quam quidam appetentes erraverunt a fide,*‡ ius proprietatis naturali lege sanctitum impugnant; et per immane facinus, cum omnium hominum necessitatibus consulere et

\* Is. lviii. 1.

† Iud. Epis. v. 8.

‡ 1 Tim. vi. 10.



desideriis satisfacere videantur, quidquid aut legitimae hereditatis titulo, aut ingenii manuumque labore, aut victus parsimonia acquisitum est, rapere et commune habere contendunt. Atque haec quidem opinionum portenta in eorum conventibus publicant, libellis persuadent, ephemeridum nube in vulgus spargunt. Ex quo verenda Regum maiestas et imperium tantam seditiosae plebis subiit invidiam, ut nefarii proditores, omnis freni impatientes, non semel, brevi temporis intervallo, in ipsos regnorum Principes, impio ausu, arma converterint.

Haec autem perfidorum hominum audacia, quae civili consortio graviore in dies ruinas minitatur, et omnium animos sollicita trepidatione percellit, causam et originem ab iis venenatis doctrinis repetit, quae superioribus temporibus tamquam vitiosa semina medios inter populos diffusae, tam pestiferos suo tempore fructus dederunt. Probe enim nostis, Venerabiles Fratres, infensissimum bellum, quod in catholicam fidem inde a saeculo decimo sexto a Novatoribus commotum est, et quam maxime in dies hucusque invaluit, eo tendere ut, omni revelatione submota et quolibet supernaturali ordine subverso, solius rationis inventis, seu potius deliramentis, aditus pateret. Eiusmodi error, qui perperam a ratione sibi nomen usurpat, cum excellendi appetentiam naturaliter homini insertam pelliciat et acuat, omnisque generis cupiditatibus laxet habenas, sponte sua non modo plurimorum hominum mentes, sed civilem etiam societatem latissime pervasit. Hinc nova quadam impietate, ipsis vel ethnicis inaudita, respublicae constitutae sunt, nulla Dei et ordinis ab eo praestituti habita ratione: publicam auctoritatem nec principium, nec maiestatem, nec vim imperandi a Deo sumere dictitatum est, sed potius a populi multitudine; quae ab omni divina sanctione solutam se aestimans, iis solummodo legibus subesse passa est, quas ipsa ad libitum tulisset.—Supernaturalibus fidei veritatibus, tamquam rationi inimicis, impugnatis et reiectis, ipse humani generis Auctor ac Redemptor a studiorum Universitatibus, Lyceis et Gymnasiis, atque ab omni publica humanae vitae consuetudine sensim et paulatim exulare cogitur.—Futurae tandem aeternaeque vitae praemiis ac poenis oblivioni traditis, felicitatis ardens desiderium intra praesentis temporis spatium definitum est.—Hisce doctrinis longe lateque disseminatis, hac tanta cogitandi agendique licentia ubique parta, mirum non est quod infimae sortis homines, pauperculae domus vel officinae pertaesi, in aedes et fortunas ditiorum involare discupiant; mirum non est quod nulla iam publicae privataeque vitae tranquillitas consistat, et ad extremam perniciem humanum genus iam pene devenerit.

Supremi autem Ecclesiae Pastores, quibus dominici gregis ab hostium insidiis tutandi munus incumbit, mature periculum avertere et fidelium saluti consulere studuerunt. Ut enim primum conflari coeperunt clandestinae societates, quarum sinu errorum, quos memoravimus, semina iam tum fovebantur, Romani Pontifices Clemens XII et Benedictus XIV impia sectarum consilia detegere et de pernicie, quae latenter instrueretur, totius orbis fideles admonere non praetermiserunt. Postquam vero ab iis, qui philosophorum nomine gloria-

bantur, effrenis quaedam libertas homini attributa est, et ius novum, ut aiunt, contra naturalem divinamque legem confingi et sanciri coeptum est. fel. mem. Pius Papa VI statim iniquam earum doctrinarum indolem et falsitatem publicis documentis ostendit; simulque apostolica providentia ruinas praedixit, ad quas plebs misere decepta raperetur.—Sed cum nihilominus nulla efficaci ratione cautum fuerit ne prava earum dogmata magis in dies populis persuaderentur, neve in publica regnorum scita evaderent, Pius PP. VII et Leo PP. XII occultas sectas anathemate damnarunt, atque iterum de periculo, quod ab illis impendebat, societatem admonuerunt.—Omnibus denique manifestum est quibus gravissimis verbis et quanta animi firmitate ac constantia gloriosus Decessor Noster Pius IX f. m., sive allocutionibus habitis, sivi Litteris encyclicis ad totius orbis Episcopos datis, tum contra iniqua sectarum conamina, tum nominatim contra iam ex ipsis erumpentem Socialismi pestem dimicaverit.

Dolendum autem est eos, quibus communis boni cura demandata est, impiorum hominum fraudibus circumventos et minis perterritos in Ecclesiam semper suspicioso vel etiam iniquo animo fuisse, non intelligentes sectarum conatus in irritum cessuros, si catholicae Ecclesiae doctrina, Romanorumque Pontificum auctoritas, et penes principes et penes populos, debito semper in honore mansisset. *Ecclesia* namque *Dei vivi*, quae *columna est et firmamentum veritatis*,\* eas doctrinas et praecepta tradit, quibus Societatis incolumitati et quieti apprime prospicitur, et nefasta Socialismi propago radicitus evellitur.

Quamquam enimvero Socialistae ipso Evangelio abutentes, ad male cautos facilius decipiendos, illud ad suam sententiam detorquere consueverint, tamen tanta est inter eorum prava dogmata et purissimam Christi doctrinam dissensio, ut nulla maior existat: *Quae enim participatio iustitiae cum iniquitate? aut quae societas lucis ad tenebras?*† Ii profecto dictitare non desinunt, ut innuimus, omnes homines esse inter se natura aequales, ideoque contendunt nec maiestati honorem ac reverentiam, nec legibus, nisi forte ab ipsis ad placitum sancitis, obedientiam deberi.—Contra vero, ex Evangelicis documentis, ea est hominum aequalitas, ut omnes eamden naturam sortiti, ad eandem filiorum Dei celsissimam dignitatem vocentur, simulque ut uno eodemque fine omnibus praestituto, singuli secundum eandem legem iudicandi sint, poenas aut mercedem pro merito consecuturi. Inaequalitas tamen iuris et potestatis ab ipso naturae Auctore dimanat, *ex quo omnis paternitas in caelis et in terra nominatur*.‡ Principum catholicam et subditorum animi mutuis officiis et iuribus, secundum catholicam doctrinam ac praecepta, ita devinciuntur, ut et imperandi temperetur libido, et obedientiae ratio facilis, firma et nobilissima efficiatur.

Sane Ecclesia subiectae multitudini Apostolicum praeceptum iugiter inculcat: *Non est potestas nisi a Deo; quae autem sunt, a Deo ordinata sunt. Itaque qui resistit potestati, Dei ordinationi resistit: qui autem resistunt ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt.* Atque iterum necessitate

\* 1 Tim. iii, 15

† 2 Cor. vi. 14.

‡ Ad Eph. iii. 15.

*subditos esse iubet non solum propter iram, sed etiam propter conscientiam; et omnibus debita reddere, cui tributum tributum, cui vectigal vectigal, cui timorem timorem, cui honorem honorem.\* Siquidem qui creavit et gubernat omnia, provida sua sapientia disposuit, ut infima per media, media per summa ad suos quaeque fines perveniant. Sicut igitur in ipso regno caelesti Angelorum choros voluit esse distinctos aliosque aliis subiectos; sicut etiam in Ecclesia varios instituit ordinum gradus, officiorumque diversitatem, ut non omnes essent Apostoli, non omnes Pastores;† ita etiam constituit in civili societate plures esse ordines, dignitate, iuribus, potestate diversos; quo scilicet civitas, quemadmodum Ecclesia, unum esset corpus, multa membra complectens, alia aliis nobiliora, sed cuncta sibi invicem necessaria et de communi bono sollicita.*

At vero ut populorum rectores potestate sibi concessa in aedificationem et non in destructionem utantur, Ecclesia Christi opportunissime monet etiam Principibus supremi iudicis severitatem imminere; et divinae Sapientiae verba usurpans, Dei nomine omnibus inclamat: *Praebete aures vos qui continetis multitudines et placetis vobis in turbis nationum; quoniam data est a Domino potestas vobis et virtus ab Altissimo, qui interrogabit opera vestra et cogitationes scrutabitur . . . . Quoniam iudicium durissimum his qui praesunt fiet. . . . Non enim subtrahet personam cuiusquam Deus, nec verebitur magnitudinem cuiusquam; quoniam pusillum et magnum ipse fecit, et aequaliter cura est illi de omnibus. Fortioribus autem fortior instat cruciatio.‡ Si tamen quandoque contingat temere et ultra modum publicam a Principibus potestatem exerceri, catholicae Ecclesiae doctrina in eos insurgere proprio Marte non sinit, ne ordinis tranquillitas magis magisque turbetur, neve societas maius exinde detrimentum capiat. Cumque res eo devenerit ut nulla alia spes salutis affulgeat, docet christianae patentiae meritis et instantibus ad Deum precibus remedium esse maturandum.—Quod si legislatorum ac principum placita aliquid sanciverint aut iusserint quod divinae aut naturali legi repugnet, christiani nominis dignitas et officium atque Apostolica sententia suadent obediendum esse magis Deo quam hominibus.§*

Salutarem porro Ecclesiae virtutem, quae in civilis societatis ordinatissimum regimen et conservationem redundat, ipsa etiam domestica societas, quae omnis civitatis et regni principium est, necessario sentit et experitur. Nostis enim, Venerabiles Fratres, rectam huius societatis rationem, secundum naturalis iuris necessitatem, in indissolubili viri ac mulieris unione primo inniti, et mutuis parentes inter et filios, dominos ac servos officiis iuribusque compleri. Nostis etiam per Socialismi placita eam pene dissolvi; siquidem firmitate amissa, quae ex religioso coniugio in ipsam refunditur, necesse est ipsam patris in prolem potestatem, et prolis erga genitores officia maxime relaxari. Contra vero *honorabile in omnibus connubium,*|| quod in ipso mundi exordio ad humanam speciem propagandam et conservandam Deus

\* Rom. xiii.    † 1 Cor. xii.    ‡ Sap. vi.    § Act. v. 29.    || Heb. xiii.

ipse instituit et inseparabile decrevit, firmitus etiam et sanctius Ecclesia docet evasisse per Christum, qui Sacramenti ei contulit dignitatem, et suae cum Ecclesia unionis formam voluit referre. Quapropter, Apostolo monente,\* sicut Christus caput est Ecclesiae, ita vir caput est mulieris; ita quemadmodum Ecclesia subiecta est Christo, qui eam castissimo perpetuoque amore complectitur, ita et mulieres viris suis decet esse subiectas, ab ipsis vicissim fidei constantique affectu diligendas.—Similiter patriae atque herilis potestatis ita Ecclesia rationem moderatur, ut ad filios ac famulos in officio continendos valeat, nec tamen praeter modum excrescat. Secundum namque catholica documenta, in parentes et dominos caelestis Patris ac Domini dimanat auctoritas; quae ideo ab ipso non solum originem ac vim sumit, sed etiam naturam et indolem necesse est mutuetur. Hinc liberos Apostolus hortatur obedire parentibus suis in Domino, et honorare patrem suum et matrem suam, quod est mandatum primum in promissione.† Parentibus autem mandat: *Et vos, putres, nolite ad iracundiam provocare filios vestros, sed educate illos in disciplina et correptione Domini.*‡ Rursus autem servis ac dominis per eundem Apostolum divinum praeceptum proponitur, ut illi quidem obediant dominis carnalibus sicut Christo . . . cum bona voluntate servientes sicut Domino: isti autem remittant minas, scientes quia omnium Dominus est in caelis et personarum acceptio non est apud Deum.§—Quae quidem omnia si secundum divinae voluntatis placitum diligenter a singulis, ad quos pertinet, servarentur, quaelibet profecto familia caelestis domus imaginem quandam prae se ferret, et praeclara exinde beneficia parta, non intra domesticos tantum parietes sese continerent, sed in ipsas respublicas uberrime dimanarent.

Publicae autem ac domesticae tranquillitati catholica sapientia, naturalis divinaeque legis praeceptis suffulta, consultissime providit etiam per ea quae sentit ac docet de iure dominii et partitione bonorum quae ad vitae necessitatem et utilitatem sunt comparata. Cum enim Socialistae ius proprietatis tamquam humanum inventum, naturali hominum aequalitati repugnans traducant, et communionem bonorum affectantes, pauperiem haud aequo animo esse perferendam, et ditiorum possessiones ac iura impune violari posse arbitrentur; Ecclesia multo satius et utilius inaequalitatem inter homines, corporis ingenique viribus naturaliter diversos, etiam in bonis possidendis agnoscit, et ius proprietatis ac dominii, ab ipsa natura profectum, intactum cuilibet et inviolatum esse iubet; novit enim furtum ac rapinam a Deo, omnis iuris auctore ac vindice, ita fuisse prohibita, ut aliena vel concupiscere non liceat, furesque et raptores, non secus ac adulteri et idololatrae, a caelesti regno excludantur.—Nec tamen ideo pauperum curam negligit, aut ipsorum necessitatibus consulere pia mater praetermittit: quin imo materno illos complectens affectu, et probe noscens eos gerere ipsius Christi personam, qui sibi praestitum beneficium putat, quod vel in minimum pauperem a quopiam fuerit collatum, magno

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\* Ad Eph. v.    † Ad Eph. v. 1, 2.    ‡ Ibid. vi. 4.    § Ibid. v. 5, 6, 7.

illos habet in honore: omni qua potest ope sublevat; domos atque hospitia iis excipiendis, alendis et curandis ubique terrarum curat erigenda, eaque in suam recipit tutelam. Gravissimo divites urget praecepto, ut quod superest pauperibus tribuant; eosque divino terret iudicio, quo, nisi egenorum inopiae succurrant, aeternis sint suppliciis mulctandi. Tandem pauperum animos maxime recreat ac solatur, sive exemplum Christi obiciens, qui *cum esset dives propter nos egenus factus est*;\* sive eiusdem verba recolens, quibus pauperes beatos edixit et aeternae beatitudinis praemia sperare iussit.—Quis autem non videat optimam hanc esse vetustissimi inter pauperes et divites dissidii componendi rationem? Sicut enim ipsa rerum factorumque evidentia demonstrat, ea ratione reiecta aut posthabita, alterutrum contingat necesse est, ut vel maxima humani generis pars in turpissimam mancipiorum conditionem relabatur, quae diu penes ethnicos obtinuit; aut humana societas continuè sit agitanda motibus, rapinis ac latrociniiis funestanda, prout recentibus etiam temporibus contigisse dolemus.

Quae cum ita sint, Venerabiles Fratres, Nos, quibus modo totius Ecclesiae regimen incumbit, sicut a Pontificatus exordiis populis ac Principibus dira tempestate iactatis portum commonstravimus quo se tutissime reciperent; ita nunc extremo, quod instat, periculo commoti Apostolicam vocem ad eos rursus attollimus; eosque per propriam ipsorum ac reipublicae salutem iterum iterumque precamur, obtestantes, ut Ecclesiam, de publica regnorum prosperitate tam egregie meritam, magistram recipiant et audiant; planeque sentiant, rationes regni et religionis ita esse coniunctas, ut quantum de hac detrahitur, tantum de subditorum officio et de imperii maiestate decedat. Et cum ad Socialismi pestem avertendam tantam Ecclesiae Christi virtutem noverint inesse, quanta nec humanis legibus inest, nec magistratuum cohibitionibus, nec militum armis, ipsam Ecclesiam in eam tandem conditionem libertatemque restituant, qua saluberrimam vim suam in totius humanae societatis commodum possit exerere.

Vos autem, Venerabiles Fratres, qui ingruentium malorum originem et indolem perspectam habetis, in id toto animi nisu ac contentione incumbite, ut catholica doctrina in omnium animos inseratur atque alte descendat. Satagite ut vel a teneris annis omnes assuescant Deum filiali amore complecti, ejusque numen vereri; Principum legumque maiestati obsequium praestare; a cupiditatibus temperare, et ordinem quem Deus sive in civili sive in domestica societate constituit, diligenter custodire. Insuper adlaboretis oportet ut Ecclesiae catholicae filii neque nomen dare, neque abominatae sectae favere ulla ratione audeant: quin imo, per egregia facinora et honestam in omnibus agendi rationem ostendant, quam bene feliciterque humana consisteret societas, si singula membra recte factis et virtutibus praefulgerent.—Tandem cum Socialismi sectatores ex hominum genere potissimum quaerantur qui artes exercent vel operas locant, quique laborum forte

pertaesi divitiarum spe ac bonorum promissione facillime alliciuntur, opportunum videtur artificum atque opificum societates fovere, quae sub religionis tutela constitutae omnes socios sua sorte contentos operumque patientes efficiant, et ad quietam ac tranquillam vitam agendam inducant.

Nostris autem vestrisque coeptis, Venerabiles Fratres, Ille aspiret, cui omnis boni principium et exitum acceptum referre cogimur.—Caeterum in spem praesentissimi auxilii ipsa Nos horum dierum erigit ratio, quibus Domini Natalis dies anniversaria celebritate recolitur. Quam enim Christus nascens senescenti iam mundo et in malorum extrema pene dilapso novam intulit salutem, eam nos quoque sperare iubet; pacemque, quam tunc per Angelos hominibus nuntiavit, nobis etiam se daturum promisit. Neque enim *abbreviata est manus Domini ut salvare nequeat, neque aggravata est auris ejus ut non exaudiat.\** His igitur auspicatissimis diebus Vobis, Venerabiles Fratres, et fidelibus Ecclesiarum vestrarum fausta omnia ac laeta ominantes, bonorum omnium Datorem enixe precamur, ut  *rursum hominibus appareat benignitas et humanitas Salvatoris nostri Dei,†* qui nos ab infensissimi hostis potestate ereptos in nobilissimam filiorum transtulit dignitatem. —Atque ut citius ac plenius voti compotes simus, fervidas ad Deum preces et ipsi Nobiscum adhibete, Venerabiles Fratres; et B. Virginis Mariae ab origine Immaculatae, ejusque Sponsi Josephi ac beatorum Apostolorum Petri et Pauli, quorum suffragiis maxime confidimus, patriocinium interponite.—Interim autem, divinorum munerum auspiciem Apostolicam Benedictionem, intimo cordis affectu, Vobis, Venerabiles Fratres, vestroque Klero ac fidelibus populis universis in Domino impertimur.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum, die 28 Decembris 1878.

Pontificatus Nostri Anno Primo.

LEO PP. XIII.

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\* Is. lix. 1.

† Tit. iii. 4.



## Science Notices.

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### (GEOGRAPHICAL EXPLORATIONS, DISCOVERIES, &c.)

**African Expeditions.**—There are no less than nineteen at the present moment at work in different parts of Africa. Of these, four are purely Catholic—namely, two bodies of French Missioners, who have been terribly harassed on their way to Lake Tanganyika and Uganda, and the Jesuit and Trappist Fathers, who are about to penetrate the interior from the Cape. The Abbé Debaize travels not as a missioner, but as a French explorer, having received 4000*l.* for his journey from the French Government, on condition that he should explore and not preach. He has now reached the last point from which there is any chance of communication with him, and he intends to strike across the Congo, and to explore the blank space on the map to the South of the Soudan.

Two other projects are on foot which will have important consequences if they are realised. The King of the Belgians and a number of merchants and capitalists have engaged Stanley and a party of explorers and traders to open up the Congo, and by peaceful efforts to establish trade along the banks of that river.

On the east coast the Sultan of Zanzibar has offered to an English Company the right to levy all taxes on imports and exports, as also a land revenue within his dominions, on the condition that he receive a certain moderate annual revenue. Mr. Jenkins, M.P., and Captain Foot, R.N., are endeavouring to interest British capitalists in the undertaking. They promise large returns, as the country over which the Sultan has influence, extending to the lakes, is very productive. A railway, of 500 miles in length, is part of the scheme. The goodwill of King Mtesa has also been secured. This royal savage is said to prefer a route to Europe by Zanzibar, to that of the Nile, and he has promised to honour this country by sending representatives or ambassadors to it. This Zanzibar scheme, however, does not appear to us to be very promising. The territory which it covers is as large as India, and, according to the estimate of Mr. Holmwood, one of her Majesty's Assistant Consuls, the entire population of savages cannot exceed fifteen millions. A number of the Protestant missionary parties are now established on the Great Lakes, the Arabs are beginning to disappear with the slave-trade, and the Abbé Debaize reports that Mpwapwa, a strategical point in the mountains of the same name in the Usagara country, through which all routes pass to Unuamuesi, is in the hands of English missioners, who had built for themselves four good stone houses, though they had not been there over six months. There can be no doubt but that English influence is growing in this direction.

**The Soudan.**—The Soudan, no doubt, will afford to European commerce the largest and best market in Africa, if convenient access can be obtained to it. At present all goods have to be carried for thousands of miles upon camels, and each camel carries on an average only about 50*l.* worth of merchandise. The population of the Soudan is more civilised and settled than that of any other district of Central Africa; and it is computed at from forty to sixty or seventy millions—the French say eighty millions. The French Societies of Commerical Geography have fixed their mind on securing this market for France. M. de Lesseps has affirmed that it naturally belongs to France. M. Gazeau de Vautibault says, in his remarkable report upon the Soudan—"All the Powers have their eye upon the great market of the Soudan, which virtually belongs to France, through her possessions on both coasts of the Mediterranean, and through her colony of Senegal." M. Duponchel has recently published a work of 371 pages on the communication to be opened with the Soudan, entitled *Le Chemin de Fer Trans-Saharien*. The proposed line is to run from Algiers to Laghonat, and thence to the Niger; the rough estimate of the cost is about 20,000,000*l.* The project has been discussed in several of the Geographical Societies, but the general feeling is that the enterprise is not possible at present. M. Duponchel's work contains much interesting and important information as to the character of the inhabitants of the Sahara, and on the resources which the proposed railroad company could count upon. He does not think that much has to be feared from the opposition of the natives. There is a rival plan started by the German Geographical Society, which has sent out Herr Gerhard Rohlfs. He is starting from Tripoli; thence he will proceed across the Sahara by a route familiar to himself and to Dr. Nachtigal, touching at Sogua and at Kufarah, thence to Wadai, one of the kingdoms of the Soudan, then to Lake Chad, and along the Sharri river, and finally across the unexplored and blank space in our maps to the Congo. The German plan of a railway from Tripoli to Lake Chad must be considered for the present to belong to the same category as the French scheme to unite Algiers by rail with Timbuctoo, though the latter is the more possible. The Reichstag has voted 125,000*fr.* for Herr Rohlfs's expenses. Meanwhile, M. Soleillet, another French explorer, is travelling from Senegal through the Soudan with a view to uniting Senegal and Algeria by railroad. M. de Lesseps has proposed to the French Government to establish telegraphic communication between these two distant French colonies; when it shall have been proved possible to preserve a telegraphic communication, the railroad schemes will have entered upon a new phase. The natives of the Sahara are not unfavourable to the telegraphic wire; they find that their camels make better speed when they follow the route of the telegraph. We may mention that the telegraph has now been established between Cairo and a point on the Equator, under the general direction of Gordon Pasha.

The Society of Geography of France has formed a Committee, composed of representatives from all the French Geographical Societies, to

stimulate expeditions to the Soudan. Three expeditions are to start from Algeria, Senegal, and the Niger, and they are to meet at Timbuctoo.

While France and Germany are busy with plans and adventures to secure to themselves the trade of the Soudan, England is not altogether inactive. Mr. Donald Mackenzie has gone to Cape Juby, on the north-west coast of Africa, to complete his arrangements with the Berbers, who do all the carrying trade between the Soudan and Morocco. He has taken out a wooden house in pieces, which he is to erect on the coast near Cape Juby, and upon this house he will run up the English flag. He has a large cargo of merchandise, which will be quickly and easily disposed of to the Berbers, with whom he is already on excellent terms. The Berbers, who are a civilised and intelligent race, are only too well pleased to abandon Morocco for England, and there is every reason to suppose that the Soudan trade will, after all, fall entirely into the hands of England, and not into those of France or Germany. The English Government has determined to appoint a Consul to Cape Juby as soon as Mr. Mackenzie has established himself there.

**New Guinea or Papua.**—New Guinea was so called from the resemblance of its race to the natives of the Guinea Coast on the west of Africa; Papua is a Malay term, signifying frizzled like wool, from the extraordinary mops of woolly hair peculiar to its inhabitants. There are, however, radical differences between the Papuans and the African negroes. The former have aquiline noses, the forehead flat and retreating, and the mouth large. It is curious that woolly-haired people should be found in so far apart places as Africa and Papua, and in scarcely any other part of the world. Signor L. M. D'Alberty is the great explorer of New Guinea, and he recently read an interesting paper on his adventures before the Royal Geographical Society. New Guinea has a special interest, from the fact that a strong desire has been expressed to annex it to Australia as a British possession. It is the largest island in the world, considerably exceeding Borneo in its length and area. At one time, no doubt, it formed a part of Australia, and Signor D'Alberty says that the growth of polypus and coral in the narrow and shallow channel (80 miles) of the Torres Straits will in time re-unite it with Australia geographically. Gold has been found on the Goldie River, near Port Moresby, and emigrants from Australia are eagerly risking their lives in the hope of finding fortunes in New Guinea. Signor D'Alberty was attracted to New Guinea as a naturalist. His chief desire was to secure specimens of birds of paradise, for which this island is the most famous in the world. His first visit was to the north of the island, to the Arfak range. Our explorer discovered the true localities and birthplace of the handsomest species of birds of paradise—and this, as well as having made a good impression on the natives, seems to have been a most abundant reward. The natives of the southern part of the main island are intelligent, and possess many good qualities.

The fact that within the last twelve months the crews of three vessels from Cooktown have been murdered, and, it is said, *eaten* by the inhabitants of Booker Island, is not altogether promising. Fortunately all the tribes are not alike.

If mineral is discovered in any large quantity, there will be a future for the southern part of the main island. But as to the neighbourhood of the Fly River, Signor D'Albertis does not believe that a European could live there. "Leaving aside," he says, "the importance which New Guinea may acquire from its mineral resources, which are, however, not yet ascertained, we must for the present be content to regard it as the country of the birds of paradise." For ourselves, however, we cannot so leave it, but while we know it to be inhabited by our fellow-creatures, we must pray and plan and labour till salvation be carried even to them.

Signor D'Albertis has been awarded the medal of the Italian Geographical Society, and he fully deserves it.

**Sabak, a new British Colony in Borneo.**—A British steamer, *America*, left England for Borneo little more than a year ago, representing the interests of an English Company. Baron von Overbeck, the head of the expedition, had entered into negotiations with the Sultan of Brunei, by which the Company becomes possessed of the entire northern portion of Borneo, from Kimanis river northwards, comprising the magnificent harbour of Gaza Bay as well as Ambong and Maludu bays. The Baron next sailed with the Governor of Labuan and Consul-General for Borneo, to the island of Sulu, where he induced the Sultan of that island to cede to him his rights and possessions on the east coast of Borneo. The *Straits Times*, published at Singapore, says that this vast territory, which has now become English property, "possesses the only good harbours in the whole of Borneo, being endowed with a most salubrious climate, and forming, in a mineral and agricultural point of view, the richest portion of this great and fine" island. The Baron, by order of the Sultan, was proclaimed Maharajah of Sabak—(Sabak is the Malay term for the whole of North Borneo)—and Rajah of Sandakan; he has also been named British Vice-Consul for the district. The Baron ascended the river Kinabatangan, 230 miles into the interior of the country, which he describes as wonderfully rich. As yet we have no information as to the natives of the interior. But it is hoped that Father Quarteron will not be long before he has missionaries established in this new British possession, of which we shall soon hear more.

**Arctic Expeditions.**—Professor Nordenskiöld has, so far, failed to reach Behring Straits, and is fast in the ice somewhere to the north of that point. A train, drawn by dogs, has been despatched to him over land and ice with provisions, and a ship of war is working her way to the Straits to render him assistance. The *Vega* is a strongly built sailing vessel, and it is thought that she will be safe enough, if provisions have not run out.

With regard to Arctic explorations, the chief northern explorers of the Royal Geographical Society have agreed upon the following canons:—"Stick to the land floe,"—*i.e.*, hug the land ice and not the drift pack: "Stick to the Western shore," the Eastern exposure being always the colder and more obstinate. The next expedition to the North Pole should be along the Western coast of Franz-Josef Land. It trends for an unknown distance North. It is proposed to form a station as far North as possible next summer, and then in the following summer to proceed as much farther as possible. There is a strong feeling in favour of further British Arctic exploring. Next to Russia, England is the greatest Arctic Power in the world. And, as Lord Dufferin said, though from the happy absence of crime in the neighbourhood of the North Pole, the Canadian Government had not had occasion to establish judges there, it should not be forgotten that the Queen's writ now runs to the North Pole, and that the least this country could do would be to examine its territorial boundaries.

#### BOOKS OF TRAVEL.

*Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates.* By Lady ANNE BLUNT. Edited, with a Preface and some Account of the Arabs and their Horses, by W. S. B. 2 vols. With Map and Sketches by the Author. John Murray, London, 1879.

THREE things strike us in these two volumes, first, that they are beautifully illustrated, and this is a considerable attraction; secondly, that no one has ever told us so much about the Bedouin tribes of the Euphrates before, and, we might add, about Arab horses; and, thirdly, the genuineness of the narrative. We miss, however, the warmth of a poetic glow and enthusiasm which we might have expected in a book written by a lady who had traversed the Bedouin desert on horseback. The work is a very positive diary of events.

Lady Anne Blunt and her husband started from Alexandretta in December, 1877. They rode down the Valley of the Euphrates to Bagdad, then up the Tigris to Sherghat, and thence across the desert to Beyrout. The journey was supposed to be full of peril, and all their friends endeavoured to dissuade them from making it, but Lady Anne was not to be deterred. She and her husband and little suite made friends with the tribes wherever they went. Courage and frankness won them the goodwill of every one, and probably the rareness of such a visit from tribe to tribe had also its effect. The Bedouins, however, always *give* hospitalities; it is a first duty, and nothing is so sinful in their eyes as to rob or insult a guest. "Even an enemy, if he have once dismounted and touched the rope of a single tent, is safe." Lady Anne's experiences are all the more valuable because so entirely new. Many travellers have told us of the Tigris and the Euphrates, but none, in modern days, of the life that is led in Mesopotamia, and of its products. As to the religion of the Bedouins, Lady Anne assures us that they have simply none beyond the axiom that

God exists. "God is God, they say, and it very simply expresses all that they know of Him. Who and what and where He is, has not, I should think, ever been so much as discussed among them. Prayer as an outward act of religion is not practised by the pure Bedouins. With the belief in God, religion in the desert ends. The Bedouin never thinks of death, and believes that we utterly perish in the grave." Lady Anne accounts for this absence of religion partly by the life led in the desert. "A life," she says, "spent in the open air, a thoroughly healthy condition of body, a sparse diet, and hard exercise are not conducive to serious thought. . . . We ourselves had ample proof of this during our travels. Our minds were busy all day long with things before us. Of the past and of the future we thought little, but of our immediate prospects of dinner much." Then the Bedouins always die in their first sickness, always live in society, are never alone, and are nearly always moving.

As to their morals and their notions of honesty, Lady Anne says they are saints compared to the Turkish, or even to the common European type.

If her ladyship is a little "horsey," we suppose that this affection for horses, or, as she always calls them, "mares," is attributable in part to the Bedouin life she has led, or to Bedouin tastes contracted in the desert. We can safely recommend these two volumes as containing much that is new and interesting.

*Through Asiatic Turkey. Narrative of a Journey from Bombay to the Bosphorus.* By GRATTAN GEARY. With Maps and Illustrations. Two vols. Sampson Low & Co., London.

MR. GEARY has looked at the world like a man of the world; and his two volumes of travel from Bombay to Constantinople, passing, as he did, up the Persian Gulf, along the Tigris, through the chief cities and towns of Mesopotamia, are as entertaining as they are instructive. The pearl fisheries are well described. The whole question of a railway—which must come—to connect Alexandretta with Bagdad, and Bagdad with our Eastern empire, is gone into and considered from its various points of view.

Mr. Geary has a good deal to say in the second volume on the relative position and work of the different Rites in the East, of the Latin Church, and of the American (who are the chief Protestant) missionaries. He writes without any anti-Catholic leaning, but as he has been dependant upon the informants he has chanced to come across, we cannot venture to place reliance on all his narratives.

Lady Anne Blunt's account of the Bedouins, and Mr. Geary's account of the river and towns of Mesopotamia, taking them both together, though as different in style and feeling one from the other as possible, make up a very readable, and, no doubt, a more valuable account of this wonderful land than any other that is accessible to the English public.



*On Horseback through Asia Minor.* By CAPTAIN BURNABY. Seventh Edition. Sampson Low & Co., 1878.

CAPTAIN BURNABY'S "Ride to Khiva" has made his name as an author of travels. The ride through Asia Minor is not so fascinating, for it does not contain the same adventure, nor does it deal directly with as burning a question. But it is a chatty, gossipy, amusing account of all the various people he met with, and contains, perhaps, rather too much of the thoughts and sayings of his faithful servant, Radford.

The book must be taken for what it is worth—an account of the every-day life of a man who is always riding on, and who has the knack of drawing out people's views. It is strongly coloured by an anti-Russian feeling, and must not be looked to as a profound or scientific account of anybody or of anything. Still, it is a book to read, for it brings us into social relation with the people of Asia Minor.

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*From Kulja, across the Tian Shan to Lob-Nor.* By Colonel N. PREJEVALSKY. With Introduction by Sir T. DOUGLAS FORSYTH, C.B., and Maps. Sampson Low & Co., London, 1879.

COLONEL PREJEVALSKY'S account of his expedition to Lob-Nor is one of the books of travel we recommend to any one who desires to obtain a correct idea of this part of Turkestan. The writer ranks as perhaps the most intelligent and most daring of Russian explorers. And now that he has started far on another journey in Central Asia, which will last two years, interest in the traveller increases. Colonel Prejevalsky is a scientific explorer, not a mere amateur, or a book-maker. He is not diffuse, and all his remarks are to the point. He has practically discovered regions and populations which had fallen out of the world's mind. The valley of the Tarim, the position of Lob-Nor, the lofty range of mountains, rising 15,000 feet high, that back it on the south, the flowers, birds, beasts and men that are found in these regions, from which the Huns originally sprung, are all illustrated and made known, at least to a greater extent than they were known before, in the simple narrative of the Russian soldier.

Baron Rechthofen, himself a famous traveller in China, gives to this volume an interesting review and criticism of Colonel Prejevalsky's work, to which the Colonel adds a reply. The lakes, too, of Central Asia are made the subject of separate chapters, and an account of the Staroversti of Siberia cannot fail to instruct and interest.

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#### NEW MAPS.

The latest and best map of *Africa*\* is that just published by Messrs. Keith Johnston. It is on the scale of 116 geographical miles to the

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\* General Map of Africa, constructed from the most recent Coast Surveys, and embodying the results of all explorations up to the present time, 1879. W. & A. K. Johnston, Edinburgh.

inch, and is very clear and precise. Its geographical knowledge comes down to probably the last eight or ten months. No one pretending to a scientific interest in Africa can afford to be without either this or Dr. Chavanne's map of Africa, and of the two Keith Johnston's is the more recent and the more accurate.

The most useful map of *Afghanistan*\* is one published by Mr. Wyld. The researches of the Russians have been made use of, and it is a decided improvement on Colonel Walker's map of Turkestan.

Of *Zululand* there are two maps† which are much alike, one published by Messrs. Keith Johnston, and the other by Mr. Wyld. Neither is exact, and no map of that country, which is known to us only by reports and most desultory observations of travellers, can be at present exact, or entirely reliable. Mr. Johnston has not ventured, like Mr. Wyld, on drawing the mountains of the country. Our readers, however, cannot go far wrong in taking either map if they desire to follow the course of events in Zululand.

F.R.G.S.

## Notices of Catholic Continental Periodicals.

### FRENCH AND BELGIAN PERIODICALS.

**A**SCETICISM and Pathology" is the title of an interesting article by Père de Bonniot in the *Études Religieuses, Philosophiques, &c.*, for December, 1878. Asceticism, he says, is approved of by the Church: it is disapproved of by many modern authors. If you believe them, Asceticism brings with it many evils. Worst of all, it is the most fertile source of that fearful malady, hysteria. They do not say that it always produces the gravest crises; but it prepares for them; it favours the development of what they call the "hysterical temperament." We are almost ashamed to reproduce what M. A. Maury says: "The delirium of an hysterical woman breaks forth in every page of the *Revelations* of S. Gertrude"—but it expresses the sentiment of certain scientific men on this subject. The subjective conditions of hysteria are, according to Briquet, two: an extraordinary aptitude of the nerves to experience painful (*dououreux*) impressions, and secondly, an equal difficulty in reacting against them. The two conditions are essential; one is not enough without the other. So says science. But of course temperament is simply nature; its tendencies can, however, be developed and they can be moderated. Asceticism either develops or moderates them. We desire to know which.

The accusation is that it develops them. Piety, it is objected,

\* Military Staff Map of Central Asia and Afghanistan. Scale 27 geographical miles to the inch. 1878. James Wyld, Strand.

† Johnston's War Map of Zululand and Adjoining Districts. By W. & A. K. Johnston, Edinburgh. 1879. Scale 10 miles to the inch. Wyld's Military Sketch of Zululand, and Adjoining Territories. By James Wyld, London, 1879. Scale, twelve miles to the inch.

favours and nourishes a certain tenderness of the sensibility which acts in a prejudicial manner on the nerves: "*la suraffectivité*" is pronounced to be the mother of hysteria. Thus the first condition is realised; and the "prolonged fasts" in favour with ascetics realise the second. For the long abstinences weaken the organism and diminish its power of reacting against painful impressions.

In reply: it is too much forgotten, especially in the chairs of medicine, that man, besides being an animal, and therefore endowed with nervous emotions which present phenomena like those of the animal organism, is also more; by virtue of his soul he is placed under conditions of a superior order. In presence of the emotions which solicit him, he has the power to reflect, to appreciate, to compare them with the moral law, his own good, his dignity, &c. He has by free-will a right to elect the good and reject the condemned, but he always preserves the opposite faculty of closing the ear to reason and abandoning himself to sensual impressions instead of ruling them. He has the sad power of bending his reason to the service of sensuality, in which case the man makes way for the animal. And mark the double attitude; for here is the solution of the present question; the danger is all on the one side, on the other all is advantage. Every-day experience shows that the purely physical effects of sensible emotion are of one kind when the latter rules reason, and quite of another when ruled by reason. And the sad result in the former case is indeed an abandonment to sensation. But the fault is not in sensation or nervous emotion. In the mere animal Nature directs sensation to its proper end through instinct: in man, reason is the rule. It cannot be doubted that reason exerts a physical and physiological influence on the nerves, which strengthens them whilst it spares them exaggerated and dangerous shocks. So all the world will say to a man who "gives himself up" to sorrow or pleasure, "be reasonable." It will be easily understood that reason needs *grace* to fill its part perfectly.

What is the ideal of Christian asceticism? The love of God practised in the most perfect manner. And what is it to thus love God? To keep his commandments. And in order to do this Asceticism perpetually strives to retain or regain the command of reason over the thousand emotions and movements of daily life, however small (which, as reflecting men know well enough, are, for the most part, concessions to egoism, vanity, severity, softness, caprice, and the like), and submit them to the influence of moral law. The attempt is made, in other words, to become S. Paul's ideal of a Christian—the "spiritual man" as opposed to the animal man. This surely is a preventive of the nervous disorders which result from ill-regulated impressions.

But, it is said, the love of God is not entirely the observance of the law: there is at the root of it a certain tenderness: and medicine is on its guard against affectionate sentiments; it sees danger in them and almost proscribes them. This is like ordering the vine to be destroyed in order to prevent drunkenness. The affections are a most important force of Nature, and to see danger in their development is to contradict Nature. The danger is in irregular

development. And the love of God is not born of an organic emotion, like most human affections, but of reason.

The result of the practice of Christian virtues is to strengthen the will against the passions, and consequently to habituate the organism to repress those feverish emotions which prepare for hysteria. But do the "prolonged fasts" help to the same end? It is said that they enfeeble us and weaken our resistance. Physiology furnishes a solution of the objection. We take the principle from M. Camille Sée.

The losses sustained by the organism are in rigorous proportion with the work it does, that is, with the sum of the interior and exterior movements of its different parts. Similarly, the organism under pain of perishing, must recover elements equal to those lost. Thus the three terms of the phenomena are, the work done by the organism in a given time, the losses sustained in the same time, and the replacing the lost elements. The first and third are for the most part subject to our choice. Now Ascetics take *less* nourishment, not none at all: less perhaps than the sensation of hunger demands—but the latter is not the exact measure of necessity. We leave aside, of course, cases where a miracle restores the equilibrium. Fasting among us is fasting in name, whilst being in reality a sufficient supply of the lost elements. The quantity of sustenance which men habitually take is much beyond the rigorous necessity.

Fasting may sometimes aggravate an aptitude for painful impressions; but that is only one of the conditions for hysteria; and it strengthens rather than weakens the resolution to govern or reject them. A vigorous will is an efficacious corrective to morbid dispositions created by pain. Scævola with his arm over the brazier feels all the pain of the fire: he is master of his movements from moral energy. To rule, command, remain calm in the midst of a tempest of passion, shows a resistance which makes hysteria impossible. Such a power Asceticism gives. It is in a true sense the *cult* of suffering, the love of it, and the search for happiness in it. This is apparently a contradiction; in reality nothing is more real. It is the best preservative against nervous disorders. If physicians knew more about it they would inscribe Asceticism at the head of their prophylactics against hysteria.

An interesting account appears in the same number of the *Eclipse* of the 29th July last, as observed at Denver by the expedition from the Jesuit College of Woodstock, Maryland, under Father Sestini.

In the number for January of the present year there is a continuation by Père J. Brucker, of his "Studies on the history of Religion." To those interested in the subject treated in Professor Max Müller's recent Lectures on the Science of Religion, these articles should be carefully read. They show how comparative philology proves the existence of a Revelation.

In the *Revue générale* (Bruxelles) for January there is a well-considered and exhaustive paper on the "History of Wool in Belgium."

We are glad to see that M. C. de Harlez, in the December issue of the *Revue Catholique de Louvain*, takes up the subject of "Brahmanism," and shows how absurd it is to compare it with Christianity. The same excellent Review, in its January number, has a paper by M. C. Pieraerts on the question which is at present absorbing the attention of Belgium—the Education question. It is a vigorous protest against the repeal of the law of 1842, and the banishment of religion from the school. An article by Professor Lamy on the "Poetry of the Hebrews" will be eagerly read by biblical students.

"The Religious Press in Spain and Portugal" is the attractive title of two articles in the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne* (Paris) for December and January respectively. It is full of a kind of information which is not easy to obtain.

#### GERMAN PERIODICALS.

(By Dr. BELLESHEIM, of Cologne.)

DR. HENSE, of Münster, continues, in the December issue of the *Katholik*, his treatise on the nature of the Fire of Hell, quoting at greater length from the Ancient Fathers, as well as from the great theologians in the Middle Ages. Amongst them we find a unanimous *consensus* that the fire is a real material fire, and not merely the pains of a guilty conscience. There seem to be only a few Fathers who might be described as dissenting from the doctrine generally held, and foremost amongst those ranks S. Ambrose of Milan. He writes (*lib. 9 in Luc.*, 205), "Quicumque sine Christo est, in tenebris est, quia lumen in tenebris est Christus. Ergo neque est corporalium stridor aliquis dentium, neque ignis aliquis perpetuus flammarum corporalium, neque vermis est corporalis. Sed hæc ideo ponuntur, quia sicut ex multa cruditate et febres nascuntur et vermes, ita si quis non decoquat peccata sua sed miscendo peccata peccatis tanquam cruditatem quandam contrahat veterum et recentium delictorum, igne aduretur proprio et suis vermibus consumetur." Suarez, in commenting upon these words, calls them "rather difficult," and then goes on to say, "potest pie exponi, ut non ignem ipsum corporalem neget, sed flammam—i.e., quod non torqueat spiritus, corporeas flammæ excitando vel accendendo, sed alio mirabili modo." He concludes by excusing S. Ambrose because, at that period, this doctrine had not yet been sufficiently declared by the Church. The latter words sufficiently prove that Suarez found himself embarrassed. But can it be creditable to the learning of S. Ambrose to interpret his text in this way? It is beyond any doubt that the other Fathers of that period teach clearly and uncompromisingly the common doctrine of a material fire. The best explanation of S. Ambrose seems to be that he does not speak of the unrepentant sinner's state in the future life, but of present life, as we gather from his words a little further on, "et ideo, qui pacem et caritatem non detulerit ad Christi altaria, tolletur, ligatis pedibus et manibus et mittetur in tenebras exteriores." The result,

therefore, is that S. Ambrose, who very often adopts an extremely free line of interpretation, explains the words of Holy Scripture which strictly treat of eternity in a metaphorical sense of this world. Another Father, who seems to depart from the common doctrine is S. John of Damascus; but the difficulties arising from his words have been already removed by S. Thomas, *libr. IV., sentent. dist. 44, qu. 3*, where the Angel of the School writes: "Dicendum, quod Damascenus non negat simpliciter illum ignem materialem esse, sed quod non est materialis talis, qualis apud nos est; eo quod quibusdam proprietatibus ab hoc igne distinguitur." Dr. Hense very appropriately brings before us another set of testimonies, by appealing to the acts of the Martyrs, who publicly and solemnly before the tribunals testified to our doctrine, and likewise to the liturgical prayers of the Church as expressive of her creed. And in reviewing the doctrine of the Church we cannot pass over the so-called Athanasian creed.

There was, in the early period of the Middle Ages, only one—he cannot be called a Doctor of the Church, but rather a philosopher *in* the Church—who dared to call our doctrine in question. But on the Catholic side no theologian has followed Scotus Erigena: his system may be called an offspring of the Neoplatonics. When Scotus therefore contended "in igne æterno nihil aliud esse pœnam quam beatæ felicitatis absentiam," he was immediately opposed by S. Remigius and by Prudentius, who stigmatised the doctrine as subversive of Catholic faith. We need scarcely point out that the great scholastic doctors, as S. Thomas, testify to the Fire of Hell being a real one. In a succeeding article, Dr. Hense purposes commenting on the Catholic doctrine *modo speculativo*. In the same issue of the *Katholik*, I gave an outline of the eventful life of the late lamented Cardinal Archbishop of Dublin, describing his career at the Propaganda, in the Irish College, and when Archbishop of Armagh and Dublin. When I read the biographies of the deceased prelate in the English and Irish papers, I could not help being struck on finding that no one had made use of the brilliant testimony given to the young student when leaving the Propaganda. It was to this effect: "bell' ingegno, eccessivo nello studio, illibato nei costumi, osservantissimo, divoto, docile, irreprensibile, commendabilissimo in tutto" (Maziere Brady, *Episcopal Succession*, I. 346). The January issue of the *Katholik* contains an elaborate treatise of Father Zeiler, O.S.F., one of those divines of the Seraphic Order who are now engaged in bringing out an accurate and complete edition of the works of S. Bonaventure. No labour is spared to bring this edition up to the highest standard, so that it may bear all just criticism. F. Zeiler was so fortunate as to discover an edition of a minor work of a man in whose honour and fame Catholic England is deeply concerned—namely, the almost forgotten *Summa de virtutibus*, commonly ascribed to the "Doctor irrefragabilis," Alexander of Hales. It was in the seventeenth century that this work gave rise to a somewhat bitter contest between several Catholic divines, Luke Wadding contending that S. Thomas had largely borrowed from it, for his *Summa Theologica*. The Paris edition of 1509, discovered by Father



Zeiler in the Franciscan Convent of S. Frond, in Belgium, bears in a postscript the following notice:—"In qua originaliter pene omnia quæ in secundâ secundæ S. Thomas collegit habentur." The Dominicans naturally took the part of their great master, and P. De Rubeis (Rossi) went so far as to call the *Summa de virtutibus* "fictitium."

The result of Father Zeiler's investigations may be thus summarised. The little work cannot be ascribed to Alexander of Hales himself, but was edited by his disciples, whom Pope Alexander IV., in a Bull dated July 28th, 1256, had summoned to complete the great *Summa* which Alexander, when departing this life, had left unfinished. From a comparison between the *Secunda Secundæ* of S. Thomas and the *Summa de virtutibus* of Hales, one may easily see that there is a great likeness, but at the same time there is far more striking divergence. S. Thomas's treatises bear the evident mark of his own master-mind. F. Zeiler concludes by remarking that it is not encroaching on the honour of S. Thomas to discover evidence that S. Thomas made use of the *Summa* of the Doctor irrefragabilis. We venture to propose the question whether it would not be an eminently worthy task for the English Franciscans to vindicate the honour of their Order by publishing a new edition of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales?

After a *résumé* of a learned treatise by Dr. Franz, on the history of Mixed Marriages in Silesia, the *Katholik* gives a criticism on recent Conversions in England. In the English Catholic papers a doubt has been expressed as to the expediency of publishing such a list of names. It cannot be denied that as far as England, the country where the converts live and have their relations, is concerned, there are many strong reasons dissuading from it; but as to foreign countries the very opposite may be fearlessly asserted. Catholics everywhere, and in our days in the highest degree in Germany, are inexpressibly consoled by the example of the noble men and women who have preferred truth to error, and eternity to time; whilst sincere Protestants may find in such conduct a criterion of the only true Church of Christ. From this point of view the treatise in the *Katholik* is very ably written and well worth reading.

2. To the December issue of the *Historisch-politische Blätter*, I contributed the fourth article of a series on the Restoration of the Catholic Hierarchy of Scotland, examining and explaining the Bull of Leo XIII., *Ecce supremo Apostolatus apice*, and reviewing what followed the promulgation, that is to say, its reception by the Scottish Kirks, as well as by the Protestant journalism of the country. In a far better sense it may be said of the Catholic Church, as of the old royal house of the Stuarts, in the words which Cardinal Henry Benedict, Duke of York, after his brother Charles had expired at Albano, ordered to be impressed on a coin, "non desiderii hominum, sed voluntate Dei." An elaborate account is given of a new and most accurate edition of the works of the Apostolic Fathers, under the title "*Opera patrum Apostolicorum*." I cannot refrain from particularly calling the attention of the English clergy to this highly important work. More than twenty years have elapsed since Pro-

fessor von Hefele, now Bishop of Rottenburg, published the fourth edition of the Apostolic Fathers. Since that time the most momentous documents have been discovered. As early as 1856, in the Convent of Mount Athos, was found the text of the *Pastor of Hermas*, and in 1859 the Codex Sinaiticus, in the Convent of Mount Sinai, by Professor Tischendorf of Leipzig. This Codex is principally remarkable because it contains the whole letter of S. Barnabas. Finally, there was found in the library of the recently deceased Professor Mohl, in Paris, a Syriac translation of the letters of Pope S. Clement. All these important discoveries have been fully made use of by Professor Funk, who has also given a translation of the Greek text. The January issue lays before the public an historical question of great importance to English historians. Dr. Onno Klopp, formerly librarian to the late King of Hanover, has begun to bring out a splendid, accurate, and complete new edition of the works of our great philosopher Leibnitz; and two years ago he edited a capital work, entitled: "The Fall of the House of Stuart, and the Succession of the House of Hanover in Great Britain and Ireland, in their relation to European affairs from 1660 to 1714" (Vienna, 1875—1877). This work is mainly founded on the communications sent by the Imperial Ambassadors in London and Rome to the Court of Vienna, and preserved in the Imperial archives. This period, treated by Burnet and Macaulay from an English, is by Dr. Klopp considered from an international, point of view. The conclusion arrived at by Dr. Klopp was that James II. fell a victim, not to his religious convictions, but to his being entangled in the politics of Louis XIV. Now, in connection with his great historical investigations he seeks to answer, in the January issue of the *Historisch-politische Blätter*, the important question: "Was it Pope Innocent XII. who, in 1700, advised Charles II., King of Spain, to make a Will, by which the Duke of Anjou was called to the Spanish crown?" It is the opinion of most French historians that the Pope did so, but Dr. Klopp proves from the despatches of the ambassador at the Vatican that the Pope never gave such dangerous and impolitic counsel, and he proves by conclusive reasoning that the Brief commonly adduced in support of this view is a forgery.

3. In the *Stimmen aus Maria Laach* (November) Father Pächler treats the "modern state" as forerunner of the *Social Democracy*. He very ably shows that the modern state favours Socialism indirectly and directly. Father Kreiten contributes a biographical sketch of Colonel Paqueron, who realised the idea of a Christian man and Christian soldier (*Le Colonel Paqueron; notice biographique*. Par Mgr. Saivet, évêque de Meude et Perpignan. Paris, 1878); and Father Baumgartner brings to an end his essays on the condition of the Catholic Church in the United States. In the January issue we have a very thoughtful treatise under the title "A Chapter of the Life of Jesus." It is curious that in our own days the eminent privilege of the beatific vision possessed by the human Soul of our Divine Lord from the first moment of Its existence, has been impugned

on the part of certain otherwise excellent divines. Amongst them is the Vicar General of Orleans, Abbé Bougaud (*Le christianisme et les temps présents*, tom. iii. p. 449, 453, 460), Dr. Klee, late Professor in Munich, and Mgr. Laurent (*Das heilige Evangelium*, p. 361). Father Knabenbauer strongly supports the doctrine of the older school of theologians, who commonly teach that the personal union of the human Soul of our Lord with the Divinity is the highest possible degree to which human nature can be elevated. The supernatural order, as realised in God and his Saints, is necessarily connected with the beatific vision. Hence it follows that the human Soul of our Lord from the very first moment of its existence enjoyed this eminent privilege. Father Knabenbauer examines at length the doctrine of the ancient Fathers, solving the difficulties drawn from certain less accurate expressions they employed, and arrives at the conclusion that the patristic period is strongly in favour of our doctrine, which received definite expression in the words of S. Fulgentius (*Quæstio ad Ferrandum*): "perquam durum est et a sanitate fidei penitus alienum, ut dicamus, animam Christi non plenam suæ Deitatis habere notitiam, cum qua naturaliter unam creditur habere personam."

#### ITALIAN PERIODICALS.

*La Scuola Cattolica.* Milano, 1879.

*Can Italian Catholics take part in political elections?*

THE number for January 31st has a concluding article on the intervention of Catholics in the political elections of Italy, examining the subject under the aspect of its moral lawfulness. After observing that there are two kinds of moral unlawfulness, the one absolute, the other hypothetical,—the first being irremovable even by the Sovereign Pontiff, while the latter, although equally real as the first, so long as certain conditions continue, may, under other circumstances, cease altogether,—it proceeds to treat the question of sitting in Montecitorio as deputy, leaving that of giving a vote at political elections for subsequent consideration. Now, the unlawfulness of sitting as deputy in Montecitorio, it states, is clearly hypothetical, not absolute, since no one can deny to the Holy Father the right, if he so pleases, of granting permission to sit there. That at present it is unlawful there can be no question, since it was solemnly declared to be so by Pius IX. when addressing the Circolo di Santa Melania, which had come to do him homage. (In a previous article the *Scuola* disposed of an assertion lately made, that the present Pontiff had adopted a different line, and encouraged Catholics to cease their abstention from political elections.) The act of sitting as deputy in Parliament is to be condemned for two reasons, the one extrinsic, the other intrinsic. The extrinsic objection is the oath required of a deputy when taking his seat, but the writer does not think it needful to dwell upon this obstacle, since the oath could conceivably be modified by some clause which the Holy See might, if it saw fit, suggest. The clause used when the Parliament

sat at Florence, would probably not be judged sufficient since the breach of Porta Pia. The intrinsic objection applies to the act of a Catholic deputy sitting and giving his vote on public affairs in the assembly at Montecitorio. The deputy who in Rome concurs in making the laws, exercises there an act of sovereignty in the name of his constituents, whom he represents, and who form a portion of the so-called sovereign people. But in Rome the Pope alone has the right to exercise acts of sovereignty. The Holy See has enunciated this doctrine frequently, Pius IX. repeatedly affirmed it, and Leo XIII., in his first Encyclical, confirmed it. Hence a Catholic voting in the Parliament at Rome usurps a Papal right, and commits an act at once sinful and illegal. And so it must remain as long as the Pope does not authorise this participation in political affairs, and give Catholics to understand that he permits them to exercise in his dominions a portion of his own legislative power. It would then be allowable, just as in the beginning of the century, during the French invasion, it became lawful to act as governor, or prefect, only after the Pope had given his permission.

Now, as to the further question whether it be lawful for Catholics to give a vote in political elections, their answer must be the same as in the previous one, if voting as ordinarily practised and with its ordinary intention be supposed, for he who gives his vote for this or that candidate, wills and desires that the deputy he elects should take his seat and vote in Parliament, and does his best to send him there. In this case the two acts are not morally separable. Hence abstentionists have always said *Ne eletti ne elettori*. But it is possible to imagine some hypothesis which would, as a matter of fact, alter the character of the act of election, as, for instance, if the electors agreed to elect a deputy on the condition that he did not take his seat, or only with the Pope's permission. Cases of this sort can be imagined, which might be serviceable; for example, by rendering it difficult to obtain the legal number of votes for other candidates, and thus by embarrassing the Government dispose it to make concessions to the Church. For the act of voting at political elections is, in itself and apart from its ulterior purpose, no usurpation of Papal rights, but the mere exercise of a power possessed by individuals under the existing state of things. Hence the wise distinction made by the Sacred Penitentiary between electing a deputy and sitting as deputy; to elect is not *opportune*; to sit is not *tolerated*. But the question at present is not a practical question, since the reply of the Sacred Penitentiary has settled the point: *non-expedit*. As the *non-expedit*, however, might become *expedit* any day, it is highly advisable that Italians should set to work vigorously to prepare for this altered state of things, without allowing themselves to be distracted by the importunity and reproaches of those who, with childish impatience, fret at delay, and catching at every groundless rumour of orders issued from high quarters, would rush into action without preparation, without discipline, without organisation. Instead of wasting time in discussing the necessity and duty of taking part in political elections, and in deploring the ruinous consequences of abstention, let these men be solicitous to have their names enrolled on the election

lists, and let them go and vote at the municipal elections, and then, says the writer, "we should not have communal councils banishing the Catechism and the images of the Blessed Virgin and the Saints from the schools, and confiscating the pious offerings of ancestors." It is not the abstentionists, who obediently await the word of command from the Holy Father, and who do not set themselves up as his instructors in the course he ought to pursue, who put obstacles in the way of due preparation,—on the contrary, they are its strenuous advocates—but this foolish party, who would force on matters, and rush recklessly into action.

Dreading the disastrous consequences which might ensue from this temper, if an occasion for indulging it were to offer, the writer thinks it well to adduce reasons to prove the inopportuneness of intervention under present circumstances; and first, intervention at the political elections is inopportune because its success is impossible. He points, in support of this assertion, to the miserable results of the communal and provincial elections. In the great centres they utterly failed, or, if in a few places the influence of Catholics made itself felt, it was only in helping to return some of the moderate Liberal party, but these men, as might have been expected, utterly betrayed the confidence reposed in them, taking good care to clear themselves from the reproach of *clericalism* as soon as they entered the council. Even in Rome the Catholics were worsted. The reasons are not far to seek. The greater portion of the electors do not care to go to the urns, because organisation is totally wanting to them, as well as practical direction. Now this would apply with tenfold force to the political elections. Men who cannot see the necessity of availing themselves of their rights when it is a question of defending local interests which are clear and intelligible to them, will scarcely put themselves out of their way, or leave their homes, to go and provide for the general interests of the State, which the majority of them are not competent to understand. It would be folly to expect it. Moreover, ignorance of the management of elections, of the necessity of electoral committees, of clear manifestoes, of lists of safe candidates, and of united action, as well as of the multiplied and subtle acts of electoral warfare with which they would have to contend, is general amongst the Catholics of Italy, the exceptions being very few. Let them first, then, exercise themselves in administrative elections, and after some happy experiments in this line, there may be better hopes of them in the political.

But there is another great practical difficulty in the way of political intervention. Where are the Catholic deputies to be found? The ranks of the clergy could, it is true, furnish a good number well qualified, but most of their body are legally ineligible, and the dominant party would certainly find some pretext for getting rid of such as are not. The deputies must be sought, therefore, among the fairly cultured of the laity. It is a deplorable fact, however, that there is a very limited number of them, even including good and pious men, who have correct religious ideas, and a proper conception of the relations between the Church and the State, or of the bearings of the superna-

tural order on the political and civil; while from the few who form the exception must be deducted those who, from age, infirmities, straitened means, family cares or professional occupations, would be disabled from sitting in Parliament. Could the Catholics entrust their interests to those *moderate* men with the concurrence of whom the Conte di Masino thinks that a Conservative party might be formed, to the men who disjoin religion from politics, and call themselves Catholics, not clericals? They could not be placed in worse hands. Timid Catholics would not act much better, for by-and-by, instead of converting the Liberals, they would probably be converted by them. Men are wanted who could say with the fearless D'Ondes Reggio, "I am here like Daniel in the lions' den." But were things otherwise, who, with the example of France before him, could be simple enough to hope that a liberal and revolutionary Government will ever allow the elections to give results not agreeable with its own wishes? The Liberals have introduced the Constitutional system into Italy solely for their own profit, and it would be impossible for Catholics to contend against the unscrupulous arts which would be brought to bear against them. Other reasons combine to persuade the writer that his fellow-Catholics are, as yet, ill-prepared to stand the shock and conflict of the elections. He does not suppose that above twenty Catholic deputies would be returned. And what could they do for the benefit of religion and of the Church? absolutely nothing. The one interest of Catholics, in which all others are summed up in Italy, their centre, not only religiously, but politically speaking, is the Papacy. The benefit to be derived, therefore, from intervention in political elections is to be measured exclusively by the advantage thereby accruing to the Papal cause. Now this cause, he believes, would grievously suffer by an exhibition of the weakness of Catholics in Parliament. Their strength at present remains doubtful, while their numbers are certain. This consideration acts as some sort of check on their adversaries' violence, which would then be removed; moreover, it is to be feared, that by means of the elections, liberal Catholicism would establish itself in Italy as it did in France, than which nothing could be more disastrous. Some think that by the abstention of Catholics their influence is unfelt in Parliament. Were this true, and if it were so ruinous to their cause, why are their enemies so desirous to entice them to take a part in political life? Many Liberals would be enchanted to have some twenty Catholics sitting in Montecitorio. It is just because their absence makes the distinction between *legal* and *real* Italy so obvious that they deplore it, but they would then be able to assert that the whole country was fairly and truly represented; and Europe would readily believe them. The most impious and sacrilegious measures would then be proposed and carried, and declared to be the will of Italy. So long as the Catholics in Parliament must constitute so insignificant a minority, their absence is the least evil of the two, since their presence would but serve to strengthen the hands of the Church's foes, and give the Catholics the appearance of co-operation with them in their acts.



The march of events, it is true, might any day bring about an altered state of things; for instance, the attainment of power by the ultra-Revolutionists, who would probably sweep away the few remaining guarantees of order, might let in a flood of socialistic fury, causing as its result a temporary but very general reaction throughout the country, under the influence of which a Chamber with a good Catholic majority might be returned; just as in France a few years ago, from the combined dread of the arms of the foreigner and the petroleum of their fellow-countrymen, the French sent to Bordeaux an assembly which merited from its composition the title of clerical. Short of a catastrophe so fearful, occasions might arise which, if a genuine Conservative party were formed, could be turned to account: but then this party must be composed of wise and good men, who, giving ear to the teachings of the Church and the lessons of history, would be convinced that it is not by baptising Liberalism, the dream of some half-converted Piedmontese, but by fighting it that their country is to be saved. If such a Catholic party existed, instead of having to be created, it would be possible to anticipate a nearer opportunity of profitable intervention at the elections than seems now likely. In the meantime the wisdom of the Holy See is clearly manifested in the *non-expedit*.

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*La Civiltà Cattolica.* Firenze, 1879.

*Programme of a Conservative Party in Italy.*

A STATEMENT appeared in some of the Italian journals at the close of last year that several electoral meetings had been held by Catholics in which adhesion to the plan put forth by the Conte di Masino for the formation of a Conservative party was matter of deliberation. The *Osservatore Romano* of the 5th January gave a positive denial to these assertions. Not only had no such meetings been held, but a programme which is erroneous in principle could not be made the subject of deliberation by any true Catholic. The *Civiltà Cattolica* of the 1st February has an article in which it examines what this principle is which renders the programme unacceptable to Catholics. What is proposed is, in fact, an amalgamation of Catholics and Liberals, so that the upshot would be a Liberal-Catholic party. For the programme lays down two things,—first, the acceptance of accomplished facts, which, it says, Divine Providence has permitted—viz., a united Italy, “furnished with all the elements for rendering her powerful, happy and great;” and secondly, a loyal concurrence in maintaining liberal institutions, with the reservation of correcting and amending, but not destroying them. The party would be called Conservative, because, on the one hand, it would labour to maintain Catholic worship, at least as it is maintained in France and Belgium—it remains to be seen how this will be done under the auspices of Gambetta and Frère Orban,—and, on the other hand, would co-operate in preserving Liberal Italy, diminishing, so far as may be, its evil effects. The plan as drawn up by its contrivers, might be summed up in this motto: *Quærite primum regnum Italiæ*, and the rest will be added by the

way. But this mixing of good and evil, true and untrue, just and unjust, is a false and most pernicious principle. Liberalism is not a political system introduced to temper Monarchy by calling the nation to a share in the Government. That is Constitutionalism, to which the Church has never objected, no more than she has to any other form of Government; indeed, so long as the European Monarchies were purely Catholic, they were all more or less Constitutional or tempered. The regal power was checked by States-General, and subjected also to a strong curb in the authority of the Church. Absolutism came in with the Protestants, who flattered the Sovereigns in order to gain their favour and support. Liberalism is a moral system, aiming at the destruction of the social Sovereignty of Christ, and at the exclusion of the idea of revelation, and of the influence of the supernatural from all its institutions. But this is a retrogression to Paganism, and a state of complete antagonism to the Church, which was instituted to "restore all things in Christ." Liberalism desires society without Christ; the Church wills it to be integrally based upon His laws. Thus no compromise or union is possible. Again, what does the Conte di Masino mean by liberal institutions, some of which, he says, the Church "has not proscribed?" If these institutions are the exponents and applications of Liberalism, and not simply Constitutional enactments, they are clearly unacceptable. Constitutional institutions may be amended, because not bad as such; not so Liberal ones, because they are radically evil, from the spirit which animates them. Then, as regards "accomplished facts," no Catholic can consent to the spoliation of the Holy Father, although it has been consummated, for the temporal Sovereignty has been declared both by Pius IX. and by the reigning Pontiff to be necessary to the Apostolic Ministry in the present condition of the world.

After some further remarks in reply to Liberalistic cavils, the writer draws attention to the fact that the idea of this hybrid Conservative party has been very favourably entertained by the moderate Liberal journals. The reasons they allege for their satisfaction and the qualifications they subjoin in varying terms, but similar in substance, betray their motive. They will be glad of the Conservative support of some Catholic members in Parliament, for, if liberated Italy required the propelling power of the Revolution to bring it about, it now requires an element of Conservatism to preserve and secure it. Between Liberals and Catholic Conservatives, however, they reckon that there must be wide differences, and these are explained to arise from their respective views and aims in regard to the Church, the supremacy of which, or even its equality with the State, can never be admitted by Liberals. So it comes to this: the Liberals will cheerfully accept the co-operation of these Conservatives so far as concerns their own interests; in what respects the rights of the Church, they will have nothing to say to them. They intend to persist in their principles of the supremacy of the State and the servitude of the Church. Meanwhile, Liberalism will be satisfied at being recognised and admitted by Catholics, even with the expressed intention of

"improving and correcting it"; it will take good care to be neither improved nor corrected.

Moderate Liberals have an additional reason for desiring the help of this proposed Catholic party. Power has slipped from their hands, and they recognise their inability to regain it by their own unaided strength; so they seek an ally, with the help of whom they may make head victoriously against the Left. Such an ally they might find in a limited number of Catholics, whom they should admit into Parliament, themselves remaining, by their own preponderating majority, masters of the field. The ally would thus be employed to play the part of cat's paw.

But let Catholics reflect if it suits them to afford this aid to a party whence, during its fifteen years of power, emanated all the oppressive laws from which they are suffering. It was this same party who dispossessed the Pope, suppressed the religious orders, seized the property of the Church, subjected clerics to the conscription, imposed civil marriage, excluded religious instruction from the schools, protected heterodoxy, and displayed its enmity to the Sacred Ministry by every kind of vexatious enactment. Not yet satisfied, it was preparing fresh persecuting laws, when its rivals turned it out of office. Italy having fallen under the rule of the Left has, in a brief space, made great strides in the revolutionary path, and is approaching the last stage. Now, as experience has taught us, when Revolution has reached its goal, it spontaneously rushes into the abyss and destroys itself. It becomes a question, then, which is best for Catholics—to allow the Revolution to complete its final period and kill itself, or to co-operate, with the *moderates* in holding it back a little, and thus allow it to live on awhile, to work the destruction of everything civil and religious? The writer leaves this problem for the solution of the wise. The rest of the article is chiefly occupied in rebutting the accusation of want of patriotism brought against Catholics for wishing to dismember Italy by restoring to the Holy Father the dominions of which he has been unjustly deprived, a charge which it not only answers, but retorts on those who make it, who are provoking the anger of God against their country, and preparing evil days for Italy.

The Conte di Masino says that it is impossible to go entirely against Liberalism, on account of its wide diffusion. "The world," he says, "goes with Liberal ideas." But how did the world go in Apostolic times? Surely Liberalism is not more widely diffused now than was Paganism then. Yet the Apostles triumphed over the world, not by seeking a compromise with it, but crying out *Nolite conformari huic seculo*. But you may have to wait a long time for this triumph, men say. Be it so; what are years in presence of the Church's life, which is to last for ever? *Regnum quod in æternum non dissipabitur*. It fought for three centuries to beat down old Paganism, and it will fight as long as God pleases to conquer this new Paganism called Liberalism. Only let the faithful combat valiantly, and not permit themselves to be scared by the strength and obstinacy of their foes.

There is an article also on the same subject, and to the same effect in the *Scuola Cattolica* of January 31st.

## Notices of Books.

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*La Bible et les Découvertes Modernes en Egypte et en Assyrie.* Par F. VIGOUROUX, prêtre de S. Sulpice. Paris: 1877.

THIS work is a collection of articles which appeared in the *Revue des Questions Historiques*, and which the author has revised and completed up to the date of publication. His object is to show that modern archæological discoveries, far from contradicting the Bible, furnish striking proof of its authenticity and veracity. This object he has successfully achieved by giving a substantially complete account of the results obtained by the best and latest authorities from the cuneiform and hieroglyphic records, by applying these results to the defence or explanation of the sacred text with the skill of an accomplished Biblical scholar, and finally by setting forth all this solid learning in a clear and popular form, intelligible to any ordinary reader.

The work contains two principal parts. The first, purely historical, treats of a number of questions connected with the Pentateuch—for example, the Creation, the Garden of Eden, the Deluge, &c. The second part treats of the belief of the Jews in the Unity of God and in the immortality of the soul.

There is also an interesting introductory sketch of the history of Biblical Rationalism in Germany, and there are a number of well-chosen illustrations. The work is a valuable addition to Biblical literature. No one who reads the *Revue des Questions Historiques* is unacquainted with the name of the Abbé Vigouroux. A pupil of the celebrated Orientalist, Le Hir, and Professor of Sacred Scripture at S. Sulpice, he has a right to our attention and our thanks when he writes on these Bible topics in which we have too few really able defenders of the Faith.

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*The Eucharist on Calvary.* An Essay. By the Rev JOHN BRANDE MORRIS. The Introduction. London: David Nutt, 1878.

IT is very difficult to pass any judgment on this remarkable *brochure*, partly because the author protests against criticism until his whole work appears, and partly because it is so full of pitfalls and snares to the innocent reader that he must lay it down with a certain irritation. It is an "Introduction" of 50 or 60 pages to a considerable work in which the writer has treated of the passion of our Lord. The work itself, we are given to understand, the author is not at present in a position to publish. For our own part, nothing would give us greater satisfaction than to learn that Mr. Morris was enabled to publish it. Every page would be sure to have grains of gold, even if they had to be riddled out of a good deal of sand and gravel. Mr. Morris's

learning, patristic skill and linguistic acquirements are so well known that it would be impertinent to praise them. To our mind, all his writings, and this Introduction among them, labour under the defects of petty dogmatism, defective logic, and the excessive allegorizing of Holy Scripture. He is too utterly and absolutely dogmatic on linguistic and exegetical matters. He must know, better than we, that on many of the points in which he so scornfully decides, there is more to be said. Then, he builds startling theories on very slight discoveries. And lastly, he extracts allegorical meanings out of the Bible in such a violent fashion that he gives a sense of unreality to his whole thesis. We are not going to give instances of these irritating modes of procedure from the pamphlet before us. If the work itself can be brought out, it will be time enough, then, to consider the writer's defects, whilst fully appreciating his many admirable contributions to sacred science.

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*Saintly Workers.* By FREDERIC W. FARRAR, D.D. London: Macmillan and Co., 1878.

"**S**AINTLY WORKERS" is the title which Canon Farrar has given to a series of five lectures delivered by him during the Lent of 1878 at St. Andrew's, Holborn. They treat severally of those famous men of old, the martyrs, hermits, monks, early Franciscans, and missionaries, who have justly merited for themselves the proud distinction of "the heroes of unselfishness." It speaks well for the spirit of earnestness which the Ritualistic movement has diffused throughout the Anglican Establishment when a goodly number of young men, engaged for the most part in mercantile pursuits, can be drawn together week after week to listen to the lessons of simplicity, sincerity, and unselfishness which may be learnt from these lives of Catholic heroes. The fact that a Protestant dignitary can venture to lecture in strains of the very highest eulogy upon certain types of holiness which are to be found nowhere but within the Catholic Church is to be noted as significant. Canon Farrar takes care to disclaim all sympathy with what he calls "the peculiar forms of mediæval religion" which they professed. This was, of course, to be expected. He dilates on the usual Protestant "idolum" of the "social state," and each man's duty to live in society. To be sure, man is a social being, but this does not mean that a large number of exceptional men and women may not love God more purely and more intensely by withdrawing themselves—not from society in its large sense—not from Church authority, or State authority, from being taught or from being directed—but from pleasant firesides and family meals, and gossip, and nursing, and news, and housekeeping. Differing from Canon Farrar, as of course we do, profoundly on this and on other matters, we may, nevertheless, admit that he has given his hearers in these lectures much that is admirable, instructive, and edifying. One or two mistakes call for correction. For instance, how could he put down St. Thomas of Aquin as a *Franciscan*?

*L'Année Liturgique : Le Temps après la Pentecôte. Par Dom GUÉRANGER.*

WE are glad to see this continuation of a work so important to the children of the Church. This new volume, the tenth of the series, begins with Trinity Sunday, and takes us as far as the Feast of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. The Abbot of Solesmes, Dom Guéranger, wrote only the first half of the volume; death came upon him after he had written the Feast of Corpus Christi. The rest is given by one of his monks, who has been appointed by his Superior to continue the *Liturgical Year*. The task is not so difficult as one would suppose, for Dom Guéranger had been giving a daily conference to his community for well nigh forty years; and there were always some half dozen of his hearers who took notes of his admirable teachings. The Liturgy of the Church was of course a subject which often made up the matter of these conferences; and the two volumes of the *Liturgical Year*, the 11th and 12th, which are still to be written in order to complete the work, will be formed upon the Notes thus preserved. If we may judge from the second half of the present (the 10th) volume, the disciple is going to prove himself worthy of so great a Master.

This 10th Volume includes three great Feasts, Trinity Sunday, Corpus Christi, and its Octave, and the Sacred Heart of Jesus. We doubt whether the Abbot ever wrote finer pages than those for Trinity Sunday; the prayer to the Blessed Three at the end of the day is admirable. For Corpus Christi and its Octave we have the whole history and doctrine of the Eucharist, both as Sacrifice and Sacrament. The Feast of the Sacred Heart of Jesus contains an epitome of all the teaching involved in this mystery. Nothing could speak more in praise of this volume than the fact, that, although it was only published in the April of 1878, five thousand copies of it were sold within two months, and, before September, a second edition was required. Those who know the excellent English translation of the nine volumes already published will be glad to hear that Father Lawrence Shepherd has his version of this tenth volume in the press.

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*L'Histoire des rois Mages : Par CHARLES SCHOEDEL. Paris: Maisonneuve.*

IF we wish to see the myth-theory run mad, we need only open M. Charles Schoedel's new brochure, "*L'Histoire des Rois Mages*." It has often been remarked that you can with a little ingenuity make a book say anything you please, and in particular that certain texts of the Holy Scriptures can be put together so as to justify the most extraordinary doctrines. M. Schoedel, carried away by his fondness for mythical expositions, is a great offender in this respect. He selects two incidents from the Bible: the temptation of Eve, and the adoration of the infant Saviour by the three Magi; he supplements them with the legend of the "Wandering Jew," and he tells his readers that this trilogy contains under the shape of an allegory, the whole history of mankind. A brief quotation is necessary here.



"At the beginning humanity was involved and plunged in animality; it felt pressed to act, but could, as yet, act only by a blind instinct or under the influence of passion. . . . In order to know its *ego* and to take up its position on a moral basis, it mistook the right method, and instead of seeking itself in its inmost consciousness, it applied to the outer senses and their impressions, and it loved itself in its own flesh. Thus mankind, engendering itself carnally instead of renewing itself in the conception of the ideal by an act of moral order, only realised the reproduction of its own being troubled by disorder. The false ideal which it thus obtained in the child became the god in which humanity worshipped its own self, and idolatry was *ipso facto* constituted."

After this extraordinary and rather obscure specimen of Biblical interpretation, M. Schoebel coolly says: "*Ce n'est pas là une théorie, élaborée à plaisir,*" and he refers us to the second chapter of the book of Genesis.

The legend of the "Wandering Jew" is the next act in this trilogy; it represents the human race setting off in quest of the ideal; after a long and tedious journey, after a pursuit often thwarted, and as often renewed, man, typified by the Magi, rushes towards his Saviour, in whom he finds the embodiment of the whole race. "Henceforth he feels assured that he is God and that God is man, that man is all God, and that God is all man: *et totus homo est Deus*. Yes, indeed, ideal humanity is identical with *the Being, the Eternal*."

M. Schoebel really believes that his system of Hermeneutics is unassailable; he had already discussed in two pamphlets the problem of the fall, and the story of the "Wandering Jew;" he now takes up the episode of the adorations of the Magi, giving us by way of preface a long essay on the merits of idealism (Spinozism, or Pantheism we should call it), and the exclusive power which it enjoys of opening the door of knowledge and solving the problems which puzzle the human race. Leaving entirely out of the question our author's theological and metaphysical views, we are bound to say that the historical details he gives us, both on the Magi and on the various mediæval traditions connected with them, are very interesting; he also takes the opportunity of correcting certain mistakes still sanctioned by philologists; thus the expression *Zend*, which means *interpretations* or *commentaries*, applied to one of the Turanian languages is simply absurd, and should be replaced by *Bactrian*.

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*La Jeunesse d'Elisabeth d'Angleterre* (1533-1558). Par LOUIS WIESENE. 8vo. Paris and London: J. Hachette and Co.

**M.** WIESENE has constituted himself the champion of Mary Queen of Scots. He has published in her defence a volume which is justly regarded as one of the best works on the biography of the victim of Elizabeth's relentless policy, and the readers of the *Revue des Questions Historiques* need scarcely be reminded of the trouble he has taken in unravelling all the particulars connected with the episode of the Earl of Bothwell. On the present occasion M. Wiesene attempts to describe the first twenty-five years of Elizabeth's life. He leaves the sufferer for the purpose of studying the character of the persecutor,

and of ascertaining how far the agitated youth of the Tudor princess explains the general features of her reign, and the attitude she assumed in the progress of European history.

The proper treatment of such a subject required on the part of the author a considerable allowance to be made for what some critics would call minutiae. We are tolerably familiar with the outline of the picture, with the leading facts; of the details we know next to nothing, and yet it may fairly be questioned whether the period of *elaboration* to which Elizabeth's mental character was subjected does not equal, if not surpass, in real interest the whole period of the reign. As M. Wiesene aptly remarks, the history of "Queen Bess" was written during her lifetime, and of course it is to a great extent a legend instead of the record of facts; because till quite recently the popular tradition was blindly accepted without the slightest supposition that a careful sifting of State Papers, a conscientious, severe, impartial study of contemporary documents, was here more than ever indispensable. We shall not enumerate in this brief notice the sources consulted by M. Wiesene whilst preparing his excellent volume. Let us only remark that he has made special use of the diplomatic correspondence of Simon Renard and Antoine de Noailles. The former of these statesmen was, as we all know, the Spanish Ambassador at the Court of England, the latter represented France. It is very interesting to watch the tenacity with which Noailles endeavoured to secure the triumph of the Valois influence in England, and to defeat by counter-machinations the projects of the Emperor Charles V. Both he and his brother, who succeeded him, were led to take the part of the Princess Elizabeth against the plan of a Spanish alliance, and it is no exaggeration to say that the raising of Protestantism to the throne in England was materially assisted by the envoy of his most Christian Majesty. The history of the twenty-five eventful years described in this volume has given M. Wiesene the opportunity of refuting certain errors which are still accepted as well authenticated facts, and of clearing up many chronological puzzles. The fable about Mary Tudor's love for Edward Courtenay is a case in point. It is now conclusively demonstrated that far from being jealous of her sister on that score, the Queen seriously thought of marrying Elizabeth and Edward together, and was only prevented from doing so, first, by Courtenay's positive refusal, and, secondly, in consequence of the Emperor's advice. The history of Elizabeth's captivity at Woodstock is another episode which M. Wiesene has for the first time satisfactorily explained with the help of the Bedingfield Papers. We can only express a hope, by way of conclusion, that our author will write the whole history of the reign. No one, we feel quite sure, is better qualified to deal with this important subject.

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*Le Talmud de Jérusalem.* Traduit pour la première fois, par MOISE SCHWAB. In 8vo. Vol. I. *Traité Bérakoth.* Vol. II. *Traité Téa, Demaï, Kilaiin, Schebûth.* Paris: Maisonneuve.

THE study of Rabbinical literature has during the last few years made considerable progress in France, and we cannot but hail a movement which tells so much upon biblical and theological studies. Excellent French renderings of the Koran, the Vedas, the Zend-Avesta, the laws of Menu, and the sacred books of the Chinese are available to Oriental students; the Talmud alone was comparatively unknown; and yet, it may safely be affirmed, that no other work is so necessary to a thorough understanding of both the Old and the New Testament Scriptures. With a zeal and a patience for which we cannot sufficiently be grateful, M. Moses Schwab resolved some years ago to publish a French translation of the great monument of Hebrew jurisprudence, and the first instalment of his work appeared in 1872. It was useless, of course, to dream of editing both the Jerusalem and the Babylonish renderings; even the latter of these texts, the *Talmoud Babli*, as it is called, extending over sixty volumes octavo, could not be thought of for a moment; the Talmud of Jerusalem has the threefold advantage of being more ancient, better written, and much shorter, although it still represents a goodly and substantial array of twelve volumes. M. Schwab has, therefore, adopted it, and, as we have already stated, the two first instalments are now before us, the first having been issued six years ago, and the second quite recently; in order however, to enable students to compare the two *rédactions* with each other, the translator has given in the first volume both the Babylonish and the Jerusalem readings of the treatise *Bérakoth*, accompanying his work by notes, indices, appendix, tables of concordance, and other illustrative matter, and prefixing an introduction on the origin, composition, purport, and history of the Talmud.

*Les Epopées Françaises; Etudes sur les Origines et l'Histoire de la Littérature nationale.* Par L. GAUTIER. Seconde édition. Vol. 1. Paris: V. Palmé.

M. LÉON GAUTIER has just published the first volume of a new edition of "Les Epopées Françaises," and we hasten to commend it to the attention of our readers. We say *new edition*, but it would be, perhaps, more correct to describe the magnificent octavo before us as an entirely new work, for if a few chapters of the original composition have been retained, it is only in a very modified and improved shape; all the part relative to the birth and formation of French epics, to the versification and the rhythm is here given for the first time; a chapter on the style of the *chansons de geste*, a complete list of all the MSS. containing the old metrical romances, and an excellent chrestomathy have likewise been added.

We need scarcely tell our friends how thoroughly M. Gautier has treated the question of French mediæval epics, and how well he has proved their importance from the historical and archæological point of

view. Under the fiction introduced by the *trouveurs* and *jongleurs*, and which was the result of popular traditions, there was a considerable amount of truth, and it is not too much to say that the institutions of feudal society can be fully and continually illustrated by quotations from the "*Chanson de Roland*," "*Girard de Roussillon*," and the other poems of the Carlevoingian cycle.

One of the most valuable additions which we have noticed in this volume is the division bearing upon what may be designated as the æsthetics of the "*Chansons de geste*" and their merits as literary monuments. Here M. Léon Gautier is, we think, very just in his denunciation of the Renaissance movement, which he accuses of having done away with the poetical traditions of France. The Renaissance passed a sentence of condemnation on all mediæval literature, and in the name of taste it sacrificed, says M. Gautier, "all our national traditions, all our Catholic reminiscences, all our French glories, all our history. . . . France has enjoyed the sad privilege of witnessing twice in her history, at an interval of two or three centuries, a *coup d'état* directed against her institutions which novators have endeavoured to destroy and to blot out. In the sixteenth century the Renaissance scholars exclaimed, 'There was no literary France before the year 1501, we shall make one,' and in 1792, the revolutionists have added, 'Before us there was no political France, we shall extemporise one.' Thus it is that we have been twice an anti-traditional nation, a nation which has rejected its traditions, and conceived against them an implacable hatred. That is what England and Germany have not done, and that is the secret of their strength."

Since the first edition of the "*Epopées Françaises*" was published, a very considerable number of works on mediæval French poetry have been issued. Messrs. T. Meyer, Gaston Paris, Karl Bartsch, and many others, have elucidated various points of history and grammar, and brought out important monuments of early French literature; M. Léon Gautier notices all this carefully, and his work faithfully exhibits the present state of mediæval studies on the other side of the Channel.

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*Horæ Sacræ. Preces et Exercitiæ devotionis per diem, &c. Auctore G. J. GOWING, D.D., P.P. Londini: Burns et Oates, 1878.*

IF we once get over the difficulty of understanding why priests should be supposed to pray in third-rate Latin, rather than in their own tongue, we may admit that this little manual is useful and well put together. As to the language in which it is compiled, our own impression is that it is distinctly repulsive both to those who are good classical scholars and to those who are familiar with the Latinity of those patristic times when Latin, if not classical, was still a living language, and could be used without affectation. To write a devotional book in Latin, at the present day, is a very difficult task. The Latin of Tertullian is literary, if not purely classical; the Latin of S. Augustine is full of living power; the Latin of S. Thomas of Aquin

is a true language, not conforming to Cicero or to Virgil, but with all the consistency of phrase, of term, and of construction which is looked for in a real "language." But to express modern devotion, French sentiment, the self-consciousness of contemporary thought, in Latin, would require the word-compelling genius of a second Dante. Modern Latin is always either on stilts or else walking with botched and broken shoes. To write a theological or scientific treatise in Latin, however, is not so hard. This has been successfully done by such men as Franzelin and Liberatore; the "*Compendium Philosophiæ*" of Liberatore seems to us a model of scientific modern Latin, and is a very great improvement on his older works. But it is when modern prayer has to be turned into Latin that the construction refuses to bend, the adjectives and adverbs seem imbecile or hysterical, and the syntax has the aspect of a badly got-up impostor, being French or English syntax slightly disguised. If our readers do not object to this, and do not expect any eloquence or any novelty, they will probably like Dr. Gowing's "*Horæ Sacræ*." The book contains a good deal of handy spiritual reading, giving all the usual Scriptural and patristic texts on most subjects of Christian asceticism. It has a large number of meditations, a variety of preparations and thanksgivings for mass, and a great many miscellaneous prayers and practices, all of which seem unexceptionable.

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*Classic Preachers of the English Church.* Lectures delivered at S. James's Church in 1877. With an Introduction by JOHN EDWARD KEMPE, M.A. London: John Murray.

THE name of this book made us take it up with avidity, and in the expectation of finding something interesting and instructive. We were not disappointed. The book consists of six lectures which were given by Anglican clergymen of mark on six selected preachers of past times, who are considered amongst the classic preachers of the Anglican Church. These lectures were delivered on Sundays in the Church of S. James, Westminster, during the course of last year. The rector of the church, the Rev. John Edward Kempe, has prefixed to them an introduction, in which he explains the object of the lectures, and tries to justify their taking the place of a sermon at the Sunday service in the church over which he presides.

Acquaintance with the Anglican classical models might, no doubt, do a great deal to give richness and power and diversity to our language. The reading of Protestant sermons, even for the sake of their literary power, is by no means to be indiscriminately recommended. But these "classics" can do no harm. The young preacher may profitably admire the splendour of Donne, the rich imagery of Jeremy Taylor, the startling energy and colossal vigour of South, the calm quiet earnestness of Wilson and the clear forcible reasoning of Butler.

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*The Confessions of S. Augustine.* Ten Books. A new translation. (Library of Spiritual Works for English Catholics.) London: Rivingtons.

THIS is an admirably got up translation of the first ten books of S. Augustine's confessions. Despite the abuse of the name Catholic on the title-page, the work is by Protestants for the use of Protestants. It is fair, however, to say, that wherever we have tested it, the translation is honestly done; it is complete, and all through reads as pleasant and intelligible English. The English Scripture texts are not always worded exactly as a Catholic is familiar with them from his Vulgate, and one of the notes (Bk. I. chap. xi.), that on the use of salt in Baptism, which is still continued by the Church, would be needless in an edition intended for Catholics. And certainly we should not dream of inserting such a note as that at p. 252 (Bk. VI. chap. 12.). "Sacrificium pretii nostri" of the text is fairly enough rendered "Sacrifice of our Ransom," but the note tries to explain this to would-be English Catholics by saying: "It was a custom of 'the ancients' to have a Celebration of the Holy Communion at funerals for the repose of the dead and the comfort of the living." "A Celebration of Holy Communion," which is not at all what S. Augustine says was done at his mother's tomb, might comfort the living:—the Saint speaks of the *Sacrifice*, not Celebration of Communion. The Sacrifice of our Ransom, Jesus Christ, which was offered for S. Monica, is still offered in the Catholic Church for the repose of the dead. The note at p. 259 (Bk. VII. chap. 3) is made in an admirable spirit, and the notes in some other places are appropriate and useful to the general reader.

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*Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores rerum Longobardicarum et Italicarum, saec. vi.—ix.* Hannover: Hahn, 1878.

THE plan of the great collection of materials for the history of Germany in the Middle Ages, originally conceived on a great scale, expands in the execution of the work. It has become a repertory of memorials of the Papacy as much as of the Empire; and the new edition of the *Registrum* of S. Gregory the Great, now in preparation, which is to form the first instalment of the division *Epistolæ*, is a pledge that the recently appointed directors of the undertaking are in no way disposed to circumscribe its limits, or render its continuation less indispensable to the ecclesiastical historian than what has been already accomplished.

After preparations extending over nearly half a century, and an exhaustive collation of manuscripts, the last published volume gives in a handy quarto, procurable at a very moderate price, a definitive text of the original chronicles and principal biographies which illustrate—but darkly, it must be confessed, at the best—the history of Upper and Middle Italy in the earlier Middle Ages.\*

For the first two hundred years from the entry of the Lombards into Italy, the historical memorials of that people are of the most meagre

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\* The *Gesta Pontificum Romanorum* are reserved for a distinct section.



description; a succession of kings, a short tractate embodying the scanty traditions of the nation's origin, a barbarous poem or two, and the list is exhausted. It was only when their kingdom is near its extinction that the man appears—Paul the Deacon, son of Warnefrid—who is the single representative in the field of letters of the Lombard race whilst still dominant. Even in this case the author's powers were quickened and brought into full activity only when, well advanced in years, he came into immediate contact with the monastic life at Monte Cassino, and with the literary revival in the Court of Charles the Great. However precious may be Paul's "History of the Lombards," it cannot compete with the great work of Beda as regards gravity and substance, nor with the vividly written and gossipy memoirs of his own times by Gregory of Tours. Paul's work unfortunately not only wants the author's last revision, but death, it would seem, prevented him from giving the continuation and narrating the events of his own day. This loss is the more to be regretted since his familiarity with both the Lombard and Frankish Courts rendered him particularly qualified for such a task. Incomplete as it is, Paul's book obtained an immediate and enduring popularity. The existence of nearly a hundred and thirty manuscripts can be traced; of these over a hundred have been examined and used more or less for the present edition;—*non grato sane labore*, says the editor pathetically; but at least the work is now done, once and for all.

Next to the *Historia Longobardorum*, the *Liber pontificalis ecclesie Ravennatis* by Agnellus, and the *Gesta episcoporum Neapolitanorum*, form the most welcome portions of the present volume. Although a recollection of the unique MS., which is both late and bad, gives no great improvement of the text, it may be hoped that this new edition of Agnellus will direct the attention it deserves to a work hitherto much neglected. Written in imitation of the *Liber pontificalis* of the Roman Church, it cannot of course vie with its model in interest or value. It is nevertheless a rich store of material, especially for the archæologist, who will at once recognise in the author a man of kindred tastes.

With a pardonable pride Agnellus himself traces his descent from one of the best families of Ravenna. He was educated from his infancy at the Cathedral with a view to entering the ecclesiastical state, and whilst hardly more than a child he was provided with good benefices. At an early age his capacity, which he himself in no way lightly appraised, as well as other less personal advantages, gained for him a prominent position among his brethren. It was at their urgent request that he undertook to write the lives of the Bishops of Ravenna. The author brought to his task excellent qualifications: the activity and enthusiasm of youth, zeal for his church, a love of antiquity, a curious and inquiring mind. Moreover, his eminent mechanical genius marked him out as a man to be consulted where old edifices were to be repaired or new works undertaken; and this in a city like Ravenna must have put him in the way of many discoveries useful for his purpose. His researches were almost wholly local, but within

these limits they were exhaustive. Besides the writings of earlier bishops and the archives of the church, pictures, mosaics, church books and their precious coverings, sacred vessels, tombs, all afford him material for his chronicle. He is indefatigable in the search for inscriptions; no nook or corner is left unscanned: no trouble rebuts him if thereby he can clear up some doubtful point of topography or fix the date of a building. Usually he indicates with exactness the spot where his readers may go and verify for themselves the inscriptions he quotes. At times he recognises that this is a labour none but an enthusiast like himself would undertake and gives the firm assurance he speaks on no second-hand report. "Our bishop's name is inscribed up in the tiles on the roof; I have seen it and read it there."

In several parts of his work Agnellus addresses his clerical brethren directly as if it were meant for recitation before them. Having set him the task, their eagerness for its completion outdid even his industry. Now and then he indulges them with a reading in the cool evening time until the failing light warns them that the hour is come for silence and for rest, that it is time to fasten the latch and draw the bolt "lest the enemy coming find the door open and sow his tares and bring us into derision and to destruction." Sometimes the assembly is held in one of his own houses. It would seem that in the opinion of this audience these samples were dealt out to them too sparingly. Once at least their importunities—which after all were probably not wholly distasteful to the author—exhausted his patience, and he breaks out:

"Do not repeat your conduct of yesterday: have a care how you overburden me. Daily I am pestered by you with questions; it is a veritable scourge. Do not so, I say; for verily from the day I was born to this time, now over two and thirty years, never was I cornered so, as yesterday I was by you. Still, if you will persist in breaking me down with your pother, be it so: do what you will, then let me go; keep what I have already written, but no more shall you hear from me. And if by-and-by you beg me to continue, listen to your entreaties I will not."

Even had matters come to so desperate an extremity it may be doubted if his vanity at least would not have rendered Agnellus somewhat less inexorable than he is here pleased to picture himself.

The writer's methods are simple and are ingenuously confessed. Knowing of many occupants of the See hardly more than their names, he constructs for each a pretty eulogy of their virtues, "and (he says) I believe I have herein told no lie for they were (certainly) men of prayer, and chaste, almsgivers, and men who gained souls to God." Or else "lest this one's story should seem short," to two or three lines of fact he tacks a discursive sermon extending perhaps over a page or two. The purely historical notices are singular and curious, but can be used only with caution. The most valuable are in all probability taken from Ravennese annals of the fifth and sixth centuries and from the last chronicle of Maximian (Bishop of Ravenna in the middle of the sixth century), a fragment of which recent critics have, on

grounds sufficient to base an endless debate, thought good to detect in the so-called *Anonymus Valesianus*. It is to be regretted that Agnellus should have been so far bent on realising the idea of the historian as to work up in his own fashion the materials he uses, instead of being content, like the mediæval chroniclers, to copy the very words of his authorities. In the later portions the work is mutilated. Agnellus, like many other men who are antiquaries indeed but not mere antiquaries, had a strong dash of the *frondeur* in his composition. His mode of handling his subjects is vigorous and free in a degree sure to render his book unacceptable to those whose memory he was commending to posterity. This fact may sufficiently explain both the small currency the work obtained, and its present condition. The editor's annotations are full and useful, but do not entirely supersede those of his predecessor Bacchini. Much of the Benedictine's prolix commentary is obsolete; but his patient researches in the elucidation of obscure passages, and illustration of recondite points of ecclesiastical antiquity and discipline, will still repay perusal.

The *Gesta episcoporum Neapolitanorum* in their business-like straightforwardness form a contrast to the work of Agnellus. They are in two parts, the first reaching to the year 763, the second to about 872. The present edition is the first prepared directly from the unique ancient (and excellent) manuscript, and giving the complete and genuine text. The portions borrowed from other historians are carefully distinguished from the original matter. The Latinity of the anonymous earlier writer appears in its native barbarism. The second portion, by the deacon John, is distinctly superior in style to most of the contemporary Italian chronicles; and, with the other Neapolitan memorials brought together in the Appendix, shows that the instructions of Paul the historian were more carefully handed down and observed in the schools of Naples than in those of his own monastery of Monte Cassino.

Whilst the Roman rites and modes were prevailing almost without effort on this side of the Alps, the *Gesta* bear witness to the difficulty with which Roman observance held its own or made way near the city itself. In the earlier years of the eighth century Greek influence had so far obtained the ascendancy that the patriarch of Constantinople pretended to exercise jurisdiction in Naples, and temporarily at least the usurpation was, for a consideration, allowed by the bishop. Fifty years later the citizens refused at first to admit their prelate within the walls of the town, on the ground, it would seem, of his consecration in accordance with unvarying practice by the Pope. It was through Stephen, who as duke and bishop ruled Naples during nearly the whole of the second half of the eighth century, that head was definitively made against Byzantinism. He sent clerks to Rome to be instructed in ecclesiastical observance and church song; others he had educated at "S. Benedict's," as Monte Cassino was frequently called, under Paul the Deacon. From this time forward in Naples, whilst Constantinople exercises an influence, it is Rome that has the power of attraction.

As is to be expected in a work of the kind, the *Gesta* preserve many illustrations of ecclesiastical antiquity. Among other notices is one of a foundation by Bishop Agnellus, in the second half of the seventh century, of a charity for the distribution of soap annually at Christmas and Easter.\* Of more than one duke it is stated that he was equally skilled in the Greek and Latin tongues. The elder Duke Sergius gave three copies (or perhaps volumes) of the historian Josephus to the episcopal library which had been already enriched by the care, and indeed by the handiwork, of Bishop John. The author's apology for this prelate's plebeian birth is worthy of notice; hardly less so are the terms of fervid eulogy applied to him: *Hic, hic fuit secundum apostolum pontifex*, &c. If the schools of Naples had good grammarians, it would seem they were not without belief in the efficacy of the rod in enforcing their precepts (see p. 450)—with results, it must be owned, not unsatisfactory.

The *Gesta* break off at a point where a third writer takes up the work with the commencement of the pontificate of the second Athanasius. Able, crafty, resolute, versatile, unscrupulous, uniting in his own person the offices of archbishop and of duke, he is one of the most considerable figures in the troubled annals of Middle Italy in the ninth century. A picture of the soldier-bishop from the hand of a compatriot would have illustrated, and perhaps might have softened and relieved, the dark outlines of his story sketched in the pages of the Chronicler Erchempert, and in the letters of Pope John VIII.

The volume comprises, besides a revised edition of chronicles which had already appeared in the second and fifth volumes of the *Monumenta*, long since out of print, several minor pieces which have had to be sought for, or lay neglected, in the bulky collections of Mabillon, Muratori, and the Bollandists, in Ughelli, and in works of a more special character. The index is full as regards mere names, but it raises a regret that the style of index making in vogue in the palmy days of Benedictine editing is not followed. The words, *beredarius* (p. 431, l. 40), *horna* (p. 418, l. 43), *numerus* (p. 330, l. 11), *querites* (p. 475, l. 33), *regiola* (p. 434, l. 13; regio = a diminutive of *regia* [*porta*], rather than *limbus*, as is suggested in note 2; of Du Lange, ed. Henschel, s. v.), and *versio* (p. 229, l. 8) should have found a place in the Glossary.

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*In my Indian Garden.* By PHIL. ROBINSON. With a Preface by EDWIN ARNOLD. London: Sampson Low & Co. 1878.

THIS dainty volume is one of those rare books that come upon the critic from time to time as a surprise and a refreshment—a book to be put in the favourite corner of the library, and to be taken up often again with renewed pleasure. Mr. Arnold in his preface tells us that he does not know where to send us, the uninitiated in Anglo-Indian life, “for better hints of the outdoor look and spirit of things

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\* The words “*pro labandis curis*,” on which Mazochi and Paciaudi have expounded much learned ingenuity, are probably only the author's way of saying “for washing purposes.”

in our Indian garden." Even we, who have not the advantage of being "Anglo-Indians," must always share, we suppose, something of that feeling of sympathetic interest, and even reverence, which makes India a sort of magic or fairy land; and we can quite enter into the spirit of the remark that India "is never for one moment, or in any spot, as regards her people, her scenery, her cities, towns, villages, or country-places, vulgar. There is nothing in her not worth study and regard; for the stamp of a vast past is over all the land; and the very pariah-dogs are classic to those who know Indian fables and how to be entertained by them." But Mr. Robinson throws quite a fresh charm over sounds and sights even so interesting as these. His brief, picturesque vignettes of everyday Indian life—always good-natured, often humorous—are real little idylls of exquisite taste and delicacy. There is a sympathy, too, a fellow-feeling in his heart with even the lowest thing that lives. At his amiable introduction, we seem to engage

In friendly chat with bird and beast,  
And half believe it true."

We have learned to "look at life from the standpoint of a dāk-bungalow fowl;" we have grown quite familiar with "those crafty, calculating villains," the crows, which "do not wear their colour with humility or even common decency," but "swagger in it;" with that "headlong blackguard" and glutton, the green parrot; with the coolly impudent grey squirrel, "which nothing but the Arminian doctrine of universal grace will save, for its presumption is unique." Those quaint "seven sisters" of sober-coloured plumage, but unseemly levity; the jackal with his "grim and dirty humour;" the sly mongoose; the serious "mynad,"—these have become as much realities to us as the white rabbit and the mouse, the dodo, the mock-turtle, and the wise caterpillar, which our friend Alice encountered in her travels through Wonderland and elsewhere. And it is just the merit of Mr. Robinson that he makes *his* Wonderland so real to us in its minute details, and makes us feel so much sympathy and even affection for its "strange creatures," that it seems as though we had been in the Indian garden ourselves and the impressions were our own. Mr. Robinson's style is exuberant with life, overflowing too with reminiscences of Western literature, even the most modern; occasionally it appears almost too exuberant—but perhaps this is fitting to an Oriental subject. In his longer and more ambitious descriptions, he displays rare graphic power; and his sketches of the three seasons, especially those of the rainy and hot seasons, remind one forcibly of the wonderful realism of Kālidāsa himself.

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*Ven. Bedæ Historiæ Ecclesiasticæ Gentis Anglorum libri III., IV.*  
Edited by JOHN E. B. MAYOR, M.A., Professor of Latin, and J. R. LUMBY, B.D. Cambridge: at the University Press. 1878.

**T**HIS is undoubtedly the best book, at least for English readers, of S. Bede and his labours. In addition to the very careful text of the third and fourth books of the Ecclesiastical History, specially

collated for the edition, we have a translation of Ebert's very interesting life of S. Bede; a collection of "testimonia," or eulogiums on the saint, from his disciple Cuthbert down to ten Brink,—some twenty-nine in all. But the number could be easily increased; few writers, for instance, have appreciated Bede more highly than Mr. Green in his "History of the English People," where S. Bede is "at once the founder of mediæval history and the first English historian," "first among English scholars, first among English theologians," and "the father of our national education;" just as he is styled by Edmund Burke "the father of English learning." We next have copious notes both on Ebert's life and on the text of the history, full of the most valuable illustrations of every kind. The admirable onomasticon and glossary greatly enhance the utility of the book; which altogether is quite a model of exact scholarship, as it is also of typography.

The editors suggest that Bede's history might very well be put into use in schools, as the "*Monumenta Germaniæ*" have been. "The fear that boys or girls may spoil their Latin style," they say, "by reading late Latin seems chimerical. If unclassical forms are pointed out as they occur, the classical forms are imprinted only the deeper in the memory: we do not find that Homer, Pindar, Herodotus, Theocritus, corrupt our Greek prose" (p. vi.) We do not know whether this view will find favour with all readers, and perhaps the parallel with Greek is not quite exact. But at any rate, if not "boys and girls," at least we should think the senior classes in our colleges, might do very well to make acquaintance with something of the history of their own country in the graphic and perspicuous Latin of our earliest historian.

Nothing could be better than the choice of the third and fourth books, for they are full of interesting events. The reign of the saintly and valiant King Oswald, his death in battle, and the many miracles afterwards wrought by him; S. Aidan's Episcopate; the famous Vision of the Monk Fursey, one of the predecessors of Dante in his visit to the world of spirits; the coming of Archbishop Theodore, and the great impetus it gave to learning, arithmetic, astronomy and metre, Latin and Greek, "so that there remain even to this day some of their disciples who know the Latin and Greek tongue as well as their own in which they were born;" the Abbess Hilda of Whitby or Streaneshalch, and the dream of Caedmon, our first poet, which happened there; finally, the life of S. Cuthbert, and of his friend the hermit S. Herbert. The letter from another Cuthbert, Bede's own disciple, describing that well-known death-scene, "to which," as Mr. Stopford Brooke says, "English prose looks back as its sacred source," forms a fitting conclusion to Bede's own history.

We must not pass by without remark the honesty and care with which the editors have drawn out the thoroughly Catholic character of S. Bede's mind and teaching.

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*An Abridged Course of Religious Instruction, Apologetic, Dogmatic, and Moral; for the Use of Catholic Colleges and Schools.* By FATHER F. X. SCHOUPPE, S.J. Translated from the French. London: Burns and Oates, 1879.

THIS is a well-executed translation of a most useful work of Father Schouppe, the well-known author of a course of Dogmatic Theology, and of a large number of practical pastoral works. The book contains both the *proofs* of religion and the *explanation* of religious doctrine. It is very full and very condensed. Indeed, it is a question whether a book of 400 small octavo pages is not too small to hold so much matter. The book before us has a somewhat professorial and dry style, the result of an effort to say everything, and to say it precisely and yet briefly. It will not, perhaps, tempt an idle student, or lift up a pusillanimous heart. There is none of the pious unction and winning phrase of our own Challoners and Hays. But it is, in reality, a work which will help teachers, answer the questions of inquirers, and provide our more advanced boys and girls with a fairly complete manual for the study of their religion. We are much mistaken if those who begin to use it practically and systematically do not find it to be one of those truly scientific handbooks in which every definition and every epithet have been laboriously studied, and will stand the test of the keenest examination.

There are one or two matters which, in an English translation, imperatively demanded a note. Thus, it should have been explained (pp. 226-7) that in England civil marriage, and marriage before a non-Catholic minister, are true and valid marriages, though unlawful and sinful. A similar note is required to p. 378. The translator must have been awake to the necessity for such corrections in the English edition, for in the chapter on the Paschal Communion we find F. Schouppe's words—"et dans leur Eglise paroissiale"—rightly omitted in the translation.

We notice few errors of translation; but there are some, which might be corrected in another issue. For instance, we find the following sentence on p. 81:—"In order to be freed from this beneficent guardianship, science has spread, and continues to spread, monstrous and fatal errors." The French is—"C'est pour s'être affranchie de cette tutelle bienfaisante, que la science a donné et donne encore tous les jours dans des erreurs aussi monstrueuses que funestes." This means, as we need hardly point out: "It is on account of breaking loose from this beneficent guardianship that science has strayed, and continues every day to stray, into, &c."

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*Roma Sotterranea; or, an Account of the Roman Cutacombs, &c.* New Edition, rewritten and greatly enlarged. By Rev. J. SPENCER NORTHCOLE, D.D., and Rev. W. R. BROWNLOW, M.A. Part First: History. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1879.

THE pleasing fact that the first edition of this book, published in 1869, was soon exhausted would of itself have justified the earlier appearance of a second. But, since then, the third volume of

De Rossi's "*Roma Sotterranea*" has been published, and the energetic English compilers have delayed, in order to recast, their work, and partly rewrite it, in order the better to incorporate the results of his latest researches. Thus, the new edition is a much larger book than the first; indeed, it is a new work. Everything has been done too, we are glad to note, in order to make the volume worthy of its subject: it has clear type, good paper, and elegant binding; eleven well-executed chromo-lithographs and a large number of wood engravings illustrate it, and help the text; lastly, a large detached plan of the cemetery of S. Callixtus, lodged in a pocket at the end, may be opened out and laid within eye-reach while the text is being perused.

The first edition of this work has received such a consensus of approval from the best qualified judges among men of various creeds and nations as to render any attempt to recommend it altogether unnecessary. The German translation was made from it because De Rossi himself considered it to be by far the best summary of his labours. Those who know that translation will regret that its author did not keep more faithfully, on one or two points, to De Rossi's own conclusions, and avoid certain fanciful views which, we are sure, Dr. Northcote would not sanction. The new edition, whilst made professedly "on the same principles" as the first, is in all respects equal to it. Indeed, the renown of De Rossi's name has been increased by the arrangement, condensation, and translation of his own text—an unusual result, and one which shows that Messrs. Northcote and Brownlow deserve the high reputation they enjoy as Christian archaeologists. They certainly merit the gratitude of English readers for having with such signal success produced a readable and well-ordered synopsis of De Rossi's 1600 pages of folio text.

The readers of the DUBLIN REVIEW will remember an article in our number of January, 1878, on the third volume of De Rossi's "*Roma Sotterranea*." They will find there a full account of the more interesting and important portions of the discoveries which the author there made public, and which have been embodied in the text of this new edition.

The Christian origin and exclusive use of the Catacombs is now universally admitted—with one exception. That exception is Mr. J. H. Parker. Those who have read Dr. Northcote's articles in the *Month* for January, February, and March, 1878, will already know that this exception abundantly proves the rule. Mr. J. H. Parker, in his "*Archæology of Rome*," had the hardihood to run counter to the current of even Protestant authority. The reader will see in those articles, should he wish to do so, how Mr. Parker, led by his desire to prove something for his strong Protestantism, and helped by a happy lack of scholarship, and by the boldness which so often goes along with it, fell into error after error, which Dr. Northcote exposes and refutes with much felicity of proof and expression and little pity for the sorry plight in which he ultimately leaves the zealous author of the "*Archæology of Rome*." He there shows amongst minor details that Mr. Parker, by his own evidence, was incapable of

translating a short passage from Latin, yet undertook to compile a history out of Latin materials, and "to correct the errors of really learned scholars who had used the same materials before him." The calm and clear statement of De Rossi's arguments for his conclusions in the present work is such as ought to silence all opposition. We trust that Dr. Northcote has little ground now for a continuance of his fear lest later authors should follow Dr. Appel's example by saying: De Rossi believes so and so, but Mr. Parker the opposite; which, as he remarks, is like saying, "the Lord Chief Justice of England has given such an interpretation of a particular statute, but Mr. Smith does not agree with him."

We trust Catholic readers will not pass this book by with the reflection that it is on archæology, and, of course, interesting mainly to archæologists; even so, a work well written, as is this, on *Christian archæology* ought to appeal to any Catholic taste not entirely a slave to frivolous reading. It is difficult to think what can be more interesting than to be led by the hand, as we are in these pages, through the dim and silent vaults stored with the bones and burial-places of generations of the first Christian martyrs. As we pass upwards and out again into the light of the present day, and the scene of our present struggle for the same faith and religion, familiarity with the mighty men and women of old has dwarfed the figures of our own opponents, and the glare of the gay world is painful to the eye, for we remember it is no brighter or purer than when it struggled to allure from the hard path of faith the countless dead below who despised it and suffered for daring to do so.

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*Notes on the Defence of the Book of Daniel.* Addressed to the Clergy. By a CLERGYMAN. Dublin: W. McGee. London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co., 1878.

THE title of this pamphlet is misleading. Where we looked for a defence of the much-maligned Prophet, we find simply an attack upon his best known defenders. The writer calls upon his fellow-clergymen to treat Daniel as the sailors treated Jonas—to throw him overboard, and thus save both themselves and their sinking ship. This mode of appeasing the angry waves of rationalism has been so long practised by the clergy of the Established Church that we wonder how much of the cargo of revealed truth yet remains, and what they will throw over next.

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*Commentary on S. Paul's Epistle to the Romans.* By F. A. PHILIPPI. Translated from the Third Edition, by the Rev. J. S. BANKS. In two volumes. Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 38, George Street, 1878.

THIS volume is one of last year's issue to the subscribers to Messrs. Clark's Foreign Theological Library. The commentary is entirely Lutheran. The author considers that "Luther was called of

God to disclose to God's Church afresh the Apostle's meaning." The chief authorities quoted are Luther and Calvin. It is a laboured attempt to force solifidianism and imputed righteousness upon the Apostle's words. Much good learning is spoilt in defence of exploded heresy. It would be tedious to criticise in detail what we dissent from so entirely. Perhaps we ought to be thankful in these days of total unbelief to find a German Professor who believes in anything, even though it be Lutheranism.

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*History of the Reformation, in Germany and Switzerland chiefly.* By Dr. K. R. HAGENBACH. Translated by EVELINA MOORE. Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1878.

HAGENBACH writes from the extreme Evangelical standpoint. To use Dr. Littledale's expression, the event which we regard as a flood, the author considers to have been a Pentecost. It is but fair to say that the part of the translator has been admirably done. Those who care or have need to read this volume will find an easy flowing English text. The publishers of the English version cannot, however, have any doubt as to what reception such a book will meet with from Catholics. We have a grateful experience of how many works of continental, chiefly of German Protestant, historians have of late years vindicated Catholicism against the unjust aspersions of their own forefathers, and the translation of these, though they have often grave defects, we can honestly welcome. But the present author shows even by his choice of language that his *animus* is too strong to allow him to judge at all fairly of the contention between Luther and the Catholic Church. His judgment of the religious orders, at p. 41 and elsewhere, is unworthy of even a Protestant of fair historical reading. The Dominican monks he has the refinement to call "the professed heretic-hounds of the Church" (p. 51).

As to theological competency for judging fairly of us, suffice it to say that he accredits Luther with a sort of discovery or revival of sound doctrine when he protested that a *change of heart* is the only true repentance, and that he describes indulgences as mechanical expungements of sin by means of mere external works, or by payment of money. Every Catholic child knows better than this, and Hagenbach ought to have learned better before he wrote: he would, had he read over even Tetzels's instruction, drawn up for the parishes where he was to preach the jubilee.

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\*.\* We regret to be obliged to defer our notices of several important works, among which may be named Janet's *Final Causes*, and Lady Lovat's excellent translation, *A Benedictine of the Sixteenth Century*.

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